In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. C. H. and C. T. S., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0270

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
J. C. H. and C. T. S., Parents.

Filed September 5, 2023
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-JV-22-3496

Anne M. Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant
mother J.C.H.)

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Kat hleen M. Stock, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota; and

Stephanie J. Skoro, Special Prosecutor, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent Clay County
Social Services)

Emily Shaffer, Moorhead, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Jesse D. Mickels, Clay County Public Defender, Moorhead, Minnesota (for child K.H.)

Samantha F. Zimmerman, Clay County Public Defender, Moorhead, Minnesota (for child
M.H.)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Tracy M. Smith , Judge; and
John Smith, Judge .
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal from a child-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) proceeding,
mother argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by admitting hearsay ;
(2) made several clearly erroneous findings of fact ; and (3) erred by adjudicating the child
as CHIPS. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant mother J.C.H. has three children: K.H. (born in 2007), M.H., and A.H.
In October or November 2021, mother and the children experienced homelessness after
mother did not renew her apart ment lease and had difficulty in finding safe and adequate
housing. At the time of trial, mother resided with M.H. and A.H. in a shelter in Pennington
County.
The Clay County Social Services (the county) had received several reports regarding
the family between 2019 and 2022, alleging that mother homeschooled the children without
appropriate curriculum materials or any instruction, and that K.H. was recommended
mental-health services but mother was not getting K.H. to appoint ments and refused to
provide K.H. with medications. Clay County Child Protection Special Investigator J.W.
investigated these reports. On September 29, 2022, the county filed a CHIPS petition and
requested immediate placements for all three children.
This appeal relates only to K.H., who has been living with mother’s sister (aunt) and
uncle since February 2022. Prior to living with her aunt and uncle, K.H. had been running
3
away from home, and mother was scheduled for surgery. Aunt agreed to provide care for
K.H. while mother underwent surgery and recuperated.
K.H. experienced traumatic incidents in 2020 and 2021. A doctor subsequently
diagnosed K.H. with anxiety and depression and recommended that K.H. attend weekly
therapy for trauma. Mother drove K.H. to those appointments at the beginning but then
stopped. The doctor also prescribed K.H. medication for her mental health. Mother
testified that K.H. took the medication on an “as needed” basis, but K.H. discontinued it
when K.H. did not believe that it was helpful. K.H. had been hospitalized multiple times
after she exhibited self -harming behaviors and received both inpatient and outpatient
treatment. While receiving inpatient care, a doctor prescribed K.H. another medication to
address her mental health. However, when the hospital discharged K.H., mother did not
allow K.H. to continue taking the medication, so the doctor’s office never sen t the
prescription out to a pharmacy to be filled . During trial, mother testified that she was a
former emergency medical technician (EMT) and that she “knew that [the doctor’s]
recommendation was incorrect because [she] had been reading [K.H.’s] diagnosis.”
Shortly before the children’s removal from the home, mother met with the county
to screen K.H. for possible residential-treatment options , and mother specifically requested
that K.H. receive residential treatment at a certain residential treatment center. The county
informed mother that other less -restrictive options, such as medication management,
individual therapy, and family therapy must be exhausted before K.H. c ould be placed in
residential treatment.
4
The district court held a court trial on January 20 and 27, 2023. In a February 10,
2023, order, the district court found that the county proved that mother was “unwilling to
follow through with appropriate services for [K.H.]’s mental health” and “unwilling to
provide the necessary care for [K.H]’s mental health needs.” Accordingly, the district court
adjudicated K.H. as CHIPS under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(3), (8) (2022). In the
same order, the district court dismissed the CHIPS petition regarding A.H. and M.H.
In February 2023, mother filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the district
court relied on inadmissible hearsay from J .W. The district court denied the motion. This
appeal follows.
DECISION
I. Any alleged error by the district court admitting J.W.’s testimony as an
opposing-party statement did not prejudice mother.

Mother argues that the district court erred by admitting specific hearsay testimony
from J.W. as a statement by a party-opponent. We conclude that any alleged error did not
prejudice mother.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. In re
Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d. 76, 93 (Minn. App. 2012). “A district court abuses
its discretion if it improperly applies the law.” Id. We may grant a new trial “on the basis
of an improper evidentiary ruling only if appellant demonstrates prejudicial error.” Id.
However, “[a]n evidentiary error is not prejudicial if the record contains other evidence
that is sufficient to support the findings.” Id. (Minn. App. 2012).
5
Except as otherwise provided by statute or the rules of juvenile -protection
procedure, “the court shall only admit evidence that would be admissible in a civil trial
pursuant to the Minnesota Rules of Evidence.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 3.02, subd. 1. Here,
neither party asserts that the challenged statement was admissible under the statute or the
rules of juvenile-protection procedure. Under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, a n out-of-
court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserte d is generally inadmissible
hearsay. Minn. R. Evid. 801 1989 comm. cmt . However, a statement is not hearsay if it is
offered against a party and it is the party’s own statement. Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
At trial, J.W. testified to the following:
Q: Would it take work from [mother] . . . to ensure that
[K.H.] was going to therapy and taking her medication?
A: Yes.
Q: And [mother] was not willing to do that?
A: As – as far [as] my understanding, [mother] doesn’t
want medication management.

Mother objected on hearsay and speculation grounds. The district court overruled mother’s
objection and admitted J.W.’s statement as a statement by an opposing party under
rule 801(d)(2). Mother argues that rule 801(d)(2) does not apply “[b]ecause the testimony
offered was not a ‘statement,’ ” so “it cannot be admitted as a ‘statement by a party
opponent.’”
Even if we assume without deciding that the district court should not have admitted
J.W.’s statement under rule 801(d)(2), the alleged error did not prejudice mother. Mother
herself testified that she did not follow the doctor’s recommendation for K.H.’s
medications because she “had been reading [K.H.]’s diagnosis” and “knew that
6
recommendation was incorrect.” Moreover, in its order denying mother’s motion for a
new trial, the district court made clear that “[t]he findings made by the Court regarding
[mother]’s resistance [to medication management] were taken directly from [ mother]’s
own testimony.” Because other evidence in the record supports that mother opposed
medication management and wanted residential treatment for K.H. instead, mother cannot
show prejudice.1
II. The district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous except for finding
number 12.

Mother argues that the district court made clearly erroneous findings regarding
findings 11, 12, 15, 27, and 28. We are not persuaded except for finding n umber 12.
On appeal from a district court’s CHIPS determination , “we review the [district]
court’s factual findings for clear error.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315,
321 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015) ; see In re Civ. Commitment of
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221- 22 (Minn. 2021) (discussing, in detail, clear-error stand ard
appellate courts use to review district court’s findings of fact) ; see In re Welfare of Child
of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney on appeal from
juvenile-protection order), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). “[B]ecause a district court is

1 In her motion for a new trial, mother broadly a sserted that “[t]he evidence presented to
the [district court] in this case was almost entirel y inadmissible hearsay.” On appeal,
however, mother only provides legal analysis challenging the admission of J.W.’s
testimony that it was J.W.’s understanding that mother did not want medication
management. Other evidentiary challenges that mother allud es to but fails to brief
adequately are therefore waived. See State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers,
Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed
question); In re Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 586 n.1 (Minn. App. 2003) (applying Wintz
in an appeal regarding termination of parental rights), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2003).
7
in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses,” we give considerable deference
to its decision. In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). “Findings in
a CHIPS proceeding will not be reversed unless clea rly erroneous or unsupported by
substantial evidence.” In re Welfare of B.A.B., 572 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. App. 1998) .
We will not set aside individual factual findings by the district court “ unless the review of
the entire record leaves [us] with the definite an d firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The district court found in finding number 11 that mother did not consistently get
K.H. to therapy appointments. Mother testified at trial that she drove K.H. to these
appointments at first, and that she later stopped driving K.H. to her appointments because
aunt “made it impossible for [mo ther] to pick [K.H.] up.” As a result, t he finding is
supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous.
The district court found in finding number 12 that K.H.’s “medications were on an
‘as needed’ basis” and that mother “discontinued them when she di d not believe [K.H.]
was benefiting from them.” At trial, mother testified that K.H. discontinued her “as
needed” medications herself after she “felt it didn’t do anything for her.” The record does
not contain K.H.’s medical records, and nothing in the record supports that mother —as
opposed to K.H.—discontinued K.H.’s as -needed medication. We conclude that finding
number 12 is clearly erroneous because it lacks evidentiary support . However, because
substantial evidence supports all the other findings , a nd because those findings are
sufficient to support the district court’s resolution of the case, th is error is harmless. See
Hanka v. Pogatchnik , 276 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 1979) (explaining that clearly
8
erroneous finding does not require new trial when other findings of fact, which are decisive
of the case, are supported by the record); see also State ex rel. Ford v. Schnell, 933 N.W.2d
393, 407 (Minn. 2019) (concluding that an erroneous finding was harmless).
The district court found in finding number 15 that mother “appears to believe that
because she was an EMT, she has greater knowledge and understanding of how to treat
[K.H.]’s mental health than the professionals working with [K.H.]” This finding is
supported by mother’s own testimony that she did not follow the doctor’s recommendation
because she “had been reading [K.H.]’s diagnosis” and “knew that recommendation was
incorrect.” When asked if she was a doctor, mother responded that she was a former EMT.
The district court also found in finding number 15 that mother failed to ensure that
K.H. attended individual therapy consistently. This finding is also supported by mother’s
testimony that she stopped driving K.H. to therapy because of alleged conduct by mother’s
sister.
The district court found in finding number 27 that mother was “unwilling to follow
through with appropriate services for [K.H.]’s mental health” and “was unable to manage
[K.H.]’s behaviors in the home, so she voluntarily chose to have [K.H.] live with a relative,
but then refused to allow them to obtain services for [K.H.] .” The record shows that J.W.
had informed mother that K.H. must exhaust other less -restrictive treatments such as
individual therapy, family therapy, and medicine management, before she could be placed
at an i npatient treatment facility. However, mother refused to follow the doctor’s
medication recommendations for K.H. and insisted that K.H. should be placed in a
residential facility instead. The evidence therefore supports t he district court’s finding.
9
Finally, the district court found in finding number 28 that mother was “unwilling to
provide the necessary care for [K.H.]’s mental health needs, including failing to
consistently get her to her therapy appointments and refusing any medications for [K.H.]
outside a residential treatment center.” The same evidence that supports finding number
27 also supports that the district court did not make clearly erroneous finding as to finding
number 28.
In sum, we conclude that the district court’s findings 11, 15, 27, and 28 are not
clearly erroneous and the clear error regarding finding number 12 is harmless.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by adjudicating K.H. as CHIPS.

Mother asserts that the district court abused its discretion by adjudicating K.H. as
CHIPS under section 260C.007, subdivisions 6(3), (8). We are not persuaded.
Section 260C.007, subd ivision 6, requires proof that one of the enumerated
child-protection grounds exists and that the subject child needs protection or services as a
result. We review a district court’s determination that a statutory basis exists to adjudicate
a child CHIPS for an abuse of discretion. D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 321. This review involves
an inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence, but requires deference “to the district court,
which is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of Child
of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 873 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
Section 260C.007, subdivision 6(3), defines a child as CHIPS if the child
is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, ed ucation, or other
required care for the child’s physical or mental health or morals
because the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian is unable or
unwilling to provide that care.

10
(Emphasis added .)
Here, the record shows that K.H. suffers from depression and anxiety and ha s
exhibited suicidal ideation. Despite K.H.’s need for consistent mental -health treatment,
mother has actively obstructed K.H.’s treatment and demonstrated a clear inability or
unwillingness to provide K.H. the care that she needed. The district court therefore did no t
abuse its discretion by determining that section 260C.007, subdivision 6(3), is met.
Because we affirm the district court’s CHIPS adjudication on this ground, we need not
address mother’s argument regarding section 260C.007, subdivision 6(8).
Affirmed.