Charlene Karen Jundt, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0287

Charlene Karen Jundt,
Respondent,

vs.

Marcus Edward Jundt,
Appellant.

Filed August 28, 2023
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-22-10858

Benjamin J. Court, Kacie Phillips Tawfic, Stinson LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Phillip Gainsley, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge;
and Kirk, Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
This appeal arises out of respondent’s renewal of a money judgment following the
dissolution of the parties’ marriage. Appellant Marcus Edward Jundt and respo ndent

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
Charlene Karen Jundt dissolved their marriage in September 2004, and Charlene
subsequently obtained six money judgments against Marcus. 1 In July 2022, Charlene
began the process of renewing one of the judgments, which was set to expire in September
2022. Marcus had since moved out of state and was not forthcoming about his address.
As a result, Charlene attempted to serve Marcus with the summons and complaint to renew
the judgment at several different residential and commercial addresses. Marcus moved to
dismiss the lawsuit for lack of service, but the district court determined that Charlene
effectively served Marcus via substitute service at a residential address in Arizona and
denied the motion. We affirm.
FACTS
Marcus and Charlene Jundt married in August 1991 and dissolved their marriage in
September 2004. In September 2012, Charlene obtained a judgment against Marcus in the
amount of $115,088 for unpaid child support.
2 She subsequently obtained five additional
judgments against Marcus relating to the dissolution of the parties’ marriage . The six
judgments total approximately $3.4 million.

1 Because Marcus and Charlene share the same last name, we refer to them by their first
names.

2 At oral argument before this court, Marcus’s counsel disputed that the September 2012
judgment was for unpaid child support and argued that Marcus was never behind on child
support. The record here contains a copy of the judgment but does not contain the
underlying submissions and documents relating to the judgment. However, the record does
contain a 2016 order for contempt that indicates the September 2012 judgment was “for
unpaid child support” and the findings and order from a 2016 arbitration proceeding that
states, “According to Marcus’s submi ssions, the undisputed facts [include that] . . .
Charlene obtained a Judgment dated September 20, 2012 . . . for past due child support.”
3
In July 2022, Charlene filed a complaint in district court to renew the September
2012 judgment. According to the complaint, Charlene obtained partial satisfaction of the
judgment through the garnishment of Marcus’s wages, but Marcus owed $181,863.08 for
the remaining unpaid principal and accrued interest. Charlene then attempted to serve
Marcus with the summons and complaint. Marcus no longer lives in Minnesota and
Charlene was unaware of his current address. Charlene attempted to serve Marcus at a
residence in California and an office building in Arizona, but neither attempt was
successful.
On July 29, 2022, the parties appeared for a video conference before a special
magistrate regarding the dissolution file. During the conference, Charlene’s counsel
mentioned the renewal of the September 2012 judgment and that it was proving difficult
to serve Marcus with the summons and complaint. Charlene’s counsel asked Marcus’s
counsel if he would accept service on his client’s behalf, and Marcus’s counsel refused.
The special magistrate then swore in Marcus and asked him the following questions
regarding his residence:
Q: And, Mr. Jundt, where are you?
A: I’m in Arizona.

Q: Do you live in Arizona?
A: I became a citizen of Arizona, yes, so I could be near
my parents during COVID.

Q: So do you have a place, an apartment? . . . Where are
you living in Arizona?
A: I’ve lived in three different places. I’ve lived with my
parents and I lived in an apartment and I live at Dennis
Pacifico’s house.

4
Q: Where are you today?
A: Dennis Pacifico’s house.

Q: So you’re residing in Dennis Pacifico’s house?
A: Right.

Q: Is that where somebody would serve you if they needed
to serve you with legal papers?
A: That would be correct.

Charlene had previously been mailed checks from Dennis Pacifico on behalf of Marcus 3
as part of an agreement in the dissolution file. The checks and envelopes, which were dated
between April 2021 and July 2022, all list an address on Longhorn Drive in Chandler,
Arizona, as Dennis Pacifico’s address (the Longhorn address).
On August 9, 2022, a process server attempted to serve Marcus at the Longhorn
address. Following the attempt, the process server sent an email to Charlene’s counsel that
states “the server spoke with Dennis, current homeowner, stated that Jundt’s [whereabouts]
were unknown, no one here by that name, no other information known. Per the assessor’s
office, a Dennis and Karyn Pacifico [have] own[ed] this house since 2008.” On August
10, a process server again attempted to serve Marcus at the Longhorn address. A woman
answered the door but refused to identify herself. The process server left a copy of the
summons, complaint, and accompanying exhibits with the woman. On August 22, a
process server attempted service at the Longhorn address for a final time. This time, the
process server left a copy of the summons, complaint, and accompanying exhibits with
Karyn Pacifico.

3 The checks are from an account belonging to Dennis and Karyn Pacifico, but each states
“Marcus Jundt” in the “For” section of the check.
5
On September 9, 2022, Marcus filed an answer asserting that he “ha[d] not been
served with a summons and complaint in this action and that th[e] court lack[ed]
jurisdiction over him.” Shortly thereafter, Charlene hired a private investigator to
investigate Marcus’s whereabouts. The private investigator discovered that Marcus’s
driver’s license listed an address on Beardsley Road in Scottsdale, Arizona (the Beardsley
address). From September 13-21, 2022, process servers attempted to serve Marcus at the
Beardsley address on at least seven occasions. All the attempts were unsuccessful.
Marcus filed an amended motion to dismiss, again claiming that service was
ineffective. His counsel subsequently filed a memorandum in support of the motion that
argued that the Longhorn address was not his usual place of abode and therefore could not
be used for service. He asserted that service was therefore ineffective and that because he
was not properly served, the district court lacked jurisdiction over him.
The district court denied the motion. The district court found: “Given [Marcus’s]
assertion that his residence was at two different addresses, and the financial resources to
which [Marcus] has access, it is reasonable for the Court to conclude that [Marcus] resides
at more than one address. As such, it is reasonable for the Court to conclude that both the
[Longhorn] and Beardsley Addresses were usual places of abode for [Marcus] at the time
of service.” Based on this finding, the district court determined that Charlene effectively
served Marcus via substitute service on Karyn Pacifico at the Longhorn address.

6
DECISION
Service of process in a manner not specifically authorized by rule or statute is
ineffective. Lundgren v. Green, 592 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. App. 1999), rev. denied
(Minn. July 28, 1999). An individual residing outside of Minnesota may be served through
personal service. Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.04(b); see also Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 2 (2022)
(“The service of process on any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this state . . . may be made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside
this state . . . .”). Although commonly referred to as substitute service, the “service upon
an individual by leaving a copy at his usual place of abode with some person of suitable
age and discretion residing therein—is a form of ‘personal’ service.” Lebens v. Harbeck,
243 N.W.2d 128, 129 (Minn. 1976); see also Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884
N.W.2d 601, 604-05 (Minn. 2016).
“Whether servic e of process was effective, and personal jurisdiction therefore
exists, is a question of law that we review de novo.” Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754
N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008). But in conducting this review, we “apply the facts as
found by the district court unless those factual findings are clearly erroneous.” Id. Factual
“findings are clearly erroneous when they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment
of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). Under the clear-error
standard of review, it is not proper for this court to reweigh the evidence; our role is instead
to review “the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision.” Id. at 222.
7
We begin by identifying the narrow issue before this court on appeal. The district
court determined that Marcus was effectively served through substitute service on Karyn
Pacifico at the Longhorn address. Marcus argues that the district court erred in determining
that substitute service was effective because the Longhorn address was not his “usual place
of abode” and therefore not a proper residence for service. “In the context of service of
process, the residency of an individual presents a question of fact.” Jaeger , 884 N.W.2d
at 606-07. As such, we will defer to the district court’s finding on residency unless it is
clearly erroneous. Id. at 607.
The evidence to support the district court’s finding that the Longhorn address was
Marcus’s usual place of abode is as follows. In response to questions from the court-
appointed special magistrate at the July 29 video conference, Marcus stated under oath:
“I’ve lived in three different places. I’ve lived with my parents and I lived in an apartment
and I live at Dennis Pacifico’s house.” Marcus then confirmed that he was at Dennis
Pacifico’s house at the time of the video conference, that he resided at the house, and that
it would be the proper place for him to be served with legal papers. Marcus did not provide
an exact address for “Dennis Pacifico’s house,” but Charlene had been receiving checks
for over a year from Dennis Pacifico with the Longhorn address printed under Dennis and
Karyn Pacifico’s names. The most recent of these checks submitted into the record is dated
July 3, 2022, less than a month before this action was filed in district court. In addition, a
process server consulted property records and confirmed that Dennis and Karyn Pacifico
had owned the residence at the Longhorn address since 2008.
8
Based on this record, the district court’s residency finding is not clearly erroneous.
Marcus is correct that he did not identify a specific address when he stated under oath that
he resided at “Dennis Pacifico’s house,” but there is ample evidence to support the finding
that the Longhorn address was the house being referenced given that Charlene had received
mail from that address for over a year, the address was listed on the checks written by
Dennis Pacifico, and the Pacificos had owned the property for nearly 15 years. At oral
argument before this court, Marcus’s counsel asserted that the Beardsley address is also
owned by Dennis Pacifico, and that Marcus was referring to the Beardsley address when
he stated that he resided at “Dennis Pacifico’s house.” But Marcus did not submit any
evidence to support this assertion. See DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d
263, 271 (Minn. 2016) (stating that when a plaintiff clears the “low hurdle” of submitting
evidence of service, the burden shifts to the defendant “to prove insufficient service”).
Accordingly, the evidence supports the district court’s finding that the Longhorn address
was a proper place for service. The district court thus did not err in determining that
substitute service on Karyn Pacifico at the Longhorn address was effective and denying the
motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.