Benda for Common-sense, a Minnesota Non-Profit Corporation v. Denise Anderson, Director of Rice ...
Opinion text
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A23-0302
Court of Appeals Thissen, J.
Took no part, Gaïtas, J.
Benda for Common-sense,
a Minnesota Non-Profit Corporation, et al.,
Appellants,
vs. Filed: November 12, 2025
Office of Appellate Courts
Denise Anderson, Director of
Rice County Property and Tax Elections,
Respondent,
Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon,
Respondent.
________________________
Matthew L. Benda, Ashley A. Olson, Peterson, Kolker, Haedt & Benda, Ltd., Albert Lea,
Minnesota, for appellants.
Ann R. Goering, Jordan H. Soderlind, Ratwik, Roszak & Maloney, P.A., Saint Paul,
Minnesota, for respondent Denise Anderson.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Nathan J. Hartshorn, Emily B. Anderson, Assistant
Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent Minnesota Secretary of State
Steve Simon.
________________________
1
SYLLABUS
Appellants’ claim under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 seeking to restrain
respondent county official from engaging in alleged wrongful acts, errors, or omissions
related to the 2022 general election is moot.
Affirmed on other grounds.
OPINION
THISSEN, Justice.
Appellants Benda for Common-sense and Kathleen Hagen (referred to collectively
as Benda) filed a complaint and petition under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 seeking
to restrain respondent Denise Anderson, the Director of Rice County Property Tax and
Elections 1 from using embedded modems in Rice County’s electronic voting system during
the 2022 general election. The 2022 general election occurred on November 8, 2022.
The district court dismissed the case. As relevant here, the district court dismissed
the section 204B.44 petition in January 2023, concluding it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed that determination, concluding the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of Benda’s failure to serve the section 204B.44
petition on all candidates on the 2022 ballot. We do not reach that issue and take no
position on whether non-compliance with the service-of-process requirements on all
candidates under section 204B.44 is a jurisdictional bar. Instead, we hold that Benda’s
1
Respondent Denise Anderson states in her brief that she is the Director of Rice
County Property Tax and Elections, a different title from the one provided in the caption
of this case.
2
section 204B.44 petition related to the 2022 election is moot because that election has
already occurred. We thus affirm in part, to the extent the court of appeals affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of the section 204B.44 petition, although we do so on other
grounds.
FACTS
Benda filed a three-count complaint and petition in Rice County district court on
August 23, 2022, of which one count is before us. 2 That count alleged that Rice County
“intend[ed] to utilize an Electronic Voting System that has hardware, software or features
that are not properly approved, certified or secure . . . in the November 8, 2022 election”
and that such use of an electronic voting system “constitutes a ‘wrongful act, omission or
error’ pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 204B.44[a](4).” Benda asserted that the “hardware,
software or features” in dispute were modems embedded in the voting machines used in
Rice County. 3
2
The first two counts sought information under Minnesota Statutes chapter 13, the
Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA). The district court also dismissed
those counts. Benda sought review of the dismissal of the MGDPA counts in the court of
appeals. Benda for Common-sense v. Anderson, 999 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. App. 2023). The
court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of those counts. Id. at 901–02. Benda did not
appeal the dismissal of those counts to us.
The one count that is before us was brought under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44. We
observe that section 204B.44 claims are typically asserted in a separate petition rather than
a count in a civil complaint. Minn. Stat. § 204B.44(a) (stating that “[a]ny individual may
file a petition in the manner provided in this section for the correction of any [specified]
errors, omissions, or wrongful acts which have occurred or are about to occur”). No party
argues that the form of pleading requires dismissal and we express no opinion on that issue.
3
Benda asserted two types of errors regarding these embedded modems: first, a
violation of the Secretary of State’s duty to certify all electronic voting systems used in the
State under Minnesota Statutes section 206.57, subdivisions 1, 6; and second, a violation
3
The suit named Denise Anderson, the Director of Rice County Property Tax and
Elections, as the defendant, and Benda properly served Anderson with a copy of the
complaint and a summons. Benda served no one else. Secretary of State Steve Simon (the
Secretary) intervened as a defendant and is a proper party to the dispute. See Minn. R. Civ.
P. 24.03.
In September 2022, Benda moved the district court for an order prohibiting
Anderson from using any modem function in the electronic voting machines in Rice
County and requiring Anderson to submit certification that the modem functions had been
disabled or otherwise made inoperable. Benda also asked that the court require Anderson
to publish the court’s order and distribute it to election officials. Both Anderson and the
Secretary filed answers and motions asserting, among other things, that the district court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44. The
district court held a hearing on the motion on October 26, 2022, and took the matter under
advisement. The district court did not issue any order or decision before the November 8,
2022 election, which went forward as scheduled. 4
of the modem ban in Minnesota Statutes section 206.845. Because we affirm the district
court’s dismissal based on mootness, we take no position on the merits of Benda’s claims.
Sections 206.57, subdivision 1, and 206.845 were amended in 2023 and 2025, but the
changes do not affect the analysis here.
4
This case presented several challenging procedural and substantive issues for the
district court. District courts generally have 90 days to decide “questions of fact and law,
and all motions and matters submitted to a judge for a decision in trial.” Minn. Stat.
§ 546.27, subd. 1(a). We urge all courts to prioritize claims properly and timely brought
under section 204B.44 and resolve the issues before challenged elections occur whenever
possible. See Minn. Stat. § 204B.44(b) (providing that “[t]he court shall issue its findings
and a final order for appropriate relief as soon as possible after the hearing”).
4
On January 17, 2023, the district court dismissed Benda’s section 204B.44 claim
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It noted four jurisdictional defects in the claim:
(1) the 2022 election had passed and thus the claim was moot; (2) Benda’s requested relief
went to “general election issues outside the scope” of section 204B.44; (3) the petition
should have been filed with the Minnesota Supreme Court because the challenged Rice
County ballot was to record votes in state office elections; and (4) there was insufficient
service of process because Benda failed to serve the complaint on “all candidates for office”
on Rice County’s ballot as required by section 204B.44(b).
Benda appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
the section 204B.44 claim, concluding that Benda was required—and failed—to serve all
candidates on the ballot. Benda for Common-sense v. Anderson, 999 N.W.2d 893, 900–01
(Minn. App. 2023). Because the court of appeals determined the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction based on insufficient service, it did not reach the other potential
defects the district court identified. Id. at 901. Benda sought this court’s review. We
granted review but stayed the appeal pending our opinion in Rued v. Commissioner of
Human Services, 13 N.W.3d 42 (Minn. 2024). After Rued was issued, we lifted the stay.
We now conclude that Benda’s section 204B.44 claim is moot. In so holding, we affirm
the court of appeals’ conclusion that the district court lacked jurisdiction, but on alternative
grounds, without reaching the court of appeals’ basis for its conclusion.
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ANALYSIS
The issue before us is whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to
hear Benda’s section 204B.44 claim. 5 Courts hear only live, justiciable controversies.
Growe v. Simon, 2 N.W.3d 490, 499–500 (Minn. 2024). A justiciable controversy exists
when “the claim (1) involves definite and concrete assertions of right that emanate from a
legal source, (2) involves a genuine conflict in tangible interests between parties with
adverse interests, and (3) is capable of specific resolution by judgment rather than
presenting hypothetical facts that would form an advisory opinion.” Onvoy, Inc. v.
ALLETE, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617–18 (Minn. 2007). Cases are moot, and therefore
nonjusticiable, when “a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of
effective relief is no longer possible.” Winkowski v. Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d 302, 307–08
(Minn. 2023) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 We review
justiciability issues, such as whether a claim is moot, de novo. Dean v. City of Winona,
868 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2015).
5
Section 204B.44 was amended in 2025, but the change does not affect our analysis
here. Minn. Stat. § 204B.44, as amended by, Act of May 23, 2025, ch. 39, art. 8, § 58.
6
Even if a case is moot, we may, in our discretion, hear the case under certain limited
circumstances that we refer to as exceptions to mootness. See, e.g., Snell v. Walz,
985 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 2023) (stating that “mootness is not a mechanical rule that is
automatically invoked whenever the underlying dispute between the parties is settled or
otherwise resolved; it is a flexible discretionary doctrine” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Benda, who bears the burden of proving that an exception to
mootness applies, id. at 287, does not argue that any exception applies. We decline to
exercise our discretion to apply an exception to mootness in this case.
6
Benda’s section 204B.44 claim alleged that Rice County was planning to use voting
machines with embedded modems contrary to Minnesota law in the 2022 general election.
The relief requested was an order restraining Rice County from using alleged improperly
certified electronic voting systems and preventing Rice County from using any modem
function in the 2022 election. 7 The 2022 general election is over. Nothing we order can
change the voting machines used two election cycles ago. The claim is therefore moot.
Benda argues the claim is not moot because the problem it identifies will affect all
future elections in which Rice County uses the same electronic voting systems that it used
in 2022. We find the argument unpersuasive.
Benda argues it can bypass this requirement for a live, justiciable controversy by
shifting its claim midstream and asserting that its complaint now pertains to the November
2026 election rather than the November 2022 election. Benda cites Martin v. Simon,
6 N.W.3d 443 (Minn. 2024), as precedent. Benda asserts that in Martin, the petitioner
“relied upon its February 14, 2024, Memorandum in clarifying its election designation,”
and it, likewise, can clarify which election it is disputing to this court. The procedural
postures of this case and Martin, however, are distinct.
7
In the prayer for relief in its complaint and in its motion seeking an order restraining
Anderson from using the voting machines, Benda did not use the term “2022 election.” In
count three, however, Benda specifically identified the “use of an Electronic Voting
System in the November 8, 2022 election that has hardware, software or features that are
not property [sic] approved, certified or secure” as the wrongful act, omission or error about
which it was concerned. (Emphasis added.) By its own pleading, then, Benda was
disputing the means used to conduct the 2022 general election.
7
Martin originated with a section 204B.44 petition filed directly in our court
requesting decertification of a political party as a major political party and an “order that
[this party’s] candidates for partisan offices cannot use the ballot access procedures for
major political parties in the 2024 state primary and general elections.” Martin, 6 N.W.3d
at 446. After receiving the petition, we issued a scheduling order that asked Martin to
identify the “relevant dates by which a decision of this court is necessary” and “whether
[Martin wa]s seeking any relief related to the 2024 Minnesota presidential nomination
primary.” Martin v. Simon, No. A24-0216, Order at 2 (Minn. filed Feb. 8, 2024). Martin
complied, filing a memorandum on February 14, 2024, stating that he was seeking a ruling
“before May 21, 2024, which is when the candidate filing period begins” for the 2024
elections and that he was not seeking any relief “related to the 2024 Presidential
Nomination Primary.”
No such scheduling order was issued here, nor is there any confusion about the
election for which Benda was seeking relief. Nothing from Martin—or any of our
precedents—suggests that a section 204B.44 petitioner may “designate” a different
election from that referenced in their petition during an appeal in order to bypass mootness
concerns. Benda must file a new petition if it wishes to challenge a procedure for the 2026
election because the claim at issue was confined to the 2022 general election; it cannot
change the claim at this stage.
More broadly, Benda’s contention that it can shift the focus of its claim to a
different, future election runs contrary to section 204B.44. Section 204B.44 may be used
only as a procedural mechanism to bring “a challenge in the context of a single specific
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election, rather than a challenge to election policies generally.” Minn. Voters All. v. Simon,
885 N.W.2d 660, 665 (Minn. 2016) (emphasis in original); see also Minn. Majority v.
Ritchie, No. A09-0950, Order at 5–6 (Minn. filed July 22, 2009) (noting that
section 204B.44 allows correction of wrongful acts, omissions, or errors concerning “an
election” and dismissing claim that did not seek relief specific to a particular election
(emphasis added in Minn. Majority)). The single specific election Benda identified in the
claim at issue in this case is the 2022 election. Accordingly, while Benda’s initial claim
concerned election procedures—the use of allegedly illegal voting machines—in the 2022
election, its argument to avoid mootness transforms the claim into a challenge to election
policies generally.
Further, any claim about the 2026 election is not ripe. “We decide present problems,
not hypothetical ones.” Growe, 2 N.W.3d at 499. “Issues which have no existence other
than in the realm of future possibility are purely hypothetical and are not justiciable.” Id.
(citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted). Benda argues that the claim related to the
2026 election is justiciable because Anderson and the Secretary have not affirmatively
stated they will use different machines in that election. It is not clear that Anderson and
the Secretary have a duty to make such a declaration, and we do not reach that issue
because, even if such a duty exists, Benda’s argument turns the ripeness inquiry on its head.
Benda has the burden to prove ripeness, yet it does not allege or identify any evidence
indicating the type of voting system that Rice County will use in 2026. See Emery v. Simon,
22 N.W.3d 141, 142 (Minn. 2025) (order) (concluding section 204B.44 petition was not
9
ripe because the petitioner neither “alleged nor presented evidence” indicating that alleged
ballot error was “nearly certain” to occur on a 2026 ballot).
Benda’s section 204B.44 petition sought an order prohibiting Rice County from
using electronic voting systems that it claimed were improperly certified in the 2022
general election. That election has come and gone. Accordingly, Benda’s 204B.44 claim
is moot and its arguments for why its claim is not moot lack merit. We therefore agree
with the district court that Benda’s section 204B.44 claim should have been dismissed on
mootness grounds. Thus, while we affirm the court of appeals’ decision that the district
court properly dismissed Benda’s section 204B.44 claim, we do so on the alternative
grounds of mootness and do not reach or take any position on whether service of process
on all candidates is a jurisdictional requirement under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44
in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals but do so
on alternative grounds.
Affirmed on other grounds.
GAÏTAS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
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