State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0306

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sean Douglas English,
Appellant.

Filed September 5, 2023
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-14-1824

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Michael V. Mahlen, Assistant County
Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges a probation-revocation decision, arguing that the district court
abused its discretion when it found that the need for appellant’s confinement outweighed
the policies favoring probation. We affirm.
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FACTS
The following facts summarize the record, including transcripts of the plea,
sentencing, and probation-revocation hearings. In October 2014, appellant Sean Douglas
English pleaded guilty to a June 2014 offense of first-degree driving while impaired (DWI)
under Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2012). English’s prior offenses included DWIs
in 2005, 2011, and 2012. The district court sentenced English to 48 months in prison,
stayed for seven years.
English incurred no probation violations until 2019, when he admitted to using
methamphetamine and the district court sanctioned him with 15 days of jail time and
reinstated his probation. He admitted to a second violation in 2021 for consuming alcohol
around the time his apartment was destroyed by fire, after which the district court reinstated
English’s probation without imposing intermediate sanctions and ordered him to complete
an updated chemical-dependency assessment and follow its recommendations.
At a hearing in January 2022, English admitted to four additional probation
violations: (1) failure to report to his probation agent in May, June, July, and September
2021; (2) failure to complete the chemical-dependency assessment ordered by the district
court; (3) failure to remain law abiding, which included a March 2021 North Dakota
conviction for unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia and an August 2021 Minnesota
conviction for driving with a suspended license; and (4) failure to notify his probation agent
of his 2021 convictions. English explained that he did not report the 2021 convictions to
his probation agent because he thought he was “off paper,” meaning no longer on
probation. He also told the district court that he did not complete the chemical-dependency
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evaluation because he had lost his apartment and struggled to find a new home, saying , “I
was just like bouncing, trying to find places.” A community -services representative
attended the hearing and told the district court that English had received mental-health
services the previous summer and that English now had stable housing that he likely would
lose if the district court were to execute his prison sentence.
The district court found English was not amenable to probation and executed the
48-month prison sentence. English appealed, and we reversed and remanded to the district
court for consideration of the third Austin factor. State v. English, No. A22-0446, 2022 WL
17244591, at *2 (Minn. App. Nov. 28, 2022) (citing State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250
(Minn. 1980)). The district court revoked English’s probation the next day in a written
order. English appeals.
DECISION
A district court may revoke probation if the probationer violates any condition of
that probation. Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1(a) (2022). “The [district] court has broad
discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be
reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50.
“The ultimate decision whether to order revocation and imprisonment lies solely within the
district court’s discretion.” State v. Fortner, 989 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Minn. App. 2023). “A
district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the
law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281,
291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). Even if another district court, in the proper exercise
of its discretion, could have made a different ruling on the same facts, that does not mean
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that the district court abused its discretion in the present matter. State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d
578, 613 (Minn. 2004).
A district court considers three factors when determining whether to revoke
probation following a violation. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. “[T]he court must
1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the
violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that need for confinement outweighs
the policies favoring probation.” Id.
The district court must make specific findings on all three Austin factors before it
decides whether to revoke probation. State v. Modtland , 695 N.W.2d 602, 607-08 (Minn.
2005). A probation revocation cannot be “a reflexive reaction to an accumulation of
technical violations,” and the district court must determine that the defendant “cannot be
counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quoting United States
v. Reed, 573 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 1978)). This is a fact-specific analysis, and the
district court must “create thorough, fact-specific records” to explain its reasons for
revoking probation. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608.
English does not dispute the district court’s findings on the first two Austin factors.
However, English argues that the record does not support the third Austin factor because
the need for confinement did not outweigh the policies favoring probation in his case.
When analyzing this third Austin factor, the district court considers three subfactors, known
as Modtland factors:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the offender; or
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(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.

Id. at 607. A court needs to find the existence of only one Modtland factor to support
revocation. See G oldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. 2008) (stating, in
context of statutory interpretation, that appellate courts “normally interpret the conjunction
‘or’ as disjunctive, rather than conjunctive”); Broadway Child Care Ctr., Inc. v. Minn.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 955 N.W.2d 626, 634 (Minn. App. 2021) (same). We analyze only
the first subfactor here.
English argues that he is not a risk to public safety because he has a history of
participation in chemical-dependency treatment and he committed only low-level and
technical violations of his probation. He states that he completed both inpatient and
low-intensity chemical -dependency treatment in 2015 and attended additional treatment
programs in 2016 and 2019. He also participated in mental-health treatment in 2019 and
2021 and worked with a community-services organization to secure housing. Furthermore,
English contends that his August 2021 driving conviction and March 2021 North Dakota
paraphernalia conviction were not criminal because they were either a petty-misdemeanor
offense or would have been a petty misdemeanor if committed in Minnesota.
The state argues that English remains “a serious public safety concern” and that the
district court properly considered English’s offense history, his recent convictions, his
failure to complete an updated chemical-dependency assessment or engage more recently
in treatment, and his lack of contact with his probation agent. Based on these facts , the
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state argues that the record supports “the district court’s determination that the need for
confinement of [English] outweighed the policies favoring probation.”
In its written order, the district court found that “the need for confinement is
necessary to protect the public.” The district court said English “remained in the
community without addressing his chemical use issues” after his violation in 2021, ignored
the court’s order to update his chemical -dependency assessment, and did not take
advantage of opportunities for rehabilitation. The court emphasized that English’s 2021
conviction was for driving without a license when “[t]he crux of this case is driving while
impaired.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the district court did not credit English’s
argument that he thought he was “off paper” in mid-2021 because the district court had
instructed him to contact his probation agent during the April 2021 hearing and English
had called his probation agent in August 2021.
We recognize that relapse can be part of the chemical-dependency recovery process
and commend English’s efforts toward his rehabilitation. 1 Here, the district court
articulated its substantive reasons for its finding on the first Modtland subfactor and relied
on evidence from the record to support those reasons. Specifically, English did not follow

1 Notwithstanding that the record shows that English has successfully completed multiple
chemical-dependency treatment programs, the district court order describes English as an
untreated driver. The reality is more nuanced than that description suggests. English had
maintained sobriety for five years before his first relapse and subsequent probation
violation. He then completed a new chemical-dependency assessment and followed its
recommendations, but unfortunately relapsed two years later on the day his friend allegedly
set fire to their apartment, at a time when he was nine months from completing his
seven-year probation term. After that, English sought assistance from a therapist and a
community-services caseworker.
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the district court’s orders to complete a chemical-dependency assessment and to remain
law abiding, and the district court therefore determined that his confinement is necessary
to protect the public. Because the presence of only one Modtland subfactor is required to
satisfy the third Austin factor, we need not analyze the second and third subfactors. We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked English’s
probation.
Affirmed.