State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0333

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Douglas Frederick Gratz,
Appellant.

Filed March 4, 2024
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Watonwan County District Court
File No. 83-CR-21-286

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Julie Kelley, Watonwan County Attorney, St. James, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;
and Gaïtas, Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for felony harassment, arguing that the district
court obtained an inadequate waiver of his right to a jury trial on the previous-convictions
element. We affirm.
FACTS
In June 2021, appellant Douglas Frederick Gratz placed multiple call s to a medical
clinic in Mankato in which he used profanity and threatened to rape, kill, set on fire, and
drown the staff who answered the phone. Security called the police, and officers went to
Gratz’s apartment and arrested him. Because this would be Gratz’s third harassment
offense in ten years, respondent State of Minnesota charged him with felony harassment in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.749, subdivision 4(b) (2020).
Before trial, the parties submitted a written stipulation that Gratz had two previous
qualified domestic-violence-related-offense convictions within ten years of the current
offense, and the state submitted certified copies of Gratz’s prior convictions. The district
court questioned Gratz on the record about the stipulation before obtaining a waiver of his
right to a jury trial on the previous-convictions element. In October 2022, a jury found
Gratz guilty of felony harassment.
Gratz appeals.
DECISION
Gratz argues that the district court did not obtain an adequate waiver of his right to
have a jury determine the previous-conviction s element of felony harassment because the
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district court (1) did not inform him of his right to have a jury decide the element and
(2) incorrectly explained the previous-convictions element.1 The state responds that, even
if the district court did not obtain a valid waiver, Gratz benefitted from not having evidence
of his previous convictions presented to the jury and that any error did not affect his
substantial rights.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to a
jury trial on every element of a criminal offense punishable by incarceration. State v.
Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn. 2011). But a defendant may waive this right as
to one or more elements by stipulation so long as the waiver is constitutionally valid. State
v. Hinton, 702 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2005).
Waivers must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d at 848. To
ensure constitutional validity, Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01,
subdivision 1(2)(a), requires the following when a defendant gives a waiver: (1) the waiver
must be personal; (2) the waiver must be written or given on the record; (3) the court must
advise the defendant of their right to trial by jury; and (4) the defendant must have an
opportunity to consult with counsel.
Gratz challenges only the third requirement, asserting that his waiver was
inadequate because the district court failed to advise him properly of his right to a jury trial

1 Gratz also argues in a supplemental brief that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel, but we decline to address this claim because we do not consider pro se claims on
appeal that are unsupported by argument or legal authority “unless prejudicial error is
obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted).
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on the previous-convictions element in two ways. First, Gratz argues that the district court
erred by failing to inform him that he had a right to have a jury decide the
previous-convictions element and by instead stating that, by signing the stipulation, Gratz
was agreeing “that the State doesn’t have to provide evidence to the jury to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that you had two or more convictions.” Second, Gratz argues that the
district court erred by referring to the previous-convictions element as involving
“crime-of-violence” convictions instead of “qualified domestic-violence-related-offense”
convictions.
Because Gratz did not raise the alleged errors to the district court, we review them
for plain error. Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02; Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d at 852. When conducting
a plain-error review, we must determine whether there was (1) an error, (2) that was plain,
and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d at 852. An
error is plain when it is clear or obvious. Id. at 853. If the plain error affected the outcome
of the case, then it affected the defendant’s substantial rights. See id. at 852-53. If all three
prongs of plain-error review are met, we consider “whether reversal is required to ensure
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Coleman,
957 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “Under the plain error rule, if [an
appellate court] find[s] that any one of the requirements is not satisfied, [it] need not
address any of the others.” State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted).
Here, we need not consider whether either alleged error constituted plain error
because, even if the district court plainly erred, neither alleged error affected Gratz’s
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substantial rights. The state submitted certified copies of the prior convictions, which
prove the convictions as a matter of law. See Minn. Stat. § 609.041 (2020); State v. Craig,
807 N.W.2d 453, 468 (Minn. App. 2011) ( concluding that an invalid waiver of the
prior-convictions element was harmless whe n the state submitted certified copies of prior
convictions), aff’d on other grounds, (Minn. Feb. 27, 2013). Therefore, the prosecution
could have proved the previous-convictions element beyond a reasonable doubt. Gratz
does not dispute that he had two previous qualified domestic-violence-related-offense
convictions, and indeed, he concedes that this court could conclude that the allegedly
invalid waiver was harmless.
Because any error in the district court’s explanation of the waiver did not affect the
outcome of the case, we conclude that Gratz’s substantial rights were not affected.
Affirmed.