A23-0376 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. A. L. and D. J. L., Parents.

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed October 16, 2023

The holding in the court’s own words

Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. We therefore conclude that the third factor has been met. We agree, and we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the fourth factor has been met.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0376

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
J. A. L. and D. J. L., Parents.

Filed October 16, 2023
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-JV-22-1761

Anne Morris Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant-father D.J.L.)

Michelle M. Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Sarah Estep, Assistant County Attorney,
Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Otter Tail County Department of Human Services)

Janice Amundson, Dalton, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In this termination-of-parental-rights appeal, appellant-father D.J.L. challenges the
district court’s order terminating his parental rights to his three children. Father argues that
the district court abused its discretion by determining that there was a statutory basis for
termination and respondent Otter Tail County Department of Human Services (the county)
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made reasonable efforts toward reunification. Because we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Father and respondent-mother J.A.L. are the parents of three minor children, aged
2, 3, and 4. After a termination-of-parental-rights trial (the TPR trial), the district court
terminated the parents’ rights to the children. Father now appeals the order terminating his
parental rights.1 Before turning to father’s arguments on appeal, we briefly summarize the
proceedings below.
CHIPS Proceedings
Following reports that the children were exposed to drug use in the home, lacked
proper parental care, and lived in an “injurious or dangerous environment,” the county
petitioned the district court in October 2021 to adjudicate the children as being in need of
protection or services (CHIPS). The children were removed from the home and placed in
emergency protective care. In January 2022, the parents admitted to the allegations in the
CHIPS petition and the district court adjudicated the children in need of protection or
services.
Father’s Compliance with the County’s Reunification Case Plans
During the CHIPS proceedings, the county developed case plans designed to help
the parents “provide a sober, safe, and violence free home environment for the children.”2

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.

2 The county created a separate case plan for each child.
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These plans were filed with, and approved by, the district court. The case plans required
father to obtain sobriety, abstain from illegal substances, remain law abiding, maintain
contact with the county, and provide stable housing for the children. Father reviewed the
case plans with the family’s case manager before they were filed with the district court.
Father made some progress on his case plans. He entered treatment at the
ShareHouse Treatment Facility in November 2021, and meaningfully engaged in the
program. Father completed treatment and was discharged into the community in April
2022.
Although father satisfied certain aspects of his case plans, the county had
“significant concerns” about his overall progress, particularly on some of the most
important requirements.
First, father failed to remain sober in the community. He admitted that he used
drugs on two occasions while on weekend passes from ShareHouse. And after he was
discharged from treatment at ShareHouse in April 2022, he used methamphetamine twice.
Father remained in the community for about one month before he was taken into custody
at the Otter Tail County Detention Center in May 2022.
Second, father’s imprisonment impacted his ability to provide stable housing for the
children, another requirement of his case plans. Father and mother were evicted from their
home in 2022. After leaving ShareHouse, father was “essentially homeless” until he was
jailed in connection with multiple outstanding warrants. Ultimately, father expects to be
transferred from jail to prison to serve approximately 30 months for a new first-degree
driving-while-impaired conviction. Father does not have a home outside of jail or prison.
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Third, and f inally, father did not maintain contact with the county. Between
November 2021 and February 2022, father did not share his location with his case manager.
He also refused to tell his case manager where he was receiving inpatient treatment. After
his discharge from ShareHouse, the county did not reestablish regular contact with father
until he was incarcerated. Father’s failure to communicate with the county made it difficult
to arrange services to help him be successful in following his case plans.
TPR Proceedings and the District Court’s Order
In August 2022, the county filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both
parents. Th is petition alleged five statutory grounds for termination: (1) the parents
abandoned the children, (2) the parents neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
them by the parent and child relationship, (3) the parents were palpably unfit to be parties
to the parent and child relationship, (4) reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions
leading to the children’s out-of-home placement, and (5) the children were neglected and
in foster care. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), (8) (2022).
The district court held a 12-day court trial and heard testimony from the social
worker, father’s case manager, a county case ai de, father’s counselors, the guardian ad
litem, father, and others. Following trial, the district court terminated father’s and mother’s
parental rights to the children. As to father, the district court determined that there was
clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions
leading to the children’s out-of-home placement, and that the children were neglected and
in foster care. Id., subd. 1(b)(5), (8). It further determined that termination of father’s
parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
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Father appeals.
DECISION
Father challenges the district court’s order terminating his parental rights. Parental
rights may be terminated only for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O.,
462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A district court may involuntarily terminate parental
rights if: (1) at least one of the statutory bases for terminating parental rights exists under
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, sub division 1(b); (2) reasonable efforts toward
reunification were either made or were not required; and (3) the proposed termination is in
the children’s best interests. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8, .317, subd. 1
(2022); see also In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
The county bears the burden of proving the existence of a statutory condition
permitting the termination of parental rights, In re Welfare of Child of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d
861, 869-70 (Minn. 2021), and must do so by clear and convincing evidence, Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a). A reviewing court will “closely inquire into the sufficiency of
the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at
385. This court “review[s] the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for
clear error, but we review its determination of whether a particular statutory basis for
involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re
Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn.
Jan. 6, 2012). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight
of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of
Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). The clear error
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standard of review “is a review of the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the
decision.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021); see In
re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney
on appeal from a juvenile-protection order), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). “When the
record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record
might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 223 (quotation omitted). In applying the clear error standard of review,
appellate courts (1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, (2) do not
reweigh the evidence, (3) do not find their own facts, and (4) do not reconcile conflicting
evidence. Id. at 221-22. Thus,
an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of
the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the
findings of the [district] court. Rather, because the factfinder
has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues
and the advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate
court’s “duty is fully performed” after it has fairly considered
all the evidence and has determined that the evidence
reasonably supports the decision.

Id. at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); see Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468,
472 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing clear error standard of review).
Here, the district court determined that the county proved two statutory bases for
terminating father’s rights by clear and convincing evidence because: (1) the children were
neglected and in foster care and (2) reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions
leading to the removal of the children from the home. The district court further concluded
that termination of father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
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Father does not challenge the district court’s best-interests findings. However, he
contends that the district court abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights on
the two statutory bases. Upon review, we determine that clear and convincing evidence in
the record demonstrates that father failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s
out-of-home placement despite the county’s reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and
we affirm on that basis. For this reason, we need not address the remaining ground for
termination. See In re Welfare of Child. of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 n.2 (Minn. 2004)
(recognizing that only one statutory ground must be proven to support termination of
parental rights).
A district court may terminate parental rights if “reasonable efforts, under the
direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement”
out of the home. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). A reviewing court presumes that
reasonable efforts have failed if: (1) the “child has resided out of the parental home under
court order for a cumulative period of 12 months,” (2) “the court has approved the out-of-
home placement plan,” (3) the “conditions leading to the out-of-home placement have not
been corrected” as shown by the parent’s failure to “substantially [comply] with the court’s
orders and a reasonable case plan,” and (4) “reasonable efforts have been made by the
social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id., subd.
1(b)(5)(i)-(iv).
Father does not contest the district court’s findings as to the first and second factors,
which are supported by the record. Instead, father focuses on the third and fourth factors:
whether he corrected the conditions leading to the children’s removal from the home, and
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whether the county made reasonable efforts to reunify father with the children. The district
court’s findings regarding these final two factors are supported by the evidence, and those
findings support the district court’s conclusion that this statutory basis for termination is
satisfied.
Father Failed to Correct the Conditions Leading to the Out-of-Home Placement
Father argues that he will be able to care for the children in the foreseeable future
following his release from prison. He further contends that the district court failed to
address how his compliance with the case plans was necessary to correct the conditions
leading to the children’s out-of -home placement. These arguments implicate the third
factor, which considers whether the conditions leading to the children’s removal have been
corrected. Id., subd. 1(b)(5)(iii).
The record supports the district court’s findings indicating that father did not correct
these conditions. Although the district court acknowledged that father “expressed [a]
desire to fulfill his responsibilities as the children’s father,” it found that father’s “attempts
to achieve a safe, stable and nurturing environment and address his mental health and
chemical dependency needs have been minimal and uncommit ted.” The district court
commended father for “ma[king] reunification with the children his top priority,” and for
completing treatment at ShareHouse. But the district court found that father struggled with
sobriety and “ha[d] yet to show sobriety outside of a structured setting.” Based on these
findings, the district court concluded that the children could not safely be returned to
father’s care.
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Sufficient evidence in the record supports these findings. The county initially
opened an investigation after receiving reports that the children were living in an unsafe
environment. After the CHIPS proceedings, the district court approved case plans designed
to reunite the family, which father reviewed with the case manager . Among other things,
these plans required father to obtain sobriety, refrain from using drugs, maintain contact
with the county, and provide stable housing for the children.
During the TPR trial, the district court heard testimony about father’s lack of
compliance with these requirements. The case manager testified that father did not remain
in contact with the county “for a significant period of time.” And father declined to tell the
case manager where he was staying.
Father also failed to follow the requirement to become sober and abstain from illegal
substances. Although father entered treatment at ShareHouse and participated in
programming, he twice left the facility on weekend passes and tested positive for drugs
upon his return. Father did complete treatment and was released into the community. But
one month later, father was arrested and jailed. The case manager met with father a few
days after his arrest. During that meeting, father admitted using methamphetamine and
alcohol after his release from treatment. The case manager was concerned that father had
not demonstrated that he could remain sober while in the community.
Additionally, the case manager was concerned about father’s inability to establish
stable housing. The county did not have a physical home address for father. And father
was expected to be in jail and then prison for the foreseeable future.
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Based on her assessment, the case manager testified that father loved his children
but did not have the coping skills to maintain sobriety in the community, did not have
housing, and would not be able to maintain stable mental health after his release from
prison. The case manager noted that father would be incarcerated for several more years
and would not “be in the position to be available for parenting for a significant amount of
time.” Counsel asked the case manager if she believed father would be available to parent
in the foreseeable future and she responded, “I do not.”
The county supervisor also testified at the TPR trial and echoed the case manager’s
concerns. She agreed that father did not successfully complete his case plans to allow for
reunification. The supervisor testified that father was not available at the present time to
provide care to the children. Moreover, she did not believe that there would be any
resolution in the foreseeable future that would allow for father to be successfully reunified
with the children in a safe, stable, or appropriate manner.
On appeal, father argues that he will be able to care for the children in the future.
We are not persuaded by this argument given the testimony presented and father’s own
admissions that he has difficulty remaining sober and does not have housing. Moreover,
as noted, appellate courts cannot find their own facts, and “[w]hen the record reasonably
supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide
a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Kenney , 963 N.W.2d at
223 (quotation omitted); see Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 474 (noting that, although “the
record might support findings other than those made by the [district] court,” this does not
mean “that the court’s findings are defective”). Because the record supports the district
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court’s findings, we discern no clear error . While we commend father for seeking
treatment, we cannot say, on this record, that the district court abused its discretion by
determining that father did not correct the conditions leading to the children’s removal
from the home. We therefore conclude that the third factor has been met.
The County Made Reasonable Efforts to Reunify Father with the Children
As to the fourth factor, the district court concluded that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunify father and the children. A county must make reasonable efforts toward
reunification before a district court may terminate a parent’ s rights. T.R., 750 N.W.2d at
664; Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022). Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond
mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of
S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 28, 2007). To determine whether efforts were reasonable, the district court considers
whether the services offered were relevant to the safety and protection of the child,
adequate to meet the needs of the child and family, culturally appropriate, available and
accessible, consistent and timely, and realistic under the circumstances. Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(h) (2022). Finally, the district court considers “the length of the time the county
was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532
(Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).
The district court made thorough findings of fact related to the county’s efforts to
alleviate the conditions that gave rise to the need for out-of-home placement. These
services included: (1) ongoing case management and monitoring; (2) referrals to support
services including chemical-dependency assistance, drug testing, a family resource worker,
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mental-health assistance, and parental capacity evaluations; (3) transportation assistance;
(4) communication assistance; and (5) a search for relative permanency options. The
district court found that, “[t]hese services were adequate to meet the needs of the children
and family” and were specifically tailored to treat father’s chemical dependency and focus
on providing a safe and stable living environment for the children. The district court noted
that the county accommodated the cultural needs of both parents. According to the district
court, the county also made “every effort to provide these services to both parents, by
repeatedly attempting to track them down in person.” The district court found that,
[t]o the extent these services were inconsistent or untimely, it
was due to [father’s] lack of transparency and timeliness of
reporting his physical whereabouts, his voluntary choice to not
address his criminal warrants, lack of follow through on low
intensity treatment after his discharge from ShareHouse, [ and
father’s] lack of participation and contact.

Clear and convincing evidence in the record supports the district court’s findings
that the county made reasonable efforts at reunification. The county initially had difficulty
coordinating services for father because he failed to maintain regular contact with the
county or with his ser vice providers. As a result, the case manager could not confirm
whether father was complying with his case plans or receiving treatment. Father eventually
told the case manager that he was in treatment, but he refused to disclose his location. After
the county learned that father was in treatment, it continued to arrange services, including
mental-health services and alcohol-and- drug counseling. The guardian ad litem testified
that the county provided reasonable efforts to father, but that he had not corrected the
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conditions despite the county’s efforts. These circumstances support the conclusion that
the county made reasonable efforts to reunite father with the children.
Father argues that the county’s reunification efforts were insufficient because the
county denied his initial requests for visitation with the children. He further asserts that
the foster parent did not always facilitate computer-based visitation calls, despite his
requests for such visits. The record does not support these arguments. Father had multiple
visits with the children. The county case aide testified that she arranged several online
visits. And the case manager confirmed that father had supervised visits with the children
online while he was in ShareHouse. We are satisfied that the county facilitated visits
between father and the children.
The ultimate purpose of making reasonable efforts is to “assist in alleviating the
conditions that gave rise to the dependency adjudication.” H.K., 455 N.W.2d at 532. Here,
the district court found that, despite the county’s reasonable efforts, the conditions leading
to the out-of- home placement continued to exist. We agree, and we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the fourth factor has been met.
Upon review, all four of the statutory factors outlined in section 260C.301,
subdivision 1(b)(5), have been established by the record evidence. In sum, because (1) a
statutory ground for termination of parental rights is supported by clear and convincing
evidence, (2) the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and (3) father does
not contest that termination is in the children’s best interests, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by terminating father’s parental rights.
Affirmed.