St. Paul Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic Opportunity, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0419

St. Paul Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic Opportunity,
Respondent,

vs.

CareMate Home Health Care, Inc.,
Relator.

Filed January 29, 2024
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge *

St. Paul Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic Opportunity
File No. 19-98

Lyndsey M. Olson, St. Paul City Attorney, David Gorski, Assistant City Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Jacob H. Fox, Joseph H. Dudley, Dudley & Smith, P.A., Mendota Heights, Minnesota (for
relator)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Frisch , Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator CareMate Home Health Care, Inc. challenges the
determination by respondent St. Paul Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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Opportunity (the department) that CareMate violated St. Paul’s Earned Sick and Safe Time
ordinance. Because we conclude that the department did not make any legal error , the
department’s determination was not arbitrary nor unsupported by substantial evidence, and
there was no violation of CareMate’s right to due process, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2020, the department sent CareMate a notice of investigation stating that an
employee alleged that CareMate may be in violation of the St. Paul Earned Sick and Safe
Time (ESST) ordinan ce. See St. Paul, Minn., Legislative Code ( SPLC) §§ 233.03-.04
(2020). The department and CareMate also clarified the scope of investigation through
email.
In 2022, the department issued a determination stating that CareMate “failed to
provide sufficient range of ESST notice” and application of its ESST policy was deficient.
The department reasoned that a poster in CareMate’s office was insufficient notice because
many of CareMate’s employees did not need to enter the office location for work. The
department ordered backpay for the impacted employees totaling $32,942.
CareMate appealed the decision to the St. Paul Human Rights and Equal Economic
Opportunity Commission (the commission). After a hearing, the commission concluded
in a written decision that the determination was not clearly erroneous and upheld the
department’s determination of violation. CareMate seeks judicial review by way of a
petition for a writ of certiorari.
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DECISION
On appeal, Care Mate argues that the department erred in its determination of
violation and that the commission erred in affirming that determination. CareMate makes
three arguments in support of its request that this court reverse.
Appellate courts review quasi-judicial decisions “under a ‘limited and nonintrusive
standard of review .’” Reetz v. City of Saint Paul , 956 N.W.2d 238, 244 (Minn. 2021)
(quoting Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes , 823 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn. 2012)). However, this
court may nevertheless reverse if the determination “is ‘arbitrary, oppressive,
unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or without any evidence to
support it.’” Id. (quoting Dietz v. Dodge Cnty., 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Mi nn. 1992)) .
Substantial evidence to support a determination consists of: “1) such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; 2) more than a scintilla
of evidence; 3) more than some evidence; 4) more than any evidence; and 5) evidence
considered in its entirety.” Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council No. 14, St.
Paul v. Cnty. of Ramsey , 513 N.W.2d 257, 259 (Minn. App. 1994) . The decision is
arbitrary and capricious if the agency :
relied on factors which the legislature had not intended it to
consider, if it entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, if it offered an explanation for the decision that
runs counter to the evidence, or if the decision is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.

Minn. Transitions Charter Sch. v. Comm’r of Minn. Dep’t of Educ., 844 N.W.2d 223, 235
(Minn. App. 2014).
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CareMate makes three arguments in favor of reversal. First, CareMate argues that
the department legally erred by exceeding its authority. Second, CareMate argues that the
determination was arbitrary, capricious , and unsupported by substantial evidence. Third,
CareMate argues that the department and commission violated its right to due process .
Each argument is addressed in turn.
I. The department did not apply an erroneous theory of law .
CareMate argues that the department legally erred when it did not follow its own
investigative procedures.1
In its rules, the department defined an investigative process that requires a notice of
investigation be sent by U.S. mail describing the allegations and allows the department to
send later requests for additional relevant information. St. Paul Rules for ESST
Enforcement, Investigation Process (1)-(10); see also SPLC §§ 233.12(b), .13(b) (2020)
(authorizing rulemaking authority and outlining investigative process) . The department is
authorized to order backpay and additional liquidated damages. SPLC § 233.13(d) (2020).
The department notified CareMate by U.S. mail and communicated through email
to seek additional relevant information. The department determined that CareMate
violated the ordinance and ordered backpay totaling $32,942. N otably the department did
not order additional liquidated damages. Id. CareMate has not made an argument that
persuades us that the department made any legal error .

1 CareMate characterizes this argument as the department “exceeding its statutory
authority” but does not identify a statute that is implicated in this case.
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II. The determination was not arbitrary, nor unsupported by substantial
evidence.

CareMate argues substantial evidence supports that it complied with the notice
requirements by putting a poster notice in its office and the department was arbitrary in
requiring a “range of notice .” CareMate also argues the commission’s determination is
unsupported by substantial evidence .
An employer “may comply” with the ordinance by “ displaying the poster in a
conspicuous and accessible place in each establishment where such employees are
employed.” SPLC § 233.07(c) (2020). CareMate could only satisfy the notice requirement
by other means because a majority of CareMate’s employees do not need to enter the office
for their job duties . The record does not show that CareMate provided notice in another
manner. Additionally, the record shows the lack of notice corresponds in time to an
absence of ESST use. This supports the department’s finding that employees had not
received notice of ESST benefits. Finally, the commission did not receive evidence that
refuted that determination.
On the record presented, we find this sufficient to clear the low hurdle needed to
establish that the determination was not arbitrary and was supported by substantial
evidence. Thus, we defer to the department’s discretion. Reetz, 956 N.W.2d at 244.
III. There was no violation of CareMate’s right to due process.
CareMate argues its due -process rights were violated because the notice of
investigation did not cite to subsections of the ordinance . CareMate also argues the
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commission did not provide a fair and impartial consideration on administrative appeal
because the commission is staffed by and partners with the department .
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that a person’s life, liberty,
or property shall not be deprived “without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7. Whether the government has violated a person’s procedural
due-process rights is a question of law. Zellman ex rel. M.Z. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2758,
594 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn. App. 1999), rev. denied (Minn. July 28, 1999).
In determining whether an individual ’s procedural due -process rights have been
violated, we first examine “the private interest that will be affected by the official action,”
second, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and . . . additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and third, “the [g]overnment ’s
interest.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Sawh, 823 N.W.2d at 632.
First, the $32,942 of backpay is a sizable amount of money but is not large compared
to CareMate’s 2019 payroll of over $3 million. This does not weigh in CareMate’s favor.
Second, CareMate was notified of the investigation including that allegations were
related to ESST accrual and pay scale. The department asked detailed follow-up questions.
CareMate did not need subsections to prepare a response.
Additionally, CareMate exercised its right to an administrative appeal and had time
for oral arguments and rebuttal . SPLC § 233.14(a) (2020). There is no great risk of
erroneous deprivation with these layers of procedure.
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Third, St. Paul enacted the ordinance to allow employees to take time off from work
for sickness of themselves or family members. SPLC § 233.01(1) (2020). If an employer
does not provide that benefit, it is in the government’s interest to remedy the situation.
Finally, there is no evidence presented showing the commission is biased.
CareMate has not sufficiently alleged the “average [person]” would forget the burden of
proof when sitting on the commission. In re Khan, 804 N.W.2d 132, 137 (Minn. App.
2011). Therefore, we affirm.
Affirmed.