Dennis Freeman, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0434

Dennis Freeman,
Relator,

vs.

Kelber Catering,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed January 29, 2024
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 48974706-3

Dennis Freeman, Buffalo, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Kelber Catering, Minneapolis, Minnesota (respondent-employer)

Keri Phillips, Katrina Gulstad, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent-department)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Relator appeals from the determination of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that
he was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he was discharged for employment
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misconduct, arguing that he did not commit employment misconduct. Because relator has
not supported his claim with any citation to legal authority, he has forfeited its review upon
appeal. And, because upon mere inspection we discern no prejudicial error, we affirm.
FACTS
Following an incident at his employer’s workplace on August 20, 2022, relator
Dennis Freeman was indefinitely suspended from his employment with
respondent-employer Kelber Catering without pay and pending investigation. Freeman
never returned to work with Kelber. Freeman then applied for unemployment benefits
through respondent Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED).
DEED issued an initial determination that Freeman was ineligible for unemployment
benefits, which Freeman appealed to a ULJ. The ULJ, following a hearing that included
testimony from Freeman and Kelber’s director of human resources as well as multiple
exhibits, determined that Freeman was discharged due to employment misconduct, and he
was, therefore, ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. Freeman requested
reconsideration of the ULJ’s decision. O n reconsideration, t he ULJ affirmed the
determination that Freeman was discharged for employment misconduct. Freeman
petitioned for a writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Workers who are “unemployed through no fault of their own” may receive
unemployment insurance benefit payments as “a temporary partial wage replacement.”
Minn. Stat. § 268.03 (2022). But when an employer “discharges” an employee for
“employment misconduct,” that employee is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits.
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Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4 (2022). A “discharge” includes “[a] suspension from
employment without pay that is of an indefinite duration. ” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd.
5(b) (2022).
“Employment misconduct means any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct,
on the job or off the job, that is a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer
has the right to reasonably expect of the employee.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a)
(2022). “Whether an employee committed employment misconduct is a mixed question of
fact and law.” Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006).
“Whether the employee committed a particular act is a question of fact” and “whether the
act committed by the employee constitutes employment misconduct is a question of law,
which we review de novo.” Id.
We review a ULJ’s findings of fact “in the light most favorable to the decision.” Id.
And we will not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings “so long as there is evidence in the
record that substantially supports them.” Gonzalez Diaz v. Three Rivers Cmty. Action, Inc.,
917 N.W.2d 813, 815-16 (Minn. App. 2018); see also Fay v. Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev.,
860 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Minn. App. 2015) (providing that we “rely on findings that are
substantially supported by the record” (quotation omitted)). And because we defer to the
ULJ’s ability to weigh conflicting evidence , we also do not reweigh that evidence on
review. Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. App.
1995). When the credibility of a witness has a significant effect on the outcome of a
decision; however, the ULJ must set out its reason for crediting or discrediting the witness’
testimony. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a (2022). Credibility determinations which
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satisfy that requirement “are the exclusive province of the ULJ and will not be disturbed
on appeal.” Bangtson v. Allina Med. Grp., 766 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. App. 2009)
(quotation omitted).
This court “may reverse or modify the [ULJ’s] decision if the substantial rights of
the petitioner may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or
decision are,” among other enumerated reasons, affected by an error of law or “unsupported
by substantial evidence in view of the hearing record as submitted.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7(d) (2022). But “[a]n assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported
by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is [forfeited] and will not be considered
on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Louden v. Louden, 22
N.W.2d 164, 166 (Minn. 1946); see also Surf & Sand, Inc. v. Gardebring, 457 N.W.2d
782, 788 (Minn. App. 1990) (affirming when a claim of error was not supported by
argument or authority and “inspection” showed no “obvious prejudice”), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 20, 1990).
From our review of Freeman’s pro se brief, we discern that Freeman expresses
disagreement with the ULJ’s determination that he was discharged for employment
misconduct. However, Freeman’s assertion of error lacks explanation, and he cites no legal
authority to support it.
1 Therefore, Freeman forfeits any such claim of error, and our review

1 “While an appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to
comply with court rules, he is still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately
communicating to the court what it is he wan ts accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter
v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987); see also Gruenhagen v. Larson,
246 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn. 1976) (stating that a court generally will not modify ordinary
rules and procedures just because a pro se party lacks the skills and knowledge of an
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is limited to whether, upon mere inspection, the record reveals the presence of obvious
prejudicial error such that we should consider his otherwise forfeited claims. Louden, 22
N.W.2d at 166.
Our inspection of the record reveals that the ULJ made factual findings which are
supported by substantial evidence and are sufficient to conclude that the ULJ committed
no obvious prejudicial error. The ULJ heard testimony and received exhibits from the
parties and found:
• “Freeman and a temporary worker got into a dispute . . . . They exchanged
vulgar words in the view and earshot of the public.”

• “Freeman told his manager that if the temporary worker came back and
bothered him, he was going to ‘handle it like a man’ while striking his
clenched fist into the palm of his other hand. This was a threat of violence
against the temporary worker. It was not in self-defense.”

• “Upon hearing that, Freeman’s manager told him to punch out. Freeman did
not punch out. Freeman started to raise his voice and swear at his manager in
a space where ticketed guests could hear him. Freeman’s manager then
escorted him away from the concessions stand.”

• “Freeman was indefinitely suspended without pay pending investigation”
because of “the events . . . involving the temporary worker and his manager.”

The ULJ made its findings based on a credibility determination after weighing the
evidence and found that:
• The testimony of Kelber’s human resources director was detailed, reliable,
and provided the most likely explanation for the chain of events. That
testimony was based on a thorough investigation and supported by a
contemporaneous email from Freeman’s supervisor and detailed testimony
about a phone call with his manager.

attorney); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001) (emphasizing
that although “some accommodations” can be made for pro se litigants, they are “generally
held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules”).
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• Freeman’s testimony was vague, unconvincing, and not credible. Freeman
disputed the version of the events that the employer provided, testifying that
he never actually said he would “handle it like a man,” asserting that he did
not swear at his manager, and alleging that his supervisor had motive to
falsify allegations against him because he was a manipulator.

In sum, Freeman assigned error with mere assertion not supported by argument and
legal authority, and our inspection of the record reveals no obvious prejudicial error. The
ULJ’s determination that F reeman was discharged for employment misconduct is
supported by substantial evidence that he was, in fact, discharged for employment
misconduct.
Affirmed.