In re the Marriage of: Deborah Kay Schadewald, n/k/a Deborah Kay DeJong, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0436

In re the Marriage of: Deborah Kay Schadewald,
n/k/a Deborah Kay DeJong, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Gregory John Schadewald,
Appellant.

Filed February 12, 2024
Reversed
Smith, John, Judge*

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-F5-98-008027

Lindsay K. Fischbach, Barna, Guzy & Steffen, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Kenneth M. Wasche, Kenneth M. Wasche, P.C., Blaine, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We reverse because the district court’s order modifying the parties ’ January 2000
domestic-relations order specifying how the respondent’s retirement plan would be divided
affected the su bstantial rights of the appellant.
FACTS
Appellant Gregory John Schadewald (husband) and respondent Deborah Kay
Schadewald, n/k/a Deborah Kay DeJong (wife), dissolved their marriage in December
1999 pursuant to a stipulated judgment and decree. At that time, wife worked for the State
of Minnesota and had a Minnesota State Retirement System (MSRS) account. Regarding
the division of wife’s retirement “accounts and plans ,”1 the decree stated:
[Husband] shall be awarded 50% of the value as of May
12th, 1999[,] in and to any and all retirement accounts and
plans of [wife], including [wife’s] deferred compensation plan
and defined benefit pension plan. Upon entry of the judgment
and dec ree, [husband’s] counsel shall draft and submit a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order to effectuate this division
from [wife’s] retirement plans as recited herein. [Wife] shall
cooperate in providing information and execution of necessary
documents to effe ctuate this award. [Husband] shall be
responsible for any income tax consequences of the retirement
plans awarded to him herein.

1 While the decree referenced all of wife’s retirement accounts and plans, the primary issue
in this appeal is wife’s pension plan.
3
On January 26, 2000, the district court filed a domestic-relations order (DRO) 2
stating in relevant part:
• [T]he parties have mutually agreed upon May 12th, 1999[,] as
the end date of the marriage for dividing the participant’s
defined benefit pension plan.
• The Alternate Payee of the Alternate Payee’s estate shall
receive from the [MSRS] a portion of [wife’s] Defined Benefit
pension benefit. The portion payable to the Alternated Payee
is equal to the number of married years that [wife] was covered
by MSRS, divided by the total years of service credit earned,
multiplied by 50% of any annuity, refund, or other benefit
payable by the Plan.
• The retirement Plan Administrator shall commence with the
standard distribution procedures immediately, directing all
correspondence to the payee . . . .

Wife retired from employment with the State of Minnesota in 2022. In January
2023, more than 20 years after the DRO, wife filed a motion to amend the DRO to limit
husband’s share of her pension. At the time of th eir dissolution , wife earned around
$45,000 yearly, but at the time of her retirement, she earned around $145,000 yearly. Wife
acknowledged in an affidavit that the 2000 DRO allowed husband to take advantage of her
“high five salary calculation,” meaning that husband’s share of her pension would be
calculated based on her salary during the last five years of her employment, her highest
earning years. She requested that husband’s share be calculated on a marital -high-five
basis, meaning his share would be calculated based on her salary during the marriage.

2 We recognize that the decree referenced a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, not a
DRO. However, the parties have not raised an issue regarding this discrepancy, and we
therefore do not discuss it further.
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According to wife’s affidavit, “MSRS did not administer a marital high-five years of salary
calculation, but they now do administer such DROs.”
In March 2023, following a motion hearing, the district court grant ed wife’s motion
and amended the DRO so that husband’s share of the pension would be calculated using
wife’s “high-five average monthly salary during the marital period.” The court concluded
that reforming the DRO to adopt a mar ital-high-five calculation best reflected the parties’
intent. The court deemed its reformation a clarification of the decree and DRO rather than
a substantive modification of the property division.
DECISION
Husband argues that the district court erred by modifyi ng the DRO and awarding
wife additional assets. W e agree. The district court impermissibly modified the marital-
property division by increasing wife’s share and decreasing husband’s share of wife’s
pension.
The decree in this case required the creation of an order to effectuate the division of
wife’s retirement plans , and we therefore view the DRO as an extension of the decree.
Wife does not dispute that the appeal periods for the decree and DRO have expired. District
courts have limited authority to modify a division of marital property in a judgment and
decree after the appeal period has expired. Mikkelsen v. Mikkelsen, 174 N.W.2d 241, 243
(Minn. 1970); Stevens v. Stevens, 501 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. App. 1993); see also Minn.
Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (2022) (setting forth limited grounds for reopening a judgment and
decree); Shirk v. Shirk , 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1997) (“The sole relief from the
judgment and decree lies in meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.”).
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While a district court generally may not modify a final property division, it may
clarify provisions of a decree so long as it does not alter the parties’ substantive rights.
Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Minn. App. 2011); Redmond v. Redmond, 594
N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. App. 1999). An order clarifying a dissolution decree does not
affect the parties’ substantive rights when it does not increase or decrease the original
division of marital property. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d at 871; Hanson v. Hanson, 379 N.W.2d
230, 233 (Minn. App. 1985). This court will not disturb an appropriate order clarifying the
terms of a decree unless the district court abused its discretion . Potter v. Potter , 471
N.W.2d 113, 114 (Minn. App. 1991). A district court abuses its d iscretion by resolving
the matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record. Dobrin v. Dobrin,
569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
Here, the district court altered the parties’ substantive rights. The record shows that
(1) at the time o f the original DRO, MSRS did not provide for a marital-high-five
calculation method; and (2) “the MSRS plan administrator would interpret the [original]
DRO” so that husband’s benefit “would be approximately $1,065 monthly,” and under
wife’s requested amendment to the DRO, husband’s benefit “would be approximately $295
monthly.”
By amending the DRO to include a mar ital-high-five method for calculating
husband’s share of the pension, the district court increased wife’s share and decreased
husband’s share of the pension and thereby impermissibly altered the parties’ substantive
rights. See Erickson v. Erickson, 452 N.W.2d 253, 255- 56 (Minn. App. 1990) (noting that
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a district court cannot implement or enforce a dissolution judgment in a manner that alters
the terms of that judgment or otherwise alters the parties’ substantive rights) .
Wife argues that the decree and DRO, considered in tandem, are ambiguous because
the decree awarded hu sband half of the pension as of a specific date, May 12, 1999, and
the DRO does not specify whether MSRS is to use a marital-high-five or a salary-high-five
method for calculating husband’s share. The district court effectively relied on wife’s
argument in determining that it could modify the DRO. The district court deemed the May
1999 “valuation date” to be a “bright line” and declined to award husband asset gains after
that date “which were the result of [wife’s] significant effort and achievement after the
dissolution.”
We appreciate wife’s career dedication, which undoubtedly played a role in her
advancement following the dissolution. Nonetheless, the DRO contained a clear method
for calculating husband’s share, and the record indicates that the MSRS plan administrator
was able to implement the DRO as originally written. Therefore, the parties’ DRO was not
ambiguous when it was filed in January 2000. See Halverson v. Halverson, 381 N.W.2d
69, 71 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that w hether a decree is ambiguous is a legal question,
which we review de novo). As wife noted in her affidavit, “The current DRO allows
[husband] to take advantage of my high five salary calculation.” (Emphasis added.) We
conclude that the parties could not have originally intended a marital-high-five calculation
method because the record indicates that such a method did not exist at the time of the
dissolution. See Bone v. Bone , 438 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Minn. App. 1989) (stating that a
decree should be interpreted so that the original intent is accurately expressed). Regardless,
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the modified DRO clearly alters the parties’ substantive rights by increasing wife’s share
and decreasing husband’s share of the pension. As such, the district court abused its
discretion in modifying the DRO.
Reversed.