State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0442

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Dakoda August Scheldrup,
Respondent.

Filed August 14, 2023
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CR-22-685

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Todd S. Webb, Chief Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
The state filed this sentencing appeal after the district court departed from the
guidelines sentence for respondent’s conviction for failure to register as a predatory
offender. The state argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing (1) a
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downward durational departure based on insufficient offense-related factors and (2) a
downward dispositional departure based on insufficient offender-related factors. Because
we discern no abuse of the district court’s broad sentencing discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Dakoda August Scheldrup was adjudicated delinquent for felony
second-degree criminal sexual conduct in March 2019 and thereafter was required to
register as a predatory offender. Scheldrup submitted a required address-verification form
in April 2021 that listed his primary address as his grandparents’ house in Grand Rapids.
Law enforcement visited the address in August 2021 and spoke to Scheldrup’s
grandmother, who reported that Scheldrup occasionally resided there but frequently stayed
close to the construction job sites at which he worked. Scheldrup spoke with law
enforcement by phone and confirmed that he lived at the registered address but frequently
stayed near his job sites.
In November 2021, law enforcement spoke with Scheldrup’s grandmother and
brother, both of whom reported that Scheldrup was living in Park Rapids. Later that month,
Scheldrup went in person to the Grand Rapids Police Department to update his registered
address. He reported that he had not lived in the Grand Rapids area for about five months,
that he had been working and living in the Park Rapids area, and that he now lived in
Menahga.
In March 2022, appellant State of Minnesota charged Scheldrup with one count of
failure to register as a predatory offen der, a felony offense in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 5(a)(1) (2020). The complaint alleged that Scheldrup failed to comply
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with the requirements of registration between July and November 2021. In October 2022,
Scheldrup pleaded guilty to the offense without an agreement as to sentencing.
In December 2022, the Minnesota Department of Corrections filed a
presentence-investigation (PSI) report and sentencing worksheet. The state filed a
sentencing brief requesting that the district court sentence Scheldrup to one year and one
day in prison, a sentence at the bottom of the presumptive range. Scheldrup filed a motion
requesting both a downward dispositional departure and a downward durational departure
from a one-year-and-one-day executed sentence to a one-year stayed sentence, which by
operation of law would convert his felony conviction to a gross misdemeanor.
At Scheldrup’s sentencing hearing, the district court granted Scheldrup’s motion for
both types of downward departure. The district court adjudicated Scheldrup guilty and
sentenced him to one year in jail with 11 months stayed, 30 days of jail time, and three
years of probation.
The state appeals.
DECISION
On appeal, the state challenges the district court’s imposition of both a downward
durational sentencing departure and a downward dispositional sentencing departure,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by basing the departures on insufficient
evidence. We are not persuaded.
The district court has “great discretion in the imposition of sentences,” and appellate
courts “cannot simply substitute [their] judgment for that of the [district] court.” State v.
Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. 1999). Therefore, appellate courts review a district
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court’s imposition of a sentencing departure for an abuse of discretion. State v. Solberg,
882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016).
A district court’s discretion is constrained by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines,
which provide a sentencing range that is “presumed to be appropriate.” Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020). A district court “must pronounce a sentence of the applicable
disposition and within the applicable range unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Id. Substantial and compelling
circumstances are those that distinguish a case from a typical case. State v. Peake,
366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985).
Thus, a district court may impose a sentencing departure “only if aggravating or
mitigating circumstances are present and those circumstances provide a substantial and
compelling reason not to impose a guidelines sentence.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
308 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted). A district court abuses its discretion if its reasons
for imposing a departure are “improper or insufficient and there is insufficient evidence of
record to justify the departure.” Id. (quotations omitted).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a downward
durational sentencing departure.

“A ‘durational departure’ occurs when the court orders a sentence with a duration
other than the presumptive fixed duration or range” identified in the applicable grid of the
sentencing guidelines. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.5.b (2020). Imposing a
gross-misdemeanor sentence of one year for a felony offense with a presumptive sentence
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of one year and one day constitutes a durational sentencing departure. State v. Bauerly,
520 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1994).
A district court’s decision to impose a durational departure “must be based on
factors that reflect the seriousness of the offense” rather than “the characteristics of the
offender.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623. “[A] downward durational departure is justified
if the defendant’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically involved in the
commission of the offense.” State v. Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985).
Here, the district court based its decision to impose a downward durational
sentencing departure on appropriate offense-related factors supported by the record. The
district court stated the following grounds for its durational departure on the record:
For purposes of this offense, I do see some highlights
here, which is that at some point you proactively went into the
Grand Rapids Police Department to make the change. I don’t
think you were trying to manipulate the situation. I don’t think
you were trying to engage in unhealthy or scary behaviors, but
you need to register regardless. And then you went in at some
point and proactively went in to report. They were already
investigating, you know, you were probably doing it to save
your own skin, but you went in to report. You did something
proactively and then when you got there you were honest, and
so I do find that those are the specific offense -related grounds
and characteristics that support a durational departure. And
those are the types of behaviors that you are going to continue
to be rewarded for in the criminal-justice system and in your
life, being proactive, following the rules, and so I want to note
that.

The district court later stated, “I do find that the crime was less onerous as a grounds for
departure both dispositionally and durationally . . . .”
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The state argues that the district court’s findings were insufficient to support a
durational departure because the district court found that Scheldrup’s crime was “less
onerous” than the typical failure-to-register offense rather than finding it was “significantly
less serious” than the typical offense. It further argues that the record does not support a
conclusion that Scheldrup’s offense was “significantly less serious” than the typical
offense. The state contends that Scheldrup was not proactive in registering, contrary to the
district court’s finding. The state points to evidence in the criminal complaint that law
enforcement reached out multiple times and spoke with Scheldrup’s grandmother, his
brother, and Scheldrup himself before Scheldrup reported to the Grand Rapids Police
Department to update his address. We disagree; the district court relied on appropriate
offense-related factors in granting the downward durational departure, and the record
supports the district court’s findings on these factors.
The record supports the district court’s finding that Scheldrup took proactive steps
to comply with the registration requirement, making the commission of this offense
significantly less serious than the typical offense. Scheldrup spoke to law enforcement by
phone after his grandmother told him that an officer had visited her house in August 2021
and voluntarily reported to the Grand Rapids Police Department in November 2021 to
update his registered address. Furthermore, the record reflects that he was honest with law
enforcement about the circumstances and duration of his noncompliance.
The state also notes that Scheldrup’s failure to register continued for a period of five
months, which it contends is more serious than the typical commission of this offense. It
is unclear from the record whether five months of noncompliance is significantly more or
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less serious than the typical failure-to-register offense, and the state does not cite caselaw
that supports its assertion that failure to register for five months is more serious than the
typical offense. Caselaw does establish, however, that a single mitigating factor may
justify a downward durational departure. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 624-25. The district
court’s finding that Scheldrup proactively reported to the Grand Rapids Police Department
to update his registration is a mitigating factor upon which the downward durational
departure was properly based. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
imposition of a downward durational departure.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a downward
dispositional sentencing departure.

The legislature created the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines “to establish rational
and consistent sentencing standards . . . for felony convictions.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
1.A (2020). As such, the guidelines apply exclusively to felony convictions and
sentencing; they do not establish a presumptive sentencing duration or disposition for
gross-misdemeanor and misdemeanor convictions.
Here, the district court’s decision to impose a downward durational sentencing
departure converted Scheldrup’s conviction from a felony to a gross misdemeanor by
operation of law. This departure removed Scheldrup’s conviction from the purview of the
guidelines. See id. Because there is no longer an applicable guidelines disposition from
which to depart , the district court’s decision to impose a stay of sentence cannot be
characterized as a dispositional departure. We therefore conclude that we need not address
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the state’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a downward
dispositional sentencing departure.
Even if we were to address the state’s dispositional-departure argument on the
merits, however, we would conclude that the district court considered appropriate
offender-based factors in deciding to impose a downward dispositional departure and that
the record supports the district court’s finding that Scheldrup is particularly amenable to
probation. The district court’s sentencing decision was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.