State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0457

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Juan Antonio Ruiz,
Appellant.

Filed March 4, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Larson, Judge

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-CR-21-829

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Abby Wikelius, Lyon County Attorney, Julianna F. Passe, Assistant County Attorney,
Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Julio Antonio Ruiz challenges his convictions for one count of unlawful
possession of ammunition, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020) , and two
counts of fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.487,
2
subd. 3 (2020). Ruiz argues: (1) respondent State of Minnesota presented insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition and (2) the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a Schwartz1 hearing. Ruiz
also challenges the district court’s decision to impose two sentences for his two fleeing-a-
peace-officer convictions. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Ruiz’s conviction for
unlawful possession of ammunition and conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Ruiz’s motion for a Schwartz hearing. But because the district
court erred when it imposed two sentences for the fleeing -a-peace-officer convictions, we
reverse in part and remand to the district court.
FACTS
On August 23, 2021, in Lyon County, officers from the Marshall Police Department
attempted to execute multiple arrest warrants against Ruiz at a local apartment (the
Marshall apartment). When the officers entered the Marshall apartment, Ruiz jumped out
of a window and drove away in a tan Jeep. Two officers pursued Ruiz as he fled into the
surrounding countryside. The pursuit lasted between four and seven minutes and occurred
sometime between 12:08 p.m. and 12:22 p.m. The officers terminated their pursuit once
they determined no one was nearby to render assistance. The Marshall Police Department

1 A Schwartz hearing is a proceeding in which a district court determines whether a guilty
verdict was the result of juror misconduct. See Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus
Co., 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1960). When a hearing is warranted, “the [district] court
may summon the juror who alleges jury misconduct and permit, with proper safeguards,
an examination to be conducted in the presence of counsel for all interested parties and the
[district court] judge.” Zimmerman v. Witte Transp. Co. , 259 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn.
1977).
3
then notified the neighboring Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office that Ruiz was headed in their
direction.
Upon receiving the dispatch from the Marshall Police Department, a Lincoln
County sheriff went on an active search for Ruiz. The sheriff located Ruiz at approximately
1:13 p.m. and tried to pull him over, but Ruiz sped off. Ruiz eventually reentered Lyon
County. He then entered the town of Minneota with multiple Lincoln County sheriff’s
deputies in pursuit. The Minneota Police Department’s chief intervened and tried
unsuccessfully to stop Ruiz. After Ruiz left Minneota, Lyon County sheriff’s deputies
punctured the Jeep’s tires with spike strips, causing the Jeep to veer into a corn field where
the Minneota police chief apprehended Ruiz. The Marshall Police Department obtained a
warrant to search the Jeep. Inside, a detective found ammunition and a loaded firearm.
The state charged Ruiz with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), one count of unlawful possession of ammunition,
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2),2 and two counts of fleeing a peace officer in
a motor vehicle, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3. The state alleged Ruiz
committed the first fleeing-a-peace-officer offense when he fled from the Marshall Police
Department and the second fleeing-a-peace-officer offense when he fled from the Lincoln
County Sheriff’s Department and the Minneota Police Department.

2 Under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), a person cannot possess a firearm or ammunition
after a conviction for “a crime of violence.” In 2009, Ruiz was convicted of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342 (2008), which is a crime of violence,
see Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2020).
4
At a jury trial, the detective who searched the Jeep testified that he found two rounds
of “ammunition in [a] cupholder” between the driver’s and front passenger’s seats, and “a
nine millimeter handgun in the back portion of the vehicle” loaded with five rounds of
ammunition. According to the detective, the Jeep “was messy” with loose change in the
cupholder where he found the ammunition. The detective also testified that he found a
wallet containing Ruiz’s driver’s license near a brake lever approximately six inches away
from the cupholder. In addition, the detective located two identification cards in the Jeep
that did not belong to Ruiz.
The detective further testified that after he searched the Jeep , he arranged for the
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) to test the firearm for Ruiz’s DNA.
The detective contacted Ruiz to obtain a DNA swab. According to the detective, during
their interaction, Ruiz commented “that there was ammo all over the car” and “[h]e had
moved [the ammunition] around when he cleaned [the Jeep].” The detective testified that
he did not conduct a DNA test on the ammunition because Ruiz already admitted that he
moved the ammunition in the Jeep. BCA testing found a partial major male profile on the
firearm’s grip matching Ruiz.
The state also called Ruiz’s ex-girlfriend, who testified about Ruiz’s ownership of
the Jeep. She testified that Ruiz purchased the Jeep in June or July of 2021. She stated
that when Ruiz purchased the Jeep “[i]t was fairly clean” and “there [were] like no
belongings” inside.
Ruiz called the resident of the Marshall apartment to testify. She te stified that in
the days preceding August 23, 2021, she observed multiple people who either had access
5
to or drove the Jeep. She explained that, in the night or early morning hours before Ruiz’s
arrest, an individual dropped off the Jeep’s keys at the Marshall apartment so that Ruiz
“could use the vehicle.” In addition, she described two occasions where she witnessed
others driving the Jeep . In particular, she described that a few days before Ruiz’s arrest,
she and Ruiz rode in the Jeep with an unidentified male driving. More generally, she
testified that “several people were part of this vehicle” and that Ruiz “wasn’t the only one”
who had access to or used it.
At the end of the trial, the jury delivered guilty verdicts for one count of unlawful
possession of ammunition and two counts of fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle.
The jury found Ruiz not guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm.
After trial, a juror contacted defense counsel regarding the verdicts. Defense
counsel did not question the juror. Instead, defense counsel immediately notified the
district court via letter, describing the juror ’s statement that “she was pressured and
harassed by other jurors into her agreeing to one of the verdicts.” Defense counsel also
filed a motion requesting a Schwartz hearing. The district court denied the motion.
The district court then sentenced Ruiz to concurrent terms of 60 months in prison
for unlawful possession of ammunition and 17 months in prison for each fleeing-a-peace-
officer conviction. This appeal follows.
DECISION
In this direct appeal, Ruiz challenges his convictions and sentences. Ruiz argues:
(1) the state presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for unlawful
possession of ammunition and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
6
motion for a Schwartz hearing. Ruiz also argues the district court erred when it imposed
two sentences for his fleeing-a-peace -officer convictions. We address each argument in
turn.
I.
Ruiz first challenges whether the state presented sufficient evidence to show that he
possessed the ammunition in the cupholder. 3 “When evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence, appellate courts carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and
the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude
that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was
convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “The
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed
that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” Id. “The
verdict will not be overturned if the fact-finder, upon application of the presumption of
innocence and the State’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
Here, the state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove Ruiz possessed the
ammunition. See State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (noting that

3 At trial, the detective testified that he found a handgun in the back of the Jeep that
contained ammunition, but the jury found the state failed to prove Ruiz possessed the
firearm. The state concedes that Ruiz’s conviction cannot be based on the ammunition in
the handgun because the jury acquitted Ruiz of the unlawful-firearm-possession charge.
We agree. Ruiz cannot have possessed the ammunition in the handgun if he did not possess
the handgun itself. Therefore, we elect not to consider the ammunition in the handgun as
evidence that Ruiz possessed ammunition in the Jeep.
7
circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts
in dispute existed or did not exist” (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we apply the
heightened two-step circumstantial-evidence test. State v. Ortega , 813 N.W.2d 86, 100
(Minn. 2012). First, we identify the circumstances proved. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d
594, 598 (Minn. 2013). In this step, we defer to “the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these
circumstances” and “assume that the jury believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved
the defense witnesses.” Id. at 598-99 (quotations omitted). Second, we determine if the
circumstances, when viewed “as a whole,” are “consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
any rational hypothesis except that of guilt, not simply whether the inferences that point to
guilt are reasonable.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). During this step, we do not defer to
the factfinder’s choice between reasonable inferences. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320,
329-30 (Minn. 2010). The circumstantial evidence presented by the state “must form a
complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the
defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than
guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
Under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), “ a person who has been convicted of . . . a
crime of violence” is not “entitled to possess ammunition.” To obtain a conviction, the
state must prove the defendant knowingly possessed the ammunition. See Harris, 895
N.W.2d at 601. Here , the state argues that Ruiz had constructive possession of the
ammunition in the cupholder. See id. at 601 (“Possession may be proved through evidence
of . . . constructive possession.”); State v . German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. App.
2019) (the state can prove constructive possession using circumstantial evidence). The
8
state may prove constructive possession using two methods. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
First, the state may show law enforcement “found the item in a place under defendant’s
exclusive control to which other people normally did not have access.” Id. Second, if law
enforcement “found the item in a place to which others had access, the State must show
that there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that at the time the
defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and control over it.” Id.
Ruiz argues we must evaluate whether he had constructive possession using the
second method because the evidence at trial showed he did not have “exclusive control”
over the Jeep. The state disagrees, arguing the only evidence that others used the Jeep
came from a defense witness, and that we must assume the jury disregarded defense-
witness testimony when we formulate the circumstances proved. However, when
evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we are permitted to consider testimony that does
not conflict with the jury’s verdict. State v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d 145, 151-52 (Minn.
2023). Here, the legal framework for constructive possession accounts for scenarios where
contraband is “in a place to which others had access.” See State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d
156, 159 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). Therefore, testimony that others used the car
“is not inconsistent” with the jury’s verdict that Ruiz possessed the ammunition. See
Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d at 152. Moreover, the detective—a state witness—testified that he
found identification cards from two other individuals in the Jeep. Thus, even without
defense-witness testimony, evidence was presented at trial that others had access to the
Jeep. Therefore, we evaluate whether there is a strong probability inferable from the
9
evidence presented at trial that Ruiz “was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion
and control over” the ammunition in the cupholder. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
Ruiz next asserts the state presented insufficient evidence that he had constructive
possession over the ammunition in the cupholder. Courts consider several factors when
determining whether there is sufficient evidence to establish constructive possession.
“Proximity is an important consideration in assessing constructive possession.” State v.
Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001). “[E]ase
of access is . . . [another] factor relevant to establishing constructive possession, [though]
it is not the sole factor or necessarily even the most important factor.” Salyers, 858 N.W.2d
at 159; Harris, 895 N.W.2d 601-02. Further, ownership and control over a vehicle where
officers find contraband can be evidence of constructive possession. State v. Slifka, 256
N.W.2d 90, 91 (Minn. 1977) (“The officers arguably had reasonable cause to believe that
the driver constructively possessed the marijuana because the car was his and he was in
control of the car.”).
Applying this standard and resolving all fact questions in favor of the verdict, see
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598-99, we identify the circumstances proved: (1) Ruiz
purchased the Jeep in summer 2021; (2) several people used the Jeep during Ruiz’s
ownership; (3) the resident of the Marshall apartment rode in the Jeep with Ruiz while an
unidentified person drove it; (4) someone dropped off the Jeep’s keys at the Marshall
apartment several hours before Ruiz’s arrest; (5) when officers attempted to arrest Ruiz at
the Marshall apartment, Ruiz fled in the Jeep; (6) Ruiz was alone in the Jeep when he fled;
(7) when officers apprehended Ruiz, he was still alone in the Jeep; (8) after apprehending
10
Ruiz, the detective searched the Jeep, which was cluttered with miscellaneous items; (9) the
detective found two rounds of ammunition, along with loose change, in the Jeep’s
cupholder; (10) the detective located Ruiz’s wallet with his driver’s license near the Jeep’s
handbrake, six inches from the ammunition; (11) the detective located two identification
cards in the Jeep that did not belong to Ruiz; and (12) during the subsequent investigation,
Ruiz admitted that ammunition was spread all over the Jeep , and he had moved the
ammunition.
Next, we review whether “as a whole” these proved circumstances are “consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation omitted). Ruiz argues the circumstances proved do not
support a reasonable inference of guilt because the state relies solely on his proximity to
the ammunition and never tested the ammunition for his DNA. We are not persuaded.
Although the evidence presented at trial showed that others used the Jeep, Ruiz
owned the Jeep, and was alone in the Jeep both when he fled from the officers and when
he was apprehended. Ruiz sat next to the ammunition in the cupholder for over an hour
while he evaded arrest and laid his wallet with his driver’s license only six inches from the
cupholder. Further, Ruiz later admitted to the detective that he knew the Jeep contained
ammunition and that he moved the ammunition when he cleaned the Jeep. The record, in
its entirety, shows a strong probability that Ruiz had both the “ability and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over” the ammunition in the cupholder. See Harris, 895
N.W.2d at 602.
11
Ruiz also argues that, even if the evidence is consistent with guilt, there is a
reasonable alternative hypothesis that someone else possessed the ammunition. Again, we
are not persuaded. First, Ruiz’s argument fails to account for the fact that “[a] defendant
may possess an item jointly with another person.” See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. Thus,
the potential that someone else may have possessed the ammunition does not preclude Ruiz
from having exercised dominion and control over the ammunition at the time of his arrest.
Further, inferring that someone else possessed the ammunition simply because they drove
the Jeep would constitute speculation and conjecture, not a reasonable alternative
hypothesis derived from the record. See Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 330 (noting that we will
not overturn a conviction based on “mere conjecture”); State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849,
858 (Minn. 2008) (avoiding conjecture requires pointing “to evidence in the record that is
consistent with a rational theory other than guilt”).
The circumstances proved support a reasonable inference of guilt and do not support
a reasonable alternative hypothesis that is inconsistent with guilt. Therefore, we affirm
Ruiz’s unlawful possession of ammunition conviction.
II.
Ruiz next argues that he was entitled to a Schwartz hearing relying on the juror’s
post-trial allegations that other jurors harassed her into consenting to “one of the verdicts.”
Ruiz argues that defense counsel’s assertion that the juror was “harassed” indicated that
the juror experienced conduct beyond mere pressure and, therefore, the district court should
have granted Ruiz’s request for a Schwartz hearing. We review the district court’s decision
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Church, 577 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. 1998). “A district
12
court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn.
2019) (quotation omitted).
After trial, a defendant may move to impeach a jury verdict and the district court
may respond with a hearing to examine jurors “under oath [with] their testimony recorded.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(6). This hearing, known as a Schwartz hearing,
investigates “whether a jury verdict is the product of misconduct.” State v. Greer, 635
N.W.2d 82, 93 (Minn. 2001). A defendant is entitled to a Schwartz hearing when they
present a prima facie case that, “standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the
conclusion of jury misconduct.” State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 225-26 (Minn. 2000)
(quotation omitted).
A district court “should be liberal in granting [a Schwartz] hearing.” Zimmerman v.
Witte Transp. Co., 259 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 1977) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, a
juror’s testimony must be admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 606(b). See Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.03, subd. 20(6). Therefore, to require a hearing, some alignment must exist between
the juror’s allegations and the type of testimony rule 606(b) permits a defendant to elicit.
See Martin, 614 N.W.2d at 226. Under rule 606(b), “a juror may testify” about conduct
including “whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror, or as to any threats of violence or violent acts brought to bear on jurors.”
Accordingly, when a juror alleges that other jurors exerted pressure , but does not allege
“threats of violence or violent acts,” a district court does not abuse its discretion when it
13
denies a motion for a Schwartz hearing. See State v. Jackson, 615 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Minn.
App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 17, 2000); Minn. R. Evid. 606(b) 1989 comm. cmt.
(“The [district] court must distinguish between testimony about ‘psychological’
intimidation, coercion, and persuasion, which would be inadmissible, as opposed to express
acts or threats of violence.”).4
Here, Ruiz failed to present a prima facie case that “standing alone and
unchallenged” shows juror misconduct. See Martin, 614 N.W.2d at 225-26. Defense
counsel’s submission to the district court only asserts that the juror experienced
psychological intimidation: she “ was pressured and harassed by other jurors.” Defense
counsel did not indicate that the juror alleged violence, a threat of violence, or other
circumstances she could have testified about under rule 606(b). See Jackson, 615 N.W.2d
at 396. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Ruiz a Schwartz hearing.
III.
Lastly, Ruiz argues we must reverse and remand to the district court to vacate one
of his fleeing-a-peace-officer sentences because the two convictions arose from the same
behavioral incident. Whether multiple offenses occurred during the same behavioral
incident presents “a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264,

4 Our nonprecedential opinions have followed suit. See State v. Rucker, No. A15-2044,
2017 WL 746422, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 27, 2017), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2017 );
State v. Brantley, No. A12-1639, 2013 WL 6050218, at *5 (Minn. App. Nov. 18, 2013),
rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 29, 2014); State v. Jahnke, A06-1575, 2008 WL 1795278, at *1-2
(Minn. App. Apr. 22, 2008).

14
270 (Minn. 2016). We review a “district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
application of the law to those facts de novo.” Id.
Under Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2020), “if a person’s conduct constitutes more
than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of
the offenses.” Courts have interpreted subdivision 1 “to bar multiple sentences for crimes
that arise from [the same] behavioral incident.” State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825, 827
(Minn. 2011). The purpose of the statute is to “protect against exaggerating the criminality
of a person’s conduct and to make both punishment and prosecution commensurate with
culpability.” State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
The state bears the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that multiple
“offenses did not occur as part of the same behavioral incident.” State v. Williams, 608
N.W.2d 837, 841-42 (Minn. 2000).
In this case, Ruiz was convicted of two counts of fleeing a peace officer, pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3. That provision states that “[w]hoever . . . flees or
attempts to flee a peace officer,” and “knows or should reasonably know the same to be a
peace officer” commits a felony. Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3. The statute defines
fleeing as an “intent to attempt to el ude a peace officer following a signal given by any
peace officer to the driver of a motor vehicle.” Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 1 (2020).
For two intentional crimes like these, we consider “factors of time and
place . . . [and w]hether the segment of conduct involved was motivated by an effort to
obtain a single criminal objective.” Bauer, 792 N.W.2d at 828 (alteration in original)
(quotation omitted). “The application of this test depends heavily on the facts and
15
circumstances of the particular case.” Id. “[B]road statements of criminal purpose do not
unify separate acts.” State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 267 (Minn. 2020) (quotation
omitted). Rather, we must evaluate “whether all of the acts performed were necessary to
or incidental to the commission of a single crime and motivated by an intent to commit that
crime.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the state failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the two
fleeing-a-peace-officer convictions arose from separate behavioral incidents. With respect
to time and place, the evidence presented at trial shows Ruiz fled from the Marshall
apartment and continued to evade law enforcement until officers punctured the Jeep’s tires
with spike strips. Given the rural area where Ruiz committed the crimes, one would expect
that he would travel across a relatively large geographic area to evade law enforcement,
including travel ling between counties. That different officers encountered and pursued
Ruiz at different points during evasion, and some officers only pursued Ruiz after receiving
a dispatch that Ruiz was actively fleeing, shows the crimes occurred in a sufficiently similar
time and place to be considered part of the same behavioral incident.5
The record also shows that Ruiz harbored the same criminal objective. After
officers arrived at the Marshall apartment, Ruiz drove away to evade arrest. Although
officers abandoned their initial pursuit, Ruiz drove around the countryside unabated. He

5 We are also unconvinced by the state’s argument that the two convictions are not part of
the same behavioral incident because the Marshall Police Department called off their
pursuit. When evaluating whether a crime is part of the same behavioral incident, we
evaluate the defendant’s conduct, not the state’s conduct. See Barthman, 938 N.W.2d at
265-66 (outlining the framework for whether multiple offenses were part of the same
behavioral incident).
16
continued to flee law enforcement when the Lincoln County sheriff pursued him an hour
later and when the Minneota police chief tried to stop him. He did not cease fleeing until
Lyon County sheriff’s deputies stopped the Jeep with spike strips. Throughout this entire
time, Ruiz’s criminal objective remained the same—avoiding law enforcement to prevent
arrest for his outstanding arrest warrants. Accordingly, the state charged Ruiz with two
counts under the exact same statute and with the same mens rea element: “intent to attempt
to elude a peace officer.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 1.
The state did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the two convictions
stemmed from isolated conduct meriting two sentences. We conclude the district court
erred when it determined the two fleeing-a-peace-officer convictions arose from separate
behavioral incidents. Therefore, we reverse in part and remand to the district court to
vacate one of Ruiz’s fleeing-a-peace-officer sentences.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.