In the Matter of the Welfare of: C.T.B

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A23-0459

Court of Appeals Moore, III, J.
Concurring, Hudson, C.J.
Took no part, Gaïtas, J.

In the Matter of the Welfare of: C.T.B. Filed: August 13, 2025
Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant State
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant C.T.B.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant
Hennepin County Attorneys, Liesl Holum, Certified Student Attorney, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for respondent State of Minnesota.

Teresa J. Nelson, Alicia L. Granse, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Shauna F. Kieffer, Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota and Minnesota
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
________________________

SYLLABUS

Police officers did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant was

armed and dangerous when they conducted a pat-frisk of the appellant because mere

proximity to a suspect in an alleged crime is not enough to support reasonable, articulable

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suspicion for a warrantless pat-frisk.

Reversed and remanded.

OPINION

MOORE, III, Justice.

We are asked here to determine whether police officers had reasonable, articulable

suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to conduct the pat-frisk of appellant

C.T.B., which revealed that C.T.B. possessed a handgun. The district court denied C.T.B.’s

motion to suppress the handgun as a result of the search. On appeal, the court of appeals

affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that based on the totality of the

circumstances, the officers reasonably suspected that C.T.B. might be armed and dangerous

when they conducted the pat-frisk. Because the totality of the circumstances establish that

the officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that C.T.B. was armed and dangerous

when they conducted the pat-frisk, we reverse and remand to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged C.T.B. with unlawfully possessing a

firearm while under 18 years old. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(1) (2024) (“The

following persons shall not be entitled to possess . . . a pistol or . . . any other firearm: a

person under the age of 18 years . . . .”). C.T.B. moved to suppress the handgun police

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found during a pat-frisk. 1 According to C.T.B., the officers lacked a reasonable, articulable

suspicion that he was armed and dangerous when they conducted the pat-frisk because,

C.T.B. argues, mere physical proximity to a suspect involved in an alleged crime is not

enough to support reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a warrantless search.

In response, the State argued that C.T.B.’s pat-frisk was a reasonable expansion of

the search of the original suspect. In the alternative, the State also argued that the officers

had an independent, particularized basis to pat-frisk C.T.B. The district court held an

evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion. Two of the arresting officers testified, and

the State submitted as an exhibit a recording of the incident taken from one of the officer’s

body-worn camera as an exhibit.

The officers’ testimony established these facts. On December 27, 2022, police

officers responded to a report that a man in a yellow and black coat (the “original suspect”)

was pointing a handgun at people at a light rail station in Minneapolis. A few minutes

later, the officers located the original suspect standing inside a nearby carryout pizza

restaurant. One of the officers “saw through the window [of the restaurant] a [B]lack male

1
A pat-frisk is a carefully limited search of the outer clothing used by police to
ascertain whether a person is armed and dangerous and may assault an officer. See Terry,
392 U.S. at 24 (defining a frisk as “a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons”).
We commented on this kind of search in State v. Harris, where we held that “[w]hen an
officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a person he has seized is armed and
dangerous, the officer may conduct a protective pat-down search of the person’s outer
clothing in order to ascertain whether the person is armed.” 590 N.W.2d 90, 104 (Minn.
1999). We have sometimes referred to this type of limited search as a “pat-down search,”
e.g., State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Minn. 2021), or a “Terry pat-down search,” e.g.,
Matter of Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 694 n.7 (Minn. 1997). In this case, we use
the term “pat-frisk.”

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wearing a yellow jacket with black sleeves.” He also saw “maybe three or four” other

people, including 16-year-old appellant C.T.B., all “close to each other,” roughly within “a

conversational distance” of the original suspect. That officer also testified that,

From my experience, I know that if there’s multiple individuals at one place
and there’s someone known to have a firearm, that sometimes it could be
passed around to a different individual, especially when that suspect knows
that we’re looking for him or he was involved in an incident recently.

Based on these observations, one of the officers pat-frisked C.T.B. and found a handgun in

the front pocket of his sweater.

The district court denied C.T.B.’s motion to suppress the handgun. The court found

that, when officers arrived at the restaurant, the original suspect was “huddled in a group

and conversing with three to four young men.” It concluded that police “had a reasonable

and articulable suspicion that [C.T.B.] was potentially armed and had a particularized

constitutional basis to conduct a pat-frisk. . . based upon the officers’ experience that

weapons can often be passed off to another person in a group to evade detection and

[C.T.B.]’s close proximity to the original suspect.” It also concluded that the frisk of

C.T.B. was a “permissible expansion of the Terry stop and frisk of the original suspect.” 2

2
We have never held that a valid pat-frisk of one person under Terry can be expanded
to justify an independent and subsequent frisk of a second person who is simply present in
the same location with the first person without an individualized reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the second person is armed and dangerous and criminal activity is afoot. In
this case, neither the district court nor the State has articulated a persuasive reason for such
a holding.
In Ybarra v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court rejected a similar argument.
444 U.S. 85, 96 (1979). Police officers had a warrant to search a tavern and one of its
employees, but they expanded their search to pat-frisk several other customers who were
merely present in the tavern and not suspected to be involved in criminal activity. Id. at 90.

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 C.T.B. requested a trial on stipulated facts pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Juvenile

Delinquency Procedure 13.03, subdivision 3. After a bench trial, the district court found

C.T.B. guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm while under the age of 18 because he

“knowingly possessed a firearm while under the age of 18 . . . and [did] not fall into any of

the categories that would exempt him from the application of [the ineligible-persons

statute, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(1)].” 3 The district court issued an order staying the

adjudication of delinquency contingent on C.T.B. successfully following the conditions of

probation. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(B) (“If the child is not held in

detention, the court may continue the case without adjudication . . . .”).

C.T.B. appealed, claiming that the district court erred by denying his motion to

suppress evidence, specifically the handgun that arose from the pat-frisk. In a

nonprecedential opinion, the court of appeals affirmed. The court did not address the

The Court explained that “[n]othing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized
‘cursory search for weapons’ ” and that the “ ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does
not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the
person to be frisked . . . .” Id. at 93–94 (emphasis added). We likewise reject the argument
that the search of C.T.B. was justified as an “expansion” of the search of the original
suspect.
3
C.T.B. does not argue that any exception applied to him. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(1) (allowing persons under 18 to possess certain kinds of ammunition and firearms
“(i) in the actual presence or under the direct supervision of the person’s parent or guardian,
(ii) for the purpose of military drill under the auspices of a legally recognized military
organization and under competent supervision, (iii) for the purpose of instruction,
competition, or target practice on a firing range approved by the chief of police or county
sheriff in whose jurisdiction the range is located and under direct supervision; or (iv) if the
person has successfully completed a course designed to teach marksmanship and safety
with a pistol or semiautomatic military-style assault weapon and approved by the
commissioner of natural resources.”).

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“expansion” argument. Rather, it concluded that the totality of the circumstances made it

“objectively reasonable for the [police] to think that the suspect had handed the firearm to

one of the young men who was standing with the suspect when the police approached,

including [C.T.B.]” In re Welfare of C.T.B., No. A23-0459, 2023 WL 7478491, at *4

(Minn. App. Nov. 13, 2023). In doing so, the court of appeals inferred that the officers did

not find the firearm that they were looking for on the original suspect. Id. at *1 (“Although

the district court did not make a finding regarding whether the officers found a firearm

when they pat-frisked the [original] suspect, the court’s findings imply that they did not.”).

The court of appeals included this fact in the totality of the circumstances that justified

C.T.B.’s pat-frisk. Id. C.T.B. filed a petition for review of the decision of the court of

appeals, which we granted.

ANALYSIS

When reviewing the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, “we review

the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” State

v. Molnau, 904 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Minn. 2017). The heart of the dispute here concerns

whether police had a constitutional basis to pat-frisk C.T.B. The legality of an officer’s

warrantless pat-frisk turns on what we have characterized as the “Terry search exception”

to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements. State v. Flowers,

734 N.W.2d 239, 249 (Minn. 2007). Under both the United States Constitution and the

Minnesota Constitution, people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects against unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,

§ 10. Any search is presumptively unreasonable unless it is authorized by a warrant based

6
on probable cause or otherwise falls within an exception to these requirements. State v.

Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992). One such exception was created by the

United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Terry v. Ohio, which held that—in certain

circumstances—police could pat-frisk an individual without probable cause or a warrant.

392 U.S. at 27. We have held that the “principles and framework of Terry” also apply to

cases arising under the Minnesota Constitution. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363

(Minn. 2004).

The Terry exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements allows a police

officer to conduct a pat-frisk of a person, meaning a carefully limited search of the outer

clothing in an attempt to discover weapons, when the officer has a reasonable articulable

suspicion that the person is “armed and dangerous” and “criminal activity may be afoot.”

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. This reasonable articulable suspicion must be “directed at the person

to be frisked.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 (1979). We have also often remarked

that the threshold for reasonable suspicion “is ‘not high.’ ” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d

836, 843 (Minn. 2011) (quoting State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008)).

The reasonableness of an officer’s suspicions is judged by “an objective examination of

the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Lemert, 843 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 2014).

This examination is conducted “from the perspective of a trained police officer, who may

make ‘inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.’ ” Id. (quoting

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). The totality of the circumstances

includes the “special training” and “experience” of a police officer. State v. Sargent, 968

N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. 2021).

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 Yet an officer’s suspicion must be “more than an unarticulated hunch,” and “the

officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports [the officer’s]

suspicion.” State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 825–26 (Minn. 1989) (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we have rejected the automatic-

companion rule, adopted by some jurisdictions, 4 which allows police to search “any person

who is in the company of someone whom the officers have arrested.” Lemert, 843 N.W.2d

at 231, 232. “Mere proximity to, or association with, a person who may have previously

engaged in criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion,” absent some

other factor. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 844. Rather, “being a companion to an arrestee is part

of the totality of the circumstances” considered in whether an officer’s suspicion is

reasonable. Lemert, 843 N.W.2d at 233.

In explaining that C.T.B.’s search was based on more than his mere proximity to the

original suspect, the court of appeals relied in part on the fact that the police knew that the

original suspect had recently brandished a firearm and failed to find that firearm when they

searched the original suspect. C.T.B., 2023 WL 7478491, at *4. But as the court of appeals

noted, the district court did not find that the police failed to locate the firearm on the original

suspect. Id. at *1. No officer testified to that fact and nothing else in the record supports

that fact. Consequently, the court of appeals reliance on that fact was misplaced. For these

4
As C.T.B. notes, the automatic-companion rule has been adopted by the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, but has been rejected by the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits. See United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bell, 762
F.2d 495, 498 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986).

8
reasons, we conclude that the court of appeals erred in considering the fact that the firearm

was unaccounted for as a part of the totality of the circumstances that justified C.T.B.’s

pat-frisk. 5

We now turn to the remaining facts that the court of appeals and the district court

relied upon.

The district court found as a matter of fact that the original suspect was “huddled”

in a group and “conversing” with three to four young men, including C.T.B. We must

defer to this factual finding unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393,

403 (Minn. 2020). In applying the clear-error standard, we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the findings. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221

(Minn. 2021). A factual finding is clearly erroneous “if it does not have evidentiary support

in the record.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons

below, we conclude that even when the record is viewed in a light most favorable to the

district court’s findings, it fails to support a finding that the original suspect was “huddled”

in a group and “conversing” with three to four young men, including C.T.B.

First, the record does not support a finding that any of the individuals were

“conversing.” One officer testified that the individuals were a “conversational distance”

5
Because it is clear that there is no basis in the record for the court of appeals’
inference, it is not necessary to reach the issues discussed in the concurrence in order to
conclude the court of appeals erred in considering a missing gun as part of the totality of
the circumstances that could give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion. Judicial restraint
“bids us to refrain from deciding any issue not essential to the disposition of the particular
controversy before us.” Johnson v. State, 956 N.W.2d 618, 623 n.4 (Minn. 2021) (quoting
Lipka v. Minn. Sch. Emps. Ass’n, Local 1980, 550 N.W.2d 618, 622 n.9 (1996)).

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from the original suspect, but never testified that they were actually conversing. Likewise,

even when viewed in a light most favorable to the district court’s findings, the body-worn

camera footage does not show any conversation. We therefore conclude that the district

court clearly erred in finding that C.T.B. was conversing with the original suspect.

Second, the record does not support a finding that C.T.B. was “huddled in a group”

with the original suspect. The word “huddled” is commonly understood to mean “to hold

a consultation,” which suggests a coordinated effort. Merriam-Webster Dictionary 604

(11th ed. 2020). The officers never used the word “huddled” in their testimony and

reported only that the original suspect was “standing with other individuals.” When viewed

in a light most favorable to the district court’s findings, the officer’s body-worn camera

footage simply shows that for a few seconds, a group of people, including C.T.B., were

standing just inside the entrance to the pizza restaurant looking out of the window at the

approaching police officers. C.T.B. was standing behind and apart from the others by the

window; nothing in his posture or demeanor suggested any connection to the original

suspect. Nor did the body-worn camera footage show C.T.B. speaking to the others. In

short, the body-worn camera footage does not indicate that C.T.B. had any relationship to

the original suspect aside from the fact that they were both standing close to the window

for a few seconds. The record clearly shows that several people were standing around in

different areas of the restaurant, and as the officers approached, the men independently

moved toward the window, gazed out of the window for a few seconds, and then went their

separate ways. We therefore conclude that the district court’s finding that C.T.B. was

“huddled” with the original suspect is clearly erroneous because “it does not have

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evidentiary support in the record.” See Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d at 403 (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Having concluded that the district court’s factual finding that the original suspect

was “huddled” in a group and “conversing” with three to four young men, including C.T.B.,

is clearly erroneous, we are left with the arguments that C.T.B.’s mere proximity to the

original suspect and the officer’s training and experience that weapons can be passed off

to another person in a group to evade detection were sufficient to establish reasonable,

articulable suspicion. We have previously held that proximity is not enough, by itself, to

support reasonable suspicion. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 844. In this case, we conclude that

C.T.B.’s mere proximity to the original suspect, combined with the officer’s general

knowledge that people in groups may pass weapons to others to avoid detection, was not

sufficient to create a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a Terry pat-frisk. The

United States Supreme Court has explained that “the Terry exception does not permit a

frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be

frisked . . . .” Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 96 (emphasis added). On these facts, police officers’

general knowledge that weapons can be passed to evade detection, without more, is not

enough to justify a Terry search of every individual standing near the original suspect.

We recognize the legitimate concern for the safety of both the officers and the public

when firearms are involved in a potential crime. See State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886,

891 (Minn. 1998) (“officer safety is a paramount interest”). But at a suppression hearing,

the State bears the burden of proving that the police obtained the challenged evidence in

accord with the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. Molnau, 904 N.W.2d at 451.

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On the record before us, the State has not met its burden to prove that C.T.B.’s search was

constitutional. Therefore, the district court erred when it denied C.T.B.’s motion to

suppress the handgun.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and

remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

GAÏTAS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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 C O N C U R R E N C E

HUDSON, Chief Justice (concurring).

I agree with the court’s decision to reverse C.T.B.’s conviction because law

enforcement clearly had no reasonable, articulable suspicion to search him based solely on

his proximity to a person who may have previously engaged in criminal activity. I write

separately to expressly articulate that the timing of C.T.B.’s seizure—which is critical to

the required analysis of the totality of the circumstances—also demonstrates that law

enforcement lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to search C.T.B. The court’s

reluctance to articulate the boundaries of reasonable, articulable suspicion and provide law

enforcement and the public with practical guidance is troubling. Thus, I do so here.

Along with the officer’s testimony, the body-worn camera footage shows the

following events. An officer approached the glass door of the restaurant with his gun drawn

and brought the original suspect outside the restaurant. Another officer instructed the first

officer to detain the individuals inside the restaurant and began searching the original

suspect. The first officer continued to stand in front of the door with his gun drawn and

told the individuals inside who had been near the original suspect, including C.T.B., that

they could not leave. About a minute later, the officers entered the restaurant and began

frisking the individuals inside the store that they had observed standing near the original

suspect, including C.T.B.

As we said in Diede, we will not consider facts that “did not yet exist” at the time

of a seizure. 795 N.W.2d 836, 844 (Minn. 2011). A seizure occurs “when the officer, by

means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a

C-1
citizen.” State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995). While neither court below

commented on the timing of the seizure, I conclude, based on the video evidence, that

C.T.B. was seized when the officers approached the restaurant with guns drawn and

prevented the individuals inside who had been standing near the original suspect, including

C.T.B., from leaving. At that point, C.T.B.’s liberty was restrained by the officer’s force

and show of authority. Id. The video evidence shows that this seizure took place just as

the officers began their search of the original suspect. Because that search was unfinished,

the officers could not have known whether the original suspect still had the firearm that he

had been recently observed with, and they therefore did not have reasonable, articulable

suspicion to search C.T.B.

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