In the Matter of the Welfare of: C. T. B.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0459

In the Matter of the Welfare of: C. T. B.

Filed November 13, 2023
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-22-3217

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant CTB.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant juvenile challenges the denial of his motion to suppress a firearm that the
police recovered from him during a stop and frisk. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant CTB with unlawful possession of
a firearm by a person under the age of 18. CTB moved the district court to suppress
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evidence of the firearm, arguing that the firearm was the product of an unconstitutional
search and seizure.
The district court held a hearing on CTB’s motion to suppress and found that on
December 27, 2022, Metro Transit Police Department officers received reports that a man
had brandished a firearm on the platform of the Lake Street Light Rail Transit station in
Minneapolis. The suspect exited the station through the North Lobby and “was described
as a black male wearing a distinct yellow and black puffy polo jacket.”
An officer responded to the call and received a photo graph of the suspect. The
officer was informed that the suspect appeared to be headed westbound on Lake Street
toward the Little Caesar’s restaurant, which was less than a block from the transit station.
The officer went to the restaurant, looked through the windows, and saw a man who
matched the suspect’s description. The officer compared the photograph of the suspect to
the man inside the res taurant and concluded that it w as the same person. The officer
observed that the suspect was “huddled in a group and conversing with three to four young
men” near the restaurant’s front door.
The officer called for backup to help control the situation and for public safety
because the suspect was alleged to have a firearm and was standing with a group of other
people. A second officer responded. The officers approached the suspect, placed him on
the ground, handcuffed him, and pat-frisked him.
Although the district court did not make a finding regarding whether the officers
found a firearm when they pat-frisked the suspect, the court’s findings imply that they did
not. According to the district court’s findings, only one firearm was recovered at the scene,
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and it was recovered from CTB. Neither party suggests, and the record does not indicate,
that the police found a weapon during their pat-frisk of the suspect.
While the first officer secured the suspect , the second officer stood in the front
entrance to the restaurant to prevent any of the young men who had been standing with the
suspect from leaving. The first officer called for more officers because he feared the
situation could escalate and because he did not know whether multiple firearms were
involved or whether the suspect’s firearm had been passed to one of the other young men
who had been standing with him. Both officers testified that , in their experience, if a
suspect is apprehended in a grou p, it is common for the suspect to pass off a weapon or
other contraband to another person in the group to avoid its detection. For that reason, the
second officer pat -frisked the four young men who had been standing with the suspect,
including CTB. A single firearm was recovered during the pat-frisks, and it was recovered
from CTB.
The district court concluded that CTB’s pat-frisk was reasonable and denied CTB’s
motion to suppress the firearm. The case proceeded to a stipulated-facts trial. See Minn.
R. Juv. P. 13.03, subd. 3. The district court found CTB guilty of unlawful possession of a
firearm by a person under the age of 18 and stayed an adjudication of delinquency.
CTB appeals the denial of his motion to suppress.
DECISION
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Warrantless searches “are per
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se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well -delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967) (footnotes omitted). “One such exception is the protective pat search for weapons.”
State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that police may stop and frisk a person if
(1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person might be enga ged in
criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the person might be armed and
dangerous. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). If both of those factors are present, an officer may
“conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person [] in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.” Id. “‘The purpose of this limited
search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his
investigation without fear of violence . . . .’” State v. Flo wers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 251
(Minn. 2007) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)).
The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843
(Minn. 2011). The standard is met “when an officer observes unusual conduct that leads
the officer to reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity
may be afoot.” State v. Timberlake , 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation
omitted). When determining whether an officer reasonably suspected criminal activity and
reasonably believe d a person might have been armed and dangerous , “our task is to
determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances at the inception of the pat search,
the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that [defendant] might have been armed
and dangerous.” State v. Lemert, 843 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 2014).
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“Generally, evidence seized in violation of the constitution must be suppressed.”
State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 178 (Minn. 2007) . When reviewing pretrial orders on
a motion to suppress evidence, we independently review the facts, and determine, as a
matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing —the
evidence. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). We review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Ortega, 770
N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009).
The district court determined that the officers “had a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that [CTB] was potentially armed and had a particularized constitutional basis to
conduct a pat-frisk to determine if he was armed,” relying on “the officers’ experience that
weapons can often be passed off to another person in a group to evade detection an d
[CTB’s] close proximity to the original suspect.”
CTB contends that the district court erred, arguing that the pat -frisk was
impermissibly based “on his mere proximity to [the suspect].” “Mere proximity to, or
association with, a person who may have previously engaged in criminal activity is not
enough to support reasonable suspicion . . . .” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 844. CTB cites State
v. Eggersgluess, 483 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Minn. App. 1992), and argues that “[a]dditional
circumstances must be present to justify a Terry frisk, such as the observation of a bulge in
the companion’s clothing, threats to the officer, the observation of a weapon, or a sudden
or furtive movement toward a place where a weapon could be concealed.”
In Eggersgluess, we said that the defendant’s “mere presence in a vehicle where the
driver and one other passenger possessed open bottles did not create probable cause to
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suspect that [defendant], a passenger in the back seat, was also violating the open bottle
law.” 483 N.W.2d at 96-97. As to the protective pat-frisk in that case, we noted that the
officer’s “only basis for surmising [defendant] may have been armed was [the officer’s]
postulate that it is always possible that a weapon may be present .” Id. at 97. We rejected
that premise, saying that “[a] n assumption that weapons might always be present when a
law enforcement officer confronts a citizen, standing alone, cannot amount to adequate
cause to pat search for weapons.” Id. We explained:
The record here is devoid of facts supporting a
reasonable belief that [defendant] was armed or dangerous.
The alleged crime [the officer] was investigating was not one
where [defendant] would likely be armed and dangerous; it was
not a crime such as robbery, assault with weapons or homicide.
Rather, this confrontation derived from a routine traffic
investigation performed during daylight hours. Nor were other
circumstances present that would justify a search for weapons;
there was no bulge in [defendant’s] clothing, threat to [the
officer], observation of a weapon, or sudden or furtive
movement toward a place where a weapon could be concealed.

Id. (citations omitted).
In sum, the circumstances in Eggersgluess “presented no evidence that a reasonable
person would have considered to be threatening to the officer. ” Id. at 98; see Terry, 392
U.S. at 21-22 (explaining that facts must be judged by objective standard of whether
available facts at the time of the search would warrant a reasonably cautious person in
believing that the action taken was proper).
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The circumstances in this case are readily distinguishable from those in
Eggersgluess.1 Here, t he officers arrested the suspect shortly after he had reportedly
brandished a gun at a public transit station. The officers found the suspect standing with a
group of young men —including CTB —not far from the transit station. The first
responding officer asked for backup because the suspect was alleged to be armed and was
with the group of young men. After the second officer arrived and the suspect was secured,
the first officer continued to have concerns for his safety and requested additional backup.
Given the report s that the suspect had recently brandished a firearm at a public
transit station, the officers’ observation of the suspect standing by the restaurant’s front
door with four young men—including CTB—when the officers approached the suspect,
the officers’ failure to find a firearm on the suspect during his apprehension , and the
officers’ knowledge that a suspect will often hand off a weapon to avoid its detection, it
was objectively reasonable for the officer to think that the suspect had handed the firearm

1 CTB cites additional cases, which are also readily distinguishable and therefore
unpersuasive. See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 844 (“ Mere proximity to, or association with, a
person who may have previously engaged in criminal activity is not enough to support
reasonable s uspicion of possession of a controlled substance. ”); State v. Ingram , 570
N.W.2d 173, 177 -78 (Minn. App. 1997) (concluding that an attempted pat -frisk was not
justified because there was no indication that the defendant was involved in “ a type of
crime for which the offender would normally be armed” ), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 22,
1997); see also Sibron v. New York , 392 U.S. 40, 63 -64 (1968) (concluding that a Terry
stop and frisk was unreasonable based solely on an officer’s observation of the defendant
speaking with known drug addicts); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (holding that
a Terry stop was unreasonable when the officers relied on the fact that defendant “was in
a neighborhood frequented by drug users” and the situation “looked suspicious”); State v.
Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 212 (Minn. 2005) (“Because police did not articulate reasonable
suspicion that drugs were present in appellant’s storage unit, we hold that the deployment
of a drug -detection dog was an unreasonable search under the Minnesota
Constitution . . . .”).
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to one of the young men who was standing with the suspect when the police approached,
including CTB. It was also objectively reasonable for the police to be concerned for their
safety and the public’s safety while they attempted to locate the firearm that the suspect
had reportedly brandished at the transit station . See Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 251 (stating
that the purpose of a Terry frisk is “‘to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without
fear of violence’” (quoting Williams, 407 U.S. at 146)).
An officer need not be absolutely certain that a suspect is armed before conducting
a pat -frisk for weapons ; “the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Based on the totality of the circumstances set forth above,
we conclude that the officers reasonably suspected that CTB might be involved in criminal
activity and armed and dangerous. Thus, the district court did not err by denying CTB’s
motion to suppress.
Affirmed.