In the Matter of the Short-Call Substitute Teaching License Application of Jeronimo Yanez.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0464

In the Matter of the Short-Call Substitute Teaching
License Application of Jeronimo Yanez.

Filed March 11, 2024
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Minnesota Professional Educator Licensing and Standards Board

Robert J. Fowler, Fowler Law, L.L.C., Little Canada, Minnesota (for relator)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, David Cullen, Nicholas Lienesch, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent board)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
This certiorari appeal follows a remand from this court directing respondent
Minnesota Professional Educator Licensing and Standards Board (the board) to reconsider
its denial of relator Jeronimo Yanez’s application to become a substitute teacher. We
instructed the board to determine whether Yanez ’s conduct in killing Philando Castile
while employed as a police officer violates the moral standards required of teachers and

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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indicates he is unfit to teach in public schools. In re Short Call Substitute Teaching License
Application of Yanez, 983 N.W.2d 89, 100 (Minn. App. 2022). Yanez challenges the
board’s supplemented decision that again denies his application, arguing that (1) the board
failed to follow our remand instructions and (2) its decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
Because the facts underlying this appeal are recited in our previous decision, we do
not fully restate them here.
In February 2020, while he was teaching at a private school, Yanez applied for a
Minnesota short-call substitute teacher license and his application was denied. He appealed
and an administrative-law judge (ALJ) conducted a contested-case hearin g in July 2021.
At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from six witnesses and admitted over 30 exhibits.
The evidence from the contested hearing established, in relevant part, that in 2016, while
working as a police officer, Yanez fatally shot Castile, a St. Paul School District employee.
The shooting garnered significant local, national, and global media attention. In June 2017,
a jury acquitted Yanez of second-degree manslaughter and intentional discharge of a
firearm that endangered safety.
Following the contested hearing, the ALJ issued findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and a recommendation that the board deny Yanez’s application. The ALJ found that Yanez
“took a life that he should not have taken” and endangered the other two occupants of the
vehicle, one of whom was a young child; prejudged Castile in a manner that indicated
“racial bias, microaggressions, and negativity bias” that would be “detrimental to students,
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especially students of color”; and his act of killing Castile was “morally wrong, and deeply
hurtful and offensive to the community.” The ALJ recommended that the board deny
Yanez’s application under Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1) (2020), based on Yanez’s
“immoral character or conduct.”
The board adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and legal conclusions. In an
accompanying memorandum, the board determined, among other things, that the ALJ
properly evaluated Yanez’s conduct under the “morals of the community” standard. And
the board adopted the ALJ’s recommendation to deny the application.
In his first appeal, we held that (1) the burden is on Yanez to demonstrate that the
board should grant his application and (2) the phrase “immoral character or conduct” in
Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1) , is unconstitutionally vague. Yanez, 983 N.W.2d at
94-97. But we concluded that the infirmity can be cured by applying a narrowing
construction that relates the subject character or conduct to the applicant’s proposed work
as a teacher in a public school. Id. at 97-98.
Accordingly, we remanded for the board “to weigh the evidence and apply the
relevant criteria in light of our narrowing construction.” Id. at 100. We cautioned that
denying a license application based on “immoral character or conduct” requires “great
circumspection.” Id. And we directed the board to: (1) “identify which factors it is relying
upon and the weight being accorded those factors in determining whether Yanez’s conduct
violated moral standards for the teaching profession” and (2) “assess whether and how that
conduct relates to Yanez’s fitness to teach in the public schools, again identifying the
weight being accorded the factors it considers relevant.” Id.
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On remand, the board reconsidered Yanez’s application on the existing record. The
board identified the Code of Ethics for Minnesota Teachers (the code), Minn. R. 8710.2100
(2021), as establishing the factors that define the moral character required of teachers. The
code includes ten standards, three of which the board found particularly relevant and
against which it evaluated Yanez’s conduct:
First, [Yanez’s] racial profiling and prejudgment of Mr. Castile
and [his girlfriend, D.R.] as robbery suspects informed his
decision to initiate a traffic stop while the family was on their
way home from the grocery store. Such racial profiling and
prejudgment is discriminatory conduct . . . contrary to the
requirement under the Code of Ethics for Minnesota Teachers
that a teacher shall provide professional educator services in a
nondiscriminatory manner pursuant to Minnesota Rule
8710.2100, subpart 2.A.

The board placed “significant weight” on this factor.
Second, [Yanez’s] decision to fire seven shots into the vehicle,
killing Mr. Castile and endangering the lives of [D.R.] and her
four-year old daughter was wrongful and unjustified. . . .
[This] conduct . . . is contrary to the requirement under the
Code of Ethics for Minnesota Teachers that a teacher shall take
reasonable disciplinary action in exercising the authority to
provide an atmosphere conducive to learning pursuant to
Minnesota Rule 8710.2100, subpart 2.D. This means, among
other things, that a teacher will not use poor judgment and
abuse their disciplinary authority by escalating an interaction
with a student with a response that is disproportionate to the
situation at hand.

The board placed “substantial weight” on this factor.
Finally, [Yanez’s] decision to stop Mr. Castile’s vehicle and to
shoot and kill Mr. Castile created conditions harmful to the
health and safety of Mr. Castile and his family. . . . [This]
conduct . . . is contrary to the requirement under the Code of
Ethics for Minnesota Teachers that a teacher shall ma ke
reasonable efforts to protect students from conditions harmful
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to health and safety pursuant to Minnesota Rule 8710.2100,
subpart 2.B.

The board placed “great weight” on this factor.
The board also determined that Yanez is not fit to teach in the public schools, using
the eight-factor test set out in Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 386 (Cal. 1969).
Yanez appeals the board’s denial of his application by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Judicial review of an agency decision is deferential. Dokmo v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. 1990). But we will reverse a challenged decision if
it may have prejudiced the relator’s substantial rights because it is affected by an “error of
law,” lacks substantial evidentiary support, or is arbitrary or capricious. Minn. Stat.
§ 14.69(d)-(f) (2022).
I. The board followed this court’s remand instructions.

Yanez asserts three primary arguments: that the board (1) erred by considering
whether his conduct as a police officer violates the moral standards required of teachers,
(2) erred by considering his fitness to teach under the eight Morrison factors, and
(3) relabeled its prior findings rather than using “great circumspection.” We address each
argument in turn.
A. The board did not err in identifying the code and weighing the code’s
relevant standards to determine whether Yanez’s conduct as a police
officer violates the moral standards of the teaching profession.

Yanez does not dispute that the code establishes the moral standards required of
public-school teachers. We agree that the board did not err by identifying and using the
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code to ground its moral-standards analysis. Upon entering the profession, teachers have
a number of obligations, including adherence to “a set of principles which defines
professional conduct.” Minn. R. 8710.2100, subp. 1. Those principles are reflected in the
code, which “sets forth to the education profession and the public it serves standards of
professional conduct and procedures for implementation.” Id. Yanez contends that these
standards may only be used to assess an applicant’s past teaching conduct. This argument
is unavailing for several reasons.
First, Yanez cites no authority to support this argument. “ An assignment of error
on mere assertion, unsupported by argument or authority, is forfeited and need not be
considered unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Scheffler v. City of
Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017).
Second, Yanez’s suggested parameters —that the board may only consider past
teaching conduct in assessing whether an applicant exhibits “immoral character or
conduct”— would unduly restrict the board’s ability to exercise its discretion in licensing
matters. By its terms, the code applies to “[e]ach teacher, upon entering the teaching
profession.” Minn. R. 8710.2100, subp. 1. As such, it applies to individuals such as Yanez
who have worked in other professions before seeking a teaching license. Only allowing
the board to consider prior teaching conduct would, in cases involving first-time teachers,
prevent the board from considering much evidence of character and conduct at all. But the
past informs the present. Limiting the board’s consideration to prior teaching conduct
would depart from the customary hiring practice of considering an applicant’s previous
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employment experience regardless of the nature of the past employment or the employment
sought.
Third, the board implicitly found that policing and teaching are different
professions, but there are parallels between the skills required for both. It carefully
articulated how Yanez’s conduct as a police officer relates to the moral standards required
of teachers in its supplemented order. We see no legal error by the board in considering
Yanez’s prior employment experience, including his time working as a police officer, when
assessing whether his moral character and conduct conforms with the standards required
of public-school teachers.
B. The board did not err in identifying Morrison and weighing its eight
factors to determine Yanez’s fitness to teach in a public school.

In Yanez’s first appeal to this court, we cited Morrison as a “seminal decision” in
addressing vagueness challenges to statutes like Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1), that
permit teacher licensing boards to deny applications or impose discipline based on immoral
character or conduct. Yanez, 983 N.W.2d at 96. Morrison’s credentials to teach were
revoked when the school district learned that Morrison had an affair with another male
teacher. Morrison, 461 P.2d at 377-78. The education board determined that this
constituted “immoral and unprofessional conduct, and an act involving moral turpitude, all
of which warrant[ed] revocation.” Id. at 378-79. The California Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the board cannot “abstractly characterize” an applicant’s conduct as “immoral”
or “unprofessional” under California’s education code “unless that conduct indicates that
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the [person] is unfit to teach.” Id. at 386. The Morrison court identified eight factors a
board may consider when assessing fitness to teach:
[T]he likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected
students or fellow teachers, the degree of such adversity
anticipated, the proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct,
the type of teaching certificate held by the party involved, the
extenuating or aggravating circumstances, if any, surrounding
the conduct, the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the
motives resulting in the conduct, the likelihood of the
recurrence of the questioned conduct, and the extent to which
disciplinary action ma y inflict an adverse impact or chilling
effect upon the constitutional rights of the teacher involved or
other teachers.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
Yanez argues that the board erred by applying the Morrison fitness-to-teach factors
to his employment outside the teaching profession. He also criticizes the board’s analysis
of each Morrison factor, contending that the board gave no genuine weight to any of the
factors. We are not persuaded.
First, as noted above, this court already said that the Morrison factors provide
guidance in assessing whether a person has exhibited immoral character or conduct. Yanez,
983 N.W.2d at 96. The underlying facts of Morrison itself involve conduct unrelated to
teaching. Indeed, numerous other courts across the country have used the eight Morrison
factors under various circumstances, including those involving persons with no prior
teaching experience. Id. at 96- 97 (collecting cases); see Ikpa v. Comm’n on Teacher
Credentialing, 2003 WL 1547771, at *4-5 (Cal. 2d Mar. 26, 2003) (affirming the denial of
an application for a single-subject teaching permit based on applicant’s heroin convictions
as analyzed under the Morrison factors); see also Alford v. Ingram, 931 F. Supp. 768, 772-
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73 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (adopting Morrison and ruling in favor of the superintendent stating
that an application for a teaching certificate can be denied for immoral conduct—
specifically, criminal convictions unrelated to teaching—so long as the superintendent
relates the terms of the statute to the fitness to teach).
Second, the board exp ressly weighed each of the eight factors, finding that three
factors significantly support denying Yanez’s application: the likelihood that Yanez’s
conduct may adversely affect students or fellow teachers given the deep impact of Castile’s
death; the degree of anticipated adversity and resulting threats to the emotional and social
wellbeing of the students with Yanez present in the classroom; and the extenuating or
aggravating circumstances surrounding the conduct, which resulted in world-wide
notoriety of the killing and a demonstration of “extremely poor judgment” by Yanez. The
board took care to make detailed findings under each of the eight factors, demonstrating a
rational relationship between the facts and the conclusions reached while also stating the
impact of that factor on its ultimate decision. Doing so is the task assigned to the board,
not this court. On this record, we discern no basis for disturbing the board’s determination
that Yanez is unfit to teach.
C. The board did not simply relabel its prior findings.
As noted above, the board followed our remand instructions to identify and weigh
factors relevant to the moral standards required of public-school teachers and Yanez’s
fitness to teach. What Yanez characterizes as mere “relabeling” of the board’s prior
findings is precisely the contextualization of the board’s findings and analysis that we
directed the board to do. The board’s supplemented order includes 33 pages of factual
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findings and conclusions of law and a 7-page memorandum that addresses Yanez’s various
arguments and more fully explains the board’s analysis of the Morrison fitness-to-teach
factors. The supplemented order adopts almost all of the ALJ’s findings of fact and
includes dozens of the board’s own factual determinations. In short, the board’s
supplemented order is substantially different than its prior order, demonstrating the great
circumspection it was required to, and did, employ.
II. Substantial evidence supports the board’s decision.
Yanez does not argue that any of the board’s findings lack support in the record.
But he contends that the board’s decision lacks substantial evidentiary support because the
board improperly weighed competing evidence. He specifically faults the board for not
crediting evidence of Yanez’s success teaching in a private school and for considering the
report and testimony of Dr. Joseph Gothard, Ed.D., who Yanez argues is not qualified to
offer expert testimony and is biased against Yanez. The record defeats these arguments.
The board’s written decision includes numerous findings regarding the testimony of
the principal of the private school where Yanez taught during the 2020-21 school year. 1
The findings include that Yanez received a 3.8 out of 4 on his teaching performance review,
a score the principal described as “unusually high for a first-year teacher” and akin to “the
level of a tenured teacher.” And the findings reflect the principal’s support for Yanez’s
application despite his awareness that Yanez fatally shot Castile. But the board also found
that the principal lacked expertise concerning teacher licensure and that his testimony only

1 Yanez represented to the board at the remand hearing that he was still teaching at the
private school.
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addressed “aptitude to teach in a relatively small private school setting where families have
chosen to send their children, presumably knowing that [Yanez] was a member of the
faculty.” Ultimately, the board credited the testimony regarding Yanez’s success teaching
in the private school but determined it was outweighed by other evidence.
Yanez’s challenge to Dr. Gothard’s qualifications to present expert testimony also
fails. Dr. Gothard testified as an expert in the field of education and teacher ethics. He
holds a master’s degree in educational administration and a doctorate in educational
leadership and has worked as a teacher or school administrator since 1993. Dr. Gothard
has served as Superintendent of the St. Paul Public School District since July 2017. 2 He
has received numerous trainings and certifications in race and equity work, as it relates to
the education setting, and has frequently presented on these topics.
Not only does the record persuade us that Dr. Gothard is qualified to offer expert
testimony, but he related his expertise to Yanez’s circumstances and the issues facing the
board. After reviewing all relevant evidence, Dr. Gothard opined that Yanez prejudged
Castile and took his life in a manner that endangered others. He asserted that Yanez’s
prejudgments of Castile indicate racial bias, microaggressions, and negativity bias that are
detrimental to students, especially students of color. He explained that “[l]icensed
educators are responsible for countless decisions on any given day” and Yanez’s conduct
does not show that he could “provide professional education services in a

2 Yanez argues that Dr. Gothard should have been excluded as a witness for bias because
he was Castile’s “ultimate boss.” This argument is unavailing. Dr. Gothard joined the
St. Paul Public School District the year after Castile died, so they never worked together.
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nondiscriminatory manner, . . . make reasonable efforts to protect students from conditions
harmful to health and safety, and . . . take reasonable disciplinary action in exercising
authority to provide an atmosphere conducive to learning” as required by the code.
Dr. Gothard questioned Yanez’s ability to meet the ethical demands for a diverse student
population and opined that Yanez’s presence as a teacher in a Minnesota classroom poses
a risk of retraumatizing students, staff, and families. The board made extensive findings
regarding Dr. Gothard’s testimony, concluding it was highly credible and persuasive as to
the moral standards required of teachers and Yanez’s fitness to teach.
In sum, both of Yanez’s sufficiency arguments essentially ask us to reweigh the
evidence and supplement the board’s decision-making. That is not our role. The board
received extensive evidence, including testimony from experts in the fields of education
and policing. As this court directed , the board considered and weighed the evidence as it
relates to Yanez’s moral character , his conduct, and his fitness to teach. Yanez’s
disagreement with the board’s determinations does not constitute a basis to reverse.
Affirmed.