State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0475

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eric Anthony Klaysmat,
Appellant.

Filed January 22, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reilly, Judge *

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-17-949

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Jeffrey Vlatkovich, Assistant County
Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal -Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction for second -degree driving
while impaired (DWI)-test refusal , appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his
pretrial motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the complaint . He argues that the
information provided by the unidentified 911 callers lacked sufficient indicia of reliability
to give the police officer reasonable, articulable suspicion for the traffic stop. We conclude
that the callers’ tips contained sufficient indicia of reliability . We also conclude that the
district court erred by imposing a 365- day sentence for a gross misdemeanor . Thus, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Eric Anthony Klaysmat with four
counts: (1) second-degree DWI ; (2) third-degree DWI; (3) obstructing legal process; and
(4) driving after revocation. 1 The following summarizes the relevant procedural history,
the district court’s factual findings, and the evidence received during the omnibus hearing.
On December 23, 2017, around 10:30 p.m., the officer received a notification from
dispatch that two 911 callers reported that a silver “SUV-style” vehicle was traveling on
highway 169 from Buhl “with no illuminated headlights” and “swerving between the lanes
of traffic.” The officer did not receive any identifying information about the callers.

1 During the jury trial, the state moved to dismiss count four, driving after revocation, and
the district court dismissed the charge according ly.
3
The officer was stationed “just off the east entrance to Chisholm and began watching
oncoming traffic” from highway 169. The officer “observed a vehicle, matching the
description of the suspect vehicle, turn into Chisholm .” The vehicle, a silver SUV, was
followed by two other vehicles whose drivers “had their windows open, pointed at the
SUV, and yelled to the [o]fficer that the silver SUV was the vehicle-in-question.” The SUV
“pulled over to the shoulder of the roadway,” and the officer “situated his squad car about
fifteen feet behind the silver SUV and activated his eme rgency lights.” The SUV “then
pulled back onto the roadway and into traffic.”
The o fficer “activated his siren and began to follow the silver SUV.” The SUV
traveled about “one-half to one block” before it “pulled over again.” The o fficer stopped
behind the SUV which “pulled away once more and continued traveling on the shoulder of
the road for approximately one and one -half to two blocks.” The driver of the SUV also
began motioning for the officer to go around him . At no point did the officer observe the
SUV “swerve between driving lanes.” Eventually, the SUV came to a stop on the shoulder,
and the officer initiated a traffic stop. T he officer identified the SUV driver as Klaysmat.
In June 2019, Klaysmat moved to suppress evidence and dismiss the complaint ,
arguing that the officer “had no legitimate basis for the stop of [Klaysmat’s] vehicle.” The
state opposed Klaysmat’s motion. The district court held a n omnibus hearing on
Klaysmat’s motion, during which the officer testified. In a July 2019 order, the district
4
court denied Klaysmat’s motion to suppress and dismiss, determining that the officer “had
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a traffic stop.” 2
The case went to a jury trial in November 2022, and the jury found Klaysmat guilt y
of second-degree DWI, third -degree DWI, and obstructing legal process. The district court
convicted Klaysmat of second -degree DWI and sentenced him to 365 days in jail. 3
Klaysmat appeals.
DECISION
Klaysmat challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress and
dismiss, arguing that the officer “lacked reasonable articulable suspicion” to stop
Klaysmat’s SUV. When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress, appellate courts
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). Appellate courts independently

2 Klaysmat’s motion to suppress and dismiss also argued that “his arrest” and “the request
that [he] submit to [chemical] testing” were unlawful. In its order denying Klaysmat’s
motion, the district court determined that the officer “possessed sufficient probable cause
to arrest [Klaysmat] for driving under the influence and to request a breath test.” Klaysmat
does not challenge the district court’s probable-cause determination on appeal.

3 In 2023, the legislature enacted Minnesota Statutes section 609.0342 which provides that
“[a]ny law of this state that provides for a maximum sentence of imprisonment of one year
or is defined as a gross misdemeanor shall be deemed to provide for a . . . maximum
sentence of imprisonment of 364 days.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 6, § 6, at 736- 37.
Because this law applies retroactively, Klaysmat’s sentence should be reduced to 364 days.
Id. Though neither party discussed this sentencing issue, “ it is the responsibility of
appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law ” irrespective of the parties’
“oversights, lack of research, [or] failure to specify issues or to cite relevant authorities.”
State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (quotation omitted) ; see also
State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 147-48 (Minn. 2007) (stating that a defendant cannot
waive or forfeit review of an illegal sentence).
5
review the undisputed facts to determine whether the district court erred as a matter of law
by not suppressing the evidence. Id.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect an individual’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
“Searches and seizures conducted without warrants are presumptively unreasonable.” State
v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016) . An officer may, however, “conduct a brief,
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake , 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation
omitted). To meet the reasonable , articulable suspicion standard, an officer must “show
that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity , but was based
upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reaso nably warrant that intrusion.’” State v. Pike , 551 N.W.2d 919, 921- 22
(Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ). The thres hold for meeting
this standard is not high. Timberlake, 744 N.W .2d at 393. Appellate courts “review the
events surrounding the stop and consider the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether the police had a reasonable basis justifying the stop.” State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d
84, 87 (Minn. 2000).
The factual basis for an investigatory stop of a vehicle “ need not arise from the
officer’s personal observation but may be supplied by information acquired from another
person.” Marben v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety , 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980). An
informant’s tip must have “sufficient indicia of reliability.” In re Welfare of G.M.,
560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. 1997). Tips from private -citizen informants are presumed
6
reliable, particularly “when informants give information about their identity so that the
police can locate them if necessary.” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182-83 (Minn. 2007).
The district court determined that “based on the reliable informant reports along
with the [o]fficer’s own observations of [Klaysmat ’s] driving conduct (i.e., [Klaysmat ]
repeatedly pulled away from [ the officer ] despite the use of [ the officer ’s] emergency
lights),” the officer “had reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop” of
Klaysmat’s SUV. The district court determined that the 911 callers “were reliable” based
on “the specific nature” of their reports and “because their reports corrob orated one
another.”
In his brief to this court, Klaysmat argues that “[b]ecause the [911] callers’
information lacked sufficient indicia of reliability,” the officer “did not have reasonable
articulable suspicion” for the stop. Klaysmat argues that “there is no identifying
information in this case about the callers,” and the callers provided “no information about
the precise location of [their] observations” of Klaysmat’s SUV, “no information about
how long they observed the SUV,” and no “predictive infor mation that [the officer] could
verify.” The state argues that the 911 callers were reliable because they “gave specific
information describing traffic violations,” gave a “report of where they were,” and “showed
up following and point ing out [Klaysmat’s] vehicle.”
We agree with the state that the 911 callers’ tips contained sufficient indicia of
reliability. In deciding whether information provided by an informant is reliable, appellate
courts “look both at the informant and the informant’s source of information and judge
them against all of the circumstances.” G.M., 560 N.W.2d at 691 (quotation omitted) ; see
7
also Jobe v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 609 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. App. 2000) ( noting that
“Minnesota cases dealing with traffic stops based on informant tips have focused mainly
on two factors: (1) identifying information given by the informant, and (2) the facts that
support the informant’s assertion”).
As to the informants, the officer acknowledged that dispatch did not give him the
names or identifying information of the two 911 callers. The supreme court in Davis,
however, held that a brief “face -to-face confrontation” between an officer and an
informant, while the informant was “driving a car from which his identity might easily be
traced” meant that “the informant was in a position to be held accountable for his
intervention.” State v. Davis, 393 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Minn. 1986) (quotation omitted). In
Davis, the supreme court concluded that a traffic stop was lawful when an informant leaned
out her car window, motioned toward the vehicle behind her, and yelled to an officer that
the vehicle had run a red light. Id. at 180.
The officer here observed a “vehicle matching the description” f rom dispatch and
saw “two cars following directly behind that vehicle” with their windows down. The
drivers were “pointing out the window” and yelling that the vehicle in front of them “was
the vehicle in question.” The drivers’ behavior suggests that they were the two 911 callers,
and like in Davis, their face -to-face confrontation with the officer makes them more
accountable. Moreover, the callers’ use of the 911 system is “[a]nother indicator of
veracity.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 400 (2014). While 911 calls are not per se
reliable, the 911 system has “features that allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus
provides some safeguards against making false reports with immunity.” Id. at 400. As a
8
result, although the officer lacked information about the callers’ identitie s, t he callers’
face-to-face encounter with the officer and use of the 911 system contribute to their
reliability.
We next consider the information provided by the callers. The officer received
information from di spatch that two 911 callers saw a “silver -colored SUV” that had no
headlights on and was swerving all over the road. Dispatch relayed that the callers indicated
the SUV was on highway 169 coming from Buhl. When the officer saw the SUV, its
headlights were on, and the officer did not see any swerving.
“Stops based upon informant’s tips have been found valid upon a showing that there
was a basis for the informant’s knowledge.” Playle v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 439 N.W.2d
747, 748 (Minn. App. 1989). The 911 callers’ descriptions of Klaysmat’s SUV, its location,
and Klaysmat’s specific driving infractions , together with physically pointing at
Klaysmat’s SUV, show “eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving,” which
“lends significant su pport to the tip’ s reliability.” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 399. Indeed,
Minnesota appellate courts have repeatedly concluded that an investigatory stop was lawful
when the informant’s tip was based on personal observations. See City of Minnetonka v.
Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Minn. 1988) ; Magnuson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety ,
703 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Minn. App. 2005) ; Jobe, 609 N.W.2d at 922-23.
The officer’s corroboration of the callers’ descriptions of Klaysmat’s SUV and its
location, as well as the c allers’ proximity to Klaysmat’s SUV, further enhances the
reliability of the callers’ tips. See Marben, 294 N.W.2d at 699 (stating that “the reliabilit y
of the [informant’s] information” was “enhanced” whe n “the trooper was able to verify
9
that the [informant] was in the area, and in close proximity to the subject car ”). Because
the 911 callers’ information was based on personal observations and was corroborated in
part by the officer, the information was sufficiently reliable.
Klaysmat contends that “[t]he facts of this case are similar to those in Olson v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1985).” We disagree. In Olson, dispatch
informed officers that an anonymous caller reported “having observed a possible drunk
driver” and gave “a location and description of the car.” 371 N.W.2d at 556. The officers
stopped the alleged drunk driver after following him “for about half a mile, during which
time they noticed no erratic driving.” Id. at 553. The supreme court held that the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop because there were no “minimal specific and
articulable facts from the anonymous caller to support the caller’s bare assertion of a
possibly drunk driver.” Id. at 556. The supreme court concluded that there was “a complete
lack of even the most minimal indicia of reliability for the anonymous tip.” Id.
Here, by contrast, the 911 callers supplied more than a bare assertion, specifying
that Klaysmat was driving without his headlights on and swerving all over the road. Bot h
driving behaviors observed by the callers would give an officer reasonable suspicion to
conduct a traffic stop. See Minn. Stat. § 169.48, subd. 1(a)(1) (2016) (requiring vehicle
headlights to be turned on “at any time from sunset to sunrise”); Minn. Stat . § 169.13,
subds. 1, 2 (2016) (prohibiting reckless or careless driving). In addition, while the officer
did not receive any identifying information about the 911 callers, they had a face-to-face
confrontation in which the 911 callers pointed at Klaysmat’s SUV and stated it was the
vehicle in question. This face -to-face confrontation distinguishes the 911 ca llers from the
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anonymous caller in Olson. For these reasons, Klaysmat’s comparison to Olson is
unpersuasive.
In sum, we affirm the district court’s denial of Klaysmat’s motion to suppress and
dismiss because the 911 callers’ tips contained sufficient indicia of reliability and provided
reasonable suspicion for the stop. We reverse Klaysmat’s 365-day sentence and remand
for the district court to impose a sentence of 364 days consistent with the legislature’s
definition of a gross misdemeanor as providing for a maximum sentence of 364 days.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded .