Complaint Decision File 23-010C on behalf of D.V.G. from South Washington County Schools 0833-01.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0487

Complaint Decision File 23-010C on behalf of D.V.G.
from South Washington County Schools 0833-01.

Filed February 5, 2024
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Minnesota Department of Education
File No. 23-010C

Elizabeth J. Vieira, Calen E. King, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for relator Independent School District No. 833, South Washington County
Schools)

Laura E. Isenor, Education Law Advocacy Project of Southern Minnesota Regional Legal
Services, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent D.V.G.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Martha J. Casserly, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Department of Education)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Relator Independent School District No. 833 (the school district) appeals an
administrative decision from the Minnesota Department of Education (MDE) regarding a
special-education student (the student). The school district contends MDE: (1) wrongly
assumed jurisdiction to determine the school district violated suspension procedures under
2
the Minnesota Pupils Fair Dismissal Act (PFDA), Minn. Stat. §§ 121A.40-.56 (2022);
(2) improperly concluded that the school district failed to adequately respond to a parent’s
request for an independent educational evaluation under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400- 1482 (2018); and (3) decided without an
adequate basis that the school district had to pay the student compensatory services of
60 tutoring hours at $50 per hour. We affirm.
FACTS
The student attended Park High School in Cottage Grove, Minnesota. She received
special-education services beginning in the first grade and had an individualized education
plan (IEP). Throughout the 2021-2022 school year, the student had multiple behavioral
incidents and suspensions. In October 2021, the school district proposed performing a
stand-alone functional behavioral assessment (FBA) because the student’s behavioral plan
did not reflect her recent conduct at school. The school district told the student’s parent
that the student could get an outside evaluation if the parent disagreed with the FBA. In
December 2021, the school district provided the parent with its completed FBA . In the
FBA, the school district detailed the s tudent’s various difficulties with attendance,
schoolwork, and verbal and physical outbursts.
Prior to providing the FBA, the school district proposed changes to the student’s
IEP. Those changes included moving the student to homebased instruction before
transitioning her to a different school. The parent objected to these changes. The school
district then requested a mediation session with MDE. The parent and the school district
participated in mediation in January 2022. There, the parent’s advocate requested that the
3
school district provide an independent educational evaluation (IEE) to address the parent’s
objection to the student’s FBA.
In February 2022, the school district provided the parent with a prior written notice
rejecting her advocate’s request for an IEE. The school district emphasized that the request
stemmed from only the parent’s disagreement with its description in the FBA that the
student exhibited “aggression.” The parent objected and continued to request an IEE.
In August 2022, the parent filed a complaint with MDE on the student’s behalf,
alleging that the school district violated numerous IDEA provisions. In January 2023, after
an investigation, MDE issued its final decision. Among other violations, MDE found that
the school district contravened (1) PFDA because, “on at least three occasions,” the school
district did not provide the parent or the student with a written notice regarding pending
suspensions, see Minn. Stat. § 121A.46, subd. 3, and (2) IDEA because it did not
appropriately respond to the parent’s IEE request. MDE also directed the school district
and the parent to reach an agreement on compensatory services for the student.1
The parties could not agree on compensatory services, and MDE ordered the parties
to submit proposals to MDE for a final determination. The parent proposed 117 tutoring
hours at $50 per hour. The school district proposed 59.4 tutoring hours at $30 per hour. In
March 2023, MDE decided that “to make up for loss in the Student’s skills, including
academic, functional, or behavioral skills, and lack of expected progress in the general

1 MDE ordered the school district to provide compensatory services because the school
district removed the student from her educational placement for ten days and “did not
provide educational services” for continued compliance with her IEP during that time,
violating 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(b)(2) (2022).
4
education curriculum,” the school district was responsible for 60 tutoring hours at $50 per
hour.
The school district petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review MDE’s decision.
DECISION
The school district challenges MDE’s decision that it (1) violated PFDA; (2) failed
to appropriately respond to the IEE request; and (3) had to pay for the student to receive
60 tutoring hours at $50 per hour.2 MDE’s decision was a quasi-judicial agency decision
not subject to the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 14. 001-.69
(2022). See Anderson v. Comm’r of Health, 811 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Minn. App. 2012), rev.
denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2012). Accordingly, our review is limited “to questions
affecting . . . jurisdiction[,] . . . the regularity of [MDE’s] proceedings, and, as to the merits
of the controversy, whether the order or determination . . . was arbitrary, oppressive,
unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or without any evidence to
support it.” Dietz v. Dodge C ounty, 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992) (quotation
omitted).
I.
We begin with a description of the laws governing this dispute. Under IDEA,
Congress set minimum requirements for the education of public- school students with
disabilities. Special Educ. Complaint 22-027C ex rel. V.S., 981 N.W.2d 201, 211 (Minn.

2 On appeal, the school district only challenges MDE’s method for calculating
compensatory services, not the underlying violation that made compensation necessary.
5
App. 2022). “States may impose greater requirements for special education than federal
law.” Id.
IDEA “ensure[s] that all children with disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment,
and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Federal law defines a “[f]ree
appropriate public education or FAPE” as
special education and related services that—
(a) Are provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge;
(b) Meet the standards of the [State educational
agency], including the requirements of this part;
(c) Include an appropriate preschool, elementary
school, or secondary school education in the State involved;
and
(d) Are provided in conformity with an [IEP] that meets
the requirements of [34 C.F.R.] §§ 300.320 through 300.324.

34 C.F.R. § 300.17 (2022); see also 20 U.S.C § 1401(9) (substantially similar).
IEPs are “the centerpiece of [IDEA]’s education delivery system” for children with
disabilities. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). “ An IEP is a written statement
prepared for each student with a disability that includes academic and functional
performance and goals, as well as the services and accommodations to be provided to the
student.” V.S., 981 N.W.2d at 211 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)). School districts
create IEPs using IEP teams that include teachers, school representatives, and the student’s
parents or guardians. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). An IEP is largely based on the results of
statutorily required evaluations. See, e.g., id. § 1414(b)(2)(A)(ii), (c)(1)-(2), (d)(3)(A),
6
(d)(4)(A). IDEA requires a student with a suspected disability to receive a “full and
individual initial evaluation” to determine whether they are entitled to special education
and related services. Id. § 1414(a)(1). The student is then reevaluated periodically. Id.
§ 1414(a)(2), (d)(4)(A).
In Minnesota, when evaluating a student with “an emotional or behavioral disorder,”
a school district must use an FBA. Minn. R. 3525.1329, subps. 2a, 3(A)(8) (2021); see
also Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. E.M.D.H., 960 F.3d 1073, 1080 (8th Cir. 2020)
(“Minnesota’s special-education regulations require that when a student is evaluated for
‘emotional or behavioral disorders’” an FBA must support the evaluation, “among other
sources.” (quotation omitted)).
3 A school district may also conduct an FBA “as a stand-
alone evaluation without conducting a comprehensive evaluation of the student.” Minn.
Stat. § 125A.08(d) (2022). An FBA is “a process for gathering information to maximize
the efficiency of behavioral supports.” Minn. R. 3525.0210, subp. 22 (2021).
For evaluations performed under IDEA, certain procedural safeguards are in place
for parents. As relevant here, IDEA entitles a parent to a publicly funded IEE “if the parent
disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the public agency.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1)
(2022). The IEE is “conducted by a qualified examiner who is not employed by the public
agency responsible for the education of the child in question.” Id. § 300.502(a)(3)(i). If a

3 Although we are only bound by U.S. Supreme Court and Minnesota Supreme Court
decisions interpreting IDEA, other federal court decisions provide persuasive authority.
See Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20
(Minn. App. 2003) (recognizing that we are “bound by decision[s] of the Minnesota
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court,” but not “by any other federal courts’
opinion[s]” though such opinions “are persuasive and should be afforded due deference”).
7
parent disagrees with an evaluation and requests an IEE at public expense, “the public
agency must, without unnecessary delay, either— (i) File a due process complaint to
request a hearing to show that its evaluation is appropriate; or (ii) Ensure that an [IEE] is
provided at public expense.” Id. § 300.502(b)(2).
“IDEA places primary responsibility on state education agencies” to ensure a proper
education for children with disabilities. John T. ex rel. Robert T. v. Iowa Dep’t of Educ. ,
258 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 2001) ; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) (requiring state
education agencies to administer both state and federal special- education law). In
Minnesota, MDE is the state education agency. See Minn. Stat. § 120A.02(b) (20 22).
MDE plays a “unique role in supervising local school districts’ compliance with federal
and state special-education law” and has “broad oversight responsibility to ensure that local
school districts provide free appropriate public educations to students with disabilities.”
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 192 v. Minn. Dep’t of Educ., 742 N.W.2d 713, 723 (Minn. App. 2007),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2008) (Farmington).
As part of its duties, MDE investigates complaints that school districts are not
providing required services to children with disabilities.
4 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151-.153
(2022). If MDE finds that a school district violated special-education requirements, it must

4 “If a dispute arises in which the parent of a child with disabilities objects to special-
education programming matters, a parent may choose from two procedures in order to
report and seek resolution of the complaint: (1) participating in an impartial due-process
hearing; or (2) filing a complaint with [MDE].” Farmington, 742 N.W.2d at 719-20
(citations omitted). Here, the parent chose the administrative-complaint procedure.
8
order the school district to remedy its denial of those services, including with “corrective
action appropriate to address the needs of the child.” Id. § 300.151(b)(1).
With these provisions in mind, we turn to the school district’s arguments.
II.
The school district first challenges MDE’s decision that the school district violated
section 121A.46, subd ivision 3, on the ground that MDE does not have jurisdiction to
require compliance with PFDA’s suspension procedures. Specifically, the school district
argues MDE can only use IDEA to ensure compliance with a “special education law,”
which, according to the school district, PFDA is not.5
The scope of an agency’s authority presents a legal question, which we review de
novo. See Partners in Nutrition, 995 N.W.2d 631, 640 (Minn. App. 2023). To comply
with IDEA, school districts must comply with both federal and state laws. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(11)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.149(a)(2)(ii) (2022). And MDE may use IDEA
procedures when a school district fails to comply with a state law, even when state law
exceeds minimum federal standards. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281 v. Minn. Dep’t of Educ.,
743 N.W.2d 315, 324- 26 (Minn. App. 2008) (Robbinsdale). Because “IDEA regulations
incorporate state law,” a school district must comply with state standards that exceed
federal standards. Id. at 326.6

5 The school district does not dispute that it did not comply with PFDA’s suspension
procedures. Its sole argument is that MDE lacked jurisdiction to make such a
determination.
6 Our precedent is consistent with federal caselaw interpreting IDEA. See, e.g., Special
Sch. Dist. No. 1v. R.M.M. by O.M., 861 F.3d 769, 778 (8th Cir. 2017); Sch. Bd. of Indep.
9
PFDA is an education statute that, as relevant here, requires school districts to hold
“an informal administrative conference” before suspending a student unless “it appears that
the pupil will create an immediate and substantial danger.” Minn. Stat. § 121A.46, subd.
1. School districts must also personally serve the suspended student with a written
suspension notice “at or before” the suspension and mail the written notice to the student’s
parent or guardian “within 48 hours of the [informal administrative] conference.” Minn.
Stat. § 121A.46, subd. 3. The Minnesota legislature explicitly applied the suspension
provision to students with disabilities under a separate PFDA provision. See Minn. Stat.
§ 121A.43(a).
As an initial matter, w e do not discern from our prior cases that we have limited
IDEA’s application only to statutes labeled “special education,” so long as the impacted
student qualified as disabled under IDEA. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709 v. Bonney, 705
N.W.2d 209, 214 (Minn. App. 2005) (“Generally, courts have upheld state educational
requirements that go beyond those delineated in the IDEA.” (emphasis added));
Robbinsdale, 743 N.W.2d at 326 (“If a state statute requires a district to provide
educational services that exceed the minimum federal standards, those state standards are
enforceable through the IDEA.” (emphasis added)); Blackmon by Blackmon v. Springfield
R-XII Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 648, 658- 59 (8th Cir. 1999) (collecting federal cases for the
proposition that “[w]hen a state provides for educational benefits exceeding the minimum

Sch. Dist. No. 11 v. Renollett, 440 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2006); CJN by SKN v.
Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 323 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2003).
10
federal standards . . . the state standards are thus enforceable through the IDEA” (emphasis
added)).
But even if such a limitation exists, it would not apply to the PFDA provision s at
issue here. The Minnesota legislature explicitly made PFDA’s suspension procedures
applicable to students with disabilities. See Minn. Stat. § 121A.43(a). Under
section 121A.43(a), “[c]onsistent with federal law governing days of removal and section
121A.46, school personnel may suspend a child with a disability. ” (Emphasis added.)
Section 121A.46, subdivision 3, in turn, requires the school district to provide a student
with a written suspension notice before or at the time the suspension takes effect and mail
the written notice to the student’s parent or guardian within 48 hours of an informal
administrative conference. 7 Thus, because the legislature specified that the appropriate
procedure for suspending a Minnesota student with a disability is found in section 121A.46,
the school district’s argument is unavailing.
Relying on Eason v. Independent School District No. 11, 598 N.W.2d 414 (Minn.
App. 1999), the school district also argues that MDE lacked authority to enforce PFDA’s
suspension procedures because PFDA does not contain a private right of action to challenge
a school district’s suspension decision. Again, we are not persuaded.

7 The school district also argues that we cannot consider section 121A.43(a) because MDE
concluded the school district violated only section 121A.46, subdivision 3. But in its
decision, MDE explicitly referenced that the legislature applied section 121A.46,
subdivision 3, to students with disabilities through section 121A.43(a). And even if MDE
had referenced an incorrect statute, we remain “free to exercise [our] independent
judgment” over legal questions. See Ress v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., Inc., 448 N.W.2d 519, 523
(Minn. 1989).
11
In Eason, we reversed a district court’s decision to issue a temporary injunction
relying on PFDA’s suspension procedures. 598 N.W.2d at 417- 18, 420. In deciding the
plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits, we explained that PFDA does not “contain
any explicit language creating a cause of action to challenge an alleged violation of the
act’s suspension provisions” and declined to create an implicit cause of action.8 Id. at 417
(emphasis omitted).
But the absence of a private right of action does not preclude an agency from
enforcing a statute within its purview. See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 456 n.6
(2009) (observing that because a statute lacked a private right of action, it was “enforceable
only by the agency charged with administering it”). 9 And the Minnesota legislature
expressly charged MDE with carrying “out the provisions of chapters 120A to 129C and
other related education provisions under law.” Minn. Stat. § 120A.02 (2022). PFDA,
therefore, falls within the scope of MDE’s authority, and the absence of a private right of
action does not preclude MDE from ensuring compliance using the procedural mechanisms
set forth in IDEA when the suspended child has a disability.
For these reasons, we affirm MDE’s decision that the school district violated
PFDA’s suspension procedures.

8 While noting Eason concluded that PFDA ’s suspension procedures are discretionary,
rather than mandatory, see 598 N.W.2d at 417-18, the school district did not argue MDE
lacked authority because the provisions were discretionary. We do not reach this issue.
9 In fact, federal courts have been unwilling to imply a private right of action to IDEA
because of the regulatory and enforcement authority granted to the federal Secretary of
Education. See, e.g., Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ.,
615 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2010); County of Westchester v. New York, 286 F.3d 150, 153
(2d Cir. 2002).
12
III.
The school district next challenges MDE’s decision that it failed to respond
adequately to the parent’s IEE request. The school district argues that (1) MDE improperly
relied on confidential information and (2) IDEA does not require a response to an IEE
request that objects to an FBA. We review these issues de novo. See Bonney, 705 N.W.2d
at 214 (stating we retain “authority to review de novo questions of law, which arise when
an agency decision is based upon the meaning of words in a statute”).
A. Confidential Information
The school district asserts that MDE improperly relied on confidential mediation
discussions to make its decision. The school district also argues that its disclosure of
confidential information in the prior written notice does not negate the confidentiality of
the information.
Under Minnesota law, for disputes that involve “the provision of a free appropriate
public education to a child with a disability[,] . . . . mediation discussions are confidential
and inadmissible” during subsequent proceedings, unless, among other exceptions, the
“evidence is otherwise available.” Minn. Stat. § 125A.091, subd. 9 (2022). IDEA
regulations provide that mediation discussions “must be confidential and may not be used
as evidence in any subsequent due process hearing.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(b)(8) (2022).
We disagree with the school district’s characterization that MDE relied on
confidential information to reach its decision. Instead, the record shows that MDE very
13
carefully10 relied on only non-confidential information to reach its decision. Specifically,
MDE relied on the school district’s non-confidential prior written notice rejecting the IEE
request the parent made during mediation. Further, to the extent the non-confidential
document contained confidential information, it was the school district, not the parent, that
improperly disclosed that information.
MDE carefully tailored its decision to avoid using confidential information.
Therefore, we reject the argument that MDE’s decision violated state or federal protections
for confidential mediation discussions.11
B. IEE Request After FBA
The school district also argues that MDE erred when it concluded IDEA required
the school district to respond to the parent’s IEE request because the parent disagreed with
the findings in an FBA rather than a more comprehensive evaluation. The school district
asks us to apply a recent Second Circuit decision, D.S. by M.S. v. Trumbull Board of
Education, 975 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2020).
We acknowledge disagreement among the federal courts regarding whether a parent
can make an IEE request following an FBA. Compare Trumbull Bd. of Educ., 975 F.3d at

10 In its decision, MDE mentioned mediation only in a footnote in which it expressly stated
that the school district’s prior written notice included details about a mediation discussion,
but that MDE would not include those details in its decision. MDE’s legal conclusion on
the IEE issue does not mention mediation and was carefully worded to focus on the school
district’s failure to respond to the IEE request, rather than the context of the request itself.
11 The school district argues that, without the evidence in the prior written notice, MDE’s
decision was unsupported by substantial evidence. Because we conclude MDE carefully
tailored its decision to avoid using confidential mediation materials, we do not reach this
issue.
14
163 (concluding that a parent cannot request an IEE in objection to an FBA), with Harris
v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 64 & n.1, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2008) (deciding the
opposite). The disagreement stems from whether an FBA is an “evaluation” under federal
regulations. Compare Trumbull Bd. of Educ., 975 F.3d at 165 (“[A]n FBA is best
considered as an ‘assessment tool’ or ‘evaluation material’ that a school can use in
conducting an evaluation.”), with Harris, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (“The FBA’s fundamental
connection to the quality of a disabled child’s education compels this Court’s determination
that an FBA is an ‘educational evaluation.’”). Neither case addresses an IEE request when
a state statute, like that in Minnesota, specifically allows a school district to conduct an
FBA “as a stand-alone evaluation,” Minn. Stat. § 125A.08(d) (emphasis added), which is
precisely what occurred here.
But we need not decide whether a school district must respond to an IEE request
after an FBA in all situations. In this case, the school district explicitly told the parent that
she could “request an outside special education evaluation” if she disagreed with the school
district’s findings in the FBA. On this basis, we affirm MDE’s decision that the school
district failed to adequately respond to the parent’s IEE request.
IV.
Finally, the school district challenges MDE’s order that the school district pay for
the student to receive 60 tutoring hours at $50 per hour. The school district asserts that
MDE’s decision is arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence.
12

12 MDE relies on In re Haugen for the proposition that the relevant standard is abuse of
discretion. See 278 N.W.2d 75, 80 n.10 (Minn. 1979). In Haugen, the supreme court
15
An agency must support its quasi-judicial decisions with substantial evidence. Am.
Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council No. 14 v. County of Ramsey, 513 N.W.2d
257, 259 (Minn. App. 1994); see also Dietz, 487 N.W.2d at 239 (allowing appellate review
for whether an agency decision is “without any evidence to support it” (quotation omitted)).
“Substantial evidence” means “1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion; 2) more than a scintilla of evidence; 3) more
than ‘some evidence’; 4) more than ‘any evidence’; and 5) evidence considered in its
entirety.” Rsrv. Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 825 (Minn. 1977) (quotation
omitted).13
An agency also cannot issue an arbitrary quasi-judicial decision. Dietz, 487 N.W.2d
at 239. An agency engages in arbitrary decisionmaking when it (1) relied “on factors which
the legislature had not intended it to consider”; (2) “entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem”; (3) “offered an explanation for the decision that runs counter to the
evidence”; or (4) made a decision that “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Minn. Transitions Charter Sch. v.

applied an abuse- of-discretion standard for reviewing “penalties and sanctions by an
administrative agency.” Id. It is not clear that compensatory services are a sanction on the
school district. See Bonney, 705 N.W.2d at 215 (applying substantial-evidence test when
reviewing compensatory-education plan); Miener by Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749,
753 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[I]mposing liability for compensatory educational
services . . . ‘merely requires [the school district] to belatedly pay expenses that [it] should
have paid all along’” (quoting Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370-71
(1985))). In any event, under either standard we would affirm MDE’s compensatory-
services decision.
13Although Reserve Mining applied the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, we have
applied the same “substantial evidence” definition to quasi-judicial decisionmaking. See,
e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 513 N.W.2d at 259.
16
Comm’r of the Minn. Dep’t of Educ., 844 N.W.2d 223, 235 (Minn. App. 2014) (quoting
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Agric., 528 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Minn. App. 1995)).
The school district challenges MDE’s decision on the appropriate compensatory-
services award, but not MDE’s underlying factual findings that the school district failed to
provide required services to the student. When MDE concludes that a school district failed
to provide required services, it has broad “authority to order . . . compensatory education
plans.” Bonney, 705 N.W.2d at 215; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(b)(1) (providing that a
state educational agency may order “corrective action appropriate to address the needs of
the child,” including through “compensatory services”); 71 Fed. Reg. 46,602 (Aug. 14,
2006) (commenting that under 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(b) state educational agencies have
“broad flexibility to determine the appropriate . . . corrective action” when a school district
“has failed to provide appropriate services to children with disabilities, including
awarding . . . compensatory services”). Compensatory services are “designed to address
any loss of educational benefit that may have occurred.” Minn. Stat. § 125A.091, subd. 21
(2022) (describing compensatory -educational services for the purpose of due-process
hearings).
Here, MDE’s decision that the school district needed to provide the student with
compensatory services in the form of 60 tutoring hours at $50 per hour is neither arbitrary
nor unsupported by substantial evidence. The record shows that MDE directed the school
district and parent to attempt to reach an agreement on the compensatory services necessary
to address the school district’s failure to provide required services. When the parties were
unable to reach an agreement, MDE ordered the parties to submit proposals for MDE’s
17
consideration. The parent proposed 117 tutoring hours at $50 per hour; the school district
proposed 59.4 tutoring hours at $30 per hour.
The record shows that MDE largely adopted the school district’s proposal on the
number of tutoring hours. The school district explained in detail its basis for calculating
the number of tutoring hours, and it is clear from MDE’s order that it relied on those
calculations to reach its decision to award 60 tutoring hours. Thus, the record supports
MDE’s calculation of the appropriate number of tutoring hours.
The record also shows that MDE adopted the parent’s proposal regarding the rate to
pay for the tutoring hours. Although the school district proposed compensating the student
at the $30 per hour rate it pays special-education teachers to work beyond their contracts,
the parent presented evidence that tutoring costs in her area generally stretched from $ 35
to $60 per hour and went as high as $100 per hour. MDE’s order indicates that it relied on
this information to reach its decision on the appropriate hourly rate. Therefore, the record
supports MDE’s calculation.
Given MDE’s broad authority to fashion a compensatory-services award and the
evidence in the record, we affirm MDE’s decision to award compensatory services in the
form of 60 tutoring hours at $50 per hour.
Affirmed.