Zosha Winegar-Schultz, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0526

Zosha Winegar-Schultz,
Appellant,

vs.

University of Minnesota Board of Regents,
Respondent.

Filed March 11, 2024
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-20-3864

Christy L. Hall, Gender Justice, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Douglas R. Peterson, General Counsel, Brian J. Slovut, Deputy General Counsel, Carrie
Ryan Gallia, Senior Associate General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel of the
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of her
complaint against respondent-employer for reprisal in violation of the Minnesota Human

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.50 (Supp. 2023). Appellant’s reprisal action
is premised on the claim that her employer knew that a fellow employee filed a false
sexual-harassment complaint against her in retaliation for her sexual-harassment complaint
against that same employee, and that the employer took no steps in response. Appellant
claims that there are genuine issues of material fact to support her claim for discriminatory
reprisal against her employer. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact
demonstrating that respondent-employer took an adverse action against appellant, we
affirm.
FACTS
The following facts derive from the record before the district court at summary
judgment, which we consider in the light most favorable to the appellant.
Appellant Zosha Winegar-Schultz and John Doe, a nonparty to this action, were
graduate-student-employees within the same department of respondent University of
Minnesota in 2018 when they filed competing sexual-harassment complaints against each
other with the university’s Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Office (EOAA).
According to the EOAA, Winegar-Schultz’s complaint alleged “that [Doe] sexually
assaulted her in her apartment off campus in August of 2017,” and Doe’s complaint
“accused [Winegar-Schultz] of stalking and/or sexual harassment based on her attempts to
contact him (and others close to him) after he asked her to stop communicating with him,”
3
and alleged that Winegar-Schultz “sexually harassed him after their romantic relationship
ended in the Fall of 2017.”1
Winegar-Schultz learned that Doe had filed a sexual-harassment complaint against
her when she received an email notification from the university, stating: “We recently
received a report from [Doe] that you engaged in stalking and/or sexual harassment in
January 2018, after he requested that you no longer contact him.”
The EOAA investigated the two sexual-harassment complaints and concluded that
neither Winegar-Schultz nor Doe engaged in conduct that violated university policy. As
part of the investigation, the EOAA also specifically considered Winegar-Schultz’s claim
that Doe’s sexual-harassment complaint “was lodged in bad faith and in retaliation for her
complaint that he sexually assaulted her.” Following its investigation, the EOAA
determined that Doe filed his sexual-harassment complaint against Winegar-Schultz in
good faith and that it was not retaliatory against her.
Winegar-Schultz appealed the EOAA determination to the university’s Student
Sexual Misconduct Subcommittee (SSMS) and asked it, specifically, to determine whether
Doe retaliated against Winegar- Schultz by filing a “sexual harassment and stalking
complaint against her with EOAA.” The SSMS affirmed the EOAA determination,
concluding that Doe’s complaint was made “in good faith, not out of retaliation.”
In 2020, Winegar- Schultz commenced this action against the university, alleging
that it committed reprisal in violation of the MHRA. The complaint alleged that the

1 The sexual-harassment complaints are not included in the record.
4
university committed reprisal against Winegar-Schultz as a result of the sexual-harassment
complaint that Doe filed against her.
The district court granted the university’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that Winegar-Schultz’s MHRA reprisal claim failed because there existed no
facts to demonstrate that the university took an adverse employment action against
Winegar-Schultz.
Winegar-Schultz appeals.
DECISION

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this court reviews de novo whether
there are any genuine issues of material fact for trial and whether the district court erred in
its application of the law. STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72,
76 (Minn. 2002). In so doing, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
against whom summary judgment was granted and do not weigh facts or make credibility
determinations. Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Minn. 2020).
The construction of an MHRA provision is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id.
A claim for reprisal pursuant to the MHRA is as follows:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice for
any . . . employer . . . to intentionally engage in any reprisal
against any person because that person . . . opposed a practice
forbidden under this chapter . . .
. . . .
A reprisal includes, but is not limited to, any form of
intimidation, retaliation, or harassment. It is a reprisal for an
employer to do any of the following with respect to an
individual because that individual [opposed an unfair
discriminatory practice]: refuse to hire the individual; depart
from any customary employment practice; transfer or assign
5
the individual to a lesser position in terms of wages, hours, job
classification, job security, or other employment status; or
inform another employer that the individual has engaged in the
activities listed in [this section].

Minn. Stat. § 363A.152

“A reprisal claim is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden -shifting test.”
Hoover v. Norwest Priv. Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 548 (Minn. 2001); see also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing a three-part
burden-shifting test for employment discrimination). To establish a prima facie case that
an employer violated section 363A.15 because it intentionally engaged in a reprisal against
a plaintiff for having opposed a practice forbidden under the MHRA, “a plaintiff . . . must
establish the following elements: ‘(1) statutorily-protected conduct by the employee;
(2) adverse employment action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the
two.’” Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 81 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Hoover, 632
N.W.2d at 548).
The district court, in granting summary judgment to the university, determined
Winegar-Schultz failed to establish the second Bahr element because there are no facts that
demonstrate the university took an adverse action against Winegar-Schultz. The district
court reasoned that, although Winegar-Schultz “argues that John Doe took ‘adverse action’
against her, and the University failed to appropriately respond” to Doe’s actions, this is

2 Section 363A.15 was amended in 2023 in a manner not relevant to this case. See 2023
Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 19, § 68.
6
inadequate to survive summary judgment because “an ‘adverse employment action’ is one
taken by an employer.”
Winegar-Schultz claims that the existence of an adverse action by the university is
established by the fact that the university “knew or should have known” that Doe filed a
false sexual-harassment complaint against her in retaliation for her complaint against him.
We are not persuaded.
We first note that Winegar-Schultz has cited no authority which provides for
vicarious liability to an employer for a purported reprisal by its employee in an MHRA
action brought pursuant to section 363A.15. And, we have found no appellate decisions
that have applied the MHRA in such manner in a reprisal context. Winegar-Schultz cites
only to a case involving an MHRA claim for sex discrimination based on a hostile working
environment due to sexual harassment. See Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751
N.W.2d 558, 567-71 (Minn. 2008) (determining an employer was vicariously liable for the
hostile work environment created in connection with sexual harassment committed by its
employee, pursuant to an agency standard). However, to the extent that an agency principle
might be applicable to Winegar-Schultz’s reprisal claim, there exists no facts to indicate
Doe occupied the position of her supervisor such that he would be an agent of the
university.
Winegar-Schultz concedes that the university was obligated to fully investigate
Doe’s sexual-harassment complaint. And, part of the investigation by the university
involved Winegar-Schultz’s allegation that Doe filed it in retaliation of her complaint.
7
The record before the district court, and now before this court, includes: notes from
EOAA investigators who met with each of the complainants approximately five times and
who interviewed several witnesses and university personnel about Winegar-Schultz’s and
Doe’s sexual-harassment complaints; copies of emails, social media posts, texts, and
Facebook messages pertaining to the accusations; the investigatory reports compiled by the
EOAA detailing the results and findings of their approximately four- month investigation
of the complaints; the result of the appeal hearing before the SSMS affirming the EOAA
determinations; as well as transcripts from depositions of Winegar-Schultz and five other
university personnel.
Following its extensive investigation, the EOAA issued its report which indicated
that “[Doe] reported that he has been the ‘subject of a very intense campaign of harassment’
by [Winegar-Schultz],” who he accused of engaging in sexually harassing behavior toward
him that included: insulting him in public; berating him (by saying things like she hated
him and that he had ruined her life); blaming him for unhappiness and health issues;
propositioning him for sex; sending him unwanted gifts; complimenting him; threatening
him; demanding personal information; making other unwanted contact (including
consistent requests for him to spend time with her); posting hurtful information about him
on her social media accounts; and sending an unsolicited email in January 2018 to a person
with whom Doe was romantically involved, making accusations of “patterns of predatory
behavior” including “emotional abuse and sexual assault.”
The EOAA ultimately determined that the reported incidents which Doe complained
of were not actions so “severe and pervasive as to unreasonably interfere with [Doe’s] work
8
or academic performance or create a hostile environment as is necessary for a policy
violation,” and therefore Winegar-Schultz’s behavior was not “sexual harassment” under
university policy. The EOAA further determined that Doe filed his sexual-harassment
complaint against Winegar-Schultz in good faith and it was not retaliation against
Winegar-Schultz.
Thus, the record reflects that, although the EOAA ultimately dismissed Doe’s
complaint against Winegar-Schultz (and it reached the same conclusion involving
Winegar-Schultz’s complaint against Doe), Doe filed it in good faith, and it was not
retaliatory. No genuine issues of material fact contrary to this determination exist in this
record.
Winegar-Schultz’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Attempting to
identify genuine issues of material fact, Winegar-Schultz cites to the email notification she
received from the EOAA on February 20, 2018, which states: “We recently received a
report from [Doe] that you engaged in stalking and/or sexual harassment in January 2018,
after he requested that you no longer contact him.”
Winegar-Schultz insists that this single email suggests that the “material facts of
[Doe’s] complaint were false,” because Doe later told an EOAA investigator that “I never
said do not contact me.”
As we have already summarized above, the EOAA investigation of Doe’s
sexual-harassment complaint was very thorough. Further, the EOAA investigators were
aware of this factual discrepancy raised by Winegar-Schultz. And, a factual discrepancy
as to exactly when, or whether, Doe informed Winegar-Schultz to cease contact is not
9
material to Winegar- Schultz’s claim of retaliation based upon Doe’s sexual-harassment
complaint which, the record indicates, was filed in good faith and not in retaliation.
Our review of this record compels our agreement with the district court that Doe
filed a sexual-harassment complaint with the EOAA in good faith, not as retaliation for
Winegar-Schultz’s sexual-harassment complaint against him. And, because the sole basis
upon which Winegar-Schultz alleges that the university committed adverse action against
her is premised upon a retaliatory complaint filed by Doe, the district court correctly
granted respondent’s motion for summary- judgment dismissal of Winegar-Schultz’s
MHRA reprisal claim.
Affirmed.