Spring Grove Township, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0528

Spring Grove Township,
Respondent,

vs.

Brian Myrah,
Appellant,

Karen Fried, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed December 26, 2023
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Houston County District Court
File No. 28-CV-19-919

Ken D. Schueler, John T. Giesen, Dunlap & Seeger, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Thomas M. Manion, Manion Law LLC, Hopkins, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm because the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
the disputed portion of Bee Hill Drive is a town road and in find ing appellant failed to
establish his estoppel defense.
FACTS
In December 2019, respondent Spring Grove Township (township) filed a
complaint against appellant Br ian Myrah based on Myrah’s obstruction of what the
township claimed was a town road. The complaint sought declaratory relief that the road
now known as Bee Hill Drive is a town road. Myrah filed an answer asserting various
affirmative defenses, including that the road was abandoned and that the township’s claims
are barred by equitable and promissory estoppel. The other named landowners did not
oppose the township’s requested relief.
The district court held a bench trial from May 31 to June 1, 2022. During trial,
Myrah’s counsel stipulated that a road had been established at the disputed area. As a result,
the central issue was whether the township had abandoned the road or whether the township
was estopped from claiming the road existed by a note that Myrah had obtained from the
township board.
The Road and Myrah’s Property
The obstructed section of the road is part of Bee Hill Drive , which was formally
established as State Line Road in 1873. State Line Road ran along the Iowa and Minnesota
border, dipping in and out of Iowa and Minnesota, from County Road 4 in the west to
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County Road 16 in the east. By the 1950s, the western portion of the road, from County
Road 4 to the southwestern corner of what is now Myrah’s property, was no longer in use
and became overgrown. Then, in 1986, the township recorded its interest in the remaining
portion of the road under the statutory process . In the 1990s, the road was renamed “Bee
Hill Drive” to give it a unique name for police and first responders answering 911 calls.
Myrah’s property, which he purchased in 2007, is about an acre of land right on the
Iowa border. The property is located under the curve of the road where it diverges from,
and then returns to, the border, a few miles to the west of County Road 16.
The Township’s Case
The township clerk testified that there were no issues with Myrah and the road until
2016. That year, a nearby landowner expressed concerns about obstructions on the road,
and, in spri ng 2017, the township learned about a fence across the road . Three nearby
landowners testified that they and their families had regularly used the road for hunting or
for access to fields until Myrah put up that fence. The township clerk also testified that the
township requested that Myrah remove the obstructions, but Myrah refused . The township
clerk explained that Myrah claimed that the disputed section of the road belonged to him
based on a 2007 note written by the t ownship board.
Because of the obstructions, the township requested that the county surveyor
conduct a survey to identify the right of way of Bee Hill Drive. The county surveyor , a
registered surveyor who testified as an expert for the township, testified t hat he completed
a retracement survey of the road which identified several obstructions, all in the portion of
the right of way running southwest from Myrah’s driveway to the Iowa border. Over
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Myrah’s objection, the surveyor testified that the obstructed s ection is a township road
based on documentary evidence, aerial photography showing the road’s continued use, and
the lack of vacating documentation. The township also introduced the retracement survey
identifying the right of way of Bee Hill Drive around Myrah’s property based on the
existing roadbed and other physical evidence . Myrah did not challenge the retracement
survey, the surveyor’s qualifications as an expert , or the foundation for the surveyor’s
opinion.
The township clerk also testified about t he note that Myrah relied on to claim the
disputed area belonged to him and that the road had been abandoned . The township clerk
explained that, in 2007 before purchasing the property from Mark Mahr , Myrah
approached the clerk for assurance that the township would not reopen the road west of the
property, making a through road between County Road s 4 and 16. The township clerk
wrote Myrah a note that stated: “The Spring Grove Township Road known as Bee Hill
Drive runs between Houston County Road #16 and the property now owned by Mark Mahr.
Any Spring Grove Township roadway that existed running west from the said property is
officially abandoned.” The township clerk acknowledged that the note was signed by all
members of the towns hip board, explaining that the clerk wrote and signed the note, and
Myrah then went and found the other members separately to sign it.
Myrah’s Case
Myrah testified that his understanding, based on the 2007 note, was that the
township road ended on the east side of his property. Myrah did not introduce his own
survey or other expert analysis. Myrah also testified he did not recall anyone using the road
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to access fields. One of Myrah’s witnesses, a former owner of the property from 1971 until
the 1990s, similarly testified that she never saw anyone using the road.
On cross-examination, the township’s attorney questioned Myrah about the 1993
warranty deed transferring the property to the predecessor-in-title of Myrah’s property, the
2007 warranty deed transferring the property to Myrah and his parents, and the 2010
quitclaim deed from Myrah’s parents to Myrah. Myrah acknowledged that the le gal
description of the property in the 1993 deed —which stated that the property’s northern
boundary was the south side of the public highway—was different from the legal
description in the 2007 and 2010 deeds —which stated that the public highway was within
the property. Myrah could not explain why the legal descriptions differed or if he had title
to the property where the township claimed the road existed.
In its closing summation, the township argued that Myrah stipulated that Bee Hill
Drive was established as a public road and that Myrah failed to prove estoppel by
abandonment. In his summation, Myrah acknowledged that there was a township road that
ran be tween County Road 4 and County Road 16. But he argued the township had
intentionally abandoned “Bee Hill Drive running west from the easterly line of the Myrah
property to the [Iowa] border ,” and that the township was estopped from claiming that
section of road exists based on the 2007 note.
Order and Posttrial Motions
The district court issued a n order declaring that the disputed section of Bee Hill
Drive is a public township road, enjoining Myrah from interfering with the public’s use of
the road, and ordering Myrah to remove the obstructions from the right of way, except for
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a barn addition. The district court found that “Myrah stipulated at trial that Bee Hill Drive
was established as a road” and determined that Myrah failed to prove estoppel or
abandonment of the road.
Myrah filed a motion for amended findings, order, and judgment or for a new trial,
and for an order staying enforcement of the judgment. Myrah argued that many of the
district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, that there was “perjured testimony,”
and that a new trial or amended findings were appropriate under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 59.01(a), (c), (d), (f), and (g). The township opposed the motion.
The district court denied Myrah’s motion for a new trial or amended findings. In its
accompanying memorandum, the district court explained that Myrah’s case was
“hampered by the credibility of their witnesses” and that it “received ample evidence and
made the determination that [Myrah] has manufactured a self -serving interpretation that
the note by [the township clerk] . . . meant he owned the roadway, even though it was still
being used on rare occasion by the public and adjoi ning landowners for access purposes.”
DECISION
Myrah challenges the district court’s declaration that the disputed section of Bee
Hill Drive is a public town road. He first argues that the disputed section of Bee Hill Drive
is not a road. In the alternative, he argues the township is estopped from claiming the
disputed section as a road under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
We review the district court’s findings of facts following a bench trial under the
clearly erroneous standard. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Under that standard, a finding is clearly
erroneous only if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably
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supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d
214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “When reviewing mixed questions of law and
fact, we correct erroneous applications of law, but accord the district court discretion in its
ultimate conclusions and review such conclusions under an abuse of discretion standard.”
Porch v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. , 642 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Minn. App. 2002)
(quotation omitted) , rev. denied (Minn. June 26, 2002).
I. The record supports the district court’s determination that the disputed section
of Bee Hill Drive is a town road.

Myrah challenges the district court’s determination that the disputed section of Bee
Hill Drive is a town road.
In Minnesota, a road may be formally established by a township pursuant to the
process described in Minnesota Statutes section 164.07 (2022) or created by common-law
or statutory dedication. See Bengston v. Village of Marine on St. Croix , 246 N.W.2d 582,
584 (Minn. 1976). A road generally continues unless vacated pursuant to statute or
abandoned. See Minn. Stat. § 164.07 (explaining formal process for vacating a town road);
cf. Reads Landing Campers Ass’n, Inc. v. Twp. of Pepin, 546 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. 1996)
(“We have always been reluctant to grant such vacation of a public street without
something more than mere nonuse, because platted and dedicated streets are not always
utilized immediately after such dedication, but are reserved for future use as the needs of
the municipality may change.”); Neill v. Hake, 93 N.W.2d 821, 829 (Minn. 1958) (“Public
rights therein may not thereafter be divested without public consent or operation of law.”) .
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Myrah argues that (1) the district court clearly erred by finding that he stipulated to
the establishment of Bee Hill Drive, (2) the township did not formally establish “Bee Hill
Drive” under Minnesota Statute section 164.07, and (3) the district court abused its
discretion by accepting the county surveyor’s testimony that a town road existed. We
review each argument in turn.
First, Myrah argues that he stipulated only to the establishment of State Line Road,
not Bee Hill Drive. We disagree. The record shows that Myrah’s counsel stipulated that a
road was “created” at the disputed area , that both parties referred to Bee Hill Drive and
State Line Road interchangeably, and that State Line Road was renamed Bee Hill Drive in
the 1990s to assist police and first responders answering 911 calls . As a result, t he record
supports the district court’s finding that Bee Hill Drive is the road formerly known as State
Line Road, and the district court did not err by finding that Myrah stipulated that Bee Hill
Drive was established as a road .1
Second, Myrah argues that the district court erred because the township did not
prove it followed the process under section 164.07 for altering a town road . Myrah
concedes that State Line Road was formally established under section 164.07, but he asserts
that the township was required to follow that process again to rename the road Bee Hill
Drive. We disagree. Myrah identi fies no authority that requires a town to engage in the

1 For the first time on appeal, Myrah asserts that Bee Hill Drive is in a different location
than State Line Road. “A reviewing court must gene rally consider only those issues that
the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter
before it.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). Because
Myrah never raised this argument in di strict court, it is outside the purview of the record,
and is forfeited.
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formal process outlined in section 164.07 to rename a road. As a result, Myrah has not
established error. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464- 65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n
appeal error is never presumed . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one
who relies upon it.”).
Finally, Myrah argues that the district court abused its discretion by relying on the
county surveyor’s opinion that “Bee Hill Drive” is a township road. He asserts that the
surveyor’s opinion was an impermissible “legal conclusion.” We are unpersuaded. This
court reviews decisions regarding the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.
Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 45- 46 (Minn. 1997). U nder
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702, “a qualified expert witness may testify in the form of an
opinion so long as the testimony has foundational reliability and is helpful to the fact -
finder.” Cont’l Retail, LLC v. County of Hennepin, 801 N.W.2d 395, 399 ( Minn. 2011).
“Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Minn. R. Evid.
704. Thus, although opinions involving a legal analysis or mi xed question of law and fact
are not deemed helpful for the trier of fact, opinions as to factual matters are admissible
even if the opinion embraces the ultimate issue. See Conover v. N. States Power Co., 313
N.W.2d 397, 403 (Minn. 1981) ; Minn. R. Evid. 704 1977 comm. cmt .
Here, Myrah does not dispute the surveyor’s qualifications or the foundational
reliability of the surveyor’s opinion that the disputed area is a town road. He challenges the
opinion only as “ultimate issue testimony.” But the surveyor’s opinion that the disputed
area is a road is a factual opinion based on the surveyor’s review of plat maps, documentary
10
evidence, and physical evidence. The surveyor did not opine on the effect of the evidence,
such as the 2007 note, supporting Myrah’s claim that the road was abandoned or that the
township was estopped from asserting the road still exists. Thus, although the surveyor’s
opinion “embrace[d] an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact ,” that opinion was
proper under rule 704. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to
admit the opinion.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the disputed
section of Bee Hill Drive is a town road.
II. The district court did not err by determining that Myrah failed to establish
estoppel.

In the alternative, Myrah argues that , because he relied on the 2007 note written by
the township clerk, the road is abandoned under the doctrine of promissory estoppel .
Promissory estoppel is “ an equitable form of action based on good -faith reliance.”
Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 152 (Minn. 2001) . Such a
claim “requires proof that (1) a clear and definite promise was made, (2) the promisor
intended to induce reliance and the promise e in fact relied to his or her detriment, and
(3) the promise must be enforced to prevent injustice.” Martens v. Minn. Min ing & Mfg.
Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 746 (Minn. 2000) ; see also Meriwether Minn. Land & Timber, LLC
v. State, 818 N.W.2d 557, 565 (Minn. App. 2012) , rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2012) .
Promissory estoppel, like equitable estoppel, may be applied against the state to the extent
that justice requires. Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Emps. Ret. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740,
749 (Minn. 1983) . Following a bench trial, we review the district court’s equitable
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determinations for an abuse of discretion. See City of N. Oaks v. Sarpal, 797 N.W.2d 18,
23-24 (Minn. 2011).
Myrah challenges (1) the district court’s interpretation of the 2007 note and (2) the
district court’s determination he did not reasonably rely on the 2007 note. We consider
each argument in turn.
First, Myrah challenges the district court’s reading of the 2007 note. He asserts that
the note is ambiguous and thus the district court, and this court, should construe it against
the township. We disagree. As an initial matter, promissory estoppel requires a “clear and
definite promise.” Meriwether, 818 N.W.2d at 567. As a result, if Myrah is correct that the
note is ambiguous, then his promissory-estoppel claim fails. See id.
Moreover, the plain language of the 2007 note fully supports the district court’s
reading that the township did not promise to abandon the road running through Myrah’s
property. The note states that “[a]ny Spring Grove Township roadway that existed running
west from the said property is officially abandoned.” (Emphasis added.) As a result, the
township at most promised that the road running west from Myrah’s property was
abandoned, and the 2007 note wa s not a “clear and definite promise” to abandon the
disputed area of the road .
Second, Myrah argues that he “reasonably relied on the fact that there was no
roadway burdening the Myrah property.” He asserts that the district court made clearly
erroneous findings about the deeds transferring the property to Myra h and that he acted in
good faith because those deeds “showed no public roadway on or adjacent to Myrah’s
property.” We are unpersuaded.
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The 1993 deed transferring the property to Myrah’s predecessor states that the
property’s northern border was “along the south side of the public highway.” But the 2007
deed transferring the property to Myrah and his parents, as well as the 2010 quitclaim deed
transferring the full property to Myrah, state that there is a “public highway located in said
forty.” The record shows that, at trial, Myrah was asked to explain the difference between
the legal descriptions in the 1993 deed and the 2007 and 2010 deeds and could not. As a
result, the record supports the district court’s finding that Myrah “failed to explain why or
how Myrah’s predecessor in title could transfer the land above the south side of the public
highway, given he did not own it.” And, contrary to Myrah’s assertion that the deeds
“showed no public roadway on or adjacent to Myrah’s property,” the deeds explicitly note
the existence of a public highway either adjacent to or within the property.
Even if the district court made erroneous findings related to the deeds, the district
court separately found that Myrah relied on “a self -serving interpretation of the plain
language of the note,” because, as outlined above, the 2007 note did not promise that the
disputed section of the road was abandoned . And Myrah does not challenge the district
court’s finding that, in response to the continued use of the road, Myrah “erect[ed] a fence
in order to stop users [from] accessing the road” rather than having the property surveyed
or pursuing legal vacation of the road. As a result, the district court did not err by

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determining Myrah did not reasonably rely on the 2007 note and did not abuse its discretion
by rejecting Myrah’s promissory-estoppel claim. 2
Affirmed.

2 Because we conclude that Myrah has not fulfilled the elements for a promissory-estoppel
claim, we need not address the township’s argument that estoppel in the context of a public
road required Myrah to prove abandonment under the test set forth in Reads Landing
Campers Association, Inc. v. Township of Pepin, 546 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1996) .