State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0541

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

William Joseph Garbow,
Appellant.

Filed February 12, 2024
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CR-22-2886

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Cassidy Villeneuve, Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
William Joseph Garbow pleaded guilty to two offenses. He argues that his guilty
pleas are invalid on the ground that they are not supported by a proper factual basis and
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were not voluntarily entered. We conclude that Garbow’s guilty pleas are neither
inaccurate nor involuntary. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In November 2022, the state charged Garbow with multiple offenses arising from a
traffic stop. According to the complaint, a police officer observed a motor vehicle
associated with a person who had an outstand ing arrest warrant. The officer stopped the
vehicle, which was being driven by Garbow, and detected a strong odor of alcohol. T he
officer directed Garbow to turn off the vehicle, but Garbow drove away. The officer
pursued Garbow and eventually stopped the vehicle using a “PIT maneuver.” In a search
incident to Garbow’ s arrest, the officer found an open alcoholic-beverage bottle and a
syringe containing a substance that field-tested positive for methamphetamine. The officer
transported Garbow to the Itasca County jail, where the officer requested that Garbow take
a breath test, which he refused.
One month later, the parties entered into a plea agreement. Garbow pleaded guilty
to fifth-degree controlled substance crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2
(2022), and second-degree refusal to submit to a chemical test, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§§ 169A.20, subd. 2(1), .25, subd. 1(b) (2022). In exchange, the state dismissed four other
charges. The parties agreed that Garbow should receive stayed sentences of 15 months and
12 months, respectively, and be placed on probation. The parties also agreed that Garbow
should serve 30 days in jail.
When he was charged in this case, Garbow was on probation for a crime committed
in 2018 and was alleged to have violated the conditions of his probation. The state later
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alleged three additional probation violations based on Garbow’s conduct in the November
2022 incident that led to the charges in this case. In describing the parties’ plea agreement,
including the agreed-upon sentences, Garbow’s attorney referred to the interrelationship
between the two cases by stating, “whether or not Mr. Garbow asks the court to execute
that sentence will depend on what happens in the probation file.” At the conclusion of the
plea hearing in this case, the district court called the 2018 case for the purpose of allowing
Garbow to enter admissions to the alleged probation violations.
The district court held a hearing in February 2023 with two purposes: to order a
disposition with respect to Garbow’s probation violations in the 2018 case and to impose
a sentence in this case. At the outset of the hearing, Garbow’s attorney requested that the
district court first determine the disposition of Garbow’s probation violations in the 2018
case, which she described as the “controlling sentence. ” Garbow’s attorney urged the
district court to reinstate his probation; the state urged the district court to revoke probation
and execute the sentence. The district court revoked Garbow’s probation and executed his
prison sentence. This court affirmed. State v. Garbow, No. A23-0540, 2023 WL 7119092,
at *1 (Minn. App. Oct. 30, 2023).
Immediately after disposing of Garbow’s probation violations, the district court
turned to the matter of sentencing in this case. With respect to the presumptively stayed
15-month sentence on the controlled-substance offense, Garbow’s attorney said, “We are
asking that the court depart dispositionally upward and sentence Mr. Garbow to a 15-month
executed sentence to run concurrently with the other file.” When pronouncing Garbow’s
sentence on that offense, the district court noted that the sentencing guidelines call for a
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stayed 15-month sentence and stated, “Pursuant to your request, the court does commit you
to the commissioner of corrections for that period of time of 15 months.” Similarly, for
the test-refusal offense, the district court imposed a sentence of one year in jail, to run
concurrently with the sentence on the controlled-substance offense. Garbow’s attorney did
not object to the district court’s sentences. Garbow appeals.
DECISION
Garbow argues that his guilty pleas are invalid for two reasons. He argues that his
pleas are not accurate on the ground that there is not a proper factual basis. He also argues
that his guilty pleas are involuntary on the ground that the district court imposed sentences
that are contrary to the parties’ plea agreement.
To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea “must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” State v. Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364, 372 (Minn. 2007). If a guilty plea does
not satisfy all three of these requirements, the plea is invalid. See State v. Ecker, 524
N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). “A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was
invalid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). In determining the validity
of a guilty plea, this court applies a de novo standard of review. State v. Mikulak, 903
N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017).
A. Accuracy
We first consider Garbow’s argument that his guilty pleas are invalid on the ground
that they are inaccurate because there is not a proper factual basis.
To satisfy the accuracy requirement, a guilty plea must “be established on a proper
factual basis.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. A proper factual basis exists if there are
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“sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within
the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349
(Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). Stated differently, a proper factual basis exists if “the
record contains a showing that there is credible evidence available which would support a
jury verdict that defendant is guilty of at least as great a crime as that to which he pled
guilty.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “The
main purpose of the accuracy requirement is to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to
a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.”
State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983).
1. Controlled Substance Crime
“A person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the fifth degree . . . if . . . the
person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures containing a controlled substance
classified in Schedule I, II, III, or IV . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1).
Methamphetamine is a Schedule II controlled substance. Minn. Stat. § 152.02,
subd. 3(d)(2) (2022). The offense is a felony if the person has a prior conviction for a
violation of Minnesota Statutes chapter 152 or a similar offense in another jurisdiction.
Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(b) (2022).
Garbow contends that a proper factual basis is lacking with respect to the controlled-
substance offense for two reasons. First, he contends that the factual basis is inadequate
because he did not admit that his possession of methamphetamine was unlawful. He cites
State v. Clarin, 913 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 7, 2018), in
which this court rejected an argument that the state failed to prove that the appellant did
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not have a lawful prescription for methamphetamine. Id. at 720-21. We reasoned that,
although “possession of physician-prescribed methamphetamine is lawful,” the jury was
allowed to infer that the appellant’s possession of methamphetamine was unlawful because
the methamphetamine was in the form of “a white powder in an unlabeled clear plastic
baggie,” not “in capsule or tablet form” in “a labeled container with appellant’s name on
it.” Id.
In this case, methamphetamine was found in a syringe on Garbow’s person at the
time of his arrest for driving while impaired. Garbow admitted to possessing it in the
course of pleading guilty to the controlled-substance offense. He did not say anything
about having a physician’s prescription, which would have allowed him to avoid criminal
liability and punishment. But it was unnecessary for him to expressly state that he did not
have a prescription. In a guilty plea, “[e]ven if an element to an offense is not verbalized
by the defendant, a district court may nevertheless draw inferences from the facts admitted
to by the defendant.” Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. App. 2021). Based
on the circumstances surrounding Garbow’s possession of the methamphetamine—in a
syringe, mixed with alcohol—the district court was permitted to draw the reasonable
inference that his possession was unlawful. Thus, the factual basis of Garbow’s plea to the
controlled-substance offense is not lacking on the ground that Garbow did not admit that
the methamphetamine he possessed was unprescribed.
Second, Garbow contends that the factual basis of his guilty plea to the controlled-
substance offense is inadequate because he did not expressly state that he has a prior
conviction for a violation of chapter 152 of the Minnesota Statutes, which is necessary to
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enhance the offense to a felony. During the plea hearing, Garbow was asked whether he
had “a prior drug conviction from 2015,” and he answered in the affirmative. He contends
on appeal that his admission is insufficient because it does not exclude the possibility that
his prior conviction was for a violation of a drug-related statute in a chapter other than
chapter 152.
As a general matter, a guilty plea is not inaccurate if “facts exist from which the
defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred .” Nelson, 880 N.W.2d
at 861 (quotation omitted). More specifically, the supreme court has held that a
“defendant’s failure to expressly acknowledge [prior] convictions in the plea colloquy”
does not render a guilty plea inaccurate if “the felony complaint alleges prior convictions,
the defendant had the opportunity to review the felony complaint and discuss the plea with
his lawyer, and the defendant does not contest the validity of the prior convictions.” State
v. Epps, 977 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. 2022). This case is like Epps. The complaint alleged
that Garbow was convicted in August 2015 of a fifth-degree controlled-substance crime,
which is a violation of chapter 152. See Minn. Stat. § 152.025. Garbow admitted at the
plea hearing that he was represented by counsel, had been fully informed of the facts of the
case, and had discussed the case with his attorney. Garbow did not challenge the validity
of his prior conviction. Thus, the factual basis of Garbow’s plea to unlawfully possessing
methamphetamine is not lacking on the ground that Garbow did not admit that his “prior
drug conviction from 2015” was for a violation of chapter 152.

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2. Test Refusal
A person who operates a motor vehicle within the state impliedly consents to a
chemical test of his or her breath for the “purpose of determining the presence of alcohol,
a controlled substance or its metabolite, or an intoxicating substance.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.51, subd. 1(a) (2022). A law-enforcement officer may require a person to submit
to a chemical test if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person violated the
driving-while-impaired statute. Id., subd. 1(b). When requesting a breath test of such a
person, the officer must inform the person that (1) Minnesota law requires the person to
take the test, (2) refusal to submit to the test is a crime, and (3) the person has a limited
right to consult with an attorney. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2 (2022). “It is a crime for
any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test . . . of the person’s breath under” the
implied-consent law. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1).
Garbow contends that a proper factual basis is lacking with respect to the test-refusal
offense because he did not admit that the officer read him the entire breath-test advisory
before his refusal. At the plea hearing, the district court asked Garbow whether the police
officer “ask[ed] you to take a test.” Garbow answered, “Yes.” The district court also asked
Garbow whether the police officer told him “what would happen if you didn’t take the
test.” Garbow answered, “I’d be charged with a refusal.” Because Garbow admitted that
the offer provided him with some of the information that is required by the breath-test
advisory, it reasonably may be inferred that the officer read Garbow the entire breath-test
advisory. See Rosendahl, 955 N.W.2d at 297-98. Thus, the factual basis of Garbow’s plea
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to test refusal is not lacking on the ground that Garbow did not admit that the officer read
him the entire breath-test advisory.
In sum, Garbow’s guilty pleas are not invalid on the ground that they are inaccurate.
B. Voluntariness
We next consider Garbow’s argument that his guilty pleas are invalid on the ground
that he did not enter them voluntarily. Specifically, Garbow argues that his guilty pleas
are invalid because the district court imposed sentences that violate the terms of the parties’
plea agreement, which called for stayed sentences.
“It is well settled that an unqualified promise which is part of a plea arrangement
must be honored or else the guilty plea may be withdrawn.” Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d
680, 687 (Minn. 1979). Accordingly, if a guilty plea “‘rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement
or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674
(Minn. 2000) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). If a promise in
a plea agreement is not fulfilled, the defendant cannot be said to have voluntarily entered
into the plea agreement. See State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 526 (Minn. 2003); State
v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn. 2000).
Garbow’s argument is inconsistent with the district court record. The district court
did not reject the parties’ plea agreement. Rather, the district court stated that the
presumptive sentence on the controlled-substance offense is a stayed 15-month sentence
but granted Garbow’s request to execute his stayed sentences. Under Minnesota law, “a
defendant has the right to refuse probation and demand execution of sentence when the
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conditions of probation make probation more onerous than prison.” State v. Rasinski, 472
N.W.2d 645, 650 (Minn. 1991); see also State v. Ott, 341 N.W.2d 883, 883-84 (Minn.
1984). If a defendant exercises the right to demand execution of a stayed sentence, the
imposition of an executed sentence is not an upward dispositional departure from the
presumptive sentence. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.f (2022).
Garbow’s request to execute his sentences is evident from the procedural history of
the case. At the plea hearing, Garbow’s attorney informed the district court that “whether
or not Mr. Garbow asks the court to execute that sentence will depend on what happens in
the probation file.” At the subsequent hearing to resolve Garbow’s probation violations
and to impose sentenc es in this case, Garbow’s attorney asked the district court to first
order a disposition on Garbow’s probation violations in the 2018 case, which she described
as the “controlling sentence.” After the district court revoked Garbow’s probation and
executed his sentence in the 2018 case, Garbow’s attorney requested that the district court
order an executed sentence. In doing so, Garbow’s attorney said that the district court
should “depart dispositionally upward.” But that statement is a mistaken description of
what the attorney previously had described: that Garbow would request execution of his
stayed 15-month sentence to run concurrently with an executed sentence in the 2018 case.
Importantly, the district court did not state that it was ordering an upward
dispositional departure. Only Garbow’s attorney used that terminology. The district court
expressly stated that the sentencing guidelines called for a stayed sentence of 15 months,
which is consistent with the terms of the plea agreement. When imposing the sentence, the
district court referred to Garbow’s expressed preference, stating, “Pursuant to your
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request, the court does commit you to the commissioner of corrections for that period of
time of 15 months.” (Emphasis added.) The warrant of commitment does not indicate that
the district court ordered an upward departure. The district court record must be construed
to reflect that Garbow’s stayed sentence was executed at his request. So understood, there
is no sentencing departure and, thus, no violation of the plea agreement. See Ott, 341
N.W.2d at 883-84; Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.f.
We note that Garbow also argues that the district court violated his right to a Blakely
trial by ordering an upward dispositional departure without empaneling a jury. Garbow
cites caselaw providing that, if a district court commits such an error, the appropriate
appellate remedy is reversal and remand for resentencing. See, e.g., State v. Dettman, 719
N.W.2d 644, 655 (Minn. 2006). But Garbow does not request that form of relief; he
requests that this court invalidate his guilty pleas. Garbow has not cited any caselaw
providing that, if a district court violates a defendant’s right to a Blakely trial, the
defendant’s guilty plea is invalid, and we are unaware of any such caselaw. In any event,
this argument would fail for the same reason that is stated above: the district court ordered
executed sentences because it granted Garbow’s request to execute his stayed sentences.
In sum, Garbow’s guilty pleas are not invalid on the ground that they were
involuntarily entered.
Affirmed.