State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0551

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Emerson Alexander Gonzalez-Rivas,
Appellant.

Filed February 5, 2024
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-13685

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Christopher P. Renz, Andrew C. Case, Chestnut Cambronne PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Gaitas, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
A jury found appellant guilty of violating a domestic-abuse no -contact order
(DANCO). Appellant argues that his conviction should be reversed because the district
court abused its discretion by declining to instruct the jury regarding the use of interpreters
at his trial and in responding to a jury question during its deliberations. We affirm.
FACTS
In July 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Emerson Alexander
Gonzalez-Rivas with a misdemeanor violation of a DANCO. See Minn. Stat. § 629.75,
subd. 2(b) (2020) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . , a person who knows of the existence
of a domestic abuse no contact order issued against the person and violates the order is
guilty of a misdemeanor.”).
The district court issued the DANCO on January 29, 2021, when Gonzalez-Rivas
made his first appearance on a charge of felony domestic assault. The DANCO prohibited
Gonzalez-Rivas from having contact with his wife, MLDR. The district court also set
conditions of release, including prohibiting Gonzalez -Rivas from leaving the state of
Minnesota without written court approval.
At a subsequent hearing on February 25, 2021, the district court amended the
DANCO to prohibit Gonzalez -Rivas from having any contact “directly, indirectly, or
through others, in person, by telephone, in writing, electronically or by any other means ”
with MLDR, unless he had a “police escort to recov er prescription medications, personal
clothing and toiletries .” The amended DANCO also “provide[d] for third -party
3
communication regarding parenting time alone.” The district court addressed
Gonzalez-Rivas and indicated that MLDR might “disagree with the [c]ourt’s order and
wish[] to have some contact.” But the district court informed Gonzalez-Rivas that “for the
time-being, you are prohibited from having any contact with her. You understand if you
violate that term or the conditions of release, you’re going to be arrested. You’re going to
be brought back here, understood?” Gonzalez-Rivas responded, “I understand.”
In July 2021, a Metropolitan Airport police officer received a report that a person
was suspected of smoking on an airplane. The officer observed the individual, later
identified as Gonzalez -Rivas, exit the plane with a woman and four children.
Gonzalez-Rivas first identified the woman as his wife . Then he stated that she was “his
girl” and then “his sister.” The officer learned of the DANCO and determined that the
woman with Gonzalez-Rivas was MLDR.
The ensuing DANCO-violation charge was tried to a jury. At the beginning of trial,
the district court notified the parties that it planned to provide a model instruction regarding
the use of interpreters at trial . The state asked the district court to modify the model
instruction so it would not imply that Gonzalez -Rivas did not understand previous
communications, such as those occurring when the DANCO was issued and modified. The
district court proposed a modification. Gonzalez-Rivas objected and asked the court to
provide the model instruction as written. The court ultimately decided not to instruct the
jury regarding the use of interpreters at trial.
The state called two police officers as witnesses at trial and introduced several
exhibits, including the amended February 2021 DANCO and redacted transcripts of the
4
January and February 2021 hearings. Gonzalez -Rivas testified in his defense. He
acknowledged that “leading up to July 15, 2021, there was a DANCO” prohibiting contact
with MLDR, but that he nevertheless accompanied MLDR on the flight because “[he] did
not understand completely the legal proceedings.”
During jury deliberations , the jur y submitted a question to the district court
regarding the requirements of the DANCO. Gonzalez-Rivas asked the district court to
clarify the DANCO’s requirements for the jury. The district court declined to do so.
The jury found Gonzalez -Rivas guilty as charged. The district court sentenced
Gonzalez-Rivas to 90 days in jail and stayed the execution of that sentence for one year.
Gonzalez-Rivas appeals.
DECISION
I.
Gonzales-Rivas contends that the district court’s “refusal to give any instruction
regarding the use of interpreters was an abuse of discretion.”
This court reviews “a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for
abuse of discretion.” State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 222 (Minn. 2015). “A district court
abuses its discretion if it fails to properly instruct the jury on all element s of the offense
charged.” State v. Stay, 935 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “Upon
review, instructions are viewed in their entirety to determine whether they fairly and
adequately explain the law of the case.” State v. Peterson, 673 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Minn.
2004).
5
Model jury instruction guides (JIGs) are prepared by the Minnesota District Judges
Association (MDJA) Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions and are intended to reflect
the current caselaw of the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
as well as current legislation at the time of publication. 10 Minnesota Practice,
CRIMJIG—Preface (Supp. 2022). “Although district courts may favor [model] jury
instructions, their use is not required.” State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d 834, 842 (Minn. 2016).
The model jury instructions “are not the law; they are merely a committee of the Minnesota
District Judges Association ’s attempt to summarize the law for the convenience of the
parties and the trial court.” State v. Pierce, 792 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn. App. 2010).
The model instruction at issue here is CRIMJIG 2.05,1 which provides:
[[Name of language] may be used during this trial.]

Minnesota law provides that a defendant who cannot
fully understand or participate in legal proceedings because of
a difficulty speaking or comprehending English must be
provided a qualified interpreter. This is because a defendant
who lacks an understanding of the legal proceedings
surrounding [her] [his] case cannot assist in the defense ,
challenge the accusers, and make informed choices regarding
[her] [his] fundamental rights. It is through the use of qualified
interpreters that defendants who cannot fully understand
English are afforded the same fair treatment and opportunities
in their defense as English speaking defendants.

[The state policy is to use [interpreters] [translators] where it is
the judgment of the court that it is necessary to ensure fairness
in a trial.]

1 The numbering of this instruction has since changed. See 10 Minnesota Practice
CRIMJIG 1.04 (2023) (noting that the use of interpreter jury instruction takes place before
trial).
6
[(Name of person) speaks and understands some English, but
it is my judgment that (his)(her) understanding of English is
not sufficient to ensure that (he) (she) has a full understanding
of the proceedings. I have therefore authorized the use of [an
interpreter] [a translator] in this case.]

[The decision to use [an interpreter] [a translator] is my
decision.]

[[An interpreter] [A translator] is necessary for a defendant to
understand everything that is said in the courtroom. The court
instructs the [interpreter] [translator] to interpret every word
that is said.]

(Emphasis added.)

Moreover, the use note to that model instruction states:
All or part of this instruction may be given in cases where
translators or interpreters are used. The purpose of the
instruction is to ensure that the jury understands the reason for
using an interpreter or translator, that the decision to use an
interpreter or translator is the court’s decision and that the jury
should not view any party adversely for needing an interpreter
or translator.

10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 2.05 use note (2015).
The district court considered that purpose in declining to instruct the jury regarding
the use of interpreters, explaining:
[T]he principal reason for the instruction is . . . that the jury
doesn’t hold it against [] Gonzalez-Rivas for any delays caused
by the interpreters. But in this case here [], we have two
real-time interpreters using headsets and doing simultaneous
interpretation that’s not delaying or affecting the trial in any
way. So there is just not a reason to give this instruction.

The district court also explained, “I have never spoken a word directly to Mr. Gonzalez -
Rivas, so I can’t really make any representations about his speaking or comprehension
7
abilities to the jury. So I just can’t give the jury instruction not havi ng done that.” And
the district court noted that “this instruction is a discretionary instruction, it says the [c]ourt
‘may’ give it.”
Gonzales-Rivas argues that CRIMJIG 2.05 “was clearly applicable to the case and
relevant for this particular defendant w hose first language was not English and who had
two interpreters assisting him throughout the trial.” He further argues that “[t]he
interpreters were obviously present as part of the trial and potentially affected the jurors’
assessment of the going-on in the courtroom, including the evidence.” He therefore asserts
that he was “entitled” to an instruction regarding the use of interpreters, “because the
presence of interpreters in assisting the defendant at his trial supported it.” But he does not
point to any particular circumstances related to the use of the interpreters that would have
caused the jury to view the interpreters —and therefore Gonzales -Rivas—adversely.
Instead, he merely notes that the two interpreters occasionally interrupted or asked for
clarification or instruction in the presence of the jurors.
Essentially, Gonzalez-Rivas argues that an interpreter instruction was necessary
simply because interpreters were used at his trial. But Gonzales-Rivas does not cite , and
we are not aware of , any precedent holding that an instruction regarding the use of
interpreters is required any time an interpreter is used at trial. Indeed, such a rule would
be inconsistent with caselaw. Once again, c aselaw instructs that the district court must
“properly instruct the jury on all elements of the offense charged ,” Stay, 935 N.W.2d at
430 (quotation omitted) , and must “ fairly and adequately explain the law of the case ,”
Peterson, 673 N.W.2d at 486. An instruction explaining the use of interpreters at trial is
8
not necessary to meet either of those requirements. And caselaw instructs that the use of
model jury instructions is not required. Thao, 875 N.W.2d at 842. That fact is buttressed
by the use note to CRIMJIG 2.05, which states that the instruction “may” be given if an
interpreter is used at trial.
In sum, the district court considered instructing the jury on the use of interpreters at
trial but ultimately decided not to do so . In doing so, t he district court considered the
parties’ positions on the issue, and the district court’s stated reasoning was consistent with
the purpose of the optional instruction. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion.
To be clear, we do not suggest that a jury instruction regarding the use of interpreters
at trial is never appropriate. It depend s on the particular facts and circumstances of the
case. But in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there
was no reason to give such an instruction.
II.
Gonzalez-Rivas also contends that the district court’s “refusal to give [his] requested
response to the jury question was an abuse of discretion.” Specifically, Gonzalez-Rivas
argues that the jurors “needed an additional, clarifying jury instruction in response to their
question” concerning the conditions in the DANCO. The state contends that , because the
jury asked a factual question, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its response.
“It is well established that the [district court] may, in [its] discretion, give additional
instructions in response to a jury’s question on any point of law . The court has the
discretion to decide whether to amplify previous instructions, reread previous instructions,
or give no response at all.” State v. Laine, 715 N.W.2d 425, 434 (Minn. 2006).
9
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subd ivision 20(3) addresses the
court’s response to a jury’s question during deliberation. It states:
If the jury asks for additional instruction on the law during
deliberation, the court must give notice to the parties. The
court’s response must be given in the courtroom.

(a) The court may give additional instructions.
(b) The court may reread portions of the original
instructions.
(c) The court may tell the jury that the request deals with
matters not in evidence or not related to the law of the
case.
(d) The court may tell the jury that the request is a
factual matter that the jury, not the judge, must
determine.
(e) The court need not give instructions beyond the
jury’s request, but may do so to avoid giving undue
prominence to the requested instructions.
(f) The court may give additional instructions without a
jury request during deliberations. The court must give
notice to the parties of its intent to give additional
instructions.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(3)(a)-(f) (emphasis added).
Here, the jury asked the following question during its deliberations : “We would
like to know if leaving the state was carried over to the DANCO. Did the travel restriction
from 1/29/21 document carry over to the 2/25/21 document?”
The jury’s question appears to stem from the bail conditions set at the January 2021
hearing. The jury heard testimony from an officer regarding that hearing and received a
redacted transcript of the hearing, in which the district court stated that it would set bail at
$25,000 with the condition that Gonzalez-Rivas “may not leave the State of Mi nnesota
10
without written court approval.” The jury also received the amended DANCO, which did
not include or mention any travel restrictions.
Gonzalez-Rivas asked the district court to instruct the jury that the travel restriction
applied to his pretrial release, and not to the DANCO, and that the DANCO did not prohibit
Gonzalez-Rivas from leaving the state. He expressed concern that “the jury might believe
that the DANCO prohibited him from leaving the state . . . but the DANCO did not prohibit
him from leaving the State of Minnesota.” The state objected, arguing that the district court
should “leave it at [] the facts, ” noting that “ the jury has the DANCO and the language
with them.”
In response to the question, the district court instructed the jury: “You are the judges
of the facts of the case. It’s up to you to determine the facts based on the evidence presented
to you. You may continue your deliberations.” In doing so, the district court reasoned that
the jurors’ question did not appear to ask “a legal question about the application of facts to
the law, it’s more . . . [that] they want to know a fact.”
The district court did not abuse its discretion by not instructing the jury regarding
the contents of the DANCO. As the district court explained, the jury’s question concerned
a fact—whether the travel restriction applied to the amended DANCO —and not a matter
of law. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(3)(d), (“The court may tell the jury that the
request is a factual matter that the jury, and not the judge, must determine.”).
Gonzalez-Rivas argues that the district court’s failure to tell the jury that the
amended DANCO did not contain a travel restriction “allowed the jury to deliberate while
confused about a fundamental concept that the state was required to prove.” Specifically,
11
he argues that, because the district court failed “ to clarify the elements of the offense, the
jury may have found the evidence sufficient to convict [him] based on the fact that he had
left the state of Minneso ta.” But as the state argues, “the evidence in the record and the
parties’ closing arguments reveal no emphasis whatsoever of a purported violation of the
travel restriction in question.” Instead, the state argued that Gonzalez-Rivas violated the
DANCO b y having direct contact with MDLR, that an airport police officer saw them
together, and Gonzalez-Rivas admitted they were traveling together.
In sum, the record does not suggest that the jury found Gonzalez-Rivas guilty
because he left the state without permission. Thus , we have no concern that the district
court’s response to the jury’s question prejudiced Gonzalez-Rivas.
Affirmed.