A23-0563

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0554
A23-0563

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
M. M. B. and P. J. J. G., Parents.

Filed October 9, 2023
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Pine County District Court
File No. 58-JV-22-92

Anne M. Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant-
mother M.M.B.)

Michael K. Pepin, Michael K. Pepin Law Office, Pine Springs, Minnesota (for appellant-
father P.J.J.G.)

Reese Frederickson, Pine County Attorney, Sydney Silko, Assistant County Attorney, Pine
City, Minnesota (for respondent Pine County Health and Human Services)

Alfred S. Alliegro, Alliegro Law Office LLC, Center City, Minnesota (for child T.M.M.)

Jim Clune, Pine City, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Smith ,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appellant-mother M.M.B. and appellant-father
P.J.J.G. appeal from the district court’s order terminating their parental rights. Both
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appellants challenge the district court’s determination that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family. In addition, mother challenges the district court’s
determination that three statutory bases for termination of parental rights (TPR) were
established, and father challenges the district court’s determination that termination of his
parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are drawn from the district court’s findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and order terminating parental rights.
Mother and father are the biological parents of T.M.M., born in 2009, and B.M.M.,
born in 2017. On December 21, 2021, T.M.M. and B.M.M. were removed from appellants’
home. But this was not appellants’ first involvement with respondent Pine County Health
and Human Services. Six months earlier, in July 2021, the county received a report from
the sheriff’s office regarding a dispute between father and mother at appellants’ home. The
children witnessed a portion of this incident. As a result, the county opened a parent support
outreach assessment and assigned a social worker.
On September 14, 2021, the county received reports that law enforcement had
responded to the home four times the previous day. According to the reports, father was
“manic” and tested positive for methamphetamine, and controlled substances and drug
paraphernalia were left out and accessible to the children in the home. Both parents made
various allegations against each other to law enforcement, but neither followed through
with seeking an order for protection.
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On October 5, 2021, the county received a report that father threatened to kill
himself in front of the children. This report also alleged that the children were not attending
school. It was later revealed that B.M.M. was never enrolled in school and T.M.M. did not
attend school consistently because father claimed that he was dying and the parents wanted
to keep her home.
Because of these incidents, the county made referrals for appellants to complete
chemical-use assessments, discus sed various agencies where appellants could obtain
mental-health services, and arranged school-linked mental-health services for T.M.M.
On December 16, 2021, the county received a report that law enforcement had
responded to appellants’ home because father had fired a gun at an acquaintance while
inside the home with the children present. A handgun was found in the parents’ bedroom
despite father’s status as ineligible to possess a firearm due to his conviction of a crime of
violence. The home was described as “very dirty,” and animal feces and urine were
observed in the house, including in the children’s bedrooms. Father was arrested and
charged with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and one count of second-degree
assault with a dangerous weapon.
The county opened a child-protection investigation, and a social worker met with
T.M.M. at school. T.M.M. disclosed that she was worried for her safety because father had
threatened that he would shoot her next.
On December 21, 2021, the county filed a petition alleging that the children were in
need of protection or services (CHIPS), as well as an ex parte motion for emergency
protective care. The children were placed in foster care. As the custodial parent, mother
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entered an admission to the CHIPS petition. As a noncustodial parent, father was a
participant in the CHIPS action but not required to enter an admission or denial to the
CHIPS petition.
On February 23, 2022, the children were adjudicated CHIPS and custody of the
children was transferred to the county for continued out- of-home placement. Appellants
were ordered to comply with case plans aimed at reunification. The case plans required
appellants to (1) complete chemical-use assessments and follow all recommendations,
(2) abstain from mood -altering chemicals unless prescribed by a p hysician, (3) comply
with random drug testing, (4) complete a mental-health assessment and follow all
recommendations, (5) maintain safe and stable housing, (6) sign releases of information as
necessary, (7) participate in visits with the children as ordered by the court, (8) remain law
abiding, and (9) complete domestic-violence programming as directed by the social
worker.
Over the course of the case, the family faced many obstacles to reunification.
Father’s frustration during visits with the children would escalate to inappropriate
behavior. After several outbursts, the children’s foster mother was granted a harassment
restraining order against father. Both parents were complicit in preventing the social
worker from visiting their home by erecting gates and threatening to harm the social worker
if she “trespassed.” T.M.M. was hospitalized several times for a severe, genetic blood
disorder that was dis covered while she was in foster care. T.M.M. was also hospitalized
due to suicidal thoughts, which were triggered by an incident where mother video-
conferenced father into a visit without permission. During one of T.M.M.’s
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hospitalizations, hospital staff asked appellants to leave due to their escalated,
inappropriate behavior. Father was arrested and incarcerated several times. And, while
mother had some success with chemical-use treatment, she struggled with her sobriety.
On September 28, 2022, the county filed a petition to terminate both appellants’
parental rights. Following a two-day trial in February 2023 , the district court determined
that the county established the following statutory grounds to terminate appellants’ parental
rights: (1) refusal or neglect to comply with parental duties, (2) palpable unfitness to
parent, and (3) reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home
placement. The district court also determined that the county made reasonable reunification
efforts and that termination of appellants’ parental rights was in the children’s best
interests. The district court granted the TPR petition. Both father and mother appealed, and
we consolidated the appeals.
DECISION
“A district court may terminate parental rights if (1) at least one statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, (2) the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and (3) termination is in the child’s best interests.”
In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn.
Dec. 6, 2021). In reviewing an order terminating parental rights, appellate courts review
the underlying findings of fact for clear error. In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d
381, 385 (Minn. 2008). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary
to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In
re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
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Appellate courts review the district court’s determinations of whether the county made
reasonable efforts at reunification, whether a statutory basis for TPR exists, and whether
TPR is in a child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600. “A
district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the
evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts
on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Both appellants challenge the district court’s determination that the county made
reasonable reunification efforts. Additionally, mother challenges the determination that a
statutory basis for termination exists, and father challenges the determination that
termination is in the children’s best interests. We address each issue in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.

Both father and mother argue that the district court abused its discretion by ruling
that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. For the county to satisfy its
burden to provide reasonable efforts, the county’s efforts must reasonably serve to prevent
placement of children outside the home, to rehabilitate the family, and to reunify the family.
See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022). Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond mere
matters of form so as to include real , genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.W.,
727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2007). For a county’s efforts to be reasonable, the services offered must be:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child ’s family and, if
appropriate, the child; (2) tailored to the individualized needs
of the child and child’s family; (3) relevant to the safety,
protection, and well-being of the child; (4) adequate to meet
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the individualized needs of the child and family; (5) culturally
appropriate; (6) available and accessible; (7) consistent and
timely; and (8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022).
The district court determined that reasonable efforts were made by the county to
rehabilitate the parents and reunify the family. It found that the services offered were
relevant to the safety and protection of the children, adequate to meet the needs of the
children and family, culturally appropriate, available and accessible, consistent and timely,
and realistic under the circumstances.1
Specifically, the district court found that the county provided (1) referrals and
resources for chemical-dependency treatment, mental -health services, and domestic-
violence programming; (2) random drug testing; (3) in-person, phone, and text
communication with appellants; (4) communication and attempted communication with
treatment and service providers, school staff, and the guardian ad litem; (5) frequent after-
hours communication; (6) coordination and rescheduling of visits; (7) a phone card to assist
with communication between appellants and their children; (8) individual counseling for

1 The district court appears to have relied on a previous version of Minnesota Statutes
section 260.012(h), which did not include the first two factors present in the current
version—that the efforts were (1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and child’s family. Thus, the district
court did not make specific findings on those two factors. N either party noted this
discrepancy for this court’s consideration, nor did they rely on these two factors in their
arguments on appeal. Therefore, we will not consider the impact, if any, that the omission
of findings on these two factors had on the district court’s determination regarding
reasonable efforts. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n
appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can
be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.”).
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the children; (9) preschool for B.M.M.; (10) home visits; (11) more than $800 in gas
vouchers and assistance with additional transportation; and (12) assistance contacting
county resources for financial and medical needs. The record supports the district court’s
findings that the county provided these services to father and mother.
Mother argues that her progress toward reunification was impeded by father and
that the agency failed to make reasonable efforts because, while the county required and
made a referral for domestic-violence programming, it “failed to clearly articulate to
Mother that she may be able to better care for the children if she were to no longer allow
Father as a presence in her life or the lives of the children.” T he record, however,
contradicts mother’s contention. The second social worker assigned to the case testified
that she had a discussion early in the case with both parents about the couple possibly
parting ways to focus on their case plans. Mother’s argument fails to acknowledge this
testimony. In addition, mother and the second social worker testified that mother did not
participate in domestic -violence programming as required by the case plans. They also
testified that mother asked the social worker to waive this requirement after father was
incarcerated and as trial approached. The district court found that mother failed to comply
with the case plans’ domestic-violence programming requirement. Mother’s argument that
the county did not ma ke reasonable efforts because it failed to adequately address the
concerns with mother’s relationship with father is unpersuasive.
Father argues that the county failed to make reasonable efforts because the county
did not help him arrange services and the social worker made only minor attempts to
prompt the parents to follow the case plans. But the district court found that the social
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workers made several referrals, gave the parents a list of services, and made frequent efforts
to communicate with the parents in-person and via phone to track their progress. The first
social worker testified that she made initial referrals for chemical-use assessments and that
she discussed different agencies for mental -health resources. The second social worker
testified that she made referrals for mental -health services and had conversations early on
with father about where to go to complete assessments. This social worker further testified
that she attempted to communicate regularly with father directly, but father would
frequently only communicate through mother. When father did communicate directly, he
would often “blow up [the social worker’s] phone with . . . absurd messages, spewing
profanities, and then he would collect himself, apologize, and then [she] wouldn’t hear
from him for a while.” Father’s argument that the county did not try to help him obtain
services is unpersuasive.
Next, father argues that the county failed to make reasonable efforts because the
COVID-19 pandemic made obtaining services difficult. But father fails to explain exactly
which services were closed or unavailable because of the pandemic, and it appears that no
evidence was entered into the record that supports his contention that services were
unavailable due to the pandemic. Furthermore, the district court found that father had many
opportunities to engage in, and to varying degrees of success did in fact engage in,
substance-use and mental-health services. Father and the second social worker testified that
father attended therapy during the course of the case. Father testified that he attended three
different substance-use treatment programs over the course of the case. The second social
worker confirmed that father completed one in-patient treatment program but that he was
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discharged from another program for failure to participate for an entire month and was
discharged from another program without staff approval in December 2022. Fa ther’s
argument that the pandemic interfered with services is unpersuasive.
Lastly, father argues that the county failed to make reasonable efforts because, if the
county wanted reunification, it should have extended “for much longer” the period of time
for him to comply with and complete the case plans. This argument, too, is unpersuasive.
The initial case plans were established in February 2022. A permanency progress review
hearing was held on June 2, 2022, and, on August 26, 2022, an intermediate disposition
review hearing was held. Following the August hearing, the district court ordered the
county to file a permanency petition within 30 days because it found that the parents were
not in compliance with the case plans and that it was in the children’s best interests to
proceed to permanency. The district court is required to commence permanency
proceedings and hold an admit/deny hearing on the permanency petition no later than 12
months after the child is placed in foster care. Minn. Stat. § 260C.503, subd. 1 (2022). The
hearing in this case was held on November 4, 2022, at which point the children had been
in foster care for 10½ months. Trial was held in February 2023— over a year after the
children had been removed from the home. The county’s TPR petition was timely and
appropriate.
Ultimately, the district court made detailed findings, supported by the record,
regarding the numerous services and resources provided by the county that met the criteria
in Minnesota Statutes section 260C.012(h). As a result, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that a statutory
basis for termination of mother’s parental rights was established by clear and
convincing evidence.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that
three statutory bases for termination were proved by clear and convincing evidence. The
district court found that (1) mother refused or neglected to comply with parental duties,
(2) mother was palpably unfit to parent, and (3) reasonable efforts had failed to correct the
conditions leading to out-of-home placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2),
(4), (5) (2022). A decision to terminate parental rights may be affirmed based on only one
statutory ground. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
We begin with the district court’s determination that mother failed to correct the
conditions leading to out-of-home placement. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
Under this statutory basis, a basis to terminate parental rights exists if the district court
rules that, “following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the
direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s
placement.” Id. In assessing whether the conditions that led to out-of-home placement have
been corrected, “[t]he critical issue is not whether the parent formally complied with the
case plan, but rather whether the parent is presently able to assume the responsibilities of
caring for the child.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 89. It is presumed that reasonable efforts have
failed upon a showing that (1) a child has resided out of the home under court order for a
cumulative period of 12 months within the preceding 22 months, (2) the court approved
the out-of-home placement plan, (3) conditions leading to the out-of-home placement have
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not been corrected, and (4) reasonable efforts have been made by the social services agency
to rehabilitate and reunite the family. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
The district court found that the children had been in court-ordered out-of-home
placement for more than 12 months. The district court also found that the court approved
the out-of-home placement plan and ordered the parents to comply with the plan on
February 23, 2022, and August 26, 2022. Further, the district court found that reasonable
efforts were made by the county to rehabilitate and reunite the family.
Mother seems to challenge the district court’s determinations regarding the
conditions that led to removal and the district court’s determination that the conditions
were not corrected. She makes three arguments.
First, mother asserts that the initial condition that led to removal was father’s
discharge of a firearm and that his incarceration corrected this condition. But the district
court found that several conditions led to the children’s out -of-home placement. These
included (1) the unsanitary condition of the home, (2) educational neglect, (3) instability
within the home, (4) the parents’ unaddressed mental-health needs, (5) the parents’
chemical use, (6) domestic violence, and (7) safety concerns as demonstrated by the gun
incident. Furthermore, while the safety concerns posed by father’s discharge of a firearm
were corrected by his incarceration, the district court found that other conditions—
substance use, mental-health issues, instability in the home, and domestic violence—were
not corrected. Thus, father’s incarceration is not dispositive as to whether the conditions
leading to removal were corrected.
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Second, mother argue s that father’s incarceration alleviated concerns about his
propensity for violence toward mother. However, the district court found that, despite
participating in couples counseling, appellants continued to struggle with domestic
violence and unhealthy relationship dynamics. Moreover, the district court found that
mother intended to remain in a relationship with father and that the parents had not
participated in domestic-violence programming. Although father’s incarceration alleviated
immediate threats of violence against mother, the district court’s determination that the
conditions of domestic violence and unhealthy relationship dynamics were not corrected is
still supported by its findings and the record.
Third, mother argues that the conditions leading to removal were corrected because
she had been sober for approximately two months at the time of trial. Testimony and
exhibits established that mother attended and was successfully discharged from residential
treatment in March 2022 and that she then successfully competed outpatient programming
in July 2022. But, thereafter, mother did not follow continuing care recommendations. She
relapsed and tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine on August 8,
October 18, and November 15, 2022. Mother then followed recommendations and enrolled
in an outpatient program, in which she remained at the time of the trial. She again tested
positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine several times in November and
December, but by the time of trial she had been sober for two months.
In its order, the district court explained why mother’s recent sobriety, in and of itself,
did not address concerns about mother’s chemical use. Specifically, the district court cited
concern regarding mother’s pattern of use after participating in treatment programs, that
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her relapses coincided with father’s use while he was out of custody and in her life, and
that mother refused to increase programming to four times per week as recommended by
her current treatment counselor. Thus, although mother was sober in the two months
leading up to trial, the district court’s determination that the condition of substance use was
not sufficiently corrected is supported by its findings and the record.
In sum, the record supports the district court’s findings that mother failed to
adequately address her mental health, domestic violence in her relationship with father,
and her sobriety. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home
placement of the children. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the county proved this statutory basis for termination of
parental rights by clear and convincing evidence, we need not address the other two bases
found by the district court. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination
of father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that
termination was in the best interests of the children. In any termination proceeding, “the
best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 7 (2022). In analyzing the best interests of the child, the district court must balance
three factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the
parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest
of the child.” J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 604 (quotation omitted) ; see Minn. R. Juv. Prot.
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P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (requiring the district court to analyze the same factors). Competing
interests of the child “include a stable environment, health considerations, and the child’s
preferences.” In re Welfare of M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730, 744 (Minn. App. 2013). The
district court “must consider a child’s best interests and explain its rationale in its findings
and conclusions.” In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003).
Father appears to challenge the district court’s analysis of the best-interests factors.
First, father points out that the evidence shows that the children have an interest in
maintaining the parent -child relationship. Specifically, father states that the children are
bonded with and love their parents. The district court acknowledged the children’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship by considering T.M.M.’s stated preferences,
which included her love for her parents and desire to return home. However, the district
court also found that T.M.M. acknowledged that her parents’ lack of progress on the case
plans might make reunification impossible. Additionally, the district court found that
T.M.M. expressed fear of returning home at times. The record supports the district court’s
findings regarding the children’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship.
Father also argues that the evidence shows that he has a strong interest in
maintaining the parent-child relationship. He cites to testimony about his strong desire to
have his children returned and to evidence that he saved up $4,000 to pay for housing, that
he participated in visitation as much as he could, and that he completed the required mental-
health and chemical-use assessments. In its order, the district court acknowledged that
father loves his children. However, the district court also found that father missed
numerous visits and that some rescheduled visits ended abruptly due to father becoming
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verbally aggressive. The record supports the district court’s findings regarding father’s
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship.
Importantly, father fails to acknowledge any competing interests of the children in
his challenge of the district court’s ultimate determination that termination was in the
children’s best interests. Regarding competing interests, the district court found that the
children had been in a safe, stable, consistent environment for over a year, which allowed
them to develop and progress. The district court also found that this environment enabled
the children to have their needs met. It found that the guardian ad litem testified credibly
that the children were thriving in their placement. However, the district court also found
that the children have significant therapeutic work ahead to overcome their diagnoses and
prevent future issues. Ultimately, the district court found that the parents had not made
sufficient progress to demonstrate that they could care for the children now or in the
foreseeable future. The record supports the district court’s findings regarding the
competing interests of the children.
The district court’s analysis focused on the three required balancing factors. While
father and the children may have interests in preserving the parent-child relationship, the
district court made detailed findings, supported by the record, about the children’s best
interests to the contrary. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that the termination of father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.