In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0584

In re the Marriage of:

Natasha Siefker Cook, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Tobin Jack Cook,
Appellant.

Filed December 26, 2023
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-FA-18-1168

Natasha Siefker Cook, Duluth, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Tobin Cook, Duluth, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
This family -law appeal arises from a district-court order that decided several
pending motions. Appellant-father argues that the district court abused its discretion by
modifying the parties’ original parenting-time schedule, prescribing telephone contact
between the “off-duty” parent and the children at a designated time, requiring the parties
2
to communicate through a messaging platform, relying on an assessment from a
psychologist, and not finding respondent-mother “guilty” of perjury. Because none of
father’s arguments merit reversal, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 17, 2020, appellant-father Tobin Jack Cook (father) and respondent-mother
Natasha Siefker Cook n/k/a Natasha Siefker ( mother) entered into a mediated settlement
agreement as part of their marriage-dissolution proceeding. On February 24, 2021, the
district court entered a judgment and decree dissolving the marriage. The judgment and
decree generally incorporated the terms of the mediated settlement agreement and resolved
other outstanding issues. The judgment and decree includes provisions governing custody,
parenting time, communication, and therapy for the children, among other topics.
Judgment and Decree Terms
Under the terms of the judgment and decree, the parties were awarded joint legal
and joint physical custody of their three minor children. The judgment and decree also
provided that the parents shall share equal parenting time in accordance with a mediated
schedule. This sched ule specified that father is “on duty” Sundays through Tuesdays,
mother is on duty Wednesdays through Fridays, and the parties alternate being on duty on
Saturdays. Under this 4-3/3-4 schedule, weekday exchanges were to occur after school on
Wednesdays and weekend exchanges were to occur at 9:00 a.m. on Saturdays or 9:30 a.m.
on Sundays.
The judgment and decree also guaranteed the parties the “[r]ight to reasonable
access and telephone or other electronic contact with the minor child[ren].” Regarding
3
communications between the parties, the judgment and decree provided that, “[u]nless
there is an emergency, all communication between the parties shall be via text or e-mail.”
Lastly, the judgment and decree required the parties to ensure that the children are
participating in therapy and that they attend their therapy appointments. The judgment and
decree authorized mother to choose the children’s therapists going forward if father failed
to cooperate in the therapist-selection process. The district court imposed this requirement
over father’s objection based on mother’s allegations that father had not cooperated in
selecting the children’s therapists and had “actively interfere[d] with the children’s mental
health care.”
Motions at Issue on Appeal
Starting in the fall of 2021 and continuing through the summer of 2022, the parties
filed numerous motions related to custody , parenting time, and other issues . In
September 2021, mother filed an ex parte motion seeking various forms of relief, including
a modification of custody. In an affidavit in support of the motion, mother detailed the
parties’ conflict over the children’s schooling, including issues with busing. Mother also
stated that father was interfering with the children’s therapy and was attempting to alienate
the children from mother.
In December 2021, mother filed another motion asking the district court to find
father in contempt for violating the parenting-time provisions of the judgment and decree.
In the motion, she also requested compensatory parenting time. In support of her motion,
she filed an affidavit in which she stated that father had deprived her of her parenting time
on thirteen occasions in the fall of 2021. She also stated that father was continuing to
4
engage in parental alienation and asked the district court to “take a hard look into whether
the respondent’s behaviors constitute endangerment.” Attached to her affidavit was a letter
from a county psychologist who conducted a family assessment. The letter stated, in
relevant part, that “there is little doubt that [father] is intentionally inducing animosity
between his children and their mother.”
In January 2022, father filed a responsive motion. Father asked the district court to
deny mother’s motion in its entirety and to require the parties to participate in mediation
consistent with the terms of judgment and decree. In a supporting affidavit, father stated
that he cared for the children during mother’s parenting time only when mother or the
children expressly requested it. F ather also stated that his behavior was motivated by a
“desire to protect [the] children” and asserted that mother was at least partially to blame
for her estrangement from the children. The parties attempted to resolve their
parenting-time issues through mediation but were unable to reach an agreement.
Around the time that mother filed her December 2021 motion and until June 2022,
the parties and their children were involved in a Child in Need of Protective Services
(CHIPS) matter that was initiated after a county psychologist and the children’s therapist
expressed concern about the children being “heavily triangulated” in the parties’
“contentious” and “dysfunctional” parenting relationship. After an investigation, the
matter was closed, and no action was taken against the parties.
In July 2022, mother filed another motion seeking a variety of relief. She asked the
district court to find father in contempt as previously requested, to reduce her parenting
time to ten days per month for the next two years, to offset the decrease in parenting time
5
by granting her additional vacation time with the children, to allow the “off-duty” parent
to contact the children via telephone every other night at 6:00 p.m., and to order the parties
to communicate through Our Family Wizard.1 In a supporting affidavit, mother stated that
the parenting-time schedule included in the judgment and decree was untenable because
father had repeatedly taken the children during mother’s parenting time and often appeared
at mother’s house unannounced. Mother expressed a willingness to reduce her parenting
time to avoid “the repeated conflicts that have arisen” since the parties’ divorce. She
proposed a schedule in which the parties’ youngest child would stay with her Thursday
through Sunday twice a month while the parties’ two older children would stay with her
for ten consecutive nights once a month, overlapping for part of the time with the youngest
child. Mother also attached the reports of various county professionals involved in the
CHIPS matter, including the children’s guardian ad litem and social worker.
In early August 2022, father filed a responsive motion asking the district court
to: reduce mother’s parenting time; order the parties to communicate through a
combination of Our Family Wizard, text message, and email; and find mother “guilty of
perjury” based on statements she made in her July 2022 affidavit. In a supporting affidavit,
father expressed a desire to have more parenting time but objected to any modification that
either allowed the children to be with mother for more than five nights at a time or increased
the number of exchanges between the parties. Father acknowledged that “the children
often [do not] like exchanging on Wednesdays [under the current schedule] and going to

1 Our Family Wizard is a court-ordered communication website. Winkowski v. Winkowski,
989 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 2023).
6
different houses after school” because they carry their belongings with them and often
forget some items. But he opposed mother’s proposed schedule because the children would
be with mother for ten consecutive nights. Instead, he proposed a schedule where the
children would stay with father on weekdays and every other weekend during the school
year. During the summer, the children would stay with father every other week. Father
also objected to mother’s request to allow th e off-duty parent to contact the children at
6:00 p.m. every other night because “[t]he children [are not] always available then, and
neither am I.” And father asked that the parties be allowed to communicate via text
message and email as well as Our Family Wizard because he does not have internet access
at home and cannot always access the platform.
In late August 2022, father filed a motion to modify custody, parenting time, and
child support. In the motion, father asked the district court to grant him sole legal and sole
physical custody of the children. He also asked the district court to order that the children
be in father’s care “full-time,” that mother’s parenting time be “reserved,” and that
mother’s child-support obligations be adjusted accordingly.
Evidentiary Hearing and District Court Decision
On November 28, 2022, the district court held an evidentiary hearing to address the
various motions before the district court, including the motions to modify custody and
parenting time and the motion to find mother “guilty” of perjury. The district court heard
testimony from father, mother, and one other witness.
2 The district court also admitted

2 The witness testified to an incident involving mother that is not relevant to this appeal .
Consequently, we do not discuss it.
7
several exhibits, including screenshots of text messages between mother and father that
were exchanged during various parenting-time disputes.
Father testified about several matters related to the pending motions. Relevant to
parenting time, father testified that, when he was on duty, he drove the two youngest
children to and from elementary school and that the oldest child rode the bus to the child’s
middle school. Father explained that he had arranged for busing to the elementary school
from his home at the beginning of the 2022 school year but that the younger children no
longer take the bus because the parties could not agree on a busing schedule from their
respective homes. When asked whether a schedule that would allow the children to take
the bus to and from his home during the week would be in the children’s best interests, he
said: “Yes.” Father also testified that he had stopped bringing the children to therapy
appointments during his parenting time because they did not want to attend therapy. Father
testified that, in lieu of therapy, father tried “to do things they like to do and that . . . we do
together . . . to have fun.” During cross-examination, father also acknowledged removing
one of the children from a hospital, after mother had the child admitted to address
mental-health concerns, because he did not believe that hospitalization was necessary.
Lastly, regarding the use of Our Family Wizard, father testified that he had signed up for
it “after the CHIPS recommended it” and had “been using it ever since.”
During her testimony, mother primarily addressed issues related to parenting time.
Mother testified that she had “struggled” with her relationship with the children in the past
because of father’s “parental alienation.” But she asserted that her relationship with the
children was “improving greatly” because of her efforts to “take a lot of time to bond” with
8
the children and “talk to them.” At the hearing, mother also revised her request regarding
parenting time. She testified that a fifty-fifty, week-on, week-off parenting-time schedule
“would be the healthiest thing for each parent” and would provide stability for the children
by providing them with “a bus route to rely on” during each week.
On March 1, 2023, the district court filed an order resolving the parties’ outstanding
motions. The district court’s decisions on custody, parenting time, and communication are
outlined below.
The district court denied the parties’ respective motions to modify custody.
Regarding father’s motion to modify custody, the district court found that father had
“historically acted in a manner that has interfered with and damaged [mother’s]
relationship with the children” and that “the result of his behavior has been harmful.” The
district court also found that father’s “lack of recognition of the needs of his children for
mental health treatment and therapy . . . raises concerns if he should have sole
decision-making authority.” With regard to mother’s motion, the district court found that
mother “appears to be better able to put the needs of the children first” but lacks insight
into the impact of her decisions on the children. The district court also noted that “the
children are very bonded with [father] and likely view [him] as their primary parent,” which
would make a change in custody “confusing and harmful to them.” Accordingly, the
district court concluded that “[m]odification of custody is not appropriate.”
The district court did modify parenting time. The district court changed the parties’
parenting-time schedule from a 4-3/3 -4, midweek-exchange schedule to a “week-on,
week-off” schedule with exchanges occurring on Sundays at 5:00 p.m. The district court
9
found that “[a] weekly parenting schedule which would limit transitions to the weekend,
and which would allow for busing is in the children’s best interests.” The district court
noted that “[b]oth parties agree that transportation to and from school . . . is difficult on the
current schedule and would be better if the children were at the same place Monday through
Friday of each week” and that “[t]he professionals in the CHIPS case agree that a week
on/week off parenting schedule with transitions on Sundays may be more appropriate for
the children.” In addition to modifying the schedule, the district court granted mother’s
request to allow the off-duty parent to call the children every other night at 6:00 p.m. ,
finding that, “[i]n a parental high-conflict case such as this, the more structured an [o]rder
can be, the better it tends to be for the children.”
Regarding the request for an order to communicate through Our Family Wizard, the
district court found that “[b]oth parties appear to agree that they should use Our Family
Wizard to communicate with each other,” and that “[u]se of Our Family Wizard was agreed
upon in the original stipulation.” As a result, the district court ordered the parties to use
Our Family Wizard for future communications. The district court stated that the parties
should use other forms of written communication, such as text messaging, only “for
time-sensitive matters related to the children” and “may communicate by phone only in an
emergency.” Lastly, the district court denied father’s motion to find mother “guilty” of
perjury without explanation.
3
Father appeals.

3 The district court also denied mother’s motion to find father in contempt for violating the
parenting-time provisions of the judgment and decree.
10
DECISION
Father challenges the district court’s decisions to modify the original parenting-time
schedule, to allow telephone contact between the off-duty parent and the children, and to
require the parties to communicate through Our Family Wizard, as well as the district
court’s reliance on certain evidence and its refusal to find mother guilty of perjury. We
consider each challenge in turn.4
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by modifying parenting time.
Father first argues that the district court abused its discretion by modifying the
parties’ parenting-time schedule. A district court must grant a motion to modify parenting
time if modification “would not change the child’s primary residence” and “would serve
the best interests of the child.” 5 Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b) (2022). District courts
have broad discretion in deciding matters of parenting time. Hansen v. Todnem,
908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). We will not reverse a district court’s parenting-time
decision unless the district court “abuse[d] its discretion by making findings of fact that are
unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a d ecision that is against
logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted).

4 Mother is self-represented and has not filed a response in this appeal. This matter
therefore proceeds pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03, which provides that, if a
respondent does not file a brief, “the case shall be determined on the merits.”

5 Father does not argue that the parenting -time modification would change the children’s
primary residence. We therefore do not consider this element of the statute on appeal.
11
Father contends that the district court abused its discretion by modifying the parties’
parenting-time schedule because the district court did not make the findings required by
Minnesota Statutes section 518.18(d) (2022). This argument is unpersuasive because
section 518.18(d) governs custody modifications and changes in a child’s primary
residence, not parenting-time modifications. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). Parenting-time
modifications are governed by Minnesota Statutes section 518.175 (2022). See Minn.
Stat. § 518.175, subds. 5, 8. Here, the district court modified the parenting-time schedule
pursuant to section 518.175, subdivision 5.6 And section 518.175, subdivision 5, does not
require the district court to make the findings required by section 518.18(d). Compare
Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5, wi th Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). Thus, father’s reliance on
section 518.18(d) is misguided, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by
declining to make findings set forth in section 518.18.
Alternatively, father argues that the district court abused its discretion by modifying
the parties’ parenting-time schedule because the modification decision is not supported by
findings addressing the best-interests factors enumerated in Minnesota Statutes
section 518.17, subdivision 1 (2022). This argument also misses the mark. Caselaw

6 Although the district court did not expressly modify parenting time under section 518.175,
subdivision 5(b), we conclude that the district court implicitly did so based on our reading
of section 518.175, subdivision 5, and the district court’s order. See Umphlett v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 30, 1995)
(deriving the district court’s implicit finding from its resolution of an issue);
State v. Modtland, 970 N.W.2d 711, 723 (Minn. App. 2022) (affirming the district court’s
decision based on its implicit findings because those findings “were sufficient to permit
review”), rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 27, 2022) and ord. granting rev. vacated (Minn.
Mar. 14, 2023); cf. Pechovnik v. Pechovnik , 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009)
(deferring to the district court’s implicit credibility determination).
12
discussing the applicability of section 518.17, subdivision 1, persuades us that the district
court was not required to make findings on these factors when it decided to modify the
parties’ parenting-time schedule under section 518.175, subdivision 5(b).
In Hansen, the supreme court held that “[section] 518.17 applies to the creation and
initial approval of parenting plans, but [section] 518.175 . . . governs parenting time
modifications.” 908 N.W.2d at 596. In reaching this decision, the supreme court
interpreted section 518.175, subdivision 8, which provides that a “district court ‘may’
approve arrangements that are ‘reasonable and in the best interests of the child, as defined
in section 518.17, subdivision 1.’ ” Id. at 598 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8)
(emphasis added). The supreme court held that the reference to the best-interests factors
in subdivision 8 did not require the district court to make detailed findings on each factor
listed in section 518.17. Id. at 597. Instead , the reference required the district court to
merely consider the relevant best-interests factors when applying subdivision 8 of section
518.175. Id.
In this case, the motion to modify parenting time was made pursuant to
subdivision 5(b), rather than subdivision 8, of section 518.175. Under subdivision 5(b), a
district court “shall modify” parenting time if “modification would serve the best interests
of the child” and “modification would not change the child ’s primary residence.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b). But subdivision 5(b), unlike subdivision 8, does not reference
the best interests of the child, “as defined in section 518.17, subdivision 1.” For that reason,
since Hansen, this court has been reluctant to conclude that a district court considering a
motion to modify parenting time under section 518.175, subdivision 5(b) must make
13
findings addressing the best-interests factors of section 518.17, subdivision 1. See
Robbins v. Robbins, No. A22-1061, 2023 WL 2960917, at *3 (Minn. App. Apr. 17, 2023).7
Instead, we have applied the more general standard that requires a district court to “make
sufficient findings to enable appellate review.” Id. at *3 (quoting Hansen, 908 N.W.2d at
597 n.2).
Applying that standard here, we discern no legal error in the district court’s decision
not to make express findings on each of the best-interests factors. Instead, we conclude
that the district court’s order reflects that the court considered whether the parenting-time
modification would be in the children’s best interests, as the statute requires, and that the
court made sufficient findings to enable appellate review. See Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
subd. 5(b).
In deciding to modify parenting time, the district court found “[i]t is clear that there
should be some adjustment to the parenting time schedule.” The court noted that both
parties agreed that the midweek-exchange schedule created difficulties for transporting the
two younger children to and from school and that it “would be better if the children were
at the same place Monday through Friday of each week.” The district court also found that
professionals in the CHIPS matter recommended a week-on, week -off schedule. These
findings are supported by the record. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
modifying the parties’ parenting-time schedule. See Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5;
Hansen, 908 N.W.2d at 597 n.2.

7 This nonprecedential opinion is cited for its persuasive value only. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01(c).
14
We are also unpersuaded by father’s assertion on appeal that the district court’s
parenting-time modification is not in the children’s best interests because it interferes with
their spiritual education on Sunday mornings. To begin, father did not raise this argument
before the district court. Therefore, we may decline to consider it. See Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A reviewing court must generally consider only those
issues that the record shows were presented [to] and considered by the trial court in
deciding the matter before it.” (quotation omitted)). But even if this argument were
properly before us, it would be unavailing. The district court adequately considered the
best interests of the children, as discussed above. Indeed, because these parties share joint
legal custody of the children, they have “equal rights and responsibilities” regarding,
among other matters, the children’s “religious training.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b)
(2022). And there is no language in the district court’s order that prevents either parent
from bringing the children to spiritual education classes. Accordingly, we discern no error
in the district court’s parenting-time decision. See Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5; Hansen,
908 N.W.2d at 597 n.2.
8

8 Father also asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relying on four findings
that he argues are clearly erroneous. Three of these findings pertain to the district court’s
decision not to modify physical or legal custody, which father has not challenged on appeal.
Accordingly, we do not consider these findings. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. The
remaining finding—that “[t]he professionals in the CHIPS case agree that a week on/week
off parenting schedule with transitions on Sundays may be more appropriate for the
children”—is supported by the record and therefore is not clearly erroneous. See In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 223 (Minn. 2021) (explaining that appellate
courts consider whether the evidence in the record “reasonably tends to support the [district
court’s] findings” when reviewing findings for clear error). Father’s argument that the
district court erred by relying on the challenged findings is not persuasive.
15
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the off -duty parent
to contact the children during the on-duty parent’s parenting time.

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the off-duty
parent to contact the children every other day at 6:00 p.m. during the on-duty parent’s
parenting time. Father contends that this aspect of the district court’s order is not in the
children’s best interests and interferes with his right of reasonable access to the children
because the provision limits his contact with the children to times when he and the children
may not be available. We construe father’s argument as a challenge to the district court’s
parenting-time decision. Accordingly, we review the district court’s decision regarding
telephone contact between the off-duty parent and the children for an abuse of discretion.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506.
In making these assertions, father misunderstands the district court’s order. The
district court’s order does not limit the off -duty parent’s contact with the children to
6:00 p.m. every other night —it allows the off-duty parent to contact the children at
6:00 p.m. every other night. In other words, the district court’s order does not preclude the
off-duty parent from contacting the children at other times during the on-duty parent’s
parenting time. Instead, it ensures a minimum level of contact for the off-duty parent when
the children are in the other parent’s care.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to allow the
off-duty parent to contact the children at 6:00 p.m. every other night during the on-duty
parent’s parenting time. In reaching this decision, the district court found that “[i]n a
high-conflict case such as this, the more structured an [o]rder can be, the better it tends to
16
be for the children.” This finding is supported by the record, which shows that the parties
have an acrimonious relationship and that father has at times hindered mother’s efforts to
contact the children and exercise her parenting time. We therefore conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the off-duty parent to contact the children at
specified times during the on-duty parent’s parenting time.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the parties to
communicate via Our Family Wizard.

Father contends that the district court abused its discretion by ordering the parties
to communicate exclusively through Our Family Wizard because the district court based
its decision on its erroneous finding that “[u]se of Our Family Wizard was agreed upon in
the original stipulation.” We review this custody-related decision for an abuse of
discretion. Hansen, 908 N.W.2d at 596; see also Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(c)
(defining “[p]hysical custody” as “the routine daily care and control and the residence of
the child”), subd. 3(d) (defining “[j]oint physical custody” as “the routine daily care and
control and the residence of the child,” which “is structured between the parties”) (2022).
Father is correct that the judgment and decree, which incorporates the terms of the
parties’ mediated settlement agreement, does not require the parties to communicate
exclusively through Our Family Wizard. Thus, the district court’s finding that the parties
agreed upon the use of Our Family Wizard in the “original stipulation” is clearly erroneous.
See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223.
But the district court’s error does not merit reversal because it is harmless. The
district court’s decision regarding Our Family Wizard was based on not only the “original
17
stipulation” but also the parties’ prior use of the platform and the parties’ agreement that
the platform should be their “primary communication tool.” Moreover, the district court’s
order affords the parties leeway to use other methods of communication for time-sensitive
matters involving the children and emergencies. The parties’ prior use of and agreement
to use Our Family Wizard and the order’s exceptions for urgent circumstances persuade us
that the district court would reach the same conclusion if we were to remand for additional
findings. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s error is harmless and must be
ignored. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error be ignored); Grein v. Grein,
364 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. 1985) (declining to remand in a child -custody case when
“from reading the files, the record, and the [district] court’s findings, on remand the
[district] court would undoubtedly make findings that” reach the same result).
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on a family assessment
by a county psychologist.

Father asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relying on a county
psychologist’s assessment of the parties’ dynamics with each other and their children in its
findings of fact. We review this decision for an abuse of discretion. Hansen, 908 N.W.2d
at 596. Father raises three arguments to support this assertion. We consider each argument
in turn.
Father first argues that the district court abused its discretion by relying on the
assessment because the assessment “is not sufficient evidence to find [him] guilty of
parental alienation.” But the district court did not find father “guilty” of parental alienation.
Instead, the district court found that father “has historically acted i n a manner that has
18
interfered with and damaged [mother’s] relationship with the children” and that “the result
of his behavior has been harmful.” These findings support the district court’s custody and
parenting-time determinations—not a finding of “guilt.” Father’s first argument is not
persuasive.
Father next contends that the district court abused its discretion by relying on the
assessment because the psychologist who wrote it lacked “informed consent to treat or
diagnose [father] or the children,” in violation of Minnesota Rule 7200.0110, subpart 12
(2022). Rule 7200.0110, subpart 12, merely defines “informed consent”; it does not set
forth requirements for providers in the child- protection context, especially providers who
are performing assessments and not engaging in therapy. Father’s second argument is also
unavailing.
Lastly, father asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relying on the
assessment because the psychologist who wrote it was prohibited from disclosing it under
Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 1(g) (2022), and Minnesota Rules of
Evidence 404(a). Section 595.02, subdivision 1(g), provides rules for the “[t]estimony of
witnesses,” while rule 404(a) generally prohibits the admission of character evidence at
trial. Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(g); Minn. R. Evid. 404(a). The psychologist who wrote
the assessment did not testify at the evidentiary hearing. And the assessment itself was not
introduced as evidence at the hearing. Rather, the assessment was filed by mother in
support of a motion, and not objected to by father. Thus, neither section 595.02, subd. 1(g)
nor rule 404(a) are applicable in this context.
19
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
relying on the county psychologist’s assessment.
V. The district court did not err by declining to address father’s request to find
mother “guilty” of perjury.

Finally, father argues that the district court “should have found [mother] guilty of
perjury” under Minnesota Statutes section 609.48 (2022). This presents a question
regarding the district court’s application of the law, which we review de novo. Harris ex
rel. Banks v. Gellerman, 954 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn. App. 2021). Father’s argument is
not persuasive, because the issue of whether mother committed perjury under
section 609.48 was not properly before the district court. Perjury is a crime. See Minn.
Stat. §§ 609.01 (providing that chapter 609 “may be cited as the Criminal Code of 1963”),
.48, subd. 1 (describing the acts constituting perjury); see generally Minn.
Stat. §§ 609.01-.912 (the “Criminal Code”) (2022). As such, perjury must be prosecuted
in a criminal proceeding, which affords defendants special due- process protections. See
Minn. Const. art. I, §§ 6-7; Johnson v. State, 641 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. 2002) (providing
that “the power to decide whom to prosecute and what charge to file resides with the
executive branch”); State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618, 620 n.3 (Minn. 1980) (explaining
that a prosecutor is an executive official). Father presents no evidence that the state has
charged mother with perjury in a criminal proceeding, nor does he explain how the district
court in a civil family-law matter may find a party guilty of the crime of perjury without
20
prosecution or due process. For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not
err by not finding mother guilty of perjury under section 609.48.9
Affirmed.

9 To the extent that father is challenging the district court’s decision to credit mother’s
testimony, we defer to the district court’s credibility determination. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
at 221-22; Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).