In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. L. H. and J. A. T., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0595

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
A. L. H. and J. A. T., Parents.

Filed October 9, 2023
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-JV-22-1484

Brian T. Hardwick, P.C., Grand Forks, North Dakota (for appellant J.A.T.)

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, First Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent Polk County Human Services)

Jessica Borowicz, Grand Forks, North Dakota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this appeal following remand, appellant- father challenges the termination of his
parental rights. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that
further reunification efforts by respondent-county were not required. He also argues that
one of six statutory grounds for termination found by the district court is not supported by

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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the record. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in its determination
regarding reunification efforts and at least one statutory ground not challenged by appellant
supports termination, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant J.A.T. (father) has two minor children who are the subject of this case: a
child born in May 2014, and a second child born in February 2016. Father is 34 years old,
born in September 1989. Between age 18 and 32, father was incarcerated for
approximately 11 years, with short periods outside of incarceration. Father went to prison
shortly after the older child was born and was in prison when the younger child was born;
the children’s biological mother was their custodial parent from the children’s birth.
In March 2019, following a report that mother physically abused the older child,
respondent Polk County Human Services petitioned to have the older child adjudicated as
a child in need of protection or services. The child was placed out of the home and then,
in April 2019, adjudicated as a child in need of protection or services. In October 2019,
after the child returned home for a trial home visit, the county filed an amended petition
alleging that both children were in need of protection or services based on mother’s
physical abuse. Both children were placed in foster care on September 30, 2019, and then
adjudicated as children in need of protection or services in November 2019. The children
have remained together, in the same foster care placement since at least October 2, 2019.
Father did not appear at any of these child protection proceedings in 2019.
In August 2020, the county filed a petition to terminate mother’s and father’s
parental rights. Father denied the petition, and mother agreed to voluntarily terminate her
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rights if father’s parental rights were terminated. Following a trial, the district court
involuntarily terminated father’s parental rights. In its order, the district court determined
that the county proved six statutory grounds for termination, that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify father with the children and that further efforts to reunify
father with the children would be futile, and that termination was in the children’s best
interests.
Father appealed the termination of his parental rights and we reversed, concluding
that the district court erred by determining that the county made reasonable efforts to
reunify father and the children. In re Welfare of Child. of A.L.H., No. A21-0966, 2022 WL
519228 (Minn. App. Feb. 18, 2022). We concluded that the county failed to make
reasonable reunification efforts because it did not develop a case plan for father and
because the district court’s posttrial finding that further reunification efforts would be futile
was insufficient without a pretrial determination excusing the county from making
reasonable efforts. Id. at *4-5. We remanded for further proceedings. Id. at *5.
On remand, the district court ordered the county to develop a case plan to reunify
father with the children. In March 2022, the county social worker met with father to discuss
the case plan, which included a parental capacity assessment, a chemical dependency
assessment, a mental health diagnostic assessment, and parenting skill development .
Father completed the three assessments and began working with a professional on a
parenting curriculum.
Because of the limited contact between father and the children, the district court
directed the county to enlist mental health professionals to “assess/assist” the children for
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visitation with father. Both children completed evaluations with therapists. The therapists
expressed concern about the effect of reintroducing father to the children and requested to
wait for recommendations from the parental capacity assessment before moving forward.
In June 2022, the county filed a 12-page parental capacity assessment completed by
a licensed professional. The assessment was based on an interview with father as well as
testing and a record review. The assessment noted that father has spent little time with the
children, “has had no experience raising his children,” and “has spent 11 of his adult years
incarcerated.” The assessment also noted that father has problems with executive
functioning abilities, which will be chronic and adversely impact his ability to adequately
parent his children now as well as in the future, and that father’s “cognitive limitations also
significantly impact his ability to live and function independently.” Based on a
consideration of several factors affecting parenting ability, the assessment determined that
“[father] is not currently capable nor will he ever be capable of ensuring the safety and
welfare of his children.” The assessment concluded that J.A.T. should not parent the
children and that any visitation with the children would have to be approved by their
therapists because it could cause traumatic harm to the children. After the parenting
capacity assessment was filed, both children’s therapists opined that even supervised visits
between the children and father presented a high risk of destabilizing the children’s mental
health.
At father’s request, a second parental capacity assessment was conducted with a
different assessor. Father and his attorney selected the professional who completed the
second assessment. Like the first assessment, the second assessment determined that father
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does not have the capacity to parent the children. The assessment stated that father “loves
the idea of being a father but is not able to conceptualize or imagine in any sort of realistic
way what that will require of him over time” and that “[w]hat [the children] want or need
is less of a priority to him, compared to what he wants and needs.” The assessment
concluded that “[s]ervices to address his parenting deficits would have minimal impact,”
his compliance with his case plan “ha[d] not improved his capacity to parent,” and “[t]he
length of time it would take for any substantial progress he may make would far exceed
any timelines for permanency, regardless of what services he chooses to utilize.”
In September 2022, after the second parental capacity assessment was filed, the
county social worker requested that the county be relieved of further reunification efforts
and that the county be authorized to commence a new permanency proceeding. The district
court granted both requests. The court also denied father visitation during the pendency of
the proceedings. In a subsequent pretrial order, the district court confirmed that the county
was relieved of its duty to provide reasonable efforts because of the results of the two
parental capacity assessments and based on the correspondence from the children’s
therapists opining that even supervised visitation between the children and father
“present[ed] high risk in terms of destabilizing” their “mental health functioning.”
On September 16, 2022, the county filed a new petition to terminate father’s and
mother’s parental rights.
1 The petition alleged four statutory grounds: (1) substantial,

1 During the first permanency proceeding, mother agreed to voluntarily terminate her
parental rights only if father’s rights were terminated. After this court reversed the
termination of father’s parental rights, the county explored reunification between mother
and the children before bringing the current petition. Mother ultimately consented to the
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continuous, or repeated refusal or neglect to comply with parental duties; (2) palpable
unfitness; (3) failure to correct the conditions leading to the children’s placement; and
(4) the children are neglected and in foster care. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2),
(4), (5), (8) (2022). Father denied the petition.
The district court held a trial on father’s parental rights on February 2-3, 2023. The
district court admitted several exhibits and heard testimony from father, mother, the social
worker, both parental capacity assessors, and the guardian ad litem.
The county called the social worker as its initial witness. The social worker first
testified about the prior proceeding to terminate father’s parental rights. He explained that
the county informed father about the child protection proceeding on April 2, 2019, while
father was incarcerated. Father did not participate in the child protection proceedings until
August 2020, when the county petitioned to terminate his parental rights. The social
worker testified that father did not assert his parental rights or ask about reunification
efforts. The social worker testified that he was not aware of any contact between father
and the children between April 2019 and A ugust 2020. He also testified that, although
father indicated he wanted to contact the children in December 2020, father did not contact
the children before the May 2021 trial regarding the termination of father’s parental rights.
The social worker then testified that, following the remand in March 2022, he
immediately developed a case plan for father and made changes requested by father and
his attorney. Father complied with the case plan but did not sign it. The social worker

termination of her parental rights, and the district court terminated her rights
December 2022. She is not involved in this appeal.
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explained that he continued to work with father on his case plan following the first parental
capacity assessment, but the county did not pursue in-person visitation between father and
the children because of the possibility of traumatic harm based on the parental capacity
assessment and the children’s therapists’ and guardian ad litem’s concerns. The social
worker also testified that father has not provided the children with monetary support and
that father has contacted the children on only three occasions—once in Marc h 2022, once
in April 2022, and once in December 2022. Finally, the social worker testified that the
children “have flourished” in foster care and it would be in the children’s best interests to
terminate father’s parental rights.
The county introduced both parental capacity assessments, without objection,
during the assessors’ testimony. The first assessor testified, consistent with her assessment,
that father does not have the capacity to provide for the children’s needs and that she did
not believe that capacity would be likely to change even with efforts by the county. She
also testified that “the children should never be placed in [father’s] care” and that father
“would not be able to care for their basic needs, ensure their safety, and their welfare.” The
second assessor similarly testified that father “did not have the capacity to meet their needs
and [she] did not picture that changing in the foreseeable future with or without services.”
The county also called mother to testify. Mother stated that, except for a short
period of time before she learned she was pregnant with the younger child, father never
resided with mother and the children. Mother also testified that father did not engage in
regular visitation with either child even when offered by mother. And, according to
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mother, father was never involved with fulfilling the children’s daily needs, such as
medical care, food, or clothing.
Father testified on his own behalf at trial. He acknowledged that he has spent most
of his life in county jail or prison, that he had limited contact with the children since their
birth, and that he had not had a court order for visitation with the children. During the
initial child protection proceedings in spring 2019, he was arrested for driving while
impaired. While on furlough prior to going to prison, he failed to return to custody and
was “on the run” when the children were removed from mother’s home in fall 2019. On
cross-examination, father stated that he was aware of mother’s physical abuse of the
children and the child protection proceedings but explained that he did not return to help
the children at that point because the county already had placed the children in foster care,
and he would be “in custody regardless.”
Father further testified that, following remand, he complied with the case plan by
completing two parental capacity assessments, a mental health diagnostic assessment, a
chemical use assessment and that he followed the recommendations from the chemical use
assessment. He also testified that he completed the parenting curriculum required by his
case plan. When questioned by the guardian ad litem, father testified that he had gained a
lot from the parenting curriculum but was unable to provide any examples about how he
would use the techniques to parent the children.
Finally, the guardian ad litem testified that termination was in the children’s best
interests because father “has never been a consistent part of their lives” and “does not have
a bond to them.” She also testified that she “do[es] not believe that he has the capability
9
to parent the children safely” and that father “has not shown that he is able to put the
children’s interests above his own.”
On March 28, 2023, the district court filed its order terminating father’s parental
rights to the two children. In the order, the district court noted that the parental capacity
assessors’ testimony was credible and consistent with their assessments. The district court
determined that the county had made reasonable and active efforts to reunify the children
with father and that “further services for the purpose of reunification is futile and therefore
unreasonable under the circumstances”; that clear and convincing evidence supported each
of the four statutory grounds alleged in the petition;
and that termination of father’s
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The district court also determined that
the county proved two other grounds not alleged in the petition: abandonment, Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1) (2022), and failure to provide support for the minor
children without good cause, Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(3) (2022).
Father appeals.
DECISION
Parental rights should be terminated only “for grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of Child. of B.M., 845 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted).
A district court may involuntarily terminate parental rights when (1) at least one statutory
ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, (2) the county has
made reasonable efforts to reunite the parent and children or such efforts were not
statutorily required, and (3) term ination is in the children’s best interests. Minn.
10
Stat. §§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8, .317, subd. 1 (2022); see also In re Welfare of Child.
of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
When reviewing a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, we review
the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and we “review its determination of
whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present
for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn.
App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “We give considerable deference to the
district court’s decision to terminate parental rights.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. “But we
closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and
convincing.” Id.
Father challenges the termination of his parental rights to the children on two
grounds. First, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by relying on the
parental capacity assessments to determine that further reunification efforts were not
required. Second, he argues that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence
supporting the termination of his parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section
260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(1). Father does not challenge the district court’s determination
that five other statutory grounds for termination are supported by clear and convincing
evidence or its determination that termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best
interests. We address each argument in turn.
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I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that further
efforts to reunite father and children were futile.

Father challenges the district court’s determination regarding reunification efforts.
In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the district court must make a specific finding
either that (1) the agency made reasonable efforts to “rehabilitate the parent and reunite the
family” or (2) “reasonable efforts for reunification are not required as provided under
section 260.012.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8. In turn, Minnesota Statutes section
260.012 (2022) provides that “the [district] court may determine that the provision of
services or further services for the purpose of rehabilitation is futile and therefore
unreasonable under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h); see also id. (a)(7)
(“Reasonable efforts to prevent placement and for rehabilitation and reunification are
always required except upon a determination by the court that a petition has been filed
stating a prima facie case that . . . the provision of services or further services for the
purpose of reunification is futile and therefore unreasonable under the circumstances.”).
“[J]ust as the agency must establish the reasonableness of its efforts by clear and
convincing evidence, it also must establish the unreasonableness or futility of
reunification efforts by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Welfare of Child. of A.D.B.,
970 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. App. 2022). “We review the determination that reunification
efforts would be futile for an abuse of discretion.” Id.
Father challenges the district court’s reliance on the parental capacity assessments
when relieving the county of its reunification efforts. He argues that he fully complied
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with his case plan and thus the district court abused its discretion when it determined that
he was unable to parent his children. We are unpersuaded.
When reviewing the termination of parental rights, “[t]he critical issue is not
whether the parent formally complied with the case plan, but rather whether the parent is
presently able to assume the responsibilities of caring for the child.” In re Welfare of Child
of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 89 (Minn. App. 2012). The district court did not abuse its
discretion by relying on the parenting assessments in making this determination. The
record reflects that the original parenting assessment opined that father was not able to
parent his children at the time of the assessment nor would he be capable of ensuring the
safety and welfare of the children in the future. Similarly, the second assessment —
completed by an assessor chosen by father —determined that father did not have the
capacity to parent his children and that “[s]ervices to address his parenting deficits would
have minimal impact .” The second assessment also specifically found that father’s
compliance with his case plan “ha[d] not improved his capacity to parent,” and that “[t]he
length of time it would take for any substantial progress he may make would far exceed
any timelines for permanency, regardless of what services he chooses to utilize.”
Moreover, father did not object when both assessments were admitted at trial, and he did
not challenge the assessors’ qualifications or their conclusions. Nor did he offer any
evidence from any qualified professional disputing the findings of the two assessments.
Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s consideration of the
parental capacity assessments.
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The record also supports the district court’s determination that further reunification
efforts were not required. Generally, the county must make an affirmative request to be
relieved of further efforts based on futility before the district court may relieve the county
of reasonable efforts. See A.D.B., 970 N.W.2d at 733. Here, in contrast to the first
proceeding to terminate father’s parental rights, the county developed a case plan and only
requested to be relieved from further efforts after working with father on his case plan for
several months. The county made the request after the children’s therapists opined that
even supervised visits with father presented a high risk of destabilizing the children’s
mental health and the second parental capacity assessment concluded that father’s
compliance with his case plan had not improved his capacity to parent and that further
services would have minimal effect. On this record, we cannot conclude that the district
court abused its discretion when it relieved the county of further reunification efforts.
To the extent that father argues we should reweigh the parental capacity assessments
and his compliance with the case plan, we may not do so. Our role is to review the record
to confirm that evidence exists to support the factual findings made by the district court.
In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 223 (Minn. 2021). At trial, both
parental capacity assessments were admitted without objection, and the district court
determined that both parental capacity assessors testified credibly and consistently with
their assessments. Both assessments and the assessors’ testimony support the district
court’s finding that the provision of further services to rehabilitate father would be futile.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining
that further efforts for reunification were not required.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that clear and
convincing evidence supports at least one statutory ground for termination of
father’s parental rights.

Father also argues that one of the six statutory grounds for termination of parental
rights found by the district court —abandonment—is not supported by the record. Father
does not challenge the district court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence in
the record supports termination based on the other five statutory grounds.
To terminate parental rights, the district court must find “that one or more” of the
statutory grounds for termination specified in Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301 ,
subdivision 1(b) exist. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1)-(9) (2022). “In reviewing a
decision to terminate parental rights, the appellate court determines whether there is clear
and convincing evidence to support at least one statutory ground for termination.” In re
Child. of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005). If clear and convincing evidence
supports at least one of the statutory grounds found by the district court, we need not
address whether the ot her statutory grounds are supported by the record. See id. (“ Only
one [statutory] ground must be proven for termination to be ordered.”).
Here, the district court determined that termination of father’s parental rights was
supported by clear and convincing evidence for all four statutory grounds identified in the
petition: (1) substantial, continuous, or repeated refusal or neglect to comply with parental
duties; (2) palpable unfitness; (3) failure to correct the conditions leading to the children’s
placement; and (4) the children are neglected and in foster care. See Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8). The district court also found that termination
was supported by two additional grounds not alleged in the petition —abandonment, see
15
id., subd. 1(b)(1), and failure to provide support for the minor children without good cause,
see id., subd. 1(b)(3).
We conclude that the district court’s findings support termination of father’s
parental rights based on the first ground set forth in the county’s petition—failure to
comply with parental duties. Under this provision, a district court may involuntarily
terminate parental rights if the court finds “that the parent has substantially, continuously,
or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed” by the parent-child
relationship and “either reasonable efforts by the social services agency have failed to
correct the conditions that formed the basis of the petition or reasonable efforts would be
futile and therefore unreasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). In particular,
“[t]he court must find that at the time of termination, the parent is not presently able and
willing to assume his responsibilities and that the parent’s neglect of these duties will
continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 90 (quotation
omitted).
In its order, the district court determined that the county proved, by clear and
convincing evidence, that father refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed
by the parent-child relationship. To support this determination, the district court found that
father failed to develop a relationship with the children and that he did not have consistent
contact with the children. The district court was particularly troubled by father’s decision
to not engage with the child protection proceedings while on warrant status from July 2019
to June 2020, even though the children allegedly had been physically abused by mother.
The district court also found that father had not exercised his parenting duties in other
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ways—he had not contributed to the children’s health or educational development and did
not give the children gifts until March 2022. And the district court noted that father “is
unable to say with certainty the birthdates of [the children] and their grade in school.” The
district court determined that father “places his own wants and needs over the needs of his
own [c]hildren” and “[n]o reasonable efforts [by the county] would resolve this situation.”
As a result, the district court concluded that his “life choices render him unable to comply
with the duties imposed upon the father by the parent and child relationship.”
Father does not dispute the district court’s findings, which are supported by the
record. Father’s own testimony established that he had limited contact with the children
since they were born. Father also testified that he was aware of mother’s physical abuse
and the child protection proceedings but did not appear because he was “on the run” and
would be placed in custody. And as discussed above, the record supports the district court’s
finding that further reunification efforts by the county would be futile and therefore
unreasonable. As a result, w e discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
determination that clear and convincing evidence supports termination based on father’s
failure to comply with his parental duties. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). And,
because the record supports the district court’s determination based on this statutory
ground, we decline to reach father’s argument regarding the district court’s finding that
termination is also supported on the basis of abandonment.2 See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(1).

2 The county argues that this court need not address the district court’s finding of
abandonment because it was not alleged in the petition and thus could not be a basis for
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In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that further
reunification efforts were not required and that at least one statutory ground for termination
was supported by clear and convincing evidence. And, as noted above, father does not
contest the district court’s determination that termination is in the best interests of the
children. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s termination of father’s parental rights to
the two children.
Affirmed.

terminating father’s parental rights. We agree that the termination of parental rights must
be based on a ground alleged in the petition. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(1) (“If the
court finds that one or more statutory grounds set forth in the termination of parental rights
petition are proved, the court may terminate parental rights.”). We also note that we are
affirming the district court’s termination of parental rights based on Minnesota Statutes
section 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), one of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition.