State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0631

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Timothy Allen Amacher,
Appellant.

Filed July 8, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Wheelock, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-8319

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for aiding and abetting attempted first-degree
murder, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he intentionally aided another
in the commission of the offense, the district court erroneously admitted certain evidence
2
as relationship evidence, and the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. He also contends that
his aiding-after-the-fact conviction must be reversed. We affirm his conviction for aiding
and abetting attempted first-degree murder and reverse his conviction for aiding as an
accomplice after the fact.
FACTS
Appellant Timothy Allen Amacher met N.L. in 2012 at a gym Amacher owned. The
two began dating and, in 2014, moved in together. The relationship between Amacher and
N.L. became “tumultuous” as a consequence of Amacher’s unwillingness to control his
rage. Amacher’s conduct included cornering N.L., grabbing N.L. by the neck, pulling
N.L.’s hair, and damaging property. By October 2015, N.L. had moved out of the shared
residence and into a home of her own.
In June 2016, after their relationship had ended, N.L. gave birth to their shared child.
Amacher and N.L. appear to have coparented with less conflict initially, with Amacher
watching the child at N.L.’s home after N.L. returned to her job working nights as a forensic
investigator for the Minneapolis Police Department. But Amacher kept attempting to
rekindle the relationship and shaming N.L. over “trying to raise [ the child] in a broken
home.”
In July 2017, N.L. began dating D.F. N.L. told Amacher about her new relationship,
and he reacted angrily, accusing her of cheating on him during their relationship and failing
to prioritize their child . In an incident soon after, Amacher entered N.L.’s empty home,
set up a scavenger hunt with romantic poems and gifts, and waited for N.L. to come home.
When N.L. came home, she discovered Amacher, felt alarmed and upset that he had entered
3
her residence without permission, and demanded that he return her key. Throughout 2017,
Amacher continued this pattern of disturbing conduct, repeatedly calling N.L. and showing
up at her home. At one point, Amacher threatened to kill himself if N.L. did not end her
new relationship. The strains in the coparenting relationship between N.L. and Amacher
became more pronounced in 2018 as Amacher continued to interfere with N.L. and D.F.’s
relationship by, among other things, texting D.F. harassing messages and having a woman
call N.L. and claim D.F. was being unfaithful.
On August 26, 2018, Amacher reported to Saint Paul police that N.L. had assaulted
him in May 2018 by hitting him with her car.
1 The next day, on August 27, Amacher filed
for custody of the child. Between the time Amacher filed for custody and the custody trial,
Amacher made numerous reports that the child was being physically and sexually abused
by D.F. and N.L. Amacher brought the child to Midwest Children’s Resource Center (the
clinic) on four different occasions with concerns of physical and sexual abuse. Although
the child had injuries on some of these occasions, providers at the clinic determined that
the injuries were nonspecific for abuse.
A district court in the family division held a trial on the custody issues. At the trial,
Amacher’s live-in girlfriend, C.L., testified that the child was a victim of abuse.
Notwithstanding Amacher’s and C.L.’s testimony that the child was being abused, the court
awarded N.L. sole physical and sole legal custody of the child. There were various

1 N.L. was charged for this conduct but ultimately was acquitted.
4
visitation arrangements over time, but as of April 2021, Amacher was entitled only to
supervised visitation with the child once a week at FamilyWise in Minneapolis.
On April 19, 2022, Amacher applied for a set of special plates for his 2022 black
Dodge Ram truck. He was given temporary plates. But surveillance video of the truck
shows that, as late as the morning of April 21, 2022, Amacher did not have the temporary
plates on his vehicle, nor did the vehicle have any decals.
Between about 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. on April 20, 2022,2 Amacher and C.L. were at
Amacher’s gym, as was Amacher’s Dodge Ram. While they were there, C.L. sent an email
to a local news organization that detailed Amacher’s abuse allegations against N.L.
Amacher left the gym alone in his Jeep shortly after 4:00 p.m. and drove to his residence,
where he stayed until he traveled to FamilyWise for his scheduled supervised parenting
time. Amacher arrived at FamilyWise around 5:25 p.m. At about 6:55 p.m., C.L. drove
the Dodge Ram to Amacher’s residence. C.L. then drove to the area around FamilyWise,
arriving at about 7:23 p.m.
When N.L. arrived at the FamilyWise parking lot at 7:30 p.m., the child and
Amacher were still inside the building. N.L. exited her vehicle and walked toward
FamilyWise’s entrance. As N.L. approached the entrance, an individual wearing all black
and a medical facemask ran up behind her and shot her multiple times with a gun. The
shooter then fled on foot in the same direction as a black truck that had driven past

2 Amacher’s and C.L.’s locations are known based on international mobile subscriber
identity (ISMI) data obtained from their cellular devices and from data associated with the
Dodge Ram. ISMI is a number that uniquely identifies every user of a cellular network.
5
FamilyWise ten minutes earlier. Officers recovered bullet casings from the scene, which
they determined to be from a .380-caliber firearm. N.L. was severely injured, but she did
not die from her injuries.
Officers spoke with Amacher inside FamilyWise after the shooting. An officer
explained to Amacher that N.L. “was involved in a shooting.” Amacher responded, “A
shooting?” The officer asked Amacher to come with him to the station, and Amacher
declined. He explained that he felt uncomfortable being interviewed by Minneapolis police
because they were N.L.’s “coworkers.” He repeatedly claimed that he “had been
threatened by [Minneapolis police].” Officers then explained again that there had been a
shooting, and Amacher stated, “Which that has nothing to do with me.” Several minutes
into the encounter with officers, Amacher asked, “Is everybody ok?” Officers told him
that they were not sure. Amacher responded, “Oh shit. That sucks.” Officers told Amacher
that he had to go to the police station for an interview and that he could either go willingly
or in handcuffs. Amacher agreed to go with the officers.
After Amacher arrived at the station, a police investigator interviewed him. When
Amacher was in the interview room alone, the investigator observed that he was looking
at his ce llphone, which the officers had allowed him to retain in his possession. With
Amacher’s consent, the investigator examined the phone. The phone did not show any
incoming or outgoing communication with C.L. since the time of the shooting; however,
officers later discovered that home-camera footage had been deleted using Amacher’s
cellphone. Law enforcement determined that the footage would have shown C.L. returning
to their residence after the crime.
6
After the interview, officers drove Amacher back to the FamilyWise parking lot so
that he could retrieve his Jeep. Officers spoke with Amacher in the parking lot. One
sergeant asked Amacher whether there were “any other vehicles on file, or is this it?”
Amacher responded, “This is mine.” The sergeant sought clarification, asking, “[S]o this
is your only car?” Amacher responded that he owned a Dodge Challenger in addition to
the Jeep, but Amacher did not tell officers that he also owned a black Dodge Ram.
On April 28, investigators arrested Amacher, and Amacher voluntarily spoke with
them. During the interview, the officers asked Amacher why he did not tell police on the
night of the shooting that he also owned a Dodge Ram. Amacher stated that the officers at
the scene had not let him finish speaking when they asked about his vehicles. He then told
the investigators that he had a Dodge Ram truck but did not consider it to be his as it was
leased. The investigators then showed Amacher a picture of the truck from the surveillance
video, and Amacher immediately responded, “That’s not my truck. Dead giveaway right
here—I have Superman logos.” He claimed to have put the Superman decals on about two
weeks before the shooting. Amacher also pointed out that his truck had a “GT logo” that
came from the factory and that no GT logo could be seen in the pictures. Amacher also
claimed to the investigators that he had put the temporary plates on right away. The
investigators asked whether Amacher owned any firearms. Amacher listed several calibers
of firearm, none of which were a .380. The investigators then asked him whether he owned
a .380-caliber firearm, and Amacher stated that he did not own “either of them anymore.”
When asked whether C.L. had guns of her own or access to his guns, Amacher told officers
7
that C.L. did not even know where his guns were. Amacher also denied having any issues
with N.L.
Law enforcement searched Amacher’s residence, business, and truck. From the
residence, officers recovered .380-caliber bullets, casings matching those found at the
scene of the attempted murder, electronic surveillance equipment, and an empty box for a
.380-caliber handgun. From the gym, officers recovered a digital-video-recorder box with
more surveillance footage. And from the truck, officers recovered a medical facemask
similar to the one worn by the shooter.
On May 2, 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged Amacher with one count
of aiding and abetting attempted first- degree murder and one count of aiding an offender
as an accomplice after the fact.
Before trial, the state noticed its intent to admit four categories of relationship
evidence under Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 (2022):
1. The origin and history of [N.L.] and Amacher’s
romantic relationship beginning in 2012, the birth of their child
in 2016, and Amacher’s refusal to accept [N.L.]’s decision to
end the relationship in 2016-17.

2. The protracted child custody battle between
[N.L.] and Amacher, starting in 2018 until the date of the
charged offense (April 20, 2022), including but not limited to
topics covered in family court litigation and the custody trial
itself.

3. Amacher’s harassment of [N.L.] and her current
significant other, including but not limited to false allegations
of domestic violence and child abuse during that same time.

8
4. The origin and history of [C.L.] and Amacher’s
relationship, including but not limited to [C.L.]’s involvement
in the custody dispute and false allegations of child abuse.

Amacher moved to exclude this evidence, arguing that the evidence the state sought to
admit was not “similar conduct” within the meaning of the statute and that a father
reporting a child’s injuries was not an example of prior domestic abuse. The district court
issued an order ruling that the evidence was admissible.
At trial, the state presented evidence consistent with the aforementioned events. In
doing so, it also presented some evidence that Amacher now challenges on appeal.
Amacher’s next-door neighbor testified about an interaction he had with C.L. in the
weeks following the shooting. The neighbor had gone to Amacher’s house to return a pair
of C.L.’s glasses that he found. When the neighbor saw C.L., she immediately began to
sob and ran over and gave him a hug. C.L. then told the neighbor that she “pulled the
trigger.” Amacher did not object to this testimony.
A social worker who had interviewed the child when he was five years old testified
about that interview. She explained that the child told her that his dad, Amacher, believed
that D.F. was touching him on his penis but that his dad was wrong and D.F. had never
touched his penis. The prosecutor then asked the social worker whether the child
“appear[ed] to be forthright.” She responded that he did. Amacher did not object.
The medical director of the clinic that treated the child when his father brought him
in for forensic evaluations also testified. After the medical director testified about the
9
treatment the child received at the clinic, the state asked him, “What is medical child
abuse?” The medical director explained:
So medical child abuse is—it’s a—you might hear it
called Munchausen syndrome by proxy. It really means that a
child is being abused and medical providers are really bein g
used as the tool of abuse. So in the classic form, they may
come in and a parent lies about a child’s symptoms or maybe
even fabricates, makes —makes a child ill, and then the child
gets unnecessary tests, unnecessary interventions based upon a
history that is not true. And in medicine, a history, you know—
“why did you come to the doctor today” is really important. So
when people lie or falsify that, kids end up getting tests and
diagnosis, getting things happened to them that aren’t justified
and it’s abusive.
The medical director opined that medical child abuse may negatively impact a child’s
well-being. The prosecutor then asked, “Is the medical child abuse one of the things that
you took into consideration when declining to treat or see [the child]?” The medical
director testified that it was. The prosecutor then asked, “[H]ow did that factor into your
decision not to want [the clinic] to see [the child]?” The medical director responded, “I
was concerned about it and I didn’t want us to be part of the problem.” Amacher did not
object.
After the state finished presenting its case in chief (which included over 40
witnesses and hundreds of exhibits), the parties gave their closing arguments. In addressing
count II, the aiding-after-the-fact charge, the prosecutor pointed to several different acts by
Amacher that were part of a “continuous course of conduct,” including deleting certain
surveillance footage; providing false informa tion to officers about his ownership of the
Dodge Ram and a .380-caliber handgun and his relationships with N.L. and C.L.; and
10
obstructing the investigation by applying Superman decals to his truck and replacing his
license plates. After he finished arguing that the state proved all of the elements of count II,
the prosecutor went on to state:
Again, I want to emphasize you should find the
defendant guilty of both counts. Both have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Count II only accounts for him
concealing evidence after-the-fact and providing misleading
information. And that’s serious and that’s bad, but a
conviction on that won’t fully account for what he did in this
case and for the ten years of hell that [N.L.] went through.
Amacher did not object. Amacher’s attorney gave his closing argument, the prosecutor
made a rebuttal, and the jury found Amacher guilty of both charges. The district court
convicted Amacher of both counts and imposed a 216-month sentence for aiding and
abetting attempted first-degree murder.
Amacher appeals.
DECISION
I. The circumstantial evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Amacher
intentionally aided C.L.

Amacher contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for
aiding and abetting attempted first-degree murder because it did not prove that he intended
to aid C.L. in attempting to murder N.L. Because the state proved the intent and aid
elements of his conviction with circumstantial evidence, we must review the sufficiency of
the evidence underlying these elements under a heightened standard. State v. Al-Naseer ,
788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010). Under the heightened circumstantial -evidence
standard, we first determine what circumstances were proved by “winnow[ing] down the
11
evidence presented at trial to a subset of facts that is consistent with the jury’s verdict and
disregard[ing] evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.” State v. Gilleylen,
993 N.W.2d 266, 275 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). Then we consider “whether the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved support a rational
hypothesis other than guilt.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473 (quotation omitted). If the
circumstantial evidence forms “a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole,
leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any
reasonable inference other than guilt,” then the evidence is sufficient. Id. (quotation
omitted). “A defendant may not rely on conjecture or speculation to set aside a verdict. ”
Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d at 275 (quotation omitted).
Here, the circumstances proved that are consistent with the guilty verdict are as
follows:
• Amacher was in the midst of a contentious dispute with N.L.
over the custody and care of their shared child.
• Amacher was in a romantic relationship with C.L. at the time
of the offense, they lived together, and they were together in
the hours before the shooting.
• Amacher had a 2022 black Dodge Ram truck that C.L. drove
to FamilyWise before shooting N.L.
• Amacher applied for temporary plates for that truck the day
before the shooting but did not affix them until the day after
the shooting—the same day a Superman decal first appeared
on the truck.
• After the shooting, but before he had the opportunity to speak
with C.L., Amacher told officers that he owned only two
cars—a Jeep and a Dodge Challenger—and did not identify the
Dodge Ram as a vehicle he owned.
12
• Amacher’s cellphone was used to delete surveillance video that
would have shown C.L. leaving their residence in Amacher’s
truck right before the shooting and returning to their residence
in that same truck just after the shooting. Amacher was looking
at his cellphone in the police-station interview room after N.L.
was shot.
• Amacher denied owning a .380-caliber firearm, the same
caliber firearm used in the shooting. But in Amacher’s
residence, officers found bullets for a .380-caliber handgun,
bullet casings from a .380-caliber handgun that matched those
found at the scene of the shooting, and an empty gun box for a
.380-caliber handgun.
• C.L. did not own any guns, nor did she know where Amacher
stored his guns.
3 But after the shooting, she nonetheless told
her neighbor that she “pulled the trigger.”
For a fact- finder to find Amacher guilty, these circumstances must (1) prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Amacher “intentionally aid[ed], advise[d], hire[d], counsel[ed], or
conspire[d] with or otherwise procure[d],” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2020), C.L. to
attempt first-degree murder pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2020), and (2) must
exclude all other rational hypotheses inconsistent with guilt. We conclude that they do.
Here, the circumstances proved establish “a complete chain,” see Al-Naseer,
788 N.W.2d at 473, that leads so directly to the conclusion that Amacher aided C.L. that it
excludes any other reasonable possibility. There is no dispute that the firearm used in the
shooting came from Amacher’s residence, and since C.L. owned no guns and did not know

3 At oral argument, Amacher’s counsel suggested that we should not consider this as a
circumstance proved because the firearms were stored in the kitchen cabinets of C.L. and
Amacher’s shared residence and it is reasonable to assume that C.L. saw the gun boxes.
We disagree. The speculative assertion that C.L. may have seen the gun boxes is not part
of the subset of facts that is consistent with the jury’s verdict, but rather is inconsistent with
the jury’s verdict. We therefore disregard it.
13
where Amacher stored his, Amacher must have given her the gun in advance of the
shooting. Amacher also made his truck more difficult to identify in the days before the
shooting by applying for a special license plate and by failing to display his temporary plate
on the truck. And after the shooting, before even speaking to C.L., Amacher deleted
surveillance video showing her driving the truck before and after th e shooting. The only
reason for him to do so would be that he knew before the shooting that the truck and C.L.
would be implicated by the video. These circumstances clearly establish that Amacher had
a role in planning the attack on N.L.
Moreover, in determining whether the evidence proves that a defendant
intentionally aided another in the commission of a crime, a fact- finder may consider,
among other things, “the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, a close association
with the principal offender before and after the crime, [and] a lack of objection or surprise
under the circumstances.” State v. McAllister , 862 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. 2015). Here,
Amacher was at FamilyWise, the scene of the crime. He spent nearly the entire day before
the shooting with the principal, C.L. And he demonstrated a lack of surprise when officers
told him about the shooting. In light of these facts, it is unreasonable to conclude that
Amacher did not aid C.L. in attempting the first-degree murder of N.L.—his former
romantic partner and the mother of his child.
II. Because the challenged relationship evidence was admissible on an alternative
ground, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that
evidence.
Amacher contends that the district court erroneously admitted a substantial amount
of evidence under Minnesota Statutes section 634.20. Amacher identifies the following as
14
evidence erroneously admitted as relationship evidence 4 under section 634.20:
(1) evidence relating to C.L.’s testimony at the custody trial, her claims about the child
being abused, and her interactions with the child; (2) evidence relating to Amacher and
C.L.’s relationship, including when they began dating and how they met; (3) evidence
about the custody case generally; and (4) evidence that Amacher wanted N.L. to terminate
her pregnancy with the child, that Amacher behaved inappropriately at the hospital after
the child’s birth, and that Amacher took the child to medical clinics other than the child’s
primary-care clinic.
A decision to admit evidence is “within the sound discretion of the district court,
and [appellate courts] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of
discretion.” State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014).
But we need not determine
whether the district court’s relationship-evidence ruling was an abuse of discretion because
we conclude that the district court appropriately admitted all of the challenged evidence
under a different theory of admissibility—that it was relevant evidence , the probative value
of which was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403; see also Minn. R.
Evid. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the United

4 In his opening brief, Amacher also contended that evidence relating to his harassment of
D.F. was not admissible under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 because D.F. was not a family or
household member of Amacher’s. But, as Amacher conceded at oral argument, the district
court also ruled that the evidence relating to D.F. was admissible as evidence relevant to
Amacher’s motive and intent, subject to analysis under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403,
and Amacher does not challenge this ruling.
15
States Constitution, the State Constitution, statute, by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in the courts of this state.”).
The district court’s written order says that the state sought to introduce relationship
evidence about the following relationships: (1) the origin and history of the relationship
between Amacher and N.L.; (2) the custody battle between Amacher and N.L.; (3) the
harassment by Amacher of N.L. and D.F.; and (4) the history of Amacher and C.L.’s
relationship. After determining that the evidence was admissible under Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20, the district court explained that “the relationship evidence may also be relevant
in establishing motive and intent. The potential for prejudice to the Defendant is minimal
and does not substantially outweigh the probative value of this evidence.” This broad
ruling clearly encompasses any testimony about the custody trial—including the
allegations of abuse— as well as Amacher’s relationships with the victim and with the
principal, C.L.
Amacher offers no argument that this relevancy ruling was an abuse of the district
court’s broad discretion, and in the absence of such an argument, we cannot conclude that
there was error. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the challenged evidence on an appropriate alternative ground.
III. Even assuming that the prosecutor engaged in plainly erroneous misconduct,
the misconduct did not affect Amacher’s substantial rights.
Amacher contends that the prosecutor engaged in reversible misconduct by eliciting
inadmissible evidence, including (1) C.L.’s hearsay statement that she “pulled the trigger”;
(2) vouching testimony that the child “seemed forthright” when interviewed about abuse
16
allegations; and (3) testimony relating to Amacher’s alleged medical abuse of his child.
He also maintains that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct a fourth time by making an
improper closing argument when he asked the jury to hold Amacher accountable.
Because Amacher did not object during any of these four alleged instances of
misconduct, we review the alleged misconduct under a modified plain-error standard.
State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Unde r that standard, we first
determine whether Amacher has met his burden of establishing error that is plain. Id.
If Amacher establishes plain error, the burden shifts to the state to prove that the error
did not affect Amacher’s substantial rights. Id. An appellate court will conclude that
the prosecutor’s misconduct affected the defendant’s substantial rights only when there
is a “reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have
had a significant effect on the verdict of t he jury .” Id. (quotations omitted) . “To
evaluate the effect on substantial rights, we consider various factors, including the
pervasiveness of improper suggestions and the strength of evidence against the
defendant.” Id. (quotation omitted). If the sta te fails to meet its burden on the
substantial-rights prong, then we consider “whether the error should be addressed to
ensure fairness and the integrity of judicial proceedings.” State v. Parker, 901 N.W.2d
917, 926 (Minn. 2017). Here, we need not determine whether the prosecutor committed
misconduct, because we are satisfied that any misconduct did not affect Amacher’s
substantial rights. See State v. Lilienthal , 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. 2017)
17
(providing that if any one of the plain-error prongs is not met, we need not address any
other requirements).
C.L.’s statement that she pulled the trigger could not reasonably have impacted the
verdict because the cellphone-tracking evidence and physical description of the shooter
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that C.L. was, in fact, the shooter. And the “vouching”
testimony and “medical abuse” testimony were not harmful because they were not relevant
to any disputed issue and were referenced only briefly in the context of a nearly month-long
trial.
Likewise, the prosecutor’s suggestion that the jury hold Amacher accountable is not
harmful when considered in context. When evaluating whether a prosecutor committed
misconduct in a closing argument, we consider the arguments in their totality rather than
focusing on “phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue
prominence.” State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 728 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).
Here, the accountability remark was one line out of a 44-page closing argument. In sum,
we conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood that the alleged misconduct affected the
jury’s verdict.
IV. Amacher cannot be convicted of both aiding and abetting in the commission of
the crime and aiding after the fact.
Amacher’s final argument is that his aiding-after-the-fact conviction must be
reversed because the district court failed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously decide
which acts proved the after-the-fact conviction. We need not address this contention in
light of our affirming his conviction for aiding and abetting attempted first-degree murder.
18
This is because a person who is charged and convicted as a principal to an offense cannot
also be liable as an accomplice to that offense. State v. Leja, 660 N.W.2d 459, 466 (Minn.
App. 2003) (discussing that, under Minnesota law, a defendant found guilty of aiding and
abetting first- or second-degree murder is a principal and cannot also be guilty of aiding
after the fact), aff’d as modified on other grounds, 684 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 2004).
Accordingly, we reverse Amacher’s aiding-after-the-fact conviction and remand for the
district court to vacate the conviction and leave the guilty verdict intact.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.