State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0647

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Tyrone Deshawn Williams,
Respondent.

Filed December 11, 2023
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge *

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-21-645

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assist ant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker , Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Daniel P. Repka, Repka Law, LCC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
In this pretrial appeal, the state challenges the district court ’s order suppressing
evidence of a firearm discovered during a warrantless search . The state argues that the
district court erred when it determined the search was not a lawful search incident to arrest.
Because the evidence in the record fail ed to establish that the arresting officers had
probable cause to arrest respondent, w e affirm.
FACTS
Appellant State of Minnesota charged respondent Tyrone Deshawn Williams with
one count of felony possession of a firearm by an ineligible person in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020), and one count of felony domestic assault in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subds. 1, 4 (2020). Williams moved to suppress the firearm
evidence, arguing that it was obtained as the result of an unlawful search. The district court
held hearings on Williams’s motion at which one witness, St. Paul Police Officer Vladimir
Krumgant, testified and one exhibit, the officer’s body-worn camera footage, was received
into evidence. The district court found the relevant facts to be as follows.
At around 5:47 p.m. on February 2, 2021, Officer Krumgant responded to a call
regarding “a domestic” and a single motor vehicle collision. He received information that
the driver of the vehicle fled on foot and “ was going to shoot it out with the police.” 1

1 Krumgant testified he received this information from dispatch and agreed that all dispatch
communications are recorded. The state did not in troduce the recording of the call
Krumgant received from dispatch into evidence.
3
Krumgant testified that after a patrol officer aired on the radio that they had observed the
individual, he drove to the location reported by the patrol officer. Body-worn camera video
footage shows Officer Krumgant exiting his squad car and approaching Williams with his
gun unholstered, stating, “hands, show us your hands, St. Paul Police. Get your hands up.”
The officers handcuffed Williams.
The body- worn camera footage shows Williams carrying a cooler and two duffel
bags, each strapped to his body. Officers removed the duffel bags and placed them on the
ground out of Williams’s reach. Officers opene d and searched the cooler while Officer
Krumgant conducted a pat -down of Williams’s sweatshirt. Krumgant testified that
Williams questioned the officers regarding their reasons for the stop. The body- worn
camera footage shows that, i n response to Williams’s questions, one officer stated that
there had been a report of an accident, a report of “a domestic,” and a report that the driver
had left the scene of the accident. Williams told officers that the woman he was with hit
him, that he lost control of the vehicle , and crashed. He denied hitting her.
Officers walked Williams toward a squad vehicle, while Krumgant and the other
officers discussed the basis for the call. One officer stated, “accident with injuries and a
domestic . . . they said he had a [firearm].” An officer handed one of the duffel bags to
Krumgant. Krumgant used his hands to briefly feel the outer surface of the top of the bag,
gripped the bag’s zipper, and then paused. Officers then discussed whether to search the
bag wi thout a warrant . Krumgant decided to search the duffle bag , opened a smaller
zippered bag inside the duffel bag, and discovered a firearm.
4
Krumgant was questioned about the initial report he received at the hearing.
Krumgant testified, “it was a —initially, as a domestic, and there was a motor vehicle
collision. And then it was an update that the driver fled on foot from the accident.”
Krumgant was asked to descri be the “nature of the domestic” reported in the call.
Krumgant testified that “it was something in terms of that the [individual] and a woman
got into an altercation.” Krumgant testified that he did not see Williams holding a firearm
at the stop and agreed that it was not alleged a firearm was used in the domestic. Krumgant
also agreed, in his testimony, that he did not ask Williams for permission to search the
duffel bag and that he did not secure a search warrant prior to searching the bag. Krumgant
also testified that Williams did not , at any point during the interaction, reach for the duffel
bag.
The district court granted Williams ’s motion to suppress . The district court
determined that, while the state argued the search of the bag was a lawful sea rch incident
to arrest, the state had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Williams’s arrest was
lawful. The district court explained that “neither the [body- worn camera] recording nor
Krumgant’s testimony provide any additional evidence” as to the conduct underlying the
initial report and, therefore, the state failed to demonstrate that the officers had probable
cause to arrest Williams.2 The district court explained that “it is the state’s burden to show

2 The district court considered, pursuant to the state’s argument before it, whether police
had probable cause to believe Williams violated either Minn. Stat. § 169.09 (2020) or
Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1. Counsel for the state conceded at oral argume nts that the
police did not have probable cause to arrest Williams for the alleged violation of Minn.
Stat. § 169.09 (2020).
5
that an exception to t he warrant requirement applies” and “based on the evidence and
arguments in the record, the [c]ourt cannot conclude that the burden has been met.” The
state appeals.
DECISION
“When the [s]tate appeals a district court ’s pretrial order, the [s]tate must . . . show
both that the trial court ’s order will have a ‘critical impact ’ on the [s]tate’s ability to
prosecute the defendant successfully and that the order constituted error. ” State v. Mosley,
853 N.W.2d 789, 889 n.5 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted); see also Minn. R. Crim. P.
28.04, subd. 2(2)(b). Because the district court suppressed the firearm evidence against
Williams, and the state would be unable to prosecute Williams on this charge without it,
the parties do not dispute, and we accept, that the ruling has a critical impact on the state’s
case. In reviewing a district court ’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we
review the district court ’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo. State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn.
2007).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Evidence obtained during an
unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed. State v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836,
842 (Minn. 2011). Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable under both federal
and state law unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. Coolidge
v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443, 454- 55, 474 (1971); State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789,
6
798-99 (Minn. 2012). The state bears the burden of showing that such an exception applies.
State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2003).
In this case, the state defended the search of Williams ’s duffle bag as a search
incident to arrest. “A search incident to a lawful arrest is a well -recognized exception to
the warrant requirement.” State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn. 2015) (citing
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)). Under this exception, after a person has been
lawfully arrested, police are authorized to search the person’s body and the area within his
or her immediate control. State v. Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2000) (citing Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). The search can occur before the arrest, but the
police must have probable cause for the arrest at the time of the search. 3 In re Welfare of
G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 695 (Minn. 1997). We review a district co urt’s probable cause
determination de novo. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005).
The issue before us is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support
an honest and strong suspicion that Williams had committed domestic assault at the time
of the search.4 Probable cause to arrest without a warrant exists “when a person of ordinary
care and prudence, viewing the totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an
honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime. ” State v.
Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Minn. 2009) ; In re Welfare of G.M ., 560 N.W.2d at 695.

3 The district court’s order does not clearly establish when Williams was placed under
arrest and the parties’ briefs to this court do not address this point. As such, our analysis
assumes Williams was not under arrest at any point prior to the search and focuses instead
on whether the police had probable caus e at the time of the search.
4 The district court did not reach the issue of whether the duffle bag was in Williams ’s
immediate control, and, in light of our decision, we need not address it.
7
The state argues that police had probable cause to arrest Williams for violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 629.341 (2020) .5 A person
commits domestic assault, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1, when he
“commits an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death” or
“intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm upon another.” The state argues
police had probable cause to arrest Williams for domestic assault based on the girlfriend’s
report that Williams had assaulted her ; Williams’s location near the scene of the incident
shortly thereafter; one officer ’s observation of damage to the vehicle at the scene of the
accident; and the police officer ’s knowledge that the suspect had left the scene of the
accident. We are not persuaded .
First, there is nothing in the record to s upport the state’s assertion that police had a
report from the girlfriend that Williams assaulted her. The only citation to the record the
state provides to support this assertion is a citation to a memorandum of law filed with the
court. But the arguments of counsel are not evidence. State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153,
158 (Minn. 2004). Rather, the only evidence in the record before us regarding an allegation
of assault is Williams’s statement that the girlfriend had hit him. The state did not introduce
evidence, through Krumgant’s testimony or otherwise, any information Krumgant—or any
other officer—had regarding any alleged act committed by Williams which would give rise

5 For a search incident to arrest to be lawful “the crime for which there is probable cause
to arrest must be a crime for which a custodial arrest is authorized.” State v. Varnado, 582
N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1998). Section 629.341 allows police to make warrantless arrests
for nonfelony domestic abuse even though the assault did not take place in the presence of
an officer.
8
to probable cause to arrest for domestic assault. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1; see
also State v. Dickey , 827 N.W.2d 792, 798 (Minn. App. 2013) ( “A police officer may
convey to an arresting officer probable cause to arrest arising from information not known
to the arresting officer. ”); State v. Conaway , 319 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1982) (imputing
pooled knowledge of law enforcement to the acting officer).
The only evidence presented by the state as to the officers’ knowledge, Krumgant’s
testimony, is likewise insufficient to conclude that the totality of the circumsta nces known
to the officers gave rise to probable cause to arrest Williams for domestic assault.
Krumgant testified, when asked what was reported to him,
it was a—initially, as a domestic, and there was a motor vehicle
collision. And then it was an update that the driver fled on foot
from the accident. . . . There was also an update as we were en
route, indicating that the person who fled on foot in the
accident was going to shoot it out with the police.

When asked about the nature of the domestic, Krumgant testified , “I don’t recall entirely.
But it was something in terms of that the [individual] and a woman got into an altercation.”
Krumgant also described the scene of the accident and testified, “when we drove past it,
there was a vehicle in the middle of the street and a woman frantically on the phone.” There
is nothing in the evidence to suggest the woman was injured, or that Krumgant observed
any other indicia at the scene which would support probable cause to arrest Williams for
domestic assault. The evidence presented merely establishes that the officers knew of—
and were investigating—“ a domestic” and “an altercation” but nowhere in the record is it
alleged that Williams had assaulted the girlfriend, or otherwise committed acts in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1.

9
Almost the entirety of the state ’s brief to this court focuses on the credibility of the
girlfriend’s report to dispatch. The state did not introduce into evidence the substance of
the girlfriend’s statements to the dispatcher; the body- worn camera footage of any of the
officers; the content of the bystander’s call to dispatch reporting the accident; or any other
meaningful evidence regarding the alleged conduct to which the officers were responding.
The state does n ot articulate how , in light of the state’s failure to introduce any evidence
regarding the girlfriend’s report, the girlfriend’s credibility has any bearing on whether
police had probable cause to arrest Williams . Regardless of the credibility of such a
report—because the state failed to introduce evidence of the reported conduct, we cannot
conclude that the police had probable cause to arrest .
When reviewing a district court’s probable cause determination, this court conducts
an “objective assessment of t he strength of an officer ’s . . . belief that a person ’s conduct
satisfies the elements of an offense, accounting for such factors as the source, nature, and
reliability of the information upon which the officer bases his or her suspicion or belief.”
State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. 2011). Absent any evidence in the record
as to what the alleged conduct was, we cannot conclude the officer s objectively believed
Williams’s conduct satisfied the elements of domestic assault. While we agree, and the
parties do not dispute, that there were circumstances present in this case which provided
officers with reasonable suspicion to stop Williams , mere suspicion without more is
10
insufficient for a warrantless arrest. 6 Based on the totality of the circumstances apparent
in the record before us, probable cause is lacking.
We note that when the existence of probable cause to execute a warrantless arrest is
challenged “it is obligatory upon the state not only to fully and fairly disclose all the facts
and surrounding circumstances of the arrest but also to sustain the burden of proving
compliance with Fourth Amendment rights.” Fagin v. State, 933 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn.
2019) (quotation omitted). To meet this obligation and the burden of proof in this case, the
state relied entirely on the testimony, and body- worn camera footage, of just one of the
arresting officers. In sustaining Williams’s motion to suppress, the district court held that
the state, which had the burden of proof of proving the legality of the search incident to
arrest, failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain that the officers had probable cause
to arrest Williams for a domestic assault.
Based on the record before us , we cannot conclude the d istrict court erred in
determining police did not have probable cause to arrest Williams. Because this is the only
argument the state presented to this court, we must conclude that the state has failed to
meet its burden to prove that the warrantless of W illiams’s bag was constitutionally
permissible. T he evidence discovered as a result of the unconstitutional search must be
suppressed.
Affirmed.

6 Williams does not dispute that the facts demonstrate that there was reasonable suspicion
supporting a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); State v. Askerooth, 681
N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004)