In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. A. W. and C. M. M., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1.

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0708

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
J. A. W. and C. M. M., Parents.

Filed October 30, 2023
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-JV-23-144

James R. Martin, Faribault, Minnesota (for appellant mother J.A.W.)

Julia A. Forbes, Steele County Attorney, Campbell R. Housh, Assistant County Attorney,
Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Prairie County Alliance)

Benjamin M. Cass, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent father C.M.M.)

Julie A. Nelson, Owatonna, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
On appeal from the termination of appellant mother’s parental rights, mother argues
that the district court abused its discretion by determining that a statutory basis supports
the termination of her parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interests.
2
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating mother’s parental
rights, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant J.A.W. is the mother of a child born in August 2019. The child’s father,
C.M.M., is also a party to this matter and agreed to voluntarily terminate his parental rights
if mother’s parental rights were terminated. Both parents have a history of
methamphetamine use. Mother stopped using chemicals when she was pregnant with the
child but resumed using methamphetamine when the child was approximately seven
months old. In November 2020, respondent Minnesota Prairie County Alliance
(MNPrairie) opened a child-protection assessment because of concerns for the child’s
safety caused by the parents’ chemical health and a lack of safe and stable housing. During
this assessment, both parents were evasive and refused drug testing. MNPrairie filed a
child-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition, and the child was adjudicated
CHIPS.
In January 2021, law enforcement conducted a traffic stop of parents. The child
was in the vehicle. Law enforcement discovered a pipe with methamphetamine residue
and a marijuana pipe in the vehicle. The child was removed from the home the next day.
The child was dirty, had blisters under their fingernails, and had numerous scabs. The child
was placed in foster care and several days later had a positive hair-follicle test for
methamphetamine. The parents were granted supervised visits on the condition of negative
methamphetamine tests. MNPrairie providers stressed the importance of sobriety with
both parents, encouraged specific strategies for the parents, and assisted mother in
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scheduling chemical-health treatment. From January to May 2021, mother had 13
confirmed positive methamphetamine tests. Mother was admitted to inpatient chemical-
health treatment on May 18 and was discharged on June 28. Upon discharge, she received
referrals for outpatient treatment, an after-care support group, and individual therapy.
Mother began outpatient treatment in July.
From July 2021 until February 2022, both parents engaged in outpatient treatment,
case planning, and drug testing. During this time, mother was involved in therapy services
and saw a psychiatric provider. On February 9, the district court returned care, custody,
and control of the child to mother. After the child returned to mother’s care, she began to
miss appointments with mental-health providers as soon as February 18. By late March, a
provider at MNPrairie grew concerned that the parents were disengaging with services and
relayed this concern to them.
In April, MNPrairie was unable to reach the parents despite numerous attempts.
During this time, a family member called MNPrairie expressing concerns about the child
and mother. Due to concerns for the safety of the child, MNPrairie moved to extend the
district court’s jurisdiction which otherwise would have terminated on May 10. On May 4,
the district court granted the motion to extend jurisdiction and ordered that MNPrairie place
the child on an emergency hold if the parents did not provide a negative drug test. The
same day, MNPrairie located the child and parents, and the child w as removed. Mother
had a confirmed positive drug test for methamphetamine the following day and admitted
additional use in April. Mother reengaged with chemical-health and therapeutic services
after the child was removed.
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On June 22, the child began a trial home visit with mother and father. On
September 7, the district court ordered the child be placed in the care, custody, and control
of mother under protective supervision. After the child returned to mother’s custody, she
resumed a pattern of missing mental- and chemical -health appointments. MNPrairie
conveyed concerns to both parents that they were consistently missing mental-health
appointments. On October 26, MNPrairie requested the district court continue protective
supervision and mother requested the district court close the case. The district court issued
an order that, upon proof that mother attended her mental-health appointment later that day,
the matter would be closed. Mother attended the appointment and urged the provider to
tell the court she “showed to the appointment today.” The district court closed the CHIPS
case on November 3. Mother declined voluntary services with MNPrairie before and after
the case was closed. On November 8, the parents removed the child from daycare because
mother wanted to spend more time with the child to work on their relationship.
Mother reported relapsing and using methamphetamine again in December 2022.
Between November and January, mother did not engage in any chemical-health services,
attend narcotics anonymous, or reach out to a sober support network. During this period,
the parents would drop the child off at a relative’s house and then use methamphetamine.
This happened at least three times between December and January. On January 21, 2023,
the child was at the relative’s home when the relative was arrested for domestic assault.
The relative admitted to being intoxicated but did not acknowledge the intoxication was
unsafe for the child.
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On January 23, law enforcement noticed the parents and the child in a parking lot.
Officers followed the vehicle because they had suspected that father was attempting to steal
catalytic converters. Officers detained and eventually arrested father. Officers observed a
panicked and distraught child in the backseat of the vehicle next to power tools and a saw.
Mother and father both admitted they had used methamphetamine that day, and mother
also testified that she had methamphetamine in her system while driving with the child.
After father’s arrest, MNPrairie received a child-protection report and attempted to locate
mother and child.
On January 25, MNPrairie providers met with mother and explained their concerns
for the child. They told mother that she needed to provide a negative drug test to prevent
a law-enforcement emergency hold. Mother was aggressive, emotional, and unable to have
a calm or rational conversation with service providers. She refused to provide a drug test.
Eventually, police officers issued an emergency hold, and the child was removed. The next
day, mother met with MNPrairie providers and had a confirmed positive drug test for
methamphetamine. The meeting ended because mother was “unable or unwilling to
participate in any meaningful reciprocal conversation.” A provider noted that mother
“asked what she should do to start checking boxes.”
On January 30, MNPrairie filed a termination-of-parental-rights petition and
requested the district court find that further reasonable efforts toward reunification by
MNPrairie were futile and unreasonable. After a hearing, the district court determined that
further reasonable efforts would be futile and unreasonable based on the past efforts, the
child’s out-of-home placement days, and the circumstances leading to the petition. The
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district court ordered that both parents provide random drug tests as a condition for
visitation with the child during the termination proceeding. Both parents consistently
attended scheduled supervised visits a nd phone calls with the child, but on February 13,
the parents abruptly cancelled a visit. This cancellation concerned the assigned MNPrairie
provider because the parents historically missed visits while they were using chemicals.
The provider opted to conduct a random drug test at the parents’ apartment. When the
provider arrived, the parents were evasive and resisted testing. Ultimately, mother
provided a drug test, which was positive for methamphetamine.
The district court held a trial over five days and heard testimony from mother,
MNPrairie, mother’s mental- and chemical-health providers, the child’s foster parent, the
guardian ad litem (GAL), two family members, and mother’s property manager. On April
26, 2023, the district court involuntary terminated mother’s parental rights.
Mother now appeals.
DECISION
Parental rights may only be terminated for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A district court may involuntarily
terminate parental rights if: (1) at least one of the statutory bases for terminating parental
rights exists under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b) (2022);
(2) reasonable efforts toward reunification were either made or were not required; and
(3) the proposed termination is in the children’s best interests. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301,
subds. 1(b), 7, 8, .317, subd. 1 (2022); see also In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
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Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that a
statutory basis exists to support the termination of her parental rights and that termination
was in the child’s best interests. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not ab use its discretion by determining that a statutory
basis supports the termination of mother’s parental rights.
Mother challenges the district court’s determination that four statutory grounds exist
to terminate her parental rights: a failure to comply wit h duties of the parent and child
relationship, palpable unfitness, a failure to correct the conditions leading to removal, and
that the child was neglected and in foster care. “But we need only one properly supported
statutory ground in order to affirm a termination order.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T.,
814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012). We affirm the termination of parental rights on
two statutory grounds found by the district court: failure to comply with the duties of the
parent and child relationship and failure to correct the conditions leading to the child’s
placement.1
On appeal, we “review the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts
for clear error, but we review its determination of whether a particular statutory basis for
involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re
Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn.
Jan. 6, 2012). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are
unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against

1 Because we affirm the termination of parental rights on these grounds, we do not reach
the other bases for termination set forth in the district court’s order.
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logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted).
“A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of the
Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (quotation omitted). “In applying the clear-error
standard, we view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings. We will not conclude
that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney,
963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation and citation omitted). We must “fully and
fairly consider the evidence, but so far only as is necessary to determine beyond question
that [the evidence] reasonably tends to support the findings of the factfinder.” Id. at 223
(quotation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on
appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences
and findings to the contrary.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Duties of the Parent and Child Relationship

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that there
was clear and convincing evidence supporting the findings that she failed to comply with
the duties of the parent and child relationship. Mother specifically challenges the district
court’s determination that MNPrairie made reasonable efforts required by statute.
A district court may terminate parental rights if it determines that a parent has
“substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
9
subd. 1(b)(2). Parental duties include providing “food, clothing, shelter, education, and
other care and control necessary for the child ’s physical, mental, or emotional health and
development, if the parent is physically and financially able.” Id. Finally, to terminate
parental rights, the court must find “either” reasonable efforts by the social services agency
to reunite the family have failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of the
petition or “reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore unreasonable.” Id.
Mother predominantly argues that the district court abused its discretion because
MNPrairie did not engage in reasonable efforts.2 Mother’s argument is unavailing because
the record supports the district court’s earlier findings that further reasonable efforts by the
county would be futile and unreasonable.3

2 Mother also argues that she met the physical needs of the child in 2023. We note that
the record supports the district court’s determination that mother had “substantially,
continuously or repeatedly failed to comply with duties imposed upon her by the
parent/child relationship” because mother “repeatedly failed to provide [the child] with a
safe and stable environment, to provide proper parental care, and repeatedly failed to
address her chemical health and mental health.”

3 We note that mother did not explicitly contest the district court’s futility determination
at trial or in her proposed conclusions of law following trial. And mother did not request
the transcript from the relevant evidentiary hearing, which limits our review of this issue.
See Fischer v. Simon , 980 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Minn. 2022) (“It is elementary that a party
seeking review has a duty to see that the appellate court is presented with a record which
is sufficient to show the alleged errors and all matters necessary to consider the questions
presented.” (quotation omitted)); Custom Farm Servs., Inc. v. Collins, 238 N.W.2d 608,
609 (Minn. 1976) (“An appellant has the burden of providing an adequate record for
appeal.”). In the absence of a fulsome record, “we are limited to determining whether the
trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law.” Am. Family Li fe Ins. Co. v.
Noruk, 528 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 1995). Thus,
we review the district court’s determination that further reasonable efforts by MNPrairie
would be futile and unreasonable under Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(7) (2022) to determine if
the district court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law.
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Reasonable efforts are not required “upon a determination by the [district court] that
a petition has been filed stating a prima facie case that . . . the provision of services or
further services for the purpose of reunification is futile and therefore unreasonable under
the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(7); see also id. (h) (2022). The agency must
request a prima facie determination of futility based on the allegations made in its
termination petition. In re Welfare of Child. of A.D.B., 970 N.W.2d 725, 726, 730, 733
(Minn. App. 2022). MNPrairie made such a request at the emergency protective-care
hearing held on January 25, 2023.
The district court determined that further reasonable efforts were not required
because MNPrairie presented a prima facie case that its further efforts would be futile and
unreasonable pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(7). The district court supported t his
determination with findings of fact regarding both the family’s history in the prior CHIPS
case and the circumstances that led to the emergency hold. The district court found that
the circumstances of the petition were “due to similar concerns” as the two past removals
in the prior case. The district court found that the parents had been doing well at the close
of that case approximately three months before the petition, but the present circumstances
indicated a “major regression that is concerning for the child.” The district court noted that
MNPrairie provided the parents two years of chemical- and mental-health services during
the prior case. Finally, the district court observed that mother refused to cooperate with
MNPrairie providers. The district court found that mother’s behavior was “chaotic, erratic,
obstinate, and threatening” and that she made drug testing difficult.
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These findings of fact support the district court’s determination that further
reasonable efforts would be futile and unreasonable. Mother’s attitude and resistance to
MNPrairie human-services workers, resistance to chemical testing, and relapse within three
months of the close of the prior case reasonably indicated that further similar services from
MNPrairie would be futile. See In re Welfare of D.D.K., 376 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn.
App. 1985) (stating that a reunification plan was sufficient and that a more detailed plan
would be futile because mother resisted rehabilitative efforts and denied her parental
inadequacies); In re Welfare of J.J.B. , 390 N.W.2d 274, 281 (Minn. 1986) (stating that
mental illness or mental or emotional disability that precludes a parent from providing
proper parental care can render a county’s reasonable efforts futile). Thus, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that further efforts would be futile and
unreasonable.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that mother
“substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship” because t he record
demonstrates a pattern of unsafe circumstances for the child not remedied by mother and
MNPrairie was relieved of further reasonable efforts. Minn. Stat. § 2 60C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2).
Failure to Correct Conditions Leading to the Child’s Removal
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that there
was clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts failed to correct a condition that
led to out-of-home placement. Mother specifically argues that the district court
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erroneously relied on her past chemical abuse rather than her current progress in treatment
and again argues that MNPrairie did not make reasonable efforts.
The district court may terminate parental rights if “reasonable efforts, under the
direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement”
out of the home. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). A presumption exists that
reasonable efforts have failed if: (1) the “child has resided out of the parental home under
court order for a cumulative period of 12 months,” (2) “the court has approved the out-of-
home placement plan,” (3) the “conditions leading to the out-of-home placement have not
been corrected,” and (4) “reasonable efforts have been made by the social services agency
to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id., subd. 1(b)(5)(i)-(iv).
The parties do not contest the time the child has been in out-of-home placement or
that the district court approved an out-of-home placement plan. And as set forth above,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that further efforts would be
futile and unreasonable. Thus, we turn to mother’s argument that the district court abused
its discretion in making its determination that the conditions leading to out- of-home
placement have not been corrected.
Mother argues that her situation had changed since the child was removed in January
2023. She argues that the district court ignored these changed circumstances when
determining that the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement had not been
corrected. We disagree. The district court expressly recognized that mother had made
some changes since the child’s initial removal. It found that mother was stable and sober
at the time of the trial. The district court stated “[ mother] is able to demonstrate longer
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periods of sobriety when she has strict supervision, oversight, and accountability in place.”
But the district court nevertheless determined that, even with these changes, mother was
unable to demonstrate “she is able to keep services in place and continue her sobriety
without such oversight, and she has been unable to do so in two and a half years.” The
district court concluded that it had “no confidence [mother] will be able to make the needed
demonstration . . . within the reasonable foreseeable future.” These findings of fact are
supported by record evidence of mother’s history of methamphetamine use, relapse, and
pattern of discontinuing services when supervision has waned. And we note that,
notwithstanding mother’s characterization of the effect of any changes she has made, the
district court discredited much of her testimony and instead credited other record evidence
as to mother’s inability to demonstrate lasting stable changes. “On appeal this court must
defer to the trial court’s assessment of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
to their testimony.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992) (quotation
omitted).
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
conditions leading to the out-of-home placement have not been corrected because the
record demonstrates that mother was unable to establish that she could maintain her
sobriety without oversight.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination
of mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child.
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that
termination was in the best interests of the child because the court failed to appropriately
balance the child’s interest, mother’s interest, and competing interests. We disagree.
A district court may not terminate parental rights unless termination is in the child’s
best interests. In re Welfare of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). A best-interests
analysis should include consideration and evaluation of “all relevant factors,” including “a
review of the relationship between the child and relatives and the child and other important
persons with whom the child has resided or had significant co ntact.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.511 (2022). T hree factors that must be considered in every analysis of a child’s
best interests: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, (2) the
parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, and (3) any competing interests
of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). Where the interests of the parent and
the child conflict, the interests of the child are paramount. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7.
We review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its determination of whether
the facts it found show that termination is in a child’s best interests for abuse of discretion.
In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn. 1995); J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
The district court found that mother expressed an interest in the parent-child
relationship but discredited her testimony because she “claims great love and affection for
[the child] but does not show this alleged love and affection.” The district court grounded
this finding in mother’s patterns of “irresponsibility, drug use, and not spending time with
15
[the child].” The district court found that those patterns resulted in mother’s inability to
provide safe and stable care to the child which undermines the parent-child relationship.
These findings are supported by the record.
The district court also emphasized the child’s interest in permanency , consistency,
and stability, thoughtfully consider ing the child’s interest in “having a lifelong stable
environment, being healthy, limiting exposure to chemical substance abuse and criminal
activity, having a safe and sober caregiver, and limiting any further risk of neglect.” These
considerations are grounded in Minnesota law. See In re of Welfare of K.T., 327 N.W.2d
13, 18 (Minn. 1982) (holding that “stability [of the child] is a factor which must be given
high priority”); In re Welfare of M.G., 407 N.W.2d 118, 120-21 (Minn. App. 1987)
(explaining that stability includes the amount of time a child has spent in out-of-home
placement). In finding that mother was unable to provide stable care to the child, the
district court specifically pointed to record evidence of the extensive time the child has
spent in out-of-home placement and testimony from social workers, therapists, the child’s
foster parent, and the GAL about the negative effects this instability has had on the child.
We see no clear error in these findings, and these findings support the district court’s
ultimate determination that termination is in the best interests of this child.
We specifically note that the district court’s order is thoughtful, thorough, and
detailed, setting forth specific factual findings and credibility determinations to support the
conclusion that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child.
Because the district court properly found that the child’s interests in stability, safety, and
emotional health outweighed mother’s interest in maintaining her relationship with the
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child, and its findings are supported by the record, we see no abuse of discretion in its
decision to terminate mother’s parental rights.
Affirmed.