State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0720

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alexander Steven Jonas,
Appellant.

Filed December 23, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-22-21

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Carl E. Erickson, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Greg Scanlan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant Alexander Steven Jonas was convicted of one count of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct and one count of kidnapping arising from the sexual assault of a
woman. Following his convictions, Jonas filed a petition for postconviction relief with the
2
postconviction court seeking a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. On
appeal, Jonas challenges the postconviction court’s summary denial of his petition for
postconviction relief. Alternatively, he argues that this court must reverse his kidnapping
conviction because the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.
We first conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by
summarily denying Jonas’s postconviction petition because the files and record do not
support his ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim. We next conclude that the evidence
was insufficient to support the kidnapping conviction. We therefore affirm his convictions
for criminal sexual conduct, but we reverse the kidnapping conviction and remand to the
district court with instructions to vacate that conviction and sentence.
FACTS
In March 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged Jonas by amended complaint
with three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statutes section
609.342, subdivision 1(a) (fear of imminent great bodily harm), subdivision 1(c)(i) (injury
through the use of coercion), and subdivision 1(d) (use of force) (Supp. 2021); and one
count of kidnapping under Minnesota Statutes section 609.25, subdivision 1(2) (2020).
The charges stemmed from allegations that Jonas accompanied a woman to her home from
a bar, bound her hands with a cord when she began to fight off his sexual advances, and
then subjected her to multiple, unwanted forms of sexual penetration while she was
restrained. The case proceeded to a three-day jury trial in November 2022. The jury heard
testimony from the victim, L.S.; a sexual assault nurse examiner; responding police
officers; and Jonas.
3
At trial, L.S. testified that she met Jonas at a bar on December 30, 2021. At the end
of the evening, Jonas asked L.S. if he could go home with her. L.S. testified that she agreed
because Jonas was “pressing the issue,” and she feared he would follow her home. Jonas
then followed L.S. to her home in his own car. L.S. stated that, as soon as they arrived at
her home, Jonas took off his shoes and began “tugging at [her] clothes.” She told Jonas
that she could not have sex due to a recent surgery. L.S. testified that Jonas continued
“tugging” at her clothing and then removed her jacket and her dress. L.S. was “thrashing”
while he took off her dress and trying to “crawl away” from him. L.S. further testified that
Jonas put his knees on her arms to hold her down. Jonas then pulled a charging cord out
of the wall and tied it to one of her wrists. When he grabbed her other arm, L.S. tried to
pull it away but Jonas held her down with his knee and bound her wrists together behind
her back. Once her hands were bound, Jonas “ripped” off L.S.’s bra, “choked” her, put his
fingers inside of her vagina, and “kicked [her] in [her] vagina” with “one hard kick.” She
testified that Jonas forced her to perform oral sex on him and tried to put his fingers into
her anus.
Jonas temporarily stopped sexually assaulting L.S. when her cats came into the
room. L.S. testified that Jonas untied her, and she began to think of ways to distract him
and ask him to leave the house. She offered to get Jonas a drink and went upstairs to put
her cats away and get him a glass of water. When she returned downstairs, she handed
Jonas the glass of water and lai d down next to him on the couch. L.S. testified that the
sexual assault “start[ed] up again” as Jonas began kissing her and trying to put his finger
into her vagina. When she tried to push him away, Jonas pinned her down with his knees,
4
tied her hands behind her back again with the cord so forcefully that she was afraid he
would break her shoulder, dragged her across the carpet to the couch, and “shov[ed]” the
handle of a cat toy into her vagina. She stated that he also tried to put the cat toy into her
anus. During the assault, L.S. tried to crawl away but was unable to do so because she was
bound and had “no ability to move.” When the assault ended, Jonas untied L.S.’s hands
and she ran into the bathroom and called the police.
Police Officers B and H arrived at L.S.’s home “almost simultaneously” in response
to her emergency call. Officer B testified about his observations when he arrived at L.S.’s
home. According to the information he had at the time, “it was unknown if there was a
suspect still on scene” and the officers “didn’t have a whole lot of information on what we
were going to come across.” Officer B testified that he knocked on the door and “a male
came to the door on his cell phone.” While still on his cell phone, the male “made a
statement, ‘I’m going to jail,’ and then hung up the phone.” The male then let the officers
in the house and Officer B went downstairs to speak to L.S. while Officer H spoke with
Jonas. Officer H testified that he noticed that Jonas had dried blood on his hands and his
shirt. According to Officer H, when Jonas saw the blood on his hands, Jonas stated, “Oh,
my God.”
Anoka County Sheriff’s Deputy V assisted Officers B and H. When Deputy V
arrived at the residence, his body-worn camera was turned on and recording. The state
entered Deputy V’s body-worn camera video into evidence, which showed his
conversation with Jonas. In the video, Jonas acknowledged that he had blood on his hands
and stated that he got it from “fornicating” with L.S. Jonas asked if he could wash his
5
hands, but the deputy responded, “not right now,” and asked him to sit down. The deputy
then asked Jonas again how the blood got on him and said, “are you bleeding somewhere?”
Jonas repeated that he got blood on his hands from fornicating with L.S. and stated,
“[e]very time she said ‘no,’ it was—I would let off. And it was so difficult to—oh my
God. I just thought I was being nice.” During the conversation, Jonas told Deputy V, “I
called my mom; I’m like, ‘I’m going to jail.’” When the deputy asked why he was going
to jail, Jonas replied that he had blood on his hands. After speaking with Jonas and L.S.,
the officers arrested Jonas.
Officers also called an ambulance to take L.S. to the hospital where she underwent
a sexual-assault examination. The sexual assault nurse took photographs of L.S., which
were introduced into evidence. The nurse testified that there were red, circular marks on
L.S.’s wrists; broken blood vessels and petechia on her lip, which was consistent with
ruptured blood vessels that can occur when oxygen is cut off; and scrape marks on the
insides of her thighs. Although the nurse did not see any vaginal injuries, she did not
consider this uncommon. The nurse collected swabs from L.S.’s vaginal area, cervix,
rectum, and perineum and sent them for analysis. The parties stipulated that the swabs
taken from L.S.’s perineum and rectum contained DNA that matched Jonas’s DNA. They
further stipulated that swabs taken from Jonas’s hands contained DNA that matched L.S.’s
DNA.
Jonas testified in his own defense at trial. He testified that L.S. became “aggressive”
when they were kissing at her home and that she removed his clothing. Jonas stated that
L.S. voluntarily participated in sex and denied that she tried to push him away. He admitted
6
to putting the cat toy inside of L.S.’s vagina, but claimed that she consented to this act.
And he further testified that L.S. consented to having her hands tied with a cord and that
she never asked him to stop or indicated that she did not like it. He testified that, after he
untied her, she “abruptly” went into the bathroom and spoke to someone on the phone. He
denied sexually assaulting L.S.
Following deliberations, the jury found Jonas guilty of all four counts. The district
court sentenced Jonas to 172 months in prison on one count of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, and to 57 months in prison on the kidnapping charge, to be served consecutively.
The district court did not adjudicate the remaining two criminal- sexual-conduct charges,
which were included offenses.
Jonas filed a direct appeal, and this court granted Jonas’s motion to stay his appeal
to allow Jonas to pursue postconviction relief before the district court. Jonas filed a petition
for postconviction relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Specifically, he argued that (1) defense counsel did not effectively cross-examine the
victim, and (2) defense counsel failed to recognize that police officers were required to
give Jonas a Miranda warning before speaking with him at L.S.’s home. After reviewing
the record, the postconviction court summarily dismissed Jonas’s petition without an
evidentiary hearing. Following the filing of that order, this court reinstated Jonas’s direct
appeal.
DECISION
Jonas raises two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the postconviction
court abused its discretion by denying his petition for postconviction relief without holding
7
an evidentiary hearing. Second, Jonas claims that his kidnapping conviction must be
overturned because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We address
each argument in turn.
I. Postconviction Petition
A person convicted of a crime may seek postconviction relief by filing a petition
alleging that the conviction “violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or laws of
the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2020). A petition for
postconviction relief “shall contain . . . a statement of the facts and the grounds upon which
the petition is based and the relief desired.” Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd. 1(1) (2020). The
postconviction court must hold an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the petition and the files
and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020). “[T]he burden is on a petitioner to show facts entitling
the petitioner to relief.” Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 541 (Minn. 2023).
An appellate court reviews a summary denial of postconviction relief for an abuse
of discretion. Martin v. State, 969 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. 2022). “A postconviction
court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is
against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Minn.
2015) (quotation omitted). “Although doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary
hearing are resolved in favor of the petitioner, a [postconviction ] court need not hold a
hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to grant the
requested relief.” State v. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585, 602-03 (Minn. 2024)
(quotations omitted).
8
To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, the petitioner “must allege facts that, if proven by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy the two-prong test” articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Chavez-Nelson v. State , 948 N.W.2d 665, 671 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). Under
this two-prong test, a petitioner must show that: (1) counsel’s representation “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. (quotations omitted). If an appellant cannot meet one of
the Strickland prongs, the claim fails, and we need not address the other prong.
Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020). Because claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel present mixed questions of law and fact, “we review the
postconviction court’s legal conclusions on such questions de novo.” State v. Nicks,
831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013).
Jonas asserts that an evidentiary hearing was required because he alleged sufficient
facts to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on: (1) defense
counsel failing to effectively cross- examine L.S., and (2) defense counsel not seeking to
suppress Jonas’s statements to the police officers in L.S.’s home.
We begin by considering the first prong of the Strickland test for each claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Under the first prong, “there is a strong presumption that
counsel’s performance was reasonable.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10
(Minn. 2013). An attorney provides reasonable assistance when exercising “the customary
9
skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the
circumstances.” Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted).
A. Cross-Examination of L.S.
Jonas argues that his defense counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness because counsel did not effectively cross-examine L.S. at trial. He asserts
that defense counsel should have asked L.S. more questions about her statements to the
police and to the examining nurse. He also contends that defense counsel should have
elicited testimony that L.S. initiated or engaged with the sexual acts.
In its order denying postconviction relief, the postconviction court rejected this
argument, noting that “courts generally do not review a trial attorney’s strategy or tactics.”
It emphasized that cross-examining a victim is a “double-edged sword,” and a decision that
“only an attorney and their client can make because doing so could be just as perilous as
not doing so.” The postconviction court determined that “[t]here is nothing inherently
problematic” with a defense counsel’s choice not to vigorously cross-examine a victim and
concluded that the record lacked evidence to suggest that the decision in this case was not
reasonable. Accordingly, it concluded that Jonas had failed to allege sufficient facts to
demonstrate that defense counsel’s cross-examination of L.S. fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. We agree.
In evaluating the first prong of the Strickland test, an appellate court generally “will
not review an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim when the attorney’s conduct in
question is based on trial strategy.” Chavez-Nelson, 948 N.W.2d at 671; see also
Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004) (noting that appellate courts are poorly
10
placed to second- guess decisions of trial counsel). Trial counsel has wide latitude to
determine the best strategy for a client. Nicks , 831 N.W.2d at 506. Deciding what
testimony to elicit from a witness at trial is a matter of trial strategy. Leake v. State,
737 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Minn. 2007); see also King v. State, 562 N.W.2d 791, 796
(Minn. 1997) (recognizing that it is “a tactical decision not to dispute” witness testimony).
We are guided by the supreme court’s decision in State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676
(Minn. 2001). In Vick, the defendant asserted that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel because his attorney failed to vigorously cross-examine the victim in a
criminal-sexual-conduct case. Id. at 678. During the closing argument, the attorney
explained to the jury his justification for not aggressively questioning the victim, stating
that he “did not want to make it any more difficult than it was for her,” and therefore chose
not to “ask her ver[y] many questions.” Id. at 689. On appeal, the supreme court
determined that the defendant failed to show that his attorney’s actions were objectively
unreasonable. Id. The supreme court noted that counsel’s “decision was reasonable in
order to avoid creating sympathy for [the victim] and hostility toward [defendant] or his
attorney.” Id.; see also State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 43 (Minn. 1998) (concluding that
defense counsel’s decision not to cross-examine several state witnesses was a reasonable
trial tactic).
Based on our review of the petition as well as the files and record in this case, we
are satisfied that Jonas has failed to allege facts showing that defense counsel’s
cross-examination of L.S. fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Defense
counsel’s cross-examination of L.S. covers about eight transcript pages. The transcript
11
shows that defense counsel attempted to undermine L.S.’s credibility through a variety of
questions. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked L.S. about her alcohol
consumption at the bar. Counsel also asked about the break between the sexual assaults,
when L.S. went to the kitchen to get a glass of water for Jonas. L.S. acknowledged that
she walked by her front door when she went upstairs. She also testified that she went into
her bathroom after the first assault and nearly used an “SOS feature” on the side of her
phone, but did not actually call 911. Through this questioning, defense counsel attempted
to challenge L.S.’s credibility by suggesting that she had opportunities to leave her home
between the first and second attacks and could have called the police earlier from her
bathroom. Counsel’s decision to proceed along this line of questioning constitutes an
objectively reasonable trial strategy not to create sympathy for the victim, engender
hostility toward Jonas or his counsel, or risk alienating the jury. See Vick, 632 N.W.2d at
689.
Given the discretion afforded to trial counsel regarding strategy, we conclude that
Jonas’s argument regarding defense counsel’s cross-examination of L.S. fails to show that
his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. As such, the
postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jonas an evidentiary hearing
regarding counsel’s cross-examination of L.S.
B. Absence of a Motion to Suppress
Jonas also argues that his defense counsel’s representation was also ineffective
because counsel failed to seek suppression of pre-arrest statements made by Jonas at L.S.’s
home to law enforcement without first receiving a Miranda warning. He further contends
12
that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his petition without an
evidentiary hearing because the matter was “fact-specific” and a hearing was needed to
develop the record. Because the petition and files and records of the proceeding do not
support Jonas’s contention that a Miranda warning was required, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the postconviction court when it denied an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
To protect a defendant’s right against self -incrimination, the police must use
“procedural safeguards” when a suspect is subject to a custodial interrogation.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). This includes warning a suspect of the
right to remain silent. Id. Statements that a suspect makes during a custodial interrogation
without a Miranda warning are inadmissible at trial. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 30
(Minn. 2016). “An interrogation is custodial if, based on all the surrounding circumstances,
a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or she was in police
custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.” State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485,
491 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). Factors that suggest that an interrogation is
custodial include: (1) interviewing a suspect at a police station; (2) telling a person that he
is the prime suspect in a case; (3) the suspect making a significantly incriminating
statement; (4) officers restraining the suspect’s freedom; (5) the presence of multiple
officers; and (6) officers pointing a gun at the suspect. Id. Factors that indicate an
interrogation is not custodial include the suspect’s freedom to leave at any time, a
nonthreatening environment, and the suspect’s ability to make phone calls. Id. at 491-92.
“The test is not whether a reasonable person would believe he or she was not free to leave.”
State v. Champion, 533 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. 1995). Instead, the test is whether a
13
reasonable person would believe he or she was in police custody to the degree of a formal
arrest. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d at 491.
Here, the record and facts alleged in the petition support the postconviction court’s
determination that Jonas was not subject to a custodial interrogation when he spoke to the
officers after the assault. First, Jonas was not interviewed at a police station. Rather,
officers talked with Jonas at L.S.’s home. Next, officers did not tell Jonas that he was the
prime suspect in the case, and officers did not place him in handcuffs or physically restrain
him until after determining that a crime occurred. Furthermore, Jonas was free to make
phone calls and was on his cell phone with his mother when the police arrived. And he
continued to talk on the phone with his mother. While Jonas did make an incriminating
statement while on his cell phone with his mother—telling her that he was “going to jail”—
he did so freely and then hung up the phone. Finally, at no point did an officer point a gun
at Jonas. Taken together, the record and facts alleged in the petition reflect that the officers’
discussion with Jonas prior to his arrest did not constitute a custodial interrogation. See
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1984) (applying a totality- of-the-
circumstances analysis to determine whether a custodial interrogation occurred).
Our decision is further bolstered by caselaw providing that “‘[o]n-the-scene’
questioning, where the officers are simply trying to get a preliminary explanation of a
confusing situation, does not require a Miranda warning.” State v. Walsh,
495 N.W.2d 602, 604-05 (Minn. 1993). The postconviction court determined that officers
questioned Jonas when they arrived at L.S.’s home “because they needed to determine
whether a crime had in fact been committed.” The record supports this determination.
14
Officer B testified that when he received the emergency call from dispatch, he knew that
the victim was possibly calling from her bathroom and that it was “unknown if there was
a suspect still on scene.” He noted that officers “didn’t have a whole lot of information”
about what they were “going to come across” at the scene. Similarly, when Deputy V went
into L.S.’s home and saw Jonas, officers were still “trying to figure out what [was] going
on.” When Jonas asked if he could wash his hands, which had blood on them, Deputy V
responded, “not right now.” Deputy V then asked Jonas to sit down. He also asked Jonas
again how the blood got on Jonas and if Jonas was “bleeding somewhere.” Viewed in
context, the deputy’s questions were aimed at discovering what happened and the extent of
any injuries. We have previously recognized that a defendant was not in custody or subject
to interrogation when “officers’ questions were primarily an effort to sort out a confusing
situation involving multiple occupants encountered in different parts of the house.”
State v. Heinonen, 889 N.W.2d 817, 821-22 (Minn. App. 2017) (determining that the
defendant was not in custody, despite being briefly handcuffed and asked “routine”
questions, when officers were executing a search warrant and encountered a dog and
multiple occupants in the home), aff’d, 909 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. 2018).
Based on the totality of circumstances, we agree with the postconviction court that
the interview did not rise to the level associated with a formal arrest. Therefore, the
officers’ on-the-scene questioning of Jonas did not require a Miranda warning. As such,
counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by declining to move to suppress evidence
when an objective review shows that Jonas was not in custody when he made statements
against his interest and a motion to suppress would not have been successful. See
15
Johnson v. State, 673 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Minn. 2004) (noting that “[a] claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel may not rest on the failure of an attorney to make a motion that would
have been denied if it had been made”). For these reasons, we conclude that Jonas has not
met his burden on the first Strickland prong with regard to this claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In sum, the petition, files, and records of the proceeding conclusively show that
Jonas has not demonstrated that defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness with regard to either claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Because the first Strickland prong is determinative, we need not address the second
Strickland prong. See Leake v. State, 767 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 2009) (noting that an
appellate court “need not analyze both prongs if either one is determinative”). Therefore,
the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Jonas’s petition for
postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel without conducting an
evidentiary hearing.
II. Kidnapping Conviction
Jonas next argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his kidnapping
conviction because “the conduct underlying the kidnapping conviction was completely
incidental to the conduct underlying the criminal-sexual-conduct conviction.” Jonas’s
argument is based on the definition of kidnapping set forth in Minnesota Statutes section
609.25, subdivision 1(2), and supreme court precedent interpreting the scope of the offense.
“When a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim turns on the meaning of the statute under
which a defendant has been convicted, [appellate courts] are presented with a question of
16
statutory interpretation that [they] review de novo.” State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623,
625 (Minn. 2018). “Under the de novo standard, we do not defer to the analysis of the
[district court], but instead we exercise independent review.” Wheeler v. State,
909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018). “After deciding the meaning of the statute, [appellate
courts] apply that meaning to the facts to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
sustain the conviction.” State v. Bradley, 4 N.W.3d 105, 109 (Minn. 2024). Accordingly,
we first interpret the language of the kidnapping statute, as set forth in section 609.25,
subdivision 1(2), and then apply our interpretation of the statute to the facts of this case.
Under section 609.25 (2020), a defendant is guilty of kidnapping if the defendant
“confines or removes from one place to another, any person without the person’ s
consent . . . to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter.” Minn. Stat. §
609.25, subd. 1(2). But the supreme court has held that if “the confinement or removal of
the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a separate felony, it does not
constitute kidnapping.” State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d 19, 32 (Minn. 2003), over ruled on
other grounds by State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 2005). Conversely, if the
confinement results from “purposeful behavior in its own right,” it is not incidental.
State v. Earl, 702 N.W.2d 711, 723 (Minn. 2005).
Jonas argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his kidnapping conviction
because the conduct underlying the kidnapping conviction was completely incidental to the
conduct underlying the criminal-sexual-conduct convictions. He contends that he did not
confine or remove L.S. before the sexual conduct began and that any confinement “was
17
encompassed by the sexual assault.” Thus, he claims that the evidence does not support a
separate conviction for kidnapping. We agree.
Our analysis is guided by Smith, which instructs that the “confinement or removal
must be criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely incidental to the
underlying crime, in order to justify a separate criminal sentence.” 669 N.W.2d at 32. In
that case, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and murder in the first degree
while committing kidnapping after luring the victim to his home. Id. at 22-23. The victim
was briefly confined when a doorway was blocked during the attack. Id. at 23. The
defendant’s kidnapping-related murder conviction was overturned on appeal. The supreme
court reasoned that the victim “was confined only momentarily when [the co-defendant]
blocked the doorway and that confinement occurred only after the attack that culminated
in [the] murder was underway.” Id. at 32-33. Because this brief detention was “completely
incidental to the murder for which [Smith] was convicted,” the supreme court concluded
that there was insufficient evidence of confinement to constitute kidnapping and reversed
the kidnapping-related murder conviction. Id. at 33.
In State v. Welch, the supreme court again considered whether there was sufficient
evidence to support a separate kidnapping conviction when the victim was confined during
an attempted second- degree criminal-sexual -conduct offense. 675 N.W.2d 615, 620
(Minn. 2004). In that case, the defendant walked up to a woman in the park, threw her to
the ground, restrained her hands, slammed her head against the sidewalk, and started to
choke her before the crime was interrupted. Id. at 617. The defendant was convicted of
kidnapping and attempted criminal sexual conduct. Id. at 6 18. The supreme court
18
determined that there was insufficient evidence of confinement and removal to support the
kidnapping conviction, which was reversed. Id. at 621. Relying on Smith, the supreme
court reasoned that “the confinement that forms the basis of the kidnapping is the very
force and coercion that supports the attempted second- degree criminal sexual conduct
conviction.” Id. at 620.
Based on the standard articulated in Smith and applied in Welch, we conclude that
there is insufficient evidence to support Jonas’s kidnapping conviction because the
evidence of confinement that formed the basis of the kidnapping offense in this case is the
very evidence of force and coercion that supported the criminal-sexual-conduct conviction.
The evidence of confinement reflects that it occurred during the sexual assault. According
to L.S., Jonas began taking off her clothing when they arrived at her home. When she
began struggling to get away from Jonas, he held her arms down with his knees and then
bound her wrists together with a cord. Once L.S. was restrained, Jonas sexually penetrated
her. L.S. testified that Jonas untied her after this act. Later, Jonas bound L.S.’s wrists
together a second time and sexually assaulted her again. Jonas then released L.S. and she
ran to the bathroom to call the police. We acknowledge that L.S.’s confinement was not
as brief as that presented in Smith, in which the victim was only momentarily blocked from
leaving a room when the co-defendant stood in the doorway and placed his hands against
a wall. 669 N.W.2d at 23. But, as in Smith, Jonas’s confinement of L.S. occurred after the
offense was already underway.
Further, Jonas did not take additional, purposeful steps to confine or remove L.S.
from one place to another. Cf. State v. Juarez, 837 N.W.2d 473, 478, 484-85 (Minn. 2013)
19
(determining that dragging a victim over 200 feet from a bar to an alley to attempt to
sexually assault her was not “completely incidental to his criminal sexual conduct” because
the defendant’s acts constituted “culpable conduct separate and distinct from [the] criminal
sexual conduct”). And L.S. was not confined during the entirety of the evening but, rather,
was confined only during the course of conduct immediately leading up and during to the
sexual penetration. See Welch, 675 N.W.2d at 617 (describing restraint of victim directly
leading up to attempted sexual assault).
We therefore conclude that Jonas’s actions of confining L.S. by tying her wrists was
of a “subordinate nature” to the criminal sexual assault committed by Jonas. The American
Heritage Dictionary 888 (5th ed. 2011) (noting that “incidental” is commonly defined as
“[o]f a minor, casual, or subordinate nature”); see also State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485,
488 (Minn. 2016) (stating that when a statute does not define terms, a reviewing court may
“look to the dictionary definitions of those words and apply them in the context of the
statute” to discern their meaning). Because the act of tying L.S.’s wrists was part of the
course of conduct that culminated in the criminal sexual conduct of sexual penetration, we
necessarily conclude that it was subordinate and incidental to the criminal-sexual-conduct
offense itself.
We acknowledge the sensitivity of this issue and the unfortunate use of the term
“subordinate” to describe L.S.’s experience of being bound with a cord during the sexual
penetration. But the supreme court has explained that in cases such as this, imposing a
kidnapping conviction on top of another felony conviction would unfairly exaggerate the
criminality of the defendant’s conduct. Welch, 675 N.W.2d at 621; see also
20
State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 659-60 (Minn. 2006) (stating that “[i]f a kidnapping is
completely incidental to another offense and the imposition of a separate conviction for
kidnapping unfairly exaggerates the criminality of a defendant’s conduct, the kidnapping
conviction and sentence may be vacated”). To allow the kidnapping conviction to stand
under the facts presented here would unduly exaggerate the criminality of the
criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. We therefore reverse Jonas’s kidnapping conviction
and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate that conviction and sentence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.