In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: I. M. S., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0724

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
I. M. S., Parent.

Filed November 20, 2023
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-22-1045

Nicole S. Gronneberg, Adult Representa tion Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant-mother I.M.S.)

T.B., Brooklyn Center, Minnesota (pro se respondent-father)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mary M. Lynch, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minne sota (for respondent Hennepi n County Human Services
Department)

Julian Williams, Minneapolis, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Wo rke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district c ourt’s order for termination of parental
rights (TPR), arguing that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that TPR is
in the children’s best interests and considering evidence not admitted. We affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant-mother I.M.S. was the cu stodial parent of two children.
Respondent-father T.B. is the children’s adjudicated father. In September 2021, Hennepin
County Child Protection received a report that mother’s boyfriend had physically abused
the children. Earlier that month, mother had arranged for the children, ages four and five
years old, to live with their paternal grandmother. The children asked to remain living with
their grandmother because they were afraid of mother’s boyfriend.
On October 6, 2021, a ch ild-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition was
filed. That day, the children’s out-of-home placement was court-ordered; they continued
living with their paternal grandmother. In March 2022, the children were adjudicated
CHIPS. Respondent Hennepin County Huma n Services Department (the department)
created a reunification case plan for mother. Mother was required to obtain and maintain
safe and suitable housing, complete pare nting-assessment and domestic-abuse programs
and follow recommendations, and cooperate with the department. Pursuant to the CHIPS
adjudication, father was offered a voluntary case plan.
In May 2022, the department petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights. The
department alleged that despite its reasonable reunification efforts, mother failed to correct
the conditions requiring out-of-home placeme nt. Mother had no contact with the
department or the children since February 2022. The department believed that mother
moved to Chicago. The depart ment alleged that TPR was in the children’s best interests
because they could not be retu rned to mother in the foreseeable future, and they needed
permanency.
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On March 1, 2023, the district court he ld a trial on the TPR petition. The children
had been in court-ordered out-of-home placem ent for 511 days. On March 28, 2023, the
district court filed an order for TPR. The district court noted that it received by stipulation
certain exhibits limited to “case note entries by the [d]epartment detailing their own efforts,
and to the children’s reports of abuse.”
The district court found the social worker “credible and persuasive.” The district
court found that the children reported that mo ther’s boyfriend abused them. He hit them
with a “hard belt,” caused visible injuries to their backs, buttocks, and leg, and choked one
of the children. The district court also found that one child reported that mother physically
abused the children. The department had found that a preponderance of evidence showed
physical abuse committed by mother and mother’s boyfriend.
The district court did not find mother credib le. The district court found that mother
failed to comply with her case plan. Mother requested more time to work her case plan,
but the district court found that there was no evidence that mother was prepared to work
her case plan. The district court found that mother resides in another state, does not have
stable housing, and admitted that she could not take the children immediately.
The district court found father credible but gave his testim ony “limited weight”
because of his past relationship with mother , he was not represented by counsel, and he
appeared to be influenced by how the outcome could impact his parental rights. For
example, as the district cour t noted, when father was asked if he supported the TPR, he
initially testified that “he did not know how to answer.” The district court found that father
“suggested that he does not believe in [TPR] in general and that he wants his children to
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be placed with him permanently.” Father also testified that he had “significant concerns”
about the children returning to mother’s care.
The district court ruled that the depa rtment proved statut ory grounds for TPR—
abandonment, neglect of parental duties, palp able unfitness, failure to correct conditions
leading to out-of-home placement, and the ch ildren are neglected and in foster care. See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), (8) (2022).
The district court also ruled that TPR is in the children’s best interests. The district
court balanced the three relevant factors—mother’s interest in preserving the relationship,
the children’s interests in pr eserving the relationship, a nd competing interests of the
children. The district court noted that a competing interest is stability for the children, and
a relevant consideration is th e amount of time the childre n have been in out-of-home
placement. The district court gave “great we ight” to the children’s interest in having a
“stable caregiver and living in a home free of domestic violence and physical abuse.”
Mother moved for amended findings or a ne w trial. Mother sought to remove any
finding that she physically a bused the children, claiming that the district court’s finding
that she abused the children relied on “evidence that was not offered or received at trial.”
Mother also challenged the dete rmination that TPR is in th e children’s best interests,
claiming that the evidence did not support such finding.
The district court denied mother’s motio n for a new trial but amended its findings
to exclude references to reports that mother physically abused the children. Although
removing specific findings that mother abused the children, the district court retained the
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finding that the department “determined there was a preponderance of evidence to support
a finding of physical abuse of [one child] by [mother].” This appeal followed.
DECISION
Best interests
This court may affirm the district court’ s TPR order when at least one statutory
ground for TPR is supported by clear and convincing evidence, TPR is in the best interests
of the children, and the department has ma de reasonable reunifica tion efforts or those
efforts are not required . In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
2008); see Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022). Mother argues only that the evidence does not
show that TPR is in the children’s best interests.
When at least one statutory basis for TPR ex ists, the best interests of the children
are the paramount consideration. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2022). In considering
the children’s best interests, the district court “must balance three factors: (1) the
child[ren]’s interest[s] in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
in preserving the parent-ch ild relationship; and (3) any competing interest[s] of the
child[ren].” In re Welfare of Child of W.L.P. , 678 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. App. 2004)
(quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2 )(ii) (requiring district court to
make findings addressing these factors in TP R proceedings). Competing interests of the
children “include a stable environment, he alth considerations, and the child[ren]’s
preferences.” In re Welfare of Child. of M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730, 744 (Minn. App. 2013).
When reviewing TPR decisions, this court gives “[c]onsiderable deference” to the
district court because it is in a “superior po sition to assess the cred ibility of witnesses.”
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In re Welfare of Child of S.S.W. , 767 N.W.2d 723, 733 (Min n. App. 2009) (quotation
omitted); see also Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). This court will
not reverse a district court’s best-interests determination absent an abuse of discretion. In
re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn.
Jan. 6, 2012). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are
unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against
logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted).
Here, the district court balanced the three relevant factors. The district court stated
that the children had been in out-of-home placement for 511 days. The district court found
that the children have a competing interest in stability and gave “great weight” to the
children’s interest in having a “stable careg iver and living in a home free of domestic
violence and physical abuse.”
Mother argues that the district court fa iled to explain how TPR was necessary to
meet the competing interest that the children have in a stable home free of domestic abuse.
She claims that the children ar e currently in such an environment and will remain in that
environment if her parental rights were not terminated. She also claims that because
father’s rights were not terminated and cust ody was to be transferred to the children’s
paternal grandmother, there was no benefit to the children in terminating her rights because
they would not be free to be adopted.
But the record supports the district court’s determination. The district court ruled
that five statutory bases for TPR exist. The findings supporting these determinations also
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support the district court’s conclusion that TP R is in the children’s best interests. The
record shows that the ch ildren were abused while in mothe r’s care. Mother then left the
state and has had no contact with the children since February 2022. The social worker
testified that TPR was in the children’s best in terests because mother failed to engage in
the case plan and failed to demonstrate any desire to have a relationship with the children.
The district court found the social worker to be credible, and we must defer to that finding.
Mother’s main argument is that TPR was not necessary because father’s rights were
not terminated, and the children will not be adopted. But while adoption is something that
the district court may consider, see In re Welfare of J.M. , 574 N.W.2d 717, 723 (Minn.
1998) (discussing relationship between adoptability and TPR), the impo rtance of a stable
and safe environment was a strong factor for the district court to consider in this matter.
And mother’s and father’s situations are different. They are not married, and they do not
live together. The TPR proceeding related only to mother’s parental rights. Additionally,
the children were doing well in their grandmother’s care. Relative out-of-home placement
is preferred and should not be a reason to de lay a permanency procee ding. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that TPR is in the children’s best interests.
Evidence
Mother also argues that the district court relied on evidence th at was not admitted
to find that there was a preponderance of evidence supporting a finding that mother
committed physical abuse. Moth er claims that this finding is based on hearsay that the
parties agreed would be inadmissible. We review evidentiary rulings in a TPR trial for an
abuse of discretion. In re Child of Simon, 662 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Minn. App. 2003).
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At trial, the parties stipulated to the di strict court admitting certain exhibits with
limitations. The district court was to consider “statements made by [the social worker] for
her efforts and what she has done in the ca se” and “the statements of the children.”
Essentially, the district court could consider anything that was written directly by the social
worker but would disregard anything from a third party. For example, if a child commented
to the social worker and the social worker made a note, the district court could consider it.
But if a child made a comment to any other person and that person reported it to the social
worker, the district court could not consider it.
In its amended findings, the district c ourt stated that it would “remove from its
[o]rder any reference to the ch ildren’s statements of abuse . . . that were reported to the
[d]epartment by a third-party service provider.” But the district court retained a finding
that the department made a maltreatment determination agains t mother, as that
determination was “a statement by a [d]epartment social worker” and thus stipulated to by
the parties. As the district court concluded, the parties sti pulated that the district court
could consider statements made by the social workers. It was not an abuse of discretion
for the district court to consider statements made by the involved social workers.
Additionally, although the district c ourt found that the department made a
maltreatment determination, the district court’s TPR decision focused on mother’s
abandonment of the children, her neglect of her parental duties, her failure to correct
conditions leading to out-of-home placement, and the fact that the children are neglected
and in foster care. The district court gave we ight to the fact that the children had been in
out-of-home placement for over 500 days and mother had made no effort to see the children
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and did not work any part of her case plan . While the district court found that the
department found maltreatment, the district c ourt did not consider th is to be any more
important than mother’s abandonment of her children.
Mother also claims that the district c ourt impermissibly took judicial notice of
“prehearing reports and Guardian ad Litem reports in Court Files No. 27-JV-22-1045 and
27-JV-21-2263. . . . [And] Out of Home Plac ement Plans in these matters.” Mother
“requests that any findings attributed to [these] documents be excluded from the factual
record on appeal,” but she does not point to any finding based on these records. Without a
specific finding to review, we are unable to determine if the district court erred. Kroning
v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Minn. 1997) (stating that this court will
not grant new trial based on improper ev identiary ruling unle ss challenging party
demonstrates prejudicial error).
Affirmed.