The holding in the court’s own words
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Mammadzada’s mother’s out-of- pocket expenses were directly caused by Eggleston’s crime.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Ecker 524 N.W.2d 712
- State Ex Rel. Norgaard v. Tahash 110 N.W.2d 867
- State v. Gaiovnik 794 N.W.2d 643
- 974 N.W.2d 278 not in our corpus
- 991 N.W.2d 638 not in our corpus
- State v. Palubicki 727 N.W.2d 662
- State v. Boettcher 931 N.W.2d 376
- State of Minnesota v. Toby Earl Johnson 851 N.W.2d 60
- State v. Tenerelli 598 N.W.2d 668
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0734
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Erik Paul Eggleston,
Appellant.
Filed January 29, 2024
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-24827
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
∗
∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Erik Paul Eggleston pleaded guilty to the murder of Nigar Mammadzada, the mother
of his young daughter. The district court sentenced him to 480 months of imprisonment
and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $ 20,903. Eggleston challenges one
component of the restitution award : $3,460 for airfare expenses incurred by
Mammadzada’s mother so that she and Eggleston’s and Mammadzada’s daughter could
travel to Azerbaijan after the murder to be with relatives. We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Mammadzada’s mother’s out-of-
pocket expenses were directly caused by Eggleston’s crime. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Eggleston and Mammadzada had an on-again-off-again romantic relation ship,
which ended in October 2020. Eggleston and Mammadzada remained in contact because
they had one joint child, K.E., who then was two years old. Eggleston remained hopeful
that he would reconcile with Mammadzada. But in November 2020, Mammadzada told
Eggleston that she never would resume their romantic relationship.
On November 12, 2020, Mammadzada’s mother, R.V., found her dead body in the
basement of Mammadzada’s home. Mammadzada had been shot multiple times with a
shotgun. R.V. told police officers that Eggleston likely had killed Mammadzada.
Investigators soon found Eggleston and a vehicle containing a shotgun. Nearby,
investigators found a spent shotgun shell, a bag of mushrooms, and a cell phone. A
warranted search of the cell phone revealed that it belonged to Eggleston, that it was in the
3
vicinity of Mammadzada’s home on the date of her murder, and that it contained two
photographs of Mammadzada’s lifeless body.
The state initially filed a compla int charging Eggleston with second-degree
intentional murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2020). In May 2021,
the state obtained an indictment, which added a charge of first-degree premeditated murder,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2020).
The state and Eggleston entered into a plea agreement in April 2022. Eggleston
agreed to enter a Norgaard plea1 to the charge of second-degree intentional murder, and
the state agreed to dismiss the charge of first-degree premeditated murder. The parties also
agreed that the district court would impose a sentence of 480 months of imprisonment. At
the plea hearing, Eggleston stated that he did not remember Mammadzada’s murder
because he had ingested hallucinogenic mushrooms, but he agreed that there was a
substantial likelihood that a jury would find him guilty.
At sentencing, the district court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of 480 months
of imprisonment. The state requested additional time to submit restitution claims, and the
district court reserved the restitution issue for 90 days.
In July 2022, the district court filed an order requiring Eggleston to pay restitution
in the amount of $20,903, which included $3,460 for the expenses of R.V.’s and K.E.’s
1A defendant may be allowed to enter a Norgaard plea if he “claims a loss of
memory, through amnesia or intoxication, regarding the circumstances of the offense” and
“the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade the defendant and his or her
counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” State
v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994); see also State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash,
110 N.W.2d 867, 871-72 (Minn. 1961).
4
airfare for a trip to Azerbaijan after the murder. Eggleston filed objections and requested
a hearing.
The district court conducted a restitution hearing in January 2023. R.V. testified
that, after the murder, she was the sole caretaker of two-year-old K.E., who had separation
anxiety because of her mother’s murder and would not let R.V. “out of her sight.” R.V.
sought support from her eldest daughter, N.S., who lived in Azerbaijan. But N.S. was
unable to obtain a visa to enter the United States due to a pending petition for family
reunification. Also, long-distance travel would have been difficult for N.S. at that time
because she recently had given birth.
Consequently, R.V. and K.E. traveled to Azerbaijan in April 2021 so that family
members could grieve the loss of Mammadzada together and could discuss and decide who
would care for K.E. in the future. While in Azerbaijan, K.E. instantly bonded with N.S.
and began to see her as a mother figure. The trip to Azerbaijan lasted approximately four
months, which required R.V. and K.E. to renew their visas. R.V. and K.E. made a side trip
to Turkey for that purpose because Turkey had fewer visa-renewal restrictions. N.S. and
her infant child accompanied R.V. and K.E. to Turkey because K.E. would have had
difficulty being separated from N.S. R.V. and K.E. eventually returned to Minnesota in
August 2021.
In February 2023, the district court issued a second restitution order, which
overruled Eggleston’s objections and affirmed the July 2022 restitution order in all
respects. Eggleston appeals.
5
DECISION
Eggleston argues that the district court erred by ordering restitution with respect to
the expenses of R.V.’s and K.E.’s trip to Azerbaijan on the ground that the trip was not
directly caused by his crime. He does not challenge any other component of the restitution
award.
In Minnesota, restitution awards are governed primarily by statute. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 611A.04-.045 (2020); State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 646-52 (Minn. 2011). The
statute governing felony sentences authorizes a district court to impose a restitution
obligation in addition to a prison sentence or a fine. Minn. Stat. § 609.10 (2020); State v.
Beganovic, 974 N.W.2d 278, 287 (Minn. App. 2022), aff’d, 991 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 2023).
The “primary purpose” of restitution is “to restore crime victims to the same financial
position they were in before the crime. ” State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn.
2007). Accordingly, “A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the
disposition of a criminal charge . . . against the offender if the offender is convicted . . . .”
Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2020).
“A request for restitution may include, but is not limited to, any out-of-pocket losses
resulting from the crime . . . .” Id. In determining whether to order restitution and in what
amount, a district court must consider “(1) the amount of economic loss sustained by the
victim as a result of the offense; and (2) the income, resources, and obligations of the
defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a) (2020). Restitution may be ordered only
“for losses that are directly caused by, or follow naturally as a consequence of, the
defendant’s crime.” State v. Boettcher, 931 N.W.2d 376, 381 (Minn. 2019).
6
The state bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, “the
amount of loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense. ” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045,
subd. 3(a); see also State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Minn. 2014). If a victim has
sustained a loss, the district court has “significant discretion” to determine the amount of
restitution. State v. Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1999). This court applies an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s decision concerning an award
of restitution. Id. at 672.
In this case, the district court determined that the airfare expenses associated with
R.V.’s and K.E.’s trip to Azerbaijan were “a direct result of” Eggleston’s crime because
the trip “was seen as an important step in the grieving and closure process for a two -year-
old girl who had just lost her mother” and was “an important part of the process for the
family to determine how to best care for K.E. in the future.” The district court compared
R.V.’s travel expenses to the restitution claim in Palubicki, in which two surviving adult
children of a murder victim were awarded the expenses of their travel to Minnesota to
voluntarily attend the trial. 727 N.W.2d at 666-67.
Eggleston challenges the district court’s award of restitution for R.V.’s travel
expenses in three ways. First, he contends that the purpose of R.V. ’s and K.E.’s trip to
Azerbaijan is different from the purpose of the trip in Palubicki. The two purposes indeed
are different, but that does not foreclose a determination that R.V. ’s travel expenses were
directly caused by Eggleston’s crime. R.V.’s decision to travel to Azerbaijan with K.E.
was no less purposeful than the travel in Palubicki. Because Mammadzada had died,
Eggleston had been charged with her murder and was in custody, and other relatives of
7
Mammadzada lived outside the United States, R.V. had little choice but to arrange for
K.E.’s care by contacting family members in Azerbaijan. The district court was aware,
based on N.S.’s victim-impact statement at the earlier sentencing hearing, that K.E. had by
that time “accept[ed]” N.S. and her husband as her “mom and dad,” which indicates that
the trip to Azerbaijan accomplished one of its goals. Eggleston’s crime directly caused the
need for R.V. and K.E. to travel to Azerbaijan.
Second, Eggleston contends that his crime did not caus e R.V.’s travel expenses
because R.V. previously had planned to visit N.S. and her infant child in Azerbaijan. R.V.
testified that she was planning to travel to Azerbaijan—alone—in late November 2020 to
visit N.S. and her new child . But R.V. canceled those plans after Mammadzada was
murdered in mid-November 2020. R.V. made new plans to travel to Azerbaijan with K.E.
a few months later. The purpose of that trip was materially different—to grieve
Mammadzada’s death with family members, to introduce K.E. to them, and to facilitate a
decision about who would care for K.E. in the future. That a similar trip earlier was planned
but cancelled does not change the fact that the trip actually taken by R.V. and K.E. was a
direct result of Eggleston’s crime.
Third, Eggleston contends that R.V.’s and K.E.’s side trip to Turkey was not directly
caused by his crime. He asserts that “testimony at the restitution hearing did not establish
what visa issues R.V. and K.E. were experiencing, why the visa issues could not be
resolved in Azerbaijan, or why N.S. and [her infant] also needed to fly to Turkey when
they did not have any visa issues to resolve.”
8
The district court received testimony that, while R.V. and K.E. were in Azerbaijan,
they needed to renew their visas before they expired. For that reason, the side trip to Turkey
was necessary to facilitate R.V.’s and K.E.’s continued presence in Azerbaijan. One of the
state’s witnesses testified that it was better for R.V. and K.E. to renew their visas in Turkey,
where there were fewer restrictions on visa renewals. The witness did not elaborate on the
particular reasons why it was advantageous to renew the visas in Turkey, but her testimony
was unchallenged. Eggleston’s attorney had an opportunity to elicit additional evidence
about the side trip to Turkey but declined to conduct any cross-examination on that issue.
The evidence about the side trip to Turkey is sufficient to satisfy the state’s burden of
proving that those expenses were directly caused by Eggleston’s crime. See Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.045, subd. 3(a); Johnson, 851 N.W.2d at 65.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Eggleston to pay
restitution for the airfare expenses related to R.V.’s and K.E.’s trip to Azerbaijan.
Affirmed.