In the Matter of the Welfare of: D. L. W., Jr., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0741

In the Matter of the Welfare of:
D. L. W., Jr., Child.

Filed November 6, 2023
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Benton County District Court
File No. 05-JV-23-215

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant D.L.W. Jr.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Karl Schmidt, Benton County Attorney, Kathleen L. Reuter, Assistant County Attorney,
Foley, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
The state charged fifteen-year -old D.L.W. with second-degree intentional murder
for entering the apartment of a man who refused to sell him marijuana and fatally shooting
him. The district court certified the proceeding for adult prosecution after concluding that

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
the statutory factors supported certification and that the state proved by clear and
convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in juvenile court would not serve public
safety. In this appeal from that decision, we hold that the district court acted within its
discretion by certifying the proceeding for adult prosecution.
FACTS
According to a Benton County delinquency petition, fifteen-year -old D.L.W. and
three other males entered a Saint Cloud apartment building to buy marijuana from a
resident. D.L.W. went into the apartment alone while his companions waited in the
hallway. The resident refused to sell marijuana to D.L.W., and D.L.W. left the apartment
and so informed the others. The four males left the building, but D.L.W. and one of his
companions reentered while the other two remained outside in an SUV. D.L.W. alone
returned to the resident’s apartment while the other male waited in the hallway. D.L.W.
fired at least seven gunshots. His bullets entered the resident’s chest, abdomen, and arms,
killing him.
D.L.W. and the male who had reentered the building with him left the building.
Only D.L.W. got into the SUV to rejoin the two awaiting companions. The remaining male
went into an adjacent apartment building, where his mother resided, and he told her to call
for an ambulance. Inside the SUV, D.L.W. held a handgun and said that he had been
“standing over [the resident’s] body.” The male driving the SUV ordered D.L.W. to get
out. D.L.W. then exited the SUV, stripped down to a white t- shirt by removing his jacket
and sweatshirt, and ran away into a townhome.
3
The state charged D.L.W. with second- degree intentional murder and moved to
certify the proceeding for adult prosecution. The district court held a certification hearing
where it received evidence of D.L.W.’s prior delinquency history, attempts at rehabilitative
programming, and the options for future treatment in the adult and juvenile justice systems.
The evidence revealed that D.L.W. had developed an extensive delinquency record
over a very short period. His record included ten delinquency adjudications for very serious
offenses he committed on six occasions in just ten months, between August 2021 and April
2022. He had committed four felony offenses: motor vehicle theft; fleeing a police officer
in a motor vehicle; felony receipt of stolen property; and aiding and abetting simple
robbery. And he committed five misdemeanor offenses: misdemeanor receipt of stolen
property; misdemeanor driving while intoxicated; criminal damage to property; tampering
with a motor vehicle; and obstructing the legal process (a gross misdemeanor). The conduct
underlying these adjudications included violent behavior toward police and staff at his
school, as well as dangerous driving behavior.
The district court learned of D.L.W.’s substantial, unsuccessful programming
history. One of his delinquency adjudications had led the district court to order D.L.W. to
complete 90 to 120 days of secure correctional programming at Prairie Lakes Youth
Program, to comply with electronic monitoring, and to complete diagnostic and chemical-
dependency assessments. D.L.W. spent much of his time in the disciplinary room during
his stay in the Prairie Lakes Youth Program because he threatened or attempted to strike
staff and peers. Staff summoned police to the program because of D.L.W.’s threatening
behavior. D.L.W. bit one officer on the knee and punched another in the nose. Discharged
4
from Prairie Lakes, D.L.W. was placed at the East Central Regional Juvenile Center and
required to participate in its 15-to-30-day secure program. He was twice restricted to a
detention area for misconduct, and he responded to request denials rudely and
disrespectfully. He allegedly shot the victim in this case less than four months after he was
discharged from that program.
The district court considered the three primary programming and dispositional
options available to D.L.W. in the juvenile justice system. Retaining D.L.W. in the
traditional juvenile justice system would allow for supervision until he reached age
nineteen, 38 months after the certification order. Exercising extended juvenile jurisdiction
would allow for supervision until he reached age twenty-one, 62 months after the
certification order. By contrast, allowing prosecution for second-degree murder as an adult
could result in a presumptive 326-month sentence, including participation in the
department of correction’s Youthful Offender Program, behavioral therapy and counseling,
and secondary educational classes.
The district court certified the proceeding for adult prosecution, finding that all
public-safety factors favored certification. D.L.W. appeals.
DECISION
D.L.W. contests the district court’s order certifying the proceeding for his
prosecution as an adult. The district court’s decision whether to certify a proceeding for
adult prosecution is entitled to “considerable latitude,” In re Welfare of D.T.H., 572
N.W.2d 742, 744 (Minn. App. 1997) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19,
1998), and we will not reverse its decision unless we conclude that the decision reflects an
5
abuse of discretion, In re Welfare of J.H. , 844 N.W.2d 28, 34 (Minn. 2014). The district
court’s discretion is framed by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.125 (2022). When a child
older than fourteen commits an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult,
the controlling statute allows the district court to enter an order certifying the proceeding
for adult prosecution. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 1. When the child is younger than
sixteen, the state can secure adult prosecution only if it proves by clear and convincing
evidence that continuing in juvenile court disserves public safety. Id., subds. 2(6)(ii), 3. To
determine whether the public safety is served by certification, the court must consider six
factors:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;

(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
offense, including the level of the child’s participation in
planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any
mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines;

(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;

(4) the child’s programming history, including the child’s past
willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming;

(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available
in the juvenile justice system; and

(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Id., subd. 4. In honoring the district court’s wide discretion in its application of these
factors, we will accept its findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Welfare of
6
P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). We
are satisfied that the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and that it acted
within its discretion by certifying the proceeding for adult prosecution.
D.L.W. concedes that the first three factors favor certification for adult prosecution,
but he appears to suggest that the district court gave too much weight to factors two and
three. He implies that “the apparent impulsivity of this offense” supports the conclusion
that the district court weighted the culpability factor too heavily, and he says that the district
court’s order “exaggerate[s] the seriousness of his prior record” which should have been
deemed only “neutral” or as slightly favoring certification. We construe D.L.W.’s
argument as asking us to reweigh the evidence. That we will not do. See State v. Johnson,
568 N.W.2d 426, 435 (Minn. 1997). We instead consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the district court’s certification order. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 35. And the record
evidence of the contested second and third factors (D.L.W.’s culpability in the alleged
murder and his delinquency record) obviously supports the district court’s conclusions.
D.L.W. maintains that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the
final three factors support certification. He is wrong as to each factor.
As for D.L.W.’s efforts in prior programming, the record supports the district
court’s finding that, for the most part, D.L.W. refused to participate in treatment and had
“not benefitted from the tools offered to him through the programming and counseling
process.” Among other things, D.L.W.’s alleged shooting of the victim in this case within
four months of his programming makes the district court’s finding incontrovertible.
7
As to the final two factors, the district court’s findings that the punishment and
programming available in the juvenile system would be inadequate for D.L.W.’s alleged
offense and that the dispositional options available favor adult prosecution are similarly
well supported by the evidence. The district court recognized that the options available in
the juvenile justice system had already been shown insufficient to curb D.L.W.’s criminal
conduct, that the risk that D.L.W. would reoffend was high if he were merely placed on
probation in the juvenile system, that D.L.W.’s misconduct was clearly escalating, and that
the present offense was extremely dangerous. It determined that committing D.L.W. to the
department of corrections along with placement in the Youthful Offender Program would
constitute the best combination of programming and education while also protecting the
public from D.L.W.’s violent behavior. These findings are unassailable.
Affirmed.