A23-0893

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0761
A23-0893

In the Matter of Kathryn Marie Larson
On Behalf of Minor Child, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Keith Norman Marohn,
Appellant.

Filed February 12, 2024
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-FA-23-61

Kathryn Marie Larson, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Keith Norman Marohn, North Branch, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appellant-father challenges the district court’s
decision to grant respondent-mother’s petition on behalf of their child for an order for
protection (OFP) and to issue an OFP against him. Father appears to assert that the district
court’s decision was an abuse of discretion because the court: (1) failed to proceed under
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the juvenile-protection provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, which would have provided
him the assistance of counsel; (2) failed to apply the clear-and- convincing-evidence
standard; (3) misapplied the doctrine of collateral estoppel; (4) issued the OFP based on a
determination of domestic abuse that lacked sufficient evidentiary support; and
(5) erroneously admitted mother’s hearsay testimony. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Keith Norman Marohn (father) and respondent Kathryn Marie Larson
(mother) were married for more than 22 years. The parties had six children together. In
2016, father and mother divorced in Isanti County. In March 2023, mother petitioned Isanti
County district court for an OFP on behalf of the parties’ 11-year-old son, R.M.
In the petition, mother alleged that father called R.M. and threatened to beat him up
the next time they met. Mother reported the incident to the police. Mother also alleged that
father subsequently sent a text message to R.M. and that, when father gets angry, he has
told R.M. that “he will snap his neck.” Mother believed the domestic abuse would continue
because it began “around the year of 1991 and has continued through the years.” Mother
attached a screenshot of a text message to the petition; the text message reads, “I am too
scared to see you please do NOT come to the exchange today. [R.M.]” Mother also stated
that there was an active OFP, filed by mother against father, on behalf of the parties’
daughter.
The district court granted mother an emergency ex parte OFP and scheduled an
evidentiary hearing on the matter. Before that hearing, father filed a motion requesting that
the district court apply the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to the OFP proceedings
3
and moved the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on a separate petition for an OFP that
father had filed against mother. 1 The district court held a hearing on the motion. At the
hearing, father denied the conduct alleged in the OFP petition. Father informed the district
court that a separate court had denied his OFP petition and his request for a hearing thereon.
The district court declined father’s request to accept his OFP petition against mother “as a
crossclaim or a counterclaim” in the OFP proceedings mother had brought against father.
The district court also denied father’s request for application of the clear-and -
convincing-evidence standard of proof, and the court filed a memorandum and order
addressing the issue after the hearing. The district court determined that, because it was
bound by our precedential decision in Oberg v. Bradley, 868 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. App.
2015), the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof applied to the OFP
proceeding. Father filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s order regarding the
standard of proof (A23-0761).
Later, at an evidentiary hearing on mother’s OFP petition, both father and mother
testified and cross-examined each other. Mother testified that R.M. told her that he is afraid
of his father. She also stated that “[R.M.] has told me that he has received threats multiple
times of his dad snapping his neck. He is scared of being beaten up. He was scared when
those phone calls occurred between him and his dad.” Father denied the allegations and
introduced various exhibits, including screenshots of text messages between him and R.M.,
as well as audio recordings of his phone conversations with R.M.

1 At the motion hearing, father seemed to suggest that his separate OFP petition against
mother was based on his concerns that R.M. was “in danger” and was “being coerced.”
4
The district court issued the OFP, finding that, although “[father] offered various
exhibits,” “they did not outweigh [mother’s] sworn testimony outlining a history of, and
current incidence, of domestic abuse.” Father filed a notice of appeal from the district
court’s order granting the OFP (A23-0893).
Because father’s two appeals arise from the same proceeding and involve related
orders, this court consolidated them.
DECISION
Father appears to contend that the district court’s decision to grant mother’s petition
and issue the OFP was an abuse of discretion because the court: (1) failed to proceed under
the juvenile-protection provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, which would have guaranteed
him the assistance of counsel; (2) failed to apply the clear-and -convincing-evidence
standard of proof ; (3) misapplied the collateral estoppel doctrine; (4) issued the OFP
without sufficient evidentiary support; and (5) allowed the admission of hearsay evidence.
None of these arguments have merit, and we address each in turn below.
Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to grant an OFP for an abuse of
discretion. See Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018). The “district
court abuses its discretion when [the] decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or
is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted).
I. The district court did not err by proceeding under the Domestic Abuse Act.

Father “seeks to overturn precedent and have the court find that the juvenile-
protection provisions of the Juvenile Court Act apply when Domestic Abuse Act
proceedings involve allegations of domestic child abuse[.]” Father maintains that we
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should do so because he asserts that the Domestic Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01
(2022), and the juvenile-protection provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, Minn. Stat.
§§ 260C.001-.637 (2022), must be construed in pari materia, which is a canon of statutory
interpretation. “Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.” In re
Application of J.M.M., 937 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Minn. 2020).
The “related-statutes canon” of statutory construction, which deals with statutes that
are “in pari materia, is an extrinsic canon that applies only to ambiguous statutes.” State v.
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Lucas,
589 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 1999)). The canon also allows courts to construe “two statutes
with common purposes and subject matter . . . together to determine the meaning of
ambiguous statutory language.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
“The Domestic Abuse Act was enacted in 1979 to provide an efficient remedy for
victims of abuse as an alternative to other available legal remedies—such as criminal
charges, tort claims, or divorc e—which victims are sometimes reluctant, unable or
unwilling to use.” State v. Errington, 310 N.W.2d 681, 682 (Minn. 1981). “The Domestic
Abuse Act, as a remedial statute, receives liberal construction but it ‘may not be expanded
in a way that does not advance its remedial purpose.’” Sperle v. Orth, 763 N.W.2d 670,
673 (Minn. App. 2009) (quoting Swenson v. Swenson, 490 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn. App.
1992)). “It is a substantive statute which is complete in itself, carefully drafted to provide
limited types of relief to persons at risk of further abuse by other ‘family or household
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members,’ whether married or not.” Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Minn. 1992).2
“Nothing within the plain wording of the statute suggests that reference to any other statute
is necessary.” Id. And “[a]ny proceeding under” the Domestic Abuse Act “shall be in
addition to other civil or criminal remedies.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 16 (emphasis
added).
By contrast, the juvenile-protection provisions of the Juvenile Court Act address
matters concerning children in need of protection or services; permanency matters,
including termination of parental rights; postpermanency reviews; and adoption matters.
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 1(b). More specifically, “[t]he juvenile court has
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any alleged acts of domestic child abuse.” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.101, subd. 3. And the juvenile court has “original and exclusive jurisdiction”
in the following proceedings:
(1) the termination of parental rights to a child in
accordance with the provisions of sections 260C.301 to
260C.328;
(2) permanency matters under sections 260C.503 to
260C.521;
(3) the appointment and removal of a juvenile court
guardian for a child, where parental rights have been
terminated under the provisions of sections 260C.301 to
260C.328;
(4) judicial consent to the marriage of a child when
required by law;
(5) all adoption matters and review of the efforts to
finalize the adoption of the child under section 260C.317;

2 Although the holding in Baker was superseded by statute, the case is cited here only for
its discussion of the history and purpose of the Domestic Abuse Act. The Minnesota
Supreme Court reaffirmed this discussion of the purpose of the Act in Burkstrand v.
Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 211 (Minn. 2001).
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(6) the review of the placement of a child who is in
foster care pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement
between the child's parent or parents and the responsible social
services agency under section 260C.227; or between the child,
when the child is over age 18, and the agency under section
260C.229;
(7) the review of voluntary foster care placement of a
child for treatment under chapter 260D according to the review
requirements of that chapter;
(8) the reestablishment of a legal parent and child
relationship under section 260C.329; and
(9) juvenile court guardianship petitions for at-risk
juveniles filed under chapter 257D.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.101, subd. 2.

Father argues neither that the Domestic Abuse Act is ambiguous nor that the
juvenile-protection provisions of the Juvenile Court Act are ambiguous. And we discern
no relevant ambiguous language in either statute. As a result, the “related-statutes canon”
or in pari materia canon does not apply here. See Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 437.
Moreover, while this matter involves allegations of domestic abuse committed against a
child, it does not involve any of the proceedings described in the juvenile-protection
provisions of the Juvenile Court Act. We therefore conclude that the juvenile-protection
provisions of the Juvenile Court Act do not apply to this matter, and that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in applying the Domestic Abuse Act and proceeding thereunder.
As much as father has challenged the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, we
note that a petition for an OFP can be filed “in the court having jurisdiction over dissolution
actions, in the county of residence of either party, in the county in which a pending or
completed family court proceeding involving the parties or their minor children was
brought, or in the county in which the alleged domestic abuse occurred.” Minn. Stat.
8
§ 518B.01, subd. 3. The parties divorced in Isanti County in 2016. Under the Domestic
Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, mother filed the present petition for an OFP in Isanti
County. The record also reflects an active OFP against father that mother filed in Isanti
County on behalf of the parties’ daughter. Thus, because Isanti County is the county in
which pending or completed family court proceedings involving the parties or their minor
children were brought, we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to hear this
matter under the Domestic Abuse Act.
In addition to his argument that the juvenile-protection provisions of the Juvenile
Court Act should govern this case, father insists that the proceedings “[were] held without
notice of the right [to] counsel,” which violated his due process rights. Father provides no
citation to legal authority in support of this contention. “Appellate courts cannot presume
error by the district court . . . .” Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. App. 2022)
(citing Noltimier v. Noltimier, 157 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. 1968) (dismissing appeal
because of an inadequate record and stating that “[e]rror cannot be presumed”)) . Mere
assertions of error without supporting authority or argument are inadequately briefed and
are waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection. See State v. Andersen,
871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015).
Here, there is no prejudicial error obvious on mere inspection. Both the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the Minnesota
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to counsel during criminal
prosecution. The right to counsel is also guaranteed “in cases where lack of counsel could
well result in a deprivation of ‘life, liberty, or property without due process of law.’” Cox
9
v. Slama, 355 N.W.2d 401, 402 (Minn. 1984) (quoting U.S. Const., amend. V and XIV;
Minn. Const. art. I, § 7). Additionally, a parent has the right to effective assistance of
counsel in connection with proceedings in juvenile court, as provided by Minnesota
Statutes section 260C.163, subdivision 3. But there is no guarantee of the assistance of
counsel under the Domestic Abuse Act.
As a result, we conclude that the district court did not err by proceeding under the
Domestic Abuse Act.
II. The district court did not err by applying the preponderance -of-the-evidence
standard of proof.

Father appears to assert that the district court erred by declining to apply the clear-
and-convincing-evidence standard of proof. We disagree.
“‘Identification of the applicable burden and standard of proof presents questions of
law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.’” In re Substitute Teaching License
Application of Yanez, 983 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Minn. App. 2022) (quoting C.O. v. Doe, 757
N.W.2d 343, 352 (Minn. 2008)). The Domestic Abuse Act does not identify the standard
of proof required for the district court to issue an OFP. But in Oberg, this court held that
Minnesota Statutes section 518B.01, subdivision 11(b), “implies the requirement that a
petitioner must meet the . . . preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to obtain an OFP.”
3
868 N.W.2d at 64. “The district court, like this court, is bound by supreme court precedent

3 Subdivision 11(b) governs vacating or modifying an OFP and provides that a respondent
named in an OFP “has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that there
has been a material change in circumstances” and that the conditions the court relied on in
granting the OFP “no longer apply and are unlikely to occur.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01,
subd. 11(b).
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and the published opinions of the court of appeals . . . .” State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763,
767 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).
Here, the district court applied the standard of proof identified in a precedential
opinion of this court by requiring that mother prove her OFP petition by a preponderance
of the evidence. For that reason, the district court did not err in applying the preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard.
III. The district court did not apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Father appears to claim that the district court erred by misapplying the collateral
estoppel doctrine in refusing to allow him to proceed on his OFP petition against mother
“as a crossclaim or a counterclaim.” Father posits that this alleged error amounts to a denial
of his equal protection rights. We are not persuaded.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars parties from making the court redecide
issues that were actually litigated or decided in a prior action. See Mower Cnty. Hum. Servs.
v. Graves, 611 N.W.2d 386, 389 (Minn. App. 2000) (citing Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch,
Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. 1990)). Rather than misapplying the doctrine of
collateral estoppel in this case, the district court did not apply collateral estoppel at all.
During the proceedings on mother’s OFP petition against father, in his motion for
application of the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, father also moved the court to
hold an evidentiary hearing on his separate petition for an OFP against mother. As an initial
matter, we note that whether mother allegedly committed acts of domestic abuse against
R.M. was not identical to whether father committed acts of abuse against R.M. Thus, in
deciding whether to grant mother’s OFP petition on behalf of R.M., the district court was
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not redeciding issues that were actually litigated or decided in the prior proceedings on
father’s separate petition for an OFP against mother. This means that collateral estoppel
was entirely inapposite to this case in the first instance.
But more importantly, father admitted that a separate court had denied his OFP
petition against mother, as well as his request for a hearing in that separate proceeding.
Accordingly, the district court declined father’s request to “accept” his petition against
mother “as a crossclaim or a counterclaim” in this case. The district court’s decision was
not based on an application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, but rather on the district
court’s appropriate adherence to established procedure. Nowhere in the Domestic Abuse
Act is there a statutory right for a respondent to bring a separate OFP petition as a cross-
claim or a counterclaim against the petitioner. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01. If father wished
to pursue his petition for an OFP against mother, he needed to appeal the separate court’s
apparent denial of his petition and hearing, just as he appealed the district court’s decision
to grant the OFP in this matter. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03; cf. Dieseth v. Calder
Mfg. Co., 147 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. 1966) (stating that “[e]ven though the decision of
the [district] court in the first order may have been wrong, if it is an appealable order it is
still final after the time for appeal has expired”); Johnson v. Johnson, 902 N.W.2d 79, 83
(Minn. App. 2017) (citing this aspect of Dieseth). As a procedural matter, no cross-claim
or counterclaim was available to father in this case.
We conclude that the district court did not apply the collateral estoppel doctrine
when it declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on father’s separate OFP petition against
12
mother. Thus, father has not shown that the district court erred in doing so, nor has he
demonstrated that the district court otherwise violated his equal protection rights. 4
IV. The district court’s decision to issue the OFP was not an abuse of discretion.

Father appears to argue that the district court abused its discretion because the record
as a whole does not support the court’s determination that father inflicted fear of imminent
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, upon R.M. The record defeats this claim.
The statutory definition of domestic abuse includes the infliction of fear of imminent
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, when committed against a family or household
member by a family or household member. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(2). Any
family or household member may petition for an OFP. See id., subd. 4(a). Family or
household members include spouses and former spouses, parents and children, and persons
related by blood. See id., subd. 2(b)(1)-(3). The petition must allege the existence of
domestic abuse and include an affidavit stating the facts from which relief is sought. See
id., subd. 4(b).
The Domestic Abuse Act “requires either a showing of present harm or an intention
on the part of [the actor] to do present harm.” Aljubailah v. James, 903 N.W.2d 638, 643
(Minn. App. 2017) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). “The petitioner must show
the existence of the requirements for granting an OFP by a preponderance of the evidence.”

4 Father suggests that if the parties’ genders were reversed, the district court would have
ruled differently. To the extent that father’s conclusory contention that district courts
generally engage in gender-discrimination in adjudicating OFP petitions is an equal
protection claim, it lacks supporting authority, is inadequately briefed, and is therefo re
waived because no prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection of the record before us.
See Butler, 977 N.W.2d at 873; Andersen, 871 N.W.2d at 915.
13
Id. Once the petitioner establishes domestic abuse, “the district court may examine all of
the relevant circumstances proven to determine whether to grant or deny the petition for an
OFP.” Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 500 (holding that the court of appeals erred when it
concluded, as a matter of law, that a “finding of past domestic abuse alone is insufficient
to support the issuance of an OFP without a showing of a present intent to cause or inflict
fear of imminent physical harm” (quotation omitted)). Relevant circumstances include “the
timing, frequency, and severity of any alleged instances of domestic abuse, along with the
likelihood of further abuse.” Id . (quotation omitted). On appeal from a district court’s
decision to grant an OFP, “[a]n appellate court will neither reconcile conflicting evidence
nor decide issues of witness credibility.” Aljubailah, 903 N.W.2d at 643 (quotation
omitted).
In the petition in this case, mother alleged that father called R.M. and threatened to
beat him up the next time they met. Mother included with her petition a screenshot of a text
message from R.M. to father; it reads, “I am too scared to see you please do NOT come to
the exchange today. [R.M.]” The parties share joint custody of R.M., and mother testified
that, in a two-week period, father had physical custody of R.M. for six days. Because the
petition alleged the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault
against a child by a parent, the petition alleged domestic abuse as defined by the Domestic
Abuse Act.
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court considered the domestic abuse acts
alleged in the petition, past acts of domestic abuse committed by father, and the relevant
circumstances. Mother testified about the domestic abuse acts alleged in the petition, i.e.,
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that father had threatened to beat R.M. up and snap his neck. Mother stated the petition
alleged domestic abuse as defined by the Domestic Abuse Act because R.M. was scared
by the threats and “didn’t want to see his dad because he didn’t feel safe.” When the district
court asked whether there were any other instances of physical abuse by father directed
towards R.M. or herself, or others in the home, mother testified: “Yes. We have been hit.
We have been verbally threatened quite a lot. Some of them have been spanked. I think we
all have been spanked . . . [h]e’s been on top of them. He’s beat on them. He’s pinned them
to the ground.” Mother also reported a 2016 OFP proceeding against father that also
involved R.M. According to mother, she filed the 2016 OFP petition after “[father] dropped
R.M. on a kitchen table, and [R.M.] fell to the floor, and he was slammed up against a
wall.” Mother testified that R.M. was five or six years old at the time.
While father conceded that he had “spanked” his other children in the past, he denied
ever spanking R.M. But, along with the motion father filed prior to the evidentiary hearing
in this case, father submitted an affidavit he had signed, in which he admitted that a court
had found in a 2018 case that he had abused R.M. Father also introduced Exhibit 204, an
audio recording of a March 2023 conversation between father and R.M. During the
recording, father confirms that R.M. is coming to see him, and states: “It’s gonna be a hard
night, I think you know that.” Father warns R.M. that a “spanking is coming” and “probably
some groundings.” Near the end of the recording, father reiterates that he plans to spank
R.M. as well as ground him, but prefaces the warning with, “I don’t want to scare you.”
R.M. then responds and asks father not to come to the visitation exchange because he wants
to spend more time with his mother.
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Based on the record, the district court determined that, although “[father] offered
various exhibits, . . . they did not outweigh [mother’s] sworn testimony outlining a history
of, and current incidence, of domestic abuse.” The district court also found that father made
“several inconsistent statements during the hearing” and that father’s arguments about the
importance of corporal punishment were “outweighed by [mother’s] consistent testimony
that [father] has previously . . . abused the children both physically and emotionally.” The
district court determined that mother offered credible testimony that father “used excessive
physical punishments on their other children that exceed ‘spankings.’” Finally, the district
court acknowledged that R.M.’s sister had an active OFP against father “due to physical
injury that was extended due to [father’s] failure to comply with the order.”
Even if the district court had based its decision on past acts of domestic abuse alone,
it would not have abused its discretion. See Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 500. Here, however,
not only did the district court consider past acts of domestic abuse by father, but it also
considered the facts alleged in the petition, and all the other relevant circumstances. The
district court ultimately determined mother’s testimony was more credible than that of
father, and the district court concluded that R.M. was entitled to relief. That being the case,
we “will neither reconcile conflicting evidence nor decide issues of witness credibility.”
Aljubailah, 903 N.W.2d at 643. The district court’s decision to issue the OFP was not based
on an erroneous view of the law, nor was it a decision that went against logic and the facts
in the record. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
deciding to issue the OFP.
16
V. The district court did not commit prejudicial error by admitting mother’s
hearsay statements.

Finally, father appears to contend that the district court committed prejudicial error
by admitting mother’s hearsay testimony. This argument is unavailing.
“The Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply to domestic abuse hearings.” Olson v.
Olson, 892 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. App. 2017). “Rulings on the admissibility of evidence
lie within the district court’s discretion, and this court will not disturb an evidentiary ruling
unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or is an abuse of that discretion.”
Aljubailah, 903 N.W.2d at 644. “An appealing party bears the burden of demonstrating
that an evidentiary error resulted in prejudice.” Olson , 892 N.W.2d at 842 (citation
omitted). “An evidentiary error is prejudicial if it might reasonably have influenced the
fact-finder and changed the result of the proceeding.” Id.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement, made by a declarant, that is offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. See Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Generally, hearsay statements
are inadmissible at trial, unless an exception exists. See Minn. R. Evid. 802.
Mother’s testimony about the threats father made to R.M. included out-of-court
statements made by R.M., a declarant, that mother offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, i.e., that father inflicted fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault
on R.M. These hearsay statements do not appear to fall under any exception. But even if
mother’s testimony included otherwise inadmissible hearsay, father has not shown that
such error was prejudicial.
17
In Olson, this court held that, “[b]ecause the only evidence of appellant’s alleged
domestic abuse [was] the inadmissible hearsay statements in [mother’s] petition and
affidavit, the evidentiary error of considering [those] statements changed the outcome of
the hearing and prejudiced [father].” 892 N.W.2d at 842. By contrast, the evidence of
father’s domestic abuse here went far beyond any inadmissible hearsay statements. Mother
testified not only about the conduct alleged in the petition, but past acts of abuse committed
by father, including the active OFP filed by mother against father on behalf of the parties’
daughter, as well as an OFP she filed in 2016 against father on behalf of R.M. Mother also
testified about R.M.’s decision to send a text message to father after father made the March
2023 call to R.M. that caused R.M. to fear physical abuse. The district court also heard the
recording of the March 2023 call and testimony from both parties about the level of the
“spankings” father had subjected the children to in the past. As discussed above, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in determining based on all the evidence that mother’s
testimony was more credible than father’s version of events. Given the record before us,
we conclude that father has not carried his burden of demonstrating that any evidentiary
error might reasonably have influenced the district court and changed the result of the
proceeding. See id.
In sum, because the district court’s decision to grant the OFP in this case was not
based on an erroneous view of the law or against logic and the facts in the record, we
discern no abuse of discretion. See Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 500.
Affirmed.