State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0801

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rodney Owen Scofield,
Appellant.

Filed March 11, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-K8-01-000301

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Jillian M. Skaar, Assistant County Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Max A. Keller, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Cleary, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from an order revoking probation and executing a 54-month stayed
sentence, appellant Rodney Owen Scofield argues that (1) the district court failed to make
the required findings; (2) the record does not support revoking probation and executing his
stayed sentence; (3) the district court violated his due-process rights by relying on evidence
outside the record and on unsworn statements made by the probation officer; and (4) the
district court erred by imposing a second, consecutive 21-month sentence because that
sentence had already been imposed, executed, and satisfied. Because the district court did
not abuse its discretion by revoking probation, we affirm the execution of Scofield’s stayed
54-month sentence. But, because the 21-month sentence was already executed and served,
we reverse that sentence and remand with instructions to vacate it.
FACTS
In 2001, respondent State of Minnesota charged Scofield with four counts of
criminal sexual conduct, including two counts of first- degree criminal sexual conduct and
two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The state alleged that, between 1995
and 2000, Scofield, a youth leader at a church, had engaged in sexual contact with two
minors who participated in choir at the church.
Scofield entered into a plea agreement under which he pleaded guilty to the two
counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct—counts three and four—in exchange for
dismissal of the first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct charges. In January 2002, the district
3
court sentenced Scofield to an executed term of 21 months in prison on count three and to
a stayed term of 54 months in prison on count four, placing him on probation for 25 years.
Scofield’s conditions of probation prohibited him from having “contact with minor
males directly or indirectly on an unsupervised basis” and from “purchas[ing] or
possess[ing] sexually explicit pictures, magazines, or videotapes.” In 2004, the conditions
were amended to prohibit Scofield from having “any contact directly or indirectly with
minors.” In 2012, that condition was amended to allow Scofield to have contact with his
newborn son.
In October 2022, the probation department filed a probation-violation report
alleging that Scofield had violated the conditions of his probation by having contact with
minors other than his biological son and by possessing sexually explicit material. At the
probation-revocation hearing, Scofield admitted that he violated the conditions of his
probation. The state recommended that Scofield’s stayed sentence be executed. Scofield
argued for continued probation. The district court decided to revoke probation and executed
Scofield’s stayed 54-month sentence on count four. The district court also imposed a
consecutive sentence of 21 months in prison on count three.
Scofield appeals.
DECISION
Scofield challenges the revocation of probation and execution of his stayed sentence
on count four. Additionally, Scofield challenges the imposition of a sentence on count
three. As explained below, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
4
in revoking probation on count four. But we agree with S cofield (and the state) that the
district court erred by imposing a sentence on count three.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking probation and
executing Scofield’s stayed sentence.

“The [district] court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). “A district court abuses
its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted).
Before a district court revokes probation, the court must find that (1) a designated
specific condition or conditions were violated, (2) the violation was intentional or
inexcusable, and (3) the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.
Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. When making the required Austin findings, the court “must
seek to convey [its] substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.” State
v. Modtland , 695 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2005). Whether the district court made the
required Austin findings is a question of law, which appellate courts review de novo. Id. at
605.
1

1 The state asserts that the de novo standard of review does not apply here “because the
district court did make each specific Austin finding on the record.” But Scofield argues that
“the district court failed to make the findings required by Austin,” which, again, is subject
to de novo review.
5
A. The district court made the required Austin findings.

Scofield does not dispute that the district court made the first Austin finding—that
a designated specific condition or conditions were violated —but argues that the district
court failed to make the second and third Austin findings.
Scofield first asserts that “the district court . . . did not find that the violations were
intentional or inexcusable.” As the state points out, however, after Scofield admitted to the
alleged violations, the district court explicitly found that the violations were intentional and
inexcusable.
THE COURT: And as part of the terms of your probation[,]
. . . you were not to possess any sexual explicit material. Also
true?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Is it true that on September 6, 2022, probation
had received a forensic report from your, looks like your
computer, your iCloud account, that you had possessed and
accessed sexually explicit images/videos from the Internet?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And on September 22, 2022, you admitted to
probation that you possessed and accessed that information
without probation’s approval or knowledge?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And it also indicates that . . . you failed
to not have contact with any minor children other than your
biological son. It indicates that a forensic report showed
images of minor children at your residence on a trampoline.
And that on September 22, 2022, you admitted to probation
. . . that you had taken pictures of the children on the
trampoline and you knew that that was a violation of your
probation, correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: I do find intentional violation without excuse.
6

Scofield next contends that “the district court did not find that the need for
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” The third Austin finding requires
the district court to “balance the probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s interest
in insuring his rehabilitation and the public safety.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 606-07
(quotation omitted). “The purpose of probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be
used only as a last resort when treatment has failed.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250.
The third Austin factor may be satisfied by a finding of any of three subfactors:
“(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the
offender; or (ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively
be provided if he is confined; or (iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation
omitted).
The district court did not explicitly state that the need for confinement outweighed
the policies favoring probation. Nonetheless, the district court made that finding because it
found that the first and third Modtland subfactors were satisfied. Specifically, the district
court stated:
So you having admitted these violations, I do believe
the Austin factors are met. I do believe that confinement is
necessary to protect the public. I don’t believe that you just
have a trampoline in your yard just for fun. You’re enticing to
have children come over there and even though you’re not
standing there with them you’re watching them from far away
just like you’re watching these videos of children being
molested. And to say that you just forgot that they were on
there when there’s thousands of pictures on here of children
being taken advantage of. Of the names of victims that we will
7
never know, and your own child you victimized, your own
child in a position of trust.

I do find that prison is necessary to protect the public.
These are not little violations. I think it would unduly
appreciate [sic] the seriousness of these violations to not
impose a prison sentence.

The record demonstrates that the district court made all the required Austin findings.
B. The record supports revoking probation and executing Scofield’s stayed
sentence.

Scofield contends that the district court clearly erred and abused its discretion by
revoking probation and executing his stayed sentence. He makes two arguments.
First, Scofield argues that “the district court made several erroneous, unsupported
findings about [him] with no basis in the record.” Specifically, Scofield challenges the
district court’s statements regarding his possession of images. He first points to the district
court’s statement that he was “watching . . . videos of children being molested.” In the
probation-violation report, the probation department discussed a forensic report that it
received in September 2022 regarding the contents of Scofield’s online cloud storage
account. The forensic report, according to the probation-violation report, showed that
Scofield had possessed sexually explicit images, including a photo of child pornography
and videos with titles suggesting that Scofield searched for images relating to the sexual
exploitation of children. Scofield admitted to the probation department that he had
possessed and accessed sexually explicit images from the internet. The record supports the
district court’s statement that Scofield was “watching . . . videos of children being
molested.”
8
Scofield also points to the district court’s comment about his online cloud storage
account where the district court stated that “there’s thousands of pictures on here of
children being taken advantage of.” According to the probation- violation report, the
forensic report showed that Scofield’s online cloud storage account contained “thousands
of images” of his son in the bathtub. During the probation-violation hearing, a probation
officer explained that the “thousands [of] images” of Scofield’s son included “[v]ideos that
could be interpreted as multiple images.” The district court reviewed the forensic report
during the hearing.2 After the district court viewed several images of Scofield’s son in the
forensic report, the district court described some of the images as “disturbing.” The forensic
report also showed that Scofield had possessed a photo of child pornography and images
of four “boys” appearing partially nude. The record supports the district court’s description
of the images in Scofield’s online cloud storage account as “thousands of pictures . . . of
children being taken advantage of.”
Second, Scofield appears to argue that the violations did not establish that the need
for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. He points out that, while he
was on probation, he maintained stable housing and employment, earned a master’s degree,
and volunteered in the community. He also asserts that he had been on probation for 20
years at the time of the violations and that he had not looked at pornography online for 10
to 15 years. But an appellate court may not reweigh evidence when reviewing a district
court’s factual determinations. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 -

2 As further discussed below, the forensic report was not made part of the record.
9
22 (Minn. 2021). We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination
here.
The record supports the district court’s revocation of probation and execution of
Scofield’s stayed sentence.
C. The district court did not violate Scofield’s due-process rights.

Scofield argues that the district court violated his due- process rights by relying on
the forensic report and on unsworn statements made by the probation officer during the
probation-revocation hearing. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the
state from depriving a criminal defendant of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7.
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.04 sets forth the procedures to be
followed to ensure that a defendant enjoys his due-process rights under Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), before probation is revoked. Generally, a revocation hearing
must be held to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
violated a condition of probation and, if so, whether the circumstances warrant revocation.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subds. 2(1)(c)(b), 3(1). But, when the defendant waives his right
to a “contested hearing,” he waives his right to have adequate evidence of the violation
presented. State v. Xiong, 638 N.W.2d 499, 503 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 16, 2002). The defendant’s waiver “serves as a stipulation to the state’s allegations in
the violation report” and “the district court may base its finding on the violation report and
the [defendant’s] waiver.” Id.
10
Scofield waived his right to a contested hearing. He therefore waived the
requirement that the state present clear and convincing evidence of the allegations in the
probation-violation report. But Scofield argues that the district court should not have relied
on the forensic report and on unsworn statements made by the probation officer to make
findings of fact relating to his arguments for continued probation.
At the probation-revocation hearing, Scofield, after admitting to the probation
violations, disputed three of the allegations in the probation- violation report. First, he
claimed that the images of his son in the bathtub were not sexual in nature. The district
court viewed several images of Scofield’s son in the forensic report and stated that it
disagreed with Scofield’s claim. The probation-violation report described the images of
Scofield’s son in the forensic report that the district court viewed.
Second, Scofield denied that a video camera in his son’s bedroom showed the
changing area in the room. In the probation- violation report, the probation department
alleged that Scofield had a video camera in his son’s bedroom with “a panoramic view of
the . . . room,” including the “changing area.” The district court asked the probation officer
about the camera’s view, and the probation officer stated that the camera showed “a
panoramic view of the room.” The district court concluded that the camera would show
Scofield’s son changing in his room.
Third, Scofield contended that he did not save the sexually explicit material to his
devices. The probation-violation report set forth the allegation that, when the probation
department asked Scofield if there was anything on his devices that might jeopardize his
11
probation, Scofield denied any wrongdoing or improper use of the devices. The probation
officer repeated this allegation to the district court.
Scofield’s argument that his due-process rights were violated is unconvincing. The
probation-violation report was part of the record. The forensic report that the district court
reviewed was described in the probation-violation report, and the statements made by the
probation officer at the hearing repeated information that was also contained in the
probation-violation report. In these circumstances, we see no violation of Scofield’s due
process rights in the district court’s review of the forensic report and its consideration of
the unsworn statements made by the probation officer during the probation-revocation
hearing.
II. The district court erred by imposing a sentence for an offense that had been
previously sentenced.

Scofield and the state agree that the district court erred by imposing a consecutive
sentence of 21 months in prison on count three because he had already served that
previously imposed and executed sentence. The double-jeopardy clauses of the United
States and Minnesota Constitutions protect criminal defendants from multiple punishments
for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. The record
demonstrates that, in January 2002, the district court sentenced Scofield to an executed
term of 21 months in prison on count three. The district court therefore erred by imposing
another sentence on count three. We reverse the 21-month sentence on count three and
remand to the district court to vacate the sentence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.