A23-0816 A23-0817

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0815
A23-0816
A23-0817

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
D. D. R., f/k/a D. D. N., X. M. B., and Any Unknown Father, Parents.

Filed January 29, 2024
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-JV-23-758, 73-JV-23-759, 73-JV-23-2321

Kimberly Stommes, Jeddeloh Snyder Stommes, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant-
mother D.D.R.)

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Elizabeth A. Lee, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent Stearns County Human Services)

Lori Hanson, Albany, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In these consolidated termination-of-parental-rights appeals, appellant-mother
D.D.R. challenges the district court’s default orders terminating her parental rights to her
three children. Mother argues that the record does not support the district court’ s
determinations that (1) there is a statutory basis for termination of mother’s parental rights,
2
(2) respondent Stearns County Human Services (the county) made reasonable efforts
toward reunification, and (3) termination of mother’s parental rights is in the children’s
best interests. Additionally, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying her motion to vacate the default orders and that her attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in terminating mother’s parental rights or in denying her motion to vacate the
default orders, and because mother has not established that she received ineffective
assistance of counsel, we affirm.
FACTS
Mother and deceased father X.M.B.1 are the parents of two minor children, aged 2
(child 1) and 1 (child 2), and mother is also the parent of a third child, aged 9 months
(child 3). Following a default proceeding, t he district court terminated mother’s and
father’s rights to child 1 and child 2 and terminated mother’s rights to child 3. 2 Mother
challenges the termination of her parental rights to the three children. 3 Before turning to
mother’s arguments, we briefly summarize the facts.

1 X.M.B. passed away in August 2023, and his parental rights are not at issue in this appeal.

2 The county was unable to identify the father of child 3 during the child -protection
proceedings and characterized him as an unknown person.

3 The district court issued three separate orders in three different case files terminating
mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed the district court’s orders in each file, and we
consolidated the appeals. Appellate file A23-0815 is the appeal of the district court’s order
in district court file 73-JV-23-758 terminating mother’s parental rights to child 2, appellate
file A23-0816 is the appeal of the district court’s order in district court file 73-JV-23- 759
terminating mother’s parental rights to child 1, and appellate file A23-0817 is the appeal
of the district court’s order in district court file 73-JV-23 -2321 terminating mother’s
3
Mother has an extensive history of involvement with child protection in North
Carolina related to her substance abuse and other issues, including domestic violence. She
has six children in North Carolina, mostly of unknown ages, and she has “signed away her
parental rights” to these children.
In Minnesota, the county became involved with mother in March 2021 on the birth
of her seventh child—child 1. Child 1’s cord blood tested positive for methamphetamine
and amphetamine , and mother also tested positive for methamphetamine. Child 1 was
placed in nonrelative foster care following an emergency protective-care hearing. The
county soon petitioned the district court to adjudicate child 1 as being in need of protection
or services (CHIPS). Child 1 was adjudicated CHIPS in April 2021. Mother was assigned
a case manager, who developed a case plan that required mother to participate in chemical-
dependency treatment, among other things. Although mother initially struggled to achieve
sobriety, she completed inpatient treatment. Following a trial home visit, child 1 was
returned to mother’s care in December 2021.
In March 2022, mother gave birth to child 2. Child 2’s cord blood tested positive
for methamphetamine. When confronted with her positive toxicology test results, m other
admitted to using methamphetamine approximately five days before child 2’s birth.
Based on mother’s relapse, child 1 was returned to nonrelative foster care. And
when child 2 was discharged from the hospital, child 2 was placed in foster care with

parental rights to child 3. Because the district court’s orders are identical in some respects,
we occasionally refer to them collectively.
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child 1. The county petitioned to adjudicate child 2 CHIPS. In May 2022, child 2 was
adjudicated CHIPS.
The county offered mother various services to help her reunify with her children,
including telephone, video, and in-person visitation, foster home visits, chemical-
dependency treatment, urinalysis testing, transportation to treatment and testing, a bus pass,
gas gift cards, Help Me Grow referrals for the children, Milestones application for day care,
paternity testing, housing resources, and medical assistance. Additionally, the county
offered mother a diagnostic mental-health assessment and therapy.
Mother sporadically participated in treatment and therapy in April and May 2022.
During this time, she continued to test positive for methamphetamine when she appeared
for scheduled tests. B y June 2022, mother was not attending appointments for chemical -
dependency treatment or therapy. She did not complete parenting education as the county
had required. Mother also missed most visits with child 1 and child 2 throughout the
summer and fall of 2022.
In December 2022, mother was admitted to an inpatient treatment program. But
due to mother’s failure to maintain sobriety and lack of participation in her case plan, the
county, in January 2023, petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights to child 1 and
child 2.
Mother completed inpatient treatment in March 2023. On March 10—two days
after her discharge from treatment —mother gave birth to child 3. Child 3’s cord blood
tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine, and child 3 required intensive
care. Mother completed an intake process for outpatient treatment but on March 14 again
5
tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. On March 22, 2023, the county
filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental rights to child 3.
Mother failed to appear at a hearing scheduled for March 22, 2023. Although the
county asked the district court to proceed by default in the cases involving child 1 and
child 2, the district court denied the motion and set another hearing for April 3, 2023.
Mother appeared at that hearing, and a pretrial hearing was scheduled for May 10, 2023.
Mother failed to appear at the pretrial hearing, and the county again requested to
proceed by default. Over the objection of mother’s attorney, the district court proceeded
by default.
During the default proceeding, the county called mother’s case manager and the
children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) as witnesses. The case manager opined that mother
would not be able to parent the children in the reasonably foreseeable future due to her
pattern of substance abuse, failure to achieve sobriety, and inability to provide a safe
environment for the children or herself. She testified that termination would serve the best
interests of the children due to “the extensive child protection involvement and case
management, the multiple relapses, . . . the amount of time that [the children] spent out of
home while [mother] . . . attempted to gain sobriety, but ultimately has not succeeded.”
The case manager testified that, as of the hearing date, child 1 had been out of the home
for 677 days, child 2 had been out of the home for 427 days, and child 3 had been out of
the home for 54 days. In addition, the case manager provided an affidavit, filed in the
district court record, detailing mother’s history and the efforts the county had made to
reunify mother and the children.
6
The GAL testified that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best
interests of the children because mother “continues to struggle being able to address her
sobriety and her mental health and being able to show that she could safely and properly
parent the three children.” According to the GAL, the children’s permanency is “very
important.”
The district court terminated mother’s parental rights to all three children in orders
filed on May 15, 2023.
On June 5, 2023, mother moved the district court to vacate the default orders and
filed separate appeals from the terminations. We stayed the appeals pending the disposition
of mother’s motion to the district court.
At a hearing before the district court, mother made several arguments in support of
her request to vacate the default orders. First, she asserted that she had a reasonable excuse
for her failure to appear before the district court; she claimed that she had overslept after a
late night of studying for school. Second, mother alleged that she had a reasonable defense
to termination and the county would not be prejudiced if the default was vacated. Third,
mother claimed that she had acted with due diligence after receiving notice of the entry of
the default orders. Finally, mother alleged that she had not been “fully informed that [her]
parental rights could be terminated by default if [she] failed to attend the hearing. ” The
district court denied mother’s motion to vacate the default orders. Mother then moved this
court to consolidate the separate appeals. We consolidated the appeals and dissolved the
stays.
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DECISION
Mother challenges the district court’s default orders terminating her parental rights
to child 1, child 2, and child 3. Parental rights may be terminated only for “grave and
weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A district
court may involuntarily terminate parental rights if: (1) at least one of the statutory bases
for terminating parental rights exists under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301,
subdivision 1(b); (2) reasonable efforts toward reunification were either made or were not
required; and (3) the proposed termination is in the children’ s best interests. Minn. Stat.
§§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8, .317, subd. 1 (2022); see also In re Welfare of Child. of
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that at least one
statutory ground for termination was supported by clear and convincing
evidence.

The county bears the burden of proving the existence of a statutory condition
permitting the termination of parental rights, In re Welfare of Child of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d
861, 869-70 (Minn. 2021), and must do so by clear and convincing evidence, Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a). A reviewing court will “closely inquire into the sufficiency of
the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at
385. We “review the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error,
but we review its determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily
terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child.
of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “A
finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence
8
or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Child. of T.R.,
750 N.W.2d 656, 660- 61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). The clear error standard of
review “is a review of the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision.”
In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021); see In re Welfare
of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney on appeal
from a juvenile-protection order), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). “When the record
reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might
also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Kenney, 963
N.W.2d at 223 (quotation omitted). In applying the clear error standard of review,
appellate courts (1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, (2) do not
reweigh the evidence, (3) do not find their own facts, and (4) do not reconcile conflicting
evidence. Id. at 221-22. Thus,
an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of
the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the
findings of the [district] court. Rather, because the factfinder
has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues
and the advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate
court’s duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all
the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably
supports the decision.

Id. at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); see Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468,
472 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing clear error standard of review).
Minnesota law permits termination of parental rights by default. See Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 18.01, .02; see also In re Welfare of L.W., 644 N.W.2d 796, 797 (Minn. 2002)
(affirming district court’s default order terminating parental rights after an evidentiary
9
hearing and noting that “[t]he district court’s decision to terminate parental rights was
based on L.F.’s failure to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement and her
neglect of [child] while [child] was in foster care, not on L.F.’s failure to appear”). Here,
mother does not challenge the district court’s decision to conduct the proceeding in her
absence.
Following the default proceeding, the district court determined that the county had
proved by clear and convincing evidence four statutory bases for termination: (1) mother’s
refusal or neglect to comply with her parental duties as to each of her three children,
(2) mother’s palpable unfitness to parent child 3, (3) the failure of reasonable efforts to
correct the conditions leading to the placement of child 1 and child 2, and (4) child 1 and
child 2 were neglected and in foster care.4
Mother challenges the district court’s determinations regarding each of these
statutory bases for termination. However, an appellate court may affirm the termination of
parental rights based on just one “properly supported statutory ground.” In re Welfare of
Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012). We conclude that clear and
convincing evidence in the record demonstrates that mother refused or neglected to comply
with her parental duties as to each of her three children, which is a basis for termination of
parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2). Thus, we

4 The district court terminated mother’s parental rights to child 1 and child 2 under
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2), (5), and (8), and it terminated
mother’s parental rights to child 3 under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision
1(b)(2) and (4).
10
need not address the remaining statutory bases for the district court’s decision to terminate
mother’s parental rights. Id.
Under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2), a district court may terminate parental
rights if a parent
has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or
neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent
by the parent and child relationship, including but not limited
to providing the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter,
education, and other care and control necessary for the child’s
physical, mental, or emotional health and development, if the
parent is physically and financially able, and either reasonable
efforts by the social services agency have failed to correct the
conditions that formed the basis of the petition or reasonable
efforts would be futile and therefore unreasonable.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). To terminate parental rights on this statutory basis,
the district court must find that, at the time of termination, the parent is not “presently able
and willing to assume [her] responsibilities” and that the parent’s neglect of these duties
“will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re Welfare of J.K., 374 N.W.2d
463, 466-67 (Minn. App. 1985) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 1985).
Mother argues that the county failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that she substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused to comply with her parental
duties. She contends that “there was no failure on the part of [mother] to satisfy the
requirements of a court-ordered case plan that would provide evidence of a parent’s
noncompliance with the duties and responsibilities.” In support of this argument, mother
points to the case manager’s testimony at the default hearing that mother partially complied
with the requirements of her case plan.
11
However, as noted, the standard of appellate review does not allow us to make our
own factual findings, reweigh the evidence, or “reconcile conflicting evidence.” Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 221-22 (quotation omitted). Our scope of review on appeal is “limited to
determining whether the [district court’s] findings address the statutory criteria, whether
those findings are supported by substantial evidence, and whether they are clearly
erroneous.” In re Welfare of D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn. 1997).
The district court found that, “despite numerous and consistent interventions,”
mother “would be unable to parent in the foreseeable future due to her inability to stay
sober long-term.” Both the case manager’s testimony and her detailed affidavit, which the
district court “took judicial notice of,” amply support this finding. The record shows that
each of mother’s three children tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Mother
admitted to using methamphetamine a week before giving birth to child 2 in March 2022.
Routine drug tests—when mother complied with the testing requirement of her case plan—
revealed that mother used methamphetamine in March, July, and December of 2021, and
March, April, May, June, and July of 2022. Mother often skipped drug testing
appointments, failing to appear 37 times. The county repeatedly made efforts to assist
mother with her substance-abuse problem. Indeed, when child 3 tested positive for
methamphetamine at birth, the county had been engaged with mother for a full two years.
During this time, m other had been offered numerous chemical-health treatment
opportunities, among other services such as therapy. Mother did not regularly engage with
these services. And although the record shows that mother briefly maintained sobriety
12
while participating in inpatient treatment, she quickly relapsed upon her discharge from
treatment, even while pregnant.
Substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that, despite the county’s
efforts to assist mother with achieving sobriety, mother will be unable to parent in the
foreseeable future du e to her significant and unrelenting substance-abuse problem.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that mother
refused or neglected to comply with her parental duties as to each of her three children.
This determination, which was properly supported, provided a statutory basis for
terminating mother’s parental rights to the three children.
II. The district court ’s implicit determination that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family was not an abuse of discretion.

To terminate parental rights, a district court must conclude that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify the family. T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 664; Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)
(2022). Reasonable efforts include providing services to a family “that go beyond mere
matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.W.,
727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2007). Those services should “assist in alleviating the conditions that gave rise to the
dependency adjudication.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App.
1990), rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). In determining whether a county’s efforts to
reunify were reasonable, a district court considers whether the services offered were
selected in collaboration with the child’s family, tailored to the individualized needs of the
child and child’s family, relevant to the safety and protection of the child, adequate to meet
13
the needs of the child and family, culturally appropriate, available and accessible,
consistent and timely, and realistic under the circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h)
(2022). The district court must also consider “the length of the time the county was
involved and the quality of effort given.” H.K., 455 N.W.2d at 532.
Mother points out that the district court’s orders terminating her parental rights do
not specifically address the county’s efforts to reunify the family. Additionally, she argues
that the county’s efforts toward reunification were not reasonable.
We agree that the district court did not make an express determination that the
county offered reasonable efforts toward reunification. However, the district court’s orders
make clear that it implicitly ruled that reasonable efforts were made. The district court
found that the county had offered mother “numerous and consistent interventions” to
address her substance- abuse problem, which was the primary cause of mother’s inability
to parent the children. Moreover, the district court’s orders state that it “took judicial notice
of” the case manager’s affidavit, which the county submitted to the district court as part of
the default proceeding. The case manager’s affidavit provides more detail regarding the
county’s efforts to help mother achieve sobriety and the other services provided to the
family. It states:
The following reasonable efforts have been provided to the
family: Child Protection Assessments, Child Protection Case
Management; foster care; relative searches; telephone and
video visitations; supervised face to face visitation; gas gift
cards; urinalysis testing for [mother]; offers for Tri-Cap
transportation services for [mother] to urinalysis testing; Tri-
Cap transportation for [mother] to chemical dependency
treatment; St. Cloud Metro bus pass; substance use assessment
for [mother]; substance use treatments for [mother]; Help Me
14
Grow referrals for the children; Milestones application for day
care; genetic testing to determine paternity of [child 2];
housing resources for [mother]; and medical assistance.

Mother does not challenge the district court’s reliance on the case manager’s affidavit.
Assuming that the district court erred by not making an explicit ruling regarding the
reasonableness of the county’s reunification efforts, its orders contain sufficient
information from which we can infer that it implicitly made the necessary determination.
Therefore, any error in not explicitly addressing the point is harmless, and relief is not
warranted. See In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 1997) (declining
to reverse termination of parental rights for harmless error).
We also reject mother’s argument that the record does not establish that the county’s
efforts toward reunification were, in fact, reasonable. As discussed, the record shows that
the county offered mother numerous chemical-health treatment opportunities and other
services to address her chemical dependency over a two- year period. Moreover, the case
manager’s testimony and her affidavit detailed the many additional services provided to
help mother parent the children, including visitation with the children and housing
assistance. Given these many services that were specifically designed to serve the family’s
needs, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the county made
reasonable efforts toward reunification.
III. The district court did not abu se its discretion in determining that termination
of mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

A district court may only terminate parental rights if the termination is in the best
interests of the child. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. To evaluate the best interests of a child
15
in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, a district court must consider (1) “the child’s
interests in preserving the parent-child relationship,” (2) “the parent’s interests in
preserving the parent-child relationship,” and (3) “any competing interests of the child.”
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing interests include health considerations,
a stable environment, and the child’s preference.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92.
Because this analysis requires credibility determinations, a reviewing court gives
“considerable deference to the district court’s findings.” Id. “[D]etermination of a child’s
best interests is generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of a record,
and . . . an appellate court’s combing through the record to determine best interests is
inappropriate because it involves credibility determinations.” In re Welfare of Child of
D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). We review a district
court’s best-interests determination for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of
J.R.R., 943 N.W.2d 661, 669 (Minn. App. 2020).
Mother raises two challenges to the district court’s determination that termination
of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. First, she argues that the record
does not support the determination because she “[did] fine” at a supervised visit, she
successfully completed inpatient treatment, and she “can provide a safe, stable, and secure
home for her three children.” Because the record amply supports the district court’s ruling,
we disagree. The case manager testified that termination was in the children’s best interests
due to mother’s unremitting drug use— including mother’s multiple relapses following
treatment— which had caused the children to remain in foster care for a significant portion
of their young lives. Moreover, the GAL testified that she believed termination was in the
16
children’s best interests because mother was unable to maintain sobriety, struggled with
her mental health, and failed to demonstrate that she could “safely and properly parent the
three children.” Given this testimony, the district court’s determination that termination
was in the children’s best interests is well founded in the record.
Second, mother contends that the district court did not “adequately analyze” the
best-interests factors because it “did not specifically make findings regarding the children’s
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, the parent’s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship, and any competing interest of the children.” Mother cites no
authority to support her argument that the district court must make specific findings
regarding these considerations. Indeed, the rule only requires the district court to make “a
specific finding that termination is in the best interests of the child,” and to “analyze” the
considerations. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). Moreover, the district court did
specifically rule that termination was in the children’s best interests, and we cannot
conclude that the district court failed to analyze the relevant considerations. The district
court stated that termination was in the children’s best interests, “taking into consideration
the findings [of fact] . . . , the length of time th[e] child[ren] ha[ve] been in placement and
the child[ren]’s need for permanency, as well as the child[ren]’s need for stability,
nurturing and attachment.” We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling
that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
17
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s request to
vacate the default orders terminating her parental rights.

Under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure, the district court may
relieve a party from a default order and grant a new trial for any of the following reasons:
(a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(b) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial;
(c) fraud (whether denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(d) the judgment is void; or
(e) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the order.

Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 22.02. Following the district court’s default orders terminating her
parental rights, mother moved to vacate the orders under rule 22.02(e)—“any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the order.” For a district court to grant relief under
this provision, a party must demonstrate that (1) she has a reasonable defense on the merits,
(2) she has a reasonable excuse for the failure to act, (3) she exercised due diligence after
receiving notice of the entry of the default order, and (4) the opposing party will suffer no
substantial prejudice if the default order is vacated. In re Welfare of Child. of Coats, 633
N.W.2d 505, 510 (Minn. 2001) (applying Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 —
which was effective before the predecessor of the current rule 22.02 was promulgated—to
consider a mother’s motion to vacate a default order terminating her parental rights). To
obtain relief, the party must establish all four factors. Id. In reviewing a district court’s
denial of a motion to vacate a default order, the appellate court considers whether the
district court abused its discretion. Id.
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Mother challenges the district court’s decision denying her motion to vacate the
default orders on two grounds. First, mother argues that because the county and the GAL
did not respond to her motion to vacate the default orders in writing, the district court
“should have . . . treated [mother’s] motion as uncontested” and refused to consider the
oral arguments of the county and the GAL. In support of this argument, mother cites rule
14.02, subdivision 3, of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure, which
provides that “[a]ny written motion . . . shall be served at least five days before it is to be
heard, unless the court for good cause shown permits a motion to be made and served less
than five days before it is to be heard.” We reject mother’s argument because the rule she
relies on does not support it. Mother fails to show that the district court abuse d its
discretion by allowing the county and the GAL to orally respond to mother’s motion.
Second, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying her
motion to vacate the default orders because she satisfied the four factors for obtaining relief
from a default order. The district court denied mother’s motion after determining that
mother had failed to establish three of the four factors. It rejected mother’s conclusory and
unsupported claim that she had a reasonable defense on the merits. It found that
oversleeping was not a reasonable excuse for failing to appear at the court hearing. And it
found that the parties, including the children, would suffer substantial prejudice if the
termination orders were vacated because permanency planning was already underway.
“A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are
unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against
logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022)
19
(quotation omitted). T he district court’s decision to deny mother’s motion to vacate the
default orders is supported by the law and the record. Thus, the district court did not abuse
its discretion.
V. Mother fails to show that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel.

A parent has a right to “effective assistance of counsel in connection with a
proceeding in juvenile court.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 3(a) (2022). To prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that (1) her
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) she was
prejudiced by the deficient performance. See State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn.
1998) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); Beaulieu v. Minn. Dep’t
of Hum. Servs., 798 N.W.2d 542, 550 (Minn. App. 2011) (“If a person claims that he was
denied [a] statutory right to counsel, this court analyzes the claim by borrowing the
[Strickland] analytical framework ordinarily used in criminal cases when applying the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”); see also In re Welfare of L.B., 404 N.W.2d 341, 345
(Minn. App. 1987) (applying Strickland standard in juvenile delinquency context).
In her motion to vacate the default orders, mother asserted that, because she did not
understand the term “default,” she was deprived of her constitutional right to due process.
The district court rejected this argument, finding that, over the course of the termination
proceedings, mother received four notices from the district court that explained the
consequences for failing to appear at hearings. Those notices, which are included in the
record on appeal, state:
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IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AT THE HEARING:
• The court may conduct the hearing without you; and
• The court may find that the factual allegations and statutory
grounds set forth in the petition have been proved; and
• The court may enter an order granting the relief requested
in the petition, which may include:
o removing the child(ren) from the home of the parent or
legal custodian and placing the child(ren) in foster care;
o permanently severing the parent’s rights to the
child(ren) pursuant to a termination of parental rights
petition;
o permanently transferring the child(ren)’s legal and
physical custody to a relative; or
o an order for other permanent placement of the
child(ren).

On appeal, mother again asserts that she did not understand that her parental rights
could be terminated in a default proceeding. But she now argues that her lack of
understanding was due to the ineffective assistance of her trial counsel. According to
mother’s brief to this court, her trial counsel failed to inform her of the meaning of the term
“default” and failed to advise her that her parental rights could be terminated by default if
she missed a hearing.
An appellant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel bears the burden of proof on
the claim. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d at 789. And “[t]here is a strong presumption that a counsel’s
performance falls within a wide range of reasonable assistance.” State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d
148, 166 (Minn. 2020).
We are not persuaded by mother’s assertions that her trial counsel failed to explain
the risks of failing to appear at hearings. Moreover, as noted by the district court, mother
was repeatedly advised in writing of the consequences of failing to appear. Thus, mother
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has not established that her trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that she was
prejudiced by that performance. Accordingly, we reject her claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel.
Affirmed.