Steven Todd Parker, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0876

Steven Todd Parker, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 29, 2024
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19-K1-05-002937

Steven Todd Parker, Stillwater, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Jessica A. Bierwerth, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this fourth appeal from his sentences, appellant challenges the district court’s
denial of his motion to correct his sentences, arguing that (1) the district court erroneously
construed his challenge to his sentences as an untimely postconviction petition, (2) his
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career-offender sentences are unlawful because he does not have the required number of
prior sequential felony convictions, (3) the sentencing court erred by imposing consecutive
sentences, and (4) the sentencing court erred in its calculation of his criminal-history score
when determining his second consecutive sentence. We affirm.
FACTS
Following a jury trial in 2007, appellant Steven Todd Parker was convicted of four
offenses based on a string of incidents that occurred in 2005: first- degree burglary of an
occupied dwelling in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) (2004); second-degree
burglary in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a) (2004); theft of a motor vehicle
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(17) (2004); and fleeing from a peace officer
by means of a motor vehicle in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (2004). After
the jury found Parker guilty of all charges, the court held a bifurcated sentencing trial to
determine whether it could impose enhanced sentences pursuant to the career -offender
statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4 (Supp. 2005). That statute allows for sentences up
to the statutory maximum when a defendant has five or more prior felony convictions and
the present offense is a felony committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct. Minn.
Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4.
Thus, the issues for the jury were (1) whether Parker had five or more prior felony
convictions and (2) whether Parker’s present offense was a felony that was committed as
part of a pattern of criminal conduct. The state presented eight court files to the jury
evidencing ten prior felony convictions for burglary, other property -related offenses, and
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fleeing from police.1 The jury found that the elements of the career -offender statute were
satisfied. After the jury’s determination, the district court questioned Parker about his prior
felonies, and Parker admitted to two additional felony convictions. The sentencing court
imposed consecutive statutory-maximum sentences on each of the four convictions based
on Parker’s career-offender status and other aggravating factors.
Parker appealed his sentences. State v. Parker, No. A07-0968, 2008 WL 2965925
(Minn. App. Aug. 5, 2008) (Parker I). We remanded for resentencing with instructions to
impose a concurrent sentence for the theft-of-motor-vehicle conviction and to limit the
reasons for a sentencing departure to Parker’s career-offender status because the other
reasons had either not been tried to the jury or were not appropriate bases for departure .
Id. at *9-10. Parker had also argued that all of his sentences should have been imposed
concurrently because consecutive sentencing is not permitted “when the court has given an
upward durational departure on any of the current offenses.” Id. at *9 n.4 (quoting Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines cmt. II.F.04 (Supp. 2005)). We rejected this argument because Parker’s
offenses involved multiple victims. Id.
On remand, the sentencing court imposed permissive consecutive sentences for the
first-degree-burglary and second-degree-burglary convictions at the respective statutory
maximums of 240 months and 120 months, totaling 360 months, and imposed the other
two sentences concurrently. The sentencing court cited only Parker’s career-offender

1 The ten convictions were entered in 1983, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1999, and 2001.
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status as the reason for imposing the statutory-maximum sentences, in accordance with our
instructions.
Parker appealed his amended sentences in 2009 on the grounds that “the sentences
imposed were excessive because the only aggravating factor the jury found was that he is
a career offender” and “sentencing as a career offender punishes him for his record instead
of the manner in which he committed” the current offenses. State v. Parker, No. A09-354,
2009 WL 3736120, at *2 (Minn. App. Nov. 10, 2009) (Parker II), rev. denied (Minn.
Jan. 19, 2010). We affirmed, reasoning that the career-offender statute “does not require
the fact-finder to consider additional aggravating factors related to the present offense.”
Id. at *2.
Parker challenged his sentence again six years later, and we affirmed the district
court’s determination that his filing was an untimely postconviction petition under Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2) (2012), rather than a motion to correct his sentence under
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, because Parker did “not argue that the length or terms of
his sentence are contrary to applicable statutes or caselaw.” Parker v. State, No. A14-2193,
2015 WL 4994540, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 24, 2015) (Parker III), rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 28, 2015).
Parker now challenges his sentences for the fourth time. Parker argued to the district
court that the duration of his sentences was unlawful because he did not have sufficient
prior sequential felony convictions to be sentenced as a career offender and that the
sentencing court failed to follow the sentencing guidelines when calculating his
criminal-history score for purposes of determining the duration of his second consecutive
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sentence. The district court addressed and rejected Parker’s criminal-history-score
argument because the durations of his sentences were computed according to the
career-offender statute, not the sentencing guidelines. The district court determined that
the portion of Parker’s filing based on the application of the career- offender sentencing
statute was an untimely postconviction petition rather than a motion to correct his
sentences, and it did not address that portion of his motion.
Parker appeals.
DECISION
Parker makes three arguments on appeal. First, he asserts that the district court erred
by construing his challenge to career-offender sentencing as an untimely postconviction
petition under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2) (2022), arguing that his filing was a
motion to correct his sentences pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, because his
challenge does not implicate his convictions. Second, he a rgues that his career-offender
sentences are unlawful because he does not have the required number of prior sequential
felony convictions. Third, he argues that the sentencing court erred by imposing his
sentences consecutively and, in the alternative, that the sentencing court erred by not using
a criminal-history score of zero to calculate his second consecutive sentence. We address
Parker’s arguments in turn.
I. The district court erred when it determined that the portion of Parker’s filing
that challenged his career-offender sentences was an untimely postconviction
petition.
Parker first argues that the district court erred by construing the portion of his filing
challenging his career-offender sentence as a postconviction petition. There are two ways
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to collaterally attack a sentence: (1) by filing a motion to correct a sentence under the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure or (2) by filing a petition for postconviction relief
under the Minnesota Statutes. Washington v. State, 845 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. App.
2014). The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that “[t]he court may at any
time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Any
other request for postconviction relief must be filed under Minnesota Statutes chapter 590
no more than two years after a conviction becomes final unless an exception to the time
limit applies. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subds. 1, 4 (2022). Because Parker filed the motion
here more than two years after the postconviction statute’s deadline and does not argue that
any exception applies, a postconviction petition would have been time-barred. We
therefore must first determine whether his filing falls within the scope of rule 27.03.
To determine whether a filing is a motion to correct a sentence or a postconviction
petition, the district court must “look to the pleadings and the relief sought in order to
determine the nature of [the] claim.” State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Minn. 2015).
The substance of the request controls rather than the label a filing is given. Bolstad v. State,
966 N.W.2d 239, 243 (Minn. 2021). We interpret rule 27.03, subdivision 9, narrowly,
Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 480, and “[i]f the motion ‘implicates more than simply [the]
sentence,’ it is properly treated as a postconviction petition.” Bolstad, 966 N.W.2d at 243
(quoting Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 482). But if it “challenges a sentence on the grounds that
the sentence is contrary to an applicable statute or other applicable law,” it is properly
treated as a motion to correct a sentence. Reynolds v. State, 874 N.W.2d 257, 260, 2 61
(Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted) (holding that a motion was proper under rule 27.03
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when it challenged a sentence on constitutional grounds), aff’d, 888 N.W.2d 125 (Minn.
2016); see also State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Minn. 2007) (holding the same
for a motion challenging a sentence based on an incorrect criminal- history score); State v.
Amundson, 828 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. App. 2013) (holding the same for a motion
challenging an upward departure based solely on a plea agreement).
The standard of review that appellate courts apply to a district court’s determination
of whether a filing is a motion to correct a sentence or a postconviction petition is unsettled.
Bolstad, 966 N.W.2d at 243. However, the general principles of our review still apply.
“We review the district court’s denial of a motion to correct a sentence [under Minn. R.
Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9,] for an abuse of discretion. Specifically, we review the district
court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings under the clearly erroneous
standard.” Townsend v. State, 834 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. 2013) (citation omitted).
To determine whether the district court erred by construing Parker’s challenge to
his career -offender sentences as a postconviction petition, we look to the substance of
Parker’s argument. Parker asserts that he did not have the requisite number of prior felony
convictions to receive maximum prison sentences under the career-offender statute. The
statute provides:
Whenever a person is convicted of a felony, and the
judge is imposing an executed sentence based on a Sentencing
Guidelines presumptive imprisonment sentence, the judge may
impose an aggravated durational departure from the
presumptive sentence up to the statutory maximum sentence if
the factfinder determines that the offender has five or more
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prior felony convictions and that the present offense is a felony
that was committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct.
Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4 . “The career -offender statute applies only when an
offender has five or more prior felony convictions, and a sentence based on an incorrect
determination that an offender has the required number of prior felony convictions is an
illegal sentence.” State v. Franklin, 847 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. App. 2014), aff’d,
861 N.W.2d 67 (Minn. 2015). “Consequently, just as a defendant may not waive review
of his criminal-history-score calculation, [a defendant] may not waive review of whether
he has five or more prior felony convictions.” Id.
The district court construed Parker’s challenge to his career-offender sentences as
an untimely postconviction petition because it determined that the motion challenged the
“basis of the verdict and conviction that [Parker] is a career offender.” But being a career
offender is not a crime in and of itself—one cannot be charged with or convicted of being
a career offender. Rather, “the career -offender statute establishes a legislatively-created
ground for departure” in sentence durations. State v. Mitchell, 687 N.W.2d 393, 399
(Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted), rev. granted (Minn. Dec. 22, 2004) and ord.
granting rev. vacated (Minn. Dec. 12, 2005). Because Parker argues that he did not have
the requisite number of prior felony convictions to justify application of the career-offender
statute to enhance his sentences, his motion is a proper rule 27.03 motion to correct his
sentences. We thus conclude that the district court erred by determining that the portion of
his motion based on whether the career-offender statute should have applied to him was an
untimely postconviction petition.
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The district court did not address the merits of Parker’s challenge to his
career-offender sentences; however, we exercise our discretion to address his arguments in
the interest of judicial economy. Although we generally do not review issues that were not
considered by the district court, State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 148 (Minn. App.
2017), aff’d, 905 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 2018), we may review any matter in the interests of
justice, see Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02 , subd. 11. We have reviewed such issues when a
defendant challenged the legality of their sentence because it is an issue that cannot be
waived, Franklin, 847 N.W.2d at 65-66, and when the issue is “purely legal in nature” and
would not result in prejudice to either party, Aery v. State, 989 N.W.2d 363, 366 n.3 (Minn.
App. 2023). We have also done so in the interest of judicial economy when the issue would
arise on remand. See, e.g., Montanaro v. State, 802 N.W.2d 726, 731 (Minn. 2011);
Edstrom v. State, 326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn. 1982); State v. Halvorson, 506 N.W.2d 331,
337 (Minn. App. 1993). All of these principles apply here. Parker challenges the legality
of his sentences. And we can address each of his arguments, which would inevitably arise
on remand, on a legal, rather than factual, basis.
Moreover, we need not reverse a correct decision by the district court simply
because it is based on incorrect reasons. State v. Eichers, 840 N.W.2d 210, 216 (Minn.
App. 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 853 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 2014) ; see State v. Fellegy,
819 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Minn. App. 2012) (“We may affirm the district court on any ground,
including one not relied on by the district court.”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2012). We
therefore address each of Parker’s arguments in turn.
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II. The district court properly sentenced Parker as a career offender.
We review a district court’s interpretation of sentencing statutes and procedural
rules de novo. State v. Amundson, 828 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. App. 2013). “We conduct
a de novo assessment of the district court’s decision as to whether a valid departure ground
exists, relying on the factual findings that support the decisions.” State v. Weaver,
796 N.W.2d 561, 567 (Minn. App. 2011). And we review those factual findings for
whether they are supported by the record. Id.
Parker contends that he had only three prior qualifying convictions because (1) his
pre-1995 and 2005 felony convictions cannot be counted to calculate criminal-history
points under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines because some of the convictions
decayed and others should have been counted as half-points and rounded down and (2) his
four 1999 felony convictions were not separate and sequential, and thus, they qualify as
only one prior conviction pursuant to State v. Huston, 616 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. App. 2000).
He claims that he is therefore entitled to the guidelines’ presumptive sentence durations for
the convictions in the underlying matter here. We address only Parker’s first argument as
the facts are undisputed and the result is dispositive.2
“Decay” refers to the sentencing guidelines’ rule prohibiting the counting of
convictions over 15 years old in the computation of criminal-history scores. See Vickla v.
State, 793 N.W.2d 265, 271 (Minn. 2011). Decay does not apply to the counting of prior

2 Even if we concluded that Parker’s second argument succeeds, his record would still
include more than five prior felony convictions—he would have seven prior felony
convictions—and the career -offender statute would apply.
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convictions under the career-offender statute. Id. (observing that “the 15-year decay factor
in the Sentencing Guidelines applicable to a presumptive sentence determination is not
referenced in the repeat-felony-offender statute”). Compare Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
II.B.1.e (Supp. 2005) (prohibiting counting convictions toward criminal-history scores “if
a period of fifteen years has elapsed since the date of discharge from or expiration of the
sentence, to the date of the current offense”) , with Minn. Stat. § 609.1095 (Supp. 2005)
(including no decay provisions). Similarly, while Minnesota Sentencing Guideline II.B.1.a
(Supp. 2005) provides for half-points for certain offenses and Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines comment II.B.101 (Supp. 2005) provides for rounding, Minn. Stat. § 609.1095
contains no similar provisions.
Therefore, the sentencing court was not required to consider whether any of Parker’s
prior convictions had decayed or were subject to rounding , and it properly considered the
pre-1995 convictions and determined that he had sufficient prior qualifying convictions to
apply the career-offender statute. We therefore conclude that the sentencing court did not
err by sentencing Parker as a career offender.
III. Parker’s challenge to consecutive sentencing has already been decided.
Parker next asserts that the sentencing court erred by imposing consecutive
sentences, arguing that Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines comment II.F.04 prohibits his
consecutive sentences because the sentencing court also applied an upward durational
departure. “The law of the case doctrine functions to bar issues that were previously
considered and denied in the same case,” and the doctrine applies to motions under Minn.
R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, “when the claim underlying the motion was previously denied”
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on appeal. Smith v. State, 974 N.W.2d 576, 581-82 (Minn. 2022). In 2008, we considered
and rejected Parker’s challenge to consecutive sentencing in his direct appeal of his original
sentences. Parker I, 2008 WL 2965925, at *9 n.4. Because this issue has already been
decided, we do not reconsider it here.
IV. The district court did not err by determining that the duration of Parker’s
second consecutive sentence was properly computed according to the
career-offender statute rather than the guidelines grid.
Finally, Parker asserts that the district court erred by determining that the sentencing
court was not required to use the sentencing guidelines to compute the duration of his
second consecutive sentence. He argues that because his sentences were imposed
consecutively, he was entitled to a guidelines-range sentence duration for his second
consecutive sentence, which should have been computed using a criminal-history score of
zero. We are not persuaded.
First, as to Parker’s entitlement to a guidelines-range sentence duration, the district
court determined that the sentencing court was not required to compute the duration of the
second consecutive sentence according to the guidelines because Parker was sentenced as
a career offender. Parker’s criminal-history score factored into his sentences only in that
the court may not impose a sentence under the career-offender statute unless the court “is
imposing an executed sentence based on a Sentencing Guidelines presumptive
imprisonment sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4. Here, it is undisputed that
Parker’s first sentence for first-degree burglary was a presumptive imprisonment sentence
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under the guidelines because the offense carried a severity level of six and Parker’s initial
criminal-history score was at least six. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines IV-V (Supp. 2005).3
Second, as to Parker’s criminal-history score and his consecutive sentence for
second-degree burglary, the sentencing guidelines mandate that when imposing a
permissive consecutive sentence, “a zero criminal history score . . . shall be used in
determining the presumptive duration.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines II.F (Supp. 2005)
(emphasis added). The guidelines do not state that a zero criminal-history score must be
used to determine the presumptive disposition. Because the sentencing court used
Parker’s criminal-history score to determine whether the career -offender statute’s
presumptive-disposition requirement was met for his second consecutive sentence, see
Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4, the rule mandating the use of a zero criminal-history score
to determine the presumptive guidelines duration did not apply. Thus, for Parker’s second
consecutive sentence, his criminal-history score was still six or more.
Second-degree burglary carries a severity level of five, Minn. Sent’g Guidelines V,
which results in a presumptive imprisonment sentence for an offender with six or more
criminal-history points, Minn. Sent’g Guidelines IV. Because the presumptive disposition
was imprisonment, the sentencing court was permitted to calculate the duration of Parker’s
second consecutive sentence using the career-offender statute rather than the guidelines
grid. Therefore, the sentencing court did not err by using a criminal -history score of six

3 The sentencing court calculated Parker’s initial criminal-history score as 14. Parker
argues that he had only six criminal-history points, but whether his score was 14 or six is
immaterial because six is the maximum criminal-history score contemplated by the
guidelines. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines IV.
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when determining the presumptive dispositions for both of Parker’s consecutive sentences.
And the district court did not err by rejecting Parker’s challenge to the sentencing court’s
use of his criminal-history score to determine his second consecutive sentence.
In sum, because the sentencing guidelines and career- offender statute authorize
the sentences that the sentencing court imposed, which included consecutive
statutory-maximum sentences, the sentencing court did not err. Therefore, although the
district court erred by construing portions of Parker’s motion as an untimely postconviction
petition rather than a motion to correct his sentences, that error was harmless, and we affirm
the district court’s determination that Parker’s sentences are not unlawful.
Affirmed.