State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0898

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dennis Lee Heard,
Appellant.

Filed September 16, 2024
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-13086

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Tacota Lemuel (certified student attorney), Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
Appellant challenges his sentence for first-degree assault, arguing that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing a 204-month sentence—the top of the presumptive
guidelines range—because its determination was contrary to law, logic, and the facts in the
record. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding
to impose a sentence within the presumptive guidelines range, we affirm.
FACTS
According to the criminal complaint, Minneapolis police officers responded to a
shooting at a gas station in June 2022. Upon their arrival on the scene, the officers learned
that the shooting had been captured on the gas station’s surveillance camera. The
surveillance footage showed a male, later identified as appellant Dennis Lee Heard,
exchanging words with the victim. At one point, the victim stepped toward Heard. Heard
pulled out a firearm and shot the victim in the chest. The victim immediately fell to the
ground. After shooting the victim, Heard walked back to his vehicle, turned around, and
shot at the victim again, but missed. Heard left the scene in his vehicle. The victim
sustained injuries to his left lung, spleen, stomach, diaphragm, and vertebra.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Heard with: (1) attempted second-degree
murder, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1) (2020), with
reference to Minnesota Statutes section 609.17, subdivision 4(2) (2020); (2) first-degree
assault, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.221, subdivision 1 (2020); and
3
(3) possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) (2020).
In February 2023, Heard entered a guilty plea to first-degree assault under a plea
agreement. In exchange for Heard’s plea of guilty, the parties agreed to the dismissal of
counts one, attempted second-degree murder, and three, unlawful possession of a firearm.
The parties also agreed to a sentencing range of 150 to 204 months, with the final sentence
left to the district court’s discretion. Heard’s defense counsel explained to the district court
that the sentencing range included two sentencing enhancements—a three-month
enhancement because Heard’s criminal-history score exceeded those on the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines grid and a 12-month enhancement because the first-degree assault
offense was Heard’s second violent felony.
1 See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.2.c,
2.G.14.b. After Heard waived his right to a jury trial and provided a factual basis—
including specific admissions that he had a 2005 first-degree assault conviction that
qualified as a prior severe violent offense for purposes of the 12-month enhancement, see
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.G.14.a.(1), 8 (Supp. 2021)—the district court found that Heard
had provided a knowing and voluntary wavier of his rights and the court accepted Heard’s
guilty plea.

1 To be clear, the parties’ agreed-upon sentencing range of 150 to 204 months was based
on 15 months in enhancements (i.e., three months per Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
2.B.2.c (Supp. 2021) plus 12 months per Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 2.G.14.b (Supp.
2021)) added to the guidelines range of 135 to 189 months, which in turn arose from the
severity level of nine assigned to first-degree assault and the fact that Heard had a criminal-
history score greater than six, see Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A (Supp. 2021).
4
Before sentencing, a probation agent from Hennepin County Community
Corrections completed a presentence investigation report (PSI). The agent reported in the
PSI that first-degree assault carried a severity level of nine and that Heard had a criminal-
history score of seven. The agent reiterated that, under the plea agreement, the parties had
agreed that Heard’s sentencing range was 150 to 204 months. The agent also noted that, at
the time of this offense, Heard was under federal supervised release due to a 2017
conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Heard’s criminal history
included prior charges of felon in possession of a pistol, none of which resulted in a
conviction.
The district court held a sentencing hearing in March 2023. At the start of the
hearing, the district court confirmed that the plea agreement called for a sentencing range
of 150 to 204 months, that a term within that range would be a presumptive guidelines
sentence, and that a sentence within that range was not a departure. Both the prosecutor
and defense counsel agreed. The district court also stated that it had received and reviewed
the PSI.
The state requested that the district court impose a sentence of 204 months,
highlighting that this was Heard’s “sixth felony conviction[,]” that Heard’s prior
convictions included “two prohibited person convictions[,]” and that Heard has
consistently engaged in criminal activity “with an escalating pattern.” Defense counsel
requested that the district court impose a sentence of 150 months, pointing to Heard’s
struggle with mental health, the fact that Heard armed himself with a weapon on the day
of the offense intending to harm himself, and the presence of Heard’s family at the hearing.
5
The district court sentenced Heard to 204 months, explaining:
I have to look at the facts of this case. I also have to look at
Mr. Heard’s history. I have no doubt clearly that as a whole,
this system certainly hasn’t done what I think we all wished it
could do for a person like Mr. Heard, who entered the system
at age 15. And would appear, has not been able to get out.
However, I have to look at public safety. And Mr. Heard has—
it would appear regularly been in possession of a firearm
unlawfully since going back to at least 2011 and has, as
indicated by the State at the time that this offense happened, he
was on Federal supervised release. He has seven criminal
history points. I have no doubt that Mr. Heard . . . has remorse
and that he very much regrets the decision he made. I have no
doubt, and it’s very clear he has a family here that loves him
very much. And Mr. Heard is more than his worst day.
However, I need to take into consideration the public safety.
And Mr. Heard has consistently shown that he is . . . a great
risk to public safety, and as the state pointed out, his behavior
has escalated. And in this case, someone almost died. And for
those reasons, I am going to sentence you to the top of the
range, Mr. Heard.

This appeal follows.
DECISION
Heard maintains that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the
204-month sentence because the district court’s decision was contrary to law, logic, and
the facts in the record.2 We disagree.
“Sentences imposed by the district court are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” State
v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). A

2 Heard does not challenge his guidelines sentencing range of 135 to 189 months per
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 4.A or the application of the three-month and 12-month
enhancements under Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 2.B.2.c and 2.G.14.b, which
resulted in the parties’ agreed-upon sentencing range of 150 to 204 months.
6
district court abuses its discretion when its decision is contrary to law or against logic and
the facts on record. Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011). A district court
rarely abuses its discretion when it imposes a sentence within the presumptive guidelines
range. See Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428-29. “This court will generally not exercise its authority
to modify a sentence within the presumptive range ‘absent compelling circumstances.’” Id.
(quoting State v. Freyer, 328 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Minn. 1982)). Appellate courts may
modify a presumptive sentence when the sentence is “inconsistent with statutory
requirements, unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not
warranted by the findings of fact issued by the district court.” Minn. Stat. § 244.11,
subd. 2(b) (2020).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C (Supp. 2021). For any given offense, the guidelines
sentence is “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and
offense severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (Supp. 2021).
Accordingly, the district court “must pronounce a sentence . . . within the applicable
[presumptive guidelines] range . . . unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp.
2021). “[A]ny sentence within the presumptive range . . . constitutes a presumptive
sentence.” Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428.
Heard contends that the district court relied on dismissed felon- in-possession
charges when it sentenced him and that such reliance on an unsubstantiated pattern of prior
firearm possession was contrary to law. In support of his argument, Heard quotes State v.
7
Womack, 319 N.W.2d 17, 19-20 (Minn. 1982), asserting that the district court was “‘not
entitled to act as factfinder and determine whether’ Heard had engaged in conduct that was
the subject of dismissed charges and charges for which he was acquitted.” In a
nonprecedential but persuasive opinion, we rejected the appellant’s use of Womack to
support a similar contention. See State v. Middleton, No. A21- 1291, 2022 WL 3349044,
at *3 (Minn. App. Aug. 15, 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2022). 3 In Middleton, we
concluded that Womack did not apply because—unlike the district court in Womack , which
imposed an upward durational departure—the district court in Middleton imposed a
presumptive guidelines sentence. Id. We therefore noted in Middleton that the applicable
jurisprudence was “the well-developed caselaw . . . that an appellate court ‘generally will
not interfere with a sentencing court’s decision to impose a term within the presumptive
sentence range.’” Id. (quoting State v. Kangbateh, 868 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. 2015)). And
because appellant cited no authority “for the proposition that a district court errs by
considering conduct underlying dismissed charges when imposing a presumptive
sentence[,]” we concluded that appellant had not established that the district court erred by
considering such conduct. Id.
Consistent with our persuasive reasoning in Middleton, we decline to extend
Womack here, where the district court likewise imposed a presumptive guidelines sentence
instead of an upward durational departure. And, as in Middleton, because Heard neglected

3 See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions . . . are not
binding authority . . . , but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive
authority.”).
8
to cite any authority to support his argument, we conclude that Heard has failed to establish
that the district court abused its discretion by considering the entirety of Heard’s prior
firearm-possession conduct in imposing a presumptive sentence. Id.
Even assuming without deciding that the district court erred by relying on an
unproven pattern of firearm possession, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Heard to 204 months because that sentencing decision was supported by other
facts in the record. See State v. Lopez, 988 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Minn. 2023) (explaining that
“[a] clearly erroneous finding . . . does not require a new trial when independent findings
of fact, decisive of the case, are supported by the record.” (citing Hanka v. Pogatchnik, 276
N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 1979)) (other citation omitted)).
The district court based its decision to sentence Heard to 204 months on the
following: that Heard had seven criminal -history points; that Heard ’s conduct over time
had demonstrated that he posed “a great risk to public safety”; that Heard was on federal
supervised release at the time of the charged incident; and that the victim almost died.
These facts are reasonably supported by the record. The PSI specified that Heard’s
criminal-history score was seven, and the parties confirmed that score as correct at the start
of the sentencing hearing. The PSI also noted that Heard was on federal supervised release
at the time of the incident. Heard’s criminal history and the facts of Heard’s underlying
conviction reasonably support the district court’s determination that Heard is a risk to
public safety. And the record establishes that Heard shot the victim in the chest and that
the victim sustained serious injuries. We therefore conclude that the district court’s factual
findings adequately sustain its sentencing determination. See Lopez, 988 N.W.2d at 116.
9
Heard argues next that the district court relied on an escalation of criminal behavior
that was not supported by the record. Beginning in 2004, Heard was convicted of: first-
degree assault; aiding and abetting attempted theft of a motor vehicle; aiding an offender;
third-degree drug possession; fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle; driving while
impaired; and first-degree assault. Because the record evidence reasonably supports the
district court’s finding that Heard had exhibited an escalation in his criminal behavior over
time, we conclude that this argument is unavailing.
Heard further contends that the district court’s reliance on an escalation in his
criminal behavior “as justification for a longer sentence, while simultaneously
acknowledging that . . . ‘th[e criminal justice] system certainly hasn’t done what . . . we all
wished it could do for a person like Mr. Heard,’” was contrary to logic. Although the
district court acknowledged that incarceration had not worked before , the court conveyed
that incapacitation of Heard through a long sentence was the only option available to
address its concern about the demonstrated, significant, and escalating risk that Heard’s
behavior posed to public safety. Because the district court’s public-safety determination is
reasonably supported by the record, we conclude that its decision was not contrary to logic.
Heard maintains that the district court “did not expressly consider” his “suicidality
at the time of the offense.” But a district court “is not required to explain its reasons for
imposing a presumptive sentence.” State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App.
2013), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). And appellate courts “may not interfere with the
sentencing court’s exercise of discretion, as long as the record shows the sentencing court
carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a
10
determination.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 -81 (Minn. App. 1985). Based on
our careful review of the record, the district court evaluated all the information presented
to it before rendering its sentencing decision.
Heard also asserts that compelling circumstances warrant a lower presumptive
sentence. Heard seems to argue that his remorse, his family’s support, his cooperation, his
attitude, and his suicidal ideations constitute compelling circumstances that would allow
this court to order a sentence modification. But Heard bargained for a sentencing range of
150 to 204 months. And he received a presumptive guidelines sentence within that range,
which is presumed reasonable. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13. Given our review of
the record, we do not discern any sufficiently compelling circumstances requiring reversal.
Moreover, although Heard expressed remorse at the sentencing hearing and his
attorney noted that Heard had familial support, the district court was not persuaded by these
circumstances. Instead, the district court noted that, while it had “no doubt” Heard felt
remorse and it was clear that he had family present, the court nonetheless “need[ed] to take
into consideration the public safety.” We will not interfere with the district court’s
discretionary decision to discount Heard’s claims of remorse and familial support in favor
of a guidelines sentence within the presumptive range. See Kangbateh, 868 N.W.2d at 14.
Heard relies on the same factors to argue that the interests of fairness warrant a
lower sentence. As noted above, Heard received a guidelines sentence, which is “presumed
to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and offense severity
characteristics.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13. We therefore discern no unfairness in the
district court’s sentencing determination.
11
Finally, we note that the plea agreement allowed Heard to avoid trial on the
attempted second- degree murder charge and the risk of a longer sentence than agreed
upon.4 Plea agreements “are in many ways analogous to a contract between the state and a
defendant.” State v. Meredyk, 754 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Minn. App. 2008). Plea agreements
essentially “represent a bargained-for understanding between the government and criminal
defendants in which each side foregoes certain rights and assumes certain risks in exchange
for a degree of certainty as to the outcome of criminal matters.” Id. (quotations omitted).
That Heard agreed to a sentencing range of 150 to 204 months to avoid the sentencing risks
associated with an attempted second-degree murder trial reinforces our conclusion that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Heard to 204 months. See id.
Affirmed.

4 With the stipulated enhancements, Heard’s guidelines range for attempted second-degree
murder, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1), with reference
to Minnesota Statutes section 609.17, subdivision 4(2), would have been 189 to 247
months. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.2.c, 2.G.2 (Supp. 2021), 2.G.14.b, 4.A.