In the Matter of the Welfare of: J. J. B., Child.
The holding in the court’s own words
Because we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the fifth and sixth public-safety factors support certification and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering adult certification, we affirm. 2010 WL 3547210, at *5, we conclude there was reasonable evidence to support the district court’s findings that public-safety factors five and six favored adult certification, and we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred, see J.H.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- In re the Welfare of J.H. 844 N.W.2d 28
- In re the Welfare of P.C.T. 823 N.W.2d 676
- In Re the Welfare of U.S. 612 N.W.2d 192
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0903
In the Matter of the Welfare of: J. J. B., Child.
Filed February 5, 2024
Affirmed
Ede, Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-JV-22-9210
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant J.J.B.)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Dana D. Erickson, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
This is an appeal from an order certifying appellant for prosecution as an adult on
charges of first- degree criminal sexual conduct. Appellant challenges the district court’s
findings that the fifth and sixth public-safety factors —which concern the adequacy of
programming in the juvenile system and the available dispositional options, and which are
set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 260B.125, subdivision 4 (2022) —favor
certification. Appellant maintains that, because the district court mis applied the fifth and
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sixth public-safety factors, the district court’s adult-certification order was an abuse of
discretion. Because we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the
fifth and sixth public-safety factors support certification and that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in ordering adult certification, we affirm.
FACTS
In November 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant J.J.B. with two
counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.342, subdivision 1a(e) (Supp. 2021). The charges concern J.J.B.’s involvement in the
sexual assault of a 9-year -old girl, on two separate occasions in 2021 and 2022, when he
was 17 years old.
The state moved the district court for presumptive certification of J.J.B. for adult
prosecution and filed a memorandum in support of finding probable cause. The district
court found that probable cause existed to believe J.J.B. committed the charged offense
and the court ordered a certification study.
Certification Studies
J.J.B. participated in three certification studies. One study was completed by Dr.
Frank Weber, a licensed psychologist; another was completed by Dr. Jennifer Weigelt, also
a licensed psychologist; and the third was completed by Robert Hastings, a senior agent
with Stearns County Community Corrections. At the time of the studies, J.J.B. was 18 years
old.
The certification studies examined six public- safety factors, which are set forth in
Minnesota Statutes section 260B.125, subdivision 4, and which the district court must
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consider “[i]n determining whether the public safety is served by certifying the matter.”
Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4. These six public-safety factors are : (1) “the seriousness
of the alleged offense in terms of community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines, the use of a firearm, and the
impact on any victim”; (2) “the culpability of the child in committing the alleged offense,
including the level of the child’s participation in planning and carrying out the offense and
the existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines”; (3) “the
child’s prior record of delinquency”; (4) “the child’s programming history, including the
child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming”; (5) “the
adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice system”; and
(6) “the dispositional options available for the child.” Id .; see also Minn. R. Juv. Delinq.
P. 18.06, subd. 3. By statute, the district court must “give greater weight to the seriousness
of the alleged offense and the child’s prior record of delinquency than to the other factors.”
Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4.
After evaluating the six public-safety factors, Dr. Weber and Dr. Weigelt
recommended that J.J.B. be designated an extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ), while
Hastings recommended that J.J.B. be certified as an adult. As relevant to the challenged
factors at issue in this appeal, the certification studies stated as follows.
As to the fifth public-safety factor—the adequacy of the punishment or
programming available in the juvenile justice system—Dr. Weber reported that J.J.B.
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would turn 19 seven months after Dr. Weber’s evaluation,1 which “is simply not enough
time for him to address his sexually abusive behavior if he is convicted” because the
Minnesota “Department of Corrections [(DOC)] indicates that the average length of
treatment” in all Minnesota treatment programs is two years. Dr. Weigelt suggested that
treatment in the juvenile system was better suited for J.J.B. because his “developmental
maturity is behind what would be expected of a typical 18-year-old.” She believed that “[i]t
[was] important that [J.J.B.] receive developmentally appropriate interventions that [could]
match the unique needs of an emerging adult.” In his report, Hastings outlined several
programs available to J.J.B., such as sex-specific treatment at West Central Regional
Juvenile Center. Hastings also noted the outpatient treatment programs available to J.J.B.,
like CORE Professional Services and Alpha Emergence Behavioral Health.
As for the sixth public-safety factor —the dispositional options available for the
child—Dr. Weber identified adult certification as an option but reported that J.J.B. “could
potentially work through his issues by the time he turned 21.” Dr. Weber, however, also
noted that “[t]ypically, progress in treatment begins when the offender” takes responsibility
for his offense. And because J.J.B. has not taken responsibility for the assaults, Dr. Weber
opined that J.J.B. required more t han two years to complete treatment. Dr. Weigelt
concluded that, if J.J.B. was designated EJJ, he would have “ade quate time to complete
treatment programming by his 21st birthday.” But Dr. Weigelt acknowledged that, if J.J.B.
is certified as an adult, he could be placed on probation, which “has no limitation connected
1 J.J.B. turned 19 in August 2023.
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to age” and “allows for longer terms of supervision and an extended period of time to
complete treatment directives if ordered by the court.” Even so, Dr. Weigelt opined that
J.J.B.’s “developmental and treatment needs would likely not be adequately addressed via
certification.” Hastings noted that, if J.J.B. was designated EJJ, he would have “a limited
amount of time to complete a treatment directive if ordered by the court.” But Hastings
stated that, if J.J.B. was certified as an adult, he could be placed on community supervision,
which has no limitation connected to the age of the probationer and allows for “an extended
period of time to complete treatment directives.”
Contested Certification Hearing
In May 2023, the district court held an adult- certification hearing. The court heard
from five witnesses: Dr. Weber; Hastings; Dr. Weigelt; Dr. Holly Booth, the executive
director at Prairie Lakes Youth Program ; and Dustin Berg, a program director at West
Central Regional Juvenile Center.
Dr. Weber testified that, although it had been several months since he completed his
assessment of J.J.B., his EJJ recommendation remained the same. But , as time passed, he
grew nervous about J.J.B.’s ability to complete treatment under an EJJ timeline. One factor
that could affect the length of J.J.B.’s treatment was J.J.B.’s denial of responsibility for the
assaults. Dr. Weber explained that studies show that people who deny responsibility for
the offense take longer to complete treatment.
Hastings testified that, under EJJ, J.J.B. would “have 27 months as of today’s court
date . . . to complete a treatment program, and . . . to potentially have a multitude of other
things” to manage. Hastings also stated that, if J.J.B. was certified as an adult, he “would
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have a longer period of time due to the fact that there’s longer forms of probation in the
adult system.” Hastings testified that this timeline supported adult certification, even
though Dr. Weber and Dr. Weigelt believed otherwise. Reporting that all programs require
sobriety before treatment begins, Hastings also expressed his concern that 27 months was
not enough time given J.J.B.’s chemical-dependency needs.
Dr. Weigelt testified that there were programs available in the juvenile system that
would meet J.J.B.’s needs and that she believed that J.J.B. would have sufficient time to
complete treatment before he turned 21. But when she discussed residential treatment
centers, Dr. Weigelt testified that many aspects of those centers can resemble a school
setting and that J.J.B. had reported struggling in school.
Dr. Booth testified about the Prairie Lakes Program. She testified that, if a 19-year-
old was referred to the program, staff at Prairie Lakes would have to apply for a waiver
from the DOC because the age range of individuals admitted to Prairie Lakes is 10 to 19
years old. Dr. Booth stated that, in the last two years, Prairie Lakes only submitted one
waiver for an individual over 19, and the DOC denied that waiver. On cross-examination,
the state questioned Dr. Booth about a recommendation by evaluators that J.J.B. be
prohibited from having unsupervised contact with females under the age of 16. When asked
if such a condition could be problematic for some programs offered by Prairie Lakes, Dr.
Booth conceded that it would be problematic. Lastly, Dr. Booth testified that Prairie Lakes
was struggling with bed availability, meaning that there could be a delay in admitting
someone into the program.
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Dustin Berg testified about West Central Regional Juvenile Center. Berg explained
that West Central must also obtain a waiver from the DOC to allow J.J.B. into the program
and likewise noted a lack of open beds at the facility.
The district court filed an order granting adult certification. The district court
considered the six public-safety factors, determining that factors one (the seriousness of
the alleged offense in terms of community protection), two (the culpability of the child in
committing the alleged offense), five (the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system), and six (the dispositional options available for the
child) favored adult certification. 2 The district court concluded that J.J.B. did not present
clear and convincing evidence “to overcome the presumption of certification.”
This appeal follows.
DECISION
J.J.B. challenges the district court’s findings that public-safety factors five and six
favor adult certification. More specifically, J.J.B. argues that, had the district court properly
applied those factors, it would have correctly concluded that he proved by clear and
convincing evidence that his case should remain in juvenile court. The state counters that
J.J.B. failed to rebut the presumption of certification by clear and convincing evidence. 3
We agree with the state.
2 The district court found that factors three (the child’s prior record of delinquency) and
four (the child’s programming history) favored retaining the matter under EJJ.
3 The state also argues that, in analyzing J.J.B.’s programming history under the fourth
public-safety factor, the district court misapplied In re Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 28, 39
(Minn. 2014), by disregarding J.J.B.’s lack of compliance with a Benton County CHIPS-
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“When a child is alleged to have committed, after becoming 14 years of age, an
offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the [district] court may enter an
order certifying the proceeding for action under the laws and court procedures controlling
adult criminal violations.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 1 (2022). “A district court has
considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify a case for adult prosecution.” In re
Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). A presumption in favor of certification exists if the child
was at least 16 years old at the time of the alleged offense and the offense is one that would
result in a presumptive commitment to prison. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3 (2022).
The child bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by “clear and convincing evidence
that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public safety.” Id.
As discussed above, to determine whether certifying a child for adult prosecution
serves public safety, the district court must consider six public-safety factors. See Minn.
Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4. In considering the public-safety factors, the district court must
take the factual allegations set forth in the juvenile-delinquency petition as true. See In re
Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 28, 38 (Minn. 2014). Public-safety factors five and six —
Truancy file and related court- ordered interventions aimed at improving J.J.B.’s school
attendance. Although we need not reach this issue because we affirm on other grounds, we
note that the supreme court explained in J.H. that “[g]enerally, a school does not fall within
the broad definition of programming . . . because its purpose is to provide children with
basic education, not to address specific behavioral or social issues of a child relevant to
juvenile delinquency.” 844 N.W.2d at 39. Because the purpose of the truancy intervention
file was to assist J.J.B. in reducing his school absences and obtaining an education, we
discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the law to the fourth
public-safety factor.
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which are the focus of J.J.B.’s appeal—concern: “(5) the adequacy of the punishment or
programming available in the juvenile justice system; and (6) the dispositional options
available for the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4. In analyzing public-safety factors
five and six, we have explained that “insufficient time for rehabilitation under the juvenile
system is an appropriate consideration when deciding whether to refer the juvenile to adult
court.” In re Welfare of U.S., 612 N.W.2d 192, 197 (Minn. App. 2000). And, in a
nonprecedential opinion, we concluded that, “if the outcome of treatment or other
programming in the juvenile system is unlikely or equivocal, then public-safety factors five
and six favor certification.” In re Welfare of J.A.S., No. A10-584, 2010 WL 3547210, at
*5 (Minn. App. Sept. 14, 2010).4
Appellate courts “review the juvenile court’s decision to certify a child to adult court
for an abuse of discretion.” J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 34. This court “will not disturb a finding
about whether public safety would be served by retaining the proceeding in juvenile court
unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. at 35. “In determining whether the juvenile court’s
findings are clearly erroneous, [appellate courts] view the record in the light most favorable
to the juvenile court’s findings.” Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous only if there is no
reasonable evidence to support the finding or when an appellate court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” Id. (quotation omitted).
4 This nonprecedential opinion is not binding. We cite it as persuasive authority. See Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
10
Here, a presumption in favor of certification exists because J.J.B. was charged with
an offense that would result in a presumptive commitment to prison and he was at least 16
years old at the time of the offense. And viewing the record in the light most favorable to
the district court’s findings, we discern no clear error in the district court’s determinations
that public-safety factors five and six favored certification. See J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 35.
In deciding whether to refer J.J.B. to adult court, the district court appropriately
considered whether there was insufficient time for rehabilitation under the juvenile system.
See U.S., 612 N.W.2d at 197. Dr. Weber testified that, as time passed, he grew more
hesitant about J.J.B.’s ability to complete treatment because of long waitlists and J.J.B.’s
“added struggles with motivation and chemical dependency.” Hastings likewise expressed
his concern that the time available to J.J.B. under EJJ was inadequate given J.J.B.’s
chemical-dependency needs and the items he would need to complete in treatment.
Hastings also stated that the longer period that would be allotted to J.J.B. under adult
probation supported certification.
The record evidence furthermore reflects that J.J.B. would face barriers to entering
juvenile treatment programs. Based on J.J.B.’s age, Prairie Lakes Youth Program and West
Central Regional Juvenile Center required waivers from the DOC to admit J.J.B. According
to Dr. Booth, only one such waiver was submitted for Prairie Lakes in the two years
preceding the certification hearing, and the DOC denied that waiver. Additionally, the fact
that J.J.B. could be prohibited from having unsupervised contact with females under the
age of 16 would be problematic for some programs available at Prairie Lakes. Lastly, the
evidence indicated a lack of available beds at both Prairie Lakes and West Central.
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Because the record amply demonstrates that the outcome of treatment or other
programming in the juvenile system was unlikely or equivocal, see J.A.S., 2010 WL
3547210, at *5, we conclude there was reasonable evidence to support the district court’s
findings that public-safety factors five and six favored adult certification, and we are not
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred, see J.H., 844 N.W.2d at
35. The district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, and we therefore will not
disturb them. See id. Based on those findings and the record as a whole, 5 J.J.B. did not
carry his burden of rebutting the presumption in favor of certification by “clear and
convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public
safety.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in deciding to certify J.J.B. to adult court. See J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 35.
Affirmed.
5 We note that the undisputed evidence underlying the district court’s unchallenged
determination that factors one (the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection) and two (the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
offense) favored adult certification also supports our conclusion that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in certifying J.J.B. for adult prosecution. Indeed, under Minnesota
Statutes section 260B.125, subdivision 4, the district court had to “give greater weight to
the seriousness of the alleged offense and the child’s prior record of delinquency than to
the other [public-safety] factors.” And, despite the district court’s finding that J.J.B.’s prior
record of delinquency favored retaining the matter under EJJ, we also note that the supreme
court has held that a district court’s adult-certification order in a criminal-sexual-conduct
case was not an abuse of discretion, where the youth’s prior record of delinquency favored
EJJ but the seriousness of the alleged offense favored certification. See J.H., 844 N.W.2d
at 36–37.