Newland Derrick Hambrick, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0925

Newland Derrick Hambrick, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed February 12, 2024
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File Nos. 69DU-CR-21-1202, 69DU-CR-21-3126

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie M. Willett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Victoria D. Wanta, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his petition for
postconviction relief, claiming that his right to counsel was not vindicated. We affirm
because appellant obtained representation by the Office of the Minnesota Appellate Public
Defender (OMAPD) before the district court issued the order now on appeal; and the
OMAPD, after having the opportunity to review the relevant pleadings and transcripts,
advised the court that it would not be submitting any filing in addition to appellant’s
previously filed pro se petition.
FACTS
Appellant Newland Derrick Hambrick had seven criminal cases pending against
him that were all resolved by a plea agreement. Under the terms of the agreement,
Hambrick was to plead guilty in two of the cases to one count of gross-misdemeanor
violation of a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO) in file No. 69DU-CR- 21-1202
and to one count of felony escape from lawful custody in file No. 69DU-CR-21 -3126
(collectively, the DANCO and escape cases) . The agreement provided that a third case,
for fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance (file No. 69DU-CR-21-3367), was to
be resolved with a stay of adjudication (the controlled-substance case).1 The remaining
four cases were to be dismissed. The district court accepted the plea agreement and

1 We note that the file in the controlled-substance case is not part of the appellate record in
the two matters on appeal—the DANCO and escape cases. Because the controlled-
substance case is referenced by the parties in this appeal, we take judicial notice of the file
in that case so that we may address the parties’ arguments in full.
3
Hambrick’s guilty pleas; the district court then sentenced Hambrick in accordance with the
agreement. Hambrick was represented by a public defender through sentencing.
In June 2022, about six weeks after his sentencing, Hambrick filed, pro se, a motion
titled “Motion for Remedy and Relief.” Hambrick’s motion referenced all his previously
charged files, including the DANCO and escape cases and the controlled-substance case.
Hambrick asked the court to set aside his convictions and grant him monetary damages
under numerous state statutes, including procedural statutes codifying the rules of civil
procedure, outlining the ability of courts to set aside judgments involving perjury, and
requiring court reporters to provide a complete record; statutes regulating attorney
misconduct, deceit or collusion by attorneys, and the unauthorized practice of law; and
other civil statutes related to securities fraud, insurance, and unconsc ionable commercial
contracts.2 The motion further asked the court to “satisfy Mr. Hambrick’s loss[es]” and
“restor[e] Hambrick’s liberties and rights. ” Hambrick’s federal claims primarily
referenced 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2018), which allows an aggrieved person to pursue a civil
claim for deprivation of their civil rights. Hambrick then filed another “Motion for Remedy
and Relief” a few days later, reiterating his arguments and challenging the court’s
jurisdiction.
Neither of the motions submitted by Hambrick were forwarded by the court
administrator to the state public defender as is required for postconviction petitions under

2 Some of the statutes cited provide criminal sanctions in addition to civil remedies, but for
offenses wholly unrelated to any of the cases involving Hambrick.
4
Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd. 1(4) (2020). And the parties agree that Hambrick never waived
his right to counsel.
In response to the motions, the district court issued an order denying the relief
sought under the various, primarily civil, statutes cited by Hambrick; “liberally” construed
the balance of the relief sought as a guilty-plea withdrawal request; and set the motions for
a hearing (the June 2022 order). Hambrick then advised the court that he did not want to
withdraw his guilty pleas and the hearing was cancelled.
In November 2022, Hambrick filed, pro se, a petition for postconviction relief in the
controlled-substance case. Hambrick requested that the court set aside all judgments made
final to April 20, 2021 , sought compensation for pain, suffering, and loss of liberty and
life, including compensatory relief under various federal civil statutes, and requested relief
under Minn. Stat. § 80A.68 (2022) (affording relief in securities fraud cases) to be “free
from fraudulent practices.”
The district court denied Hambrick’s November 2022 motion on the grounds, first,
that the motion was filed in the controlled-substance case, which did not arise until October
2021. The district court noted that Hambrick’s claims appeared to concern a hearing held
in April 2021 in a different case and that, as such, Hambrick’s “Petition does not challenge
the judgment in the present matter and does not state a basis for relief” under the
postconviction statute. Second, the district court reasoned that Hambrick’s petition
requested “monetary damages for alleged pain, suffering, loss of liberty and life, and
emotional and physical damages,” but that none of the federal or state statutes cited by
Hambrick provide him with the relief he requests. Third, the district court explained that
5
the forms of relief allowed in Minnesota’s postconviction statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.01
(2022), do not include claims for monetary damages.
In January 2023, the OMAPD informed the district court by letter that, as a result
of Hambrick’s application for a public defender a few months earlier, it had received a
copy of Hambrick’s pro se petitions and would assign him counsel in the DANCO and
escape cases. The OMAPD did not agree to represent Hambrick in the controlled-
substance case, as it “does not provide post-conviction representation on cases that were
resolved with a stay of adjudication disposition.” The appellate public defender who was
assigned the cases (the PD) requested time to review the files and to order and review
applicable transcripts. After completing the review, the PD sent a letter to the district court
in May 2023, stating:
After reviewing the files and speaking with Mr. Hambrick, he
would like our representation in this matter. However, we do
not have anything to add to what he has already filed. We
would just ask this Court to construe his postconviction
petition and memorandum as an affidavit, and grant the relief
requested by Mr. Hambrick in the interests of fairness and
justice. To clarify, Mr. Hambrick is not asking for plea
withdrawal, but, rather, he is asking for his convictions to be
vacated and dismissed for the reasons cited in his petition.
Thank you.

The district court then issued an order denying Hambrick’s motions for relief in the
DANCO and escape cases (the June 2023 order). The district court reasoned that the relief
requested had already been denied by the district court in its June 2022 and December 2022
orders.
Hambrick now appeals the district court’s June 2023 order.
6
DECISION
Hambrick argues that the June 2023 order of the district court should be reversed so
that he can proceed with a postconviction petition to vacate the convictions in his DANCO
and escape cases with the assistance of counsel. Hambrick contends the June 2023 order
is “unlawful” because it improperly references the December 2022 order in the controlled-
substance case, and because the district court reviewed Hambrick’s previous request for
relief in June 2022 without forwarding his petition to the OMAPD or securing a waiver of
his right to counsel . The state agrees with Hambrick that the order should be reversed
because the district court failed to advise Hambrick of his right to counsel before issuing
its June 2022 order.
On appeal, regardless of whether the parties agree as to the outcome, we
independently review whether the district court erred in applying the law to undisputed
facts. Bonga v. State, 765 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 2009); see also State v. Hannuksela ,
452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (noting that appellate courts have a duty to decide
cases in accordance with the law). We review a district court’s denial of a petition for
postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion, and we review questions of law de novo,
including whether a petitioner’s right to counsel was vindicated. Bonga, 765 N.W.2d at
642.
Criminal defendants are entitled to the assistance of counsel, and that right extends
to representation in a direct appeal or, if no direct appeal was brought, in a postconviction
proceeding. Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2006).
7
The failure to vindicate a defendant’s right to counsel is a structural error, requiring
reversal. Bonga, 765 N.W.2d at 643.
At the outset, we acknowledge that the district court erred in failing to forward
Hambrick’s initial pro se “Motion for Relief and Remedy” to the OMAPD. The district
court administrator is required to notify the state public defender when a pro se motion
seeking postconviction relief is filed in district court, but that did not occur in this case.
Minn. Stat. §§ 590.02, subd. 1(4), .05 (2020); Paone v. State, 658 N.W.2d 896, 899-900
(Minn. App. 2003) (holding that the remedy for a failure to forward a pro se petition
seeking relief is reversal and remand to permit the defendant to begin postconviction
proceedings again). If this appeal had been taken from the June 2022 order denying relief
when Hambrick was unrepresented, we would reverse the order and remand so that
Hambrick’s right to counsel could be vindicated.
But this appeal is not from the June 2022 order—it is from the June 2023 order.
Between the June 2022 order and the June 2023 order, Hambrick obtained representation
by the OMAPD. The OMAPD assigned Hambrick a PD in the DANCO and escape cases,
and the PD had a full opportunity to review the files. Hambrick thus received the remedy
he is now seeking—to be represented by counsel in a postconviction proceeding.
Hambrick argues, however, that the June 2023 order is invalid because it relies on
the June 2022 order. Hambrick also asserts that “because the court did not provide
Hambrick with counsel, he did not know he had the right to appeal the June 2022 order.”
But this argument ignores the fact that the OMAPD had the opportunity to identify any
errors in the district court’s June 2022 order and, presumably, to assert any additional
8
postconviction issues. In its letter to the court dated May 18, 2023, the OMAPD advised
the district court that “we do not have anything to add to what [Hambrick] has already
filed.” It thus appears that the OMAPD’s review of the file uncovered no errors in the June
2022 order or other issues to assert before the district court, particularly given the fact that
Hambrick did not want to withdraw his guilty pleas. On these facts, a reversal and remand
is unwarranted because Hambrick already received the relief he is now seeking.
Hambrick further argues that the district court erred by referencing the December
2022 order in its June 2023 order because that order was issued in the controlled-substance
case, not in the cases now on appeal. But the controlled-substance case was one of the
cases covered in the plea agreement. And, even if the reference was erroneous, we fail to
see how that reference prejudiced Hambrick. The December 2022 order was in response
to a motion that Hambrick filed only in the controlled-substance case. And, as the OMAPD
advised the court, the OMAPD could not represent Hambrick in the controlled-substance
case because it was resolved by a stay of adjudication, which does not constitute a
“conviction” as defined by Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5 (2022). See Johnston v. State,
955 N.W.2d 908, 913 (Minn. 2021) (“[T ]he plain meaning of the phrase ‘a person
convicted of a crime’ in section 590.01, subdivision 1, means a person who has a conviction
under Minnesota law.”); see also Lunzer v. State, 874 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Minn. App. 2016)
(concluding a stay of adjudication is not a “conviction” or a “sentence”). Thus, at worst,
the reference in the June 2023 order to the December 2022 o rder was errant, but not
prejudicial.
9
We conclude that, while the district court erred when the district court administrator
failed to forward Hambrick’s motions to the OMAPD, this error was cured when the
OMAPD accepted representation of Hambrick in connection with his postconviction
motions in the DANCO and escape cases. The OMAPD had a full opportunity, after
reviewing the applicable files, to assert postconviction issues on Hambrick’s behalf,
including a challenge to the district court’s June 2022 order. Hambrick’s right to counsel
for a postconviction proceeding was thus vindicated.
Affirmed.