Kieu Oanh T. Nguyen, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0984

Kieu Oanh T. Nguyen,
Appellant,

vs.

Frank Knapper, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed February 5, 2024
Reversed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Kanabec County District Court
File No. 33-CV-22-249

John G. Westrick, Savage Westrick, P.L.L.P., Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

John A. Abress, Franz Hultgren Evenson, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal arising from a dispute over the construction of a pole shed, appellant
argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting respondents’ motion to vacate
a default judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(f). Because clause (f)
is a residual clause and because respondents could have argued to vacate the default
judgment under rule 60.02(a), we reverse.
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FACTS
Appellant Kieu Oanh T. Nguyen challenges the district court’s order vacating a
default judgment against respondents Frank Knapper and his son Wayne Knapper. 1 In
August 2022, Nguyen filed a “consumer assistance request” with the Minnesota Attorney
General’s Office against Frank and Wayne. She asserted that she had hired Frank and
Wayne to build a pole shed on her property and that they had not completed any work on
the project. On October 3, the attorney general’s office sent the consumer assistance
request to Frank, requesting a response.
In the meantime, Nguyen also pursued a district court action. She served a civil
complaint on Frank and Wayne on September 26 and September 30, respectively. On
October 8, Nguyen served and filed an amended complaint. In her amended complaint,
Nguyen alleged as follows. Nguyen entered into a contract with Frank and Wayne to build
a pole shed for a total cost of $43,920. Under the contract, Frank and Wayne were to
remove trees from the property. Nguyen paid $22,000 to Frank as a down payment so that
Frank could purchase materials and begin performing work. Frank and Wayne did not start
work on the job site for several weeks after the written contract was signed. Frank and
Wayne removed the trees, but they left the stumps for Nguyen to remove. Nguyen hired a
septic company to remove the stumps and level the ground for Frank and Wayne to
construct the building. Frank and Wayne did not show up after the septic company removed

1 Because respondents share the same last name, we use their first names in this opinion.
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the stumps. Nguyen sought the return of the $22,000 she had paid to Frank and Wayne,
reimbursement of $1,000 for materials and other costs, and reimbursement for court costs.
At some point before October 17, Frank sent the attorney general’s office a response
to Nguyen’s consumer complaint. On October 20, Frank filed a letter with the district court,
enclosing a copy of the response that he had sent to the attorney general’s office. On
October 24, the district court issued a deficiency notice to Frank and Wayne informing
them that the documents had been rejected for failure to pay the filing fee.
The district court notified the parties of a scheduling hearing to be held on
January 10, 2023. Nguyen, Frank, and Wayne all appeared before the district court on that
date, and Frank and Wayne were informed of the deficiency in filing an answer.
On January 17, Nguyen filed a notice of motion and motion for default judgment
based on Frank and Wayne’s failure to file an answer. The district court held a hearing on
Nguyen’s motion on March 31. Frank and Wayne did not attend the default judgment
hearing, and Nguyen appeared pro se. At the hearing, the district court reviewed the
procedural history of the case, observing that Frank and Wayne were notified of the
deficiency in filing an answer, that they had not paid a filing fee to date, that they were
served with notice of Nguyen’s motion for default judgment, and that they had not appeared
for the hearing. The district court then swore in Nguyen as a witness. She testified that she
paid $22,000 to Frank and Wayne but they did not perform the work listed in the contract.
She also testified to other costs she had incurred to pursue the lawsuit. The district court
granted Nguyen’s motion and entered judgment against Frank and Wayne in the amount
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of $23,300. 2 In April, when Frank and Wayne had not satisfied the judgment, Nguyen
pursued garnishment proceedings against them both.
On May 23, following about a month of garnishment proceedings, Frank and Wayne
filed a motion to vacate the default judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
60.02(f). Frank submitted an affidavit describing the work that he claimed to have
performed. In a memorandum of law accompanying his motion, Frank argued that the
evidence in the record did not support Nguyen’s claim that Frank had not performed any
work because his supporting affidavit provided detailed information on the work that was
performed. Frank also argued that he was justified in stopping performance under the
contract, claiming that Nguyen anticipatorily breached the contract and had made
performance impossible. As for his failure to properly participate in the civil action, Frank
admitted to “dropping the ball” with his answer and gave no reason for not attending the
default-judgment hearing.
Wayne also provided an affidavit showing the work that he had done and stating
that he “did not sign the contract.” In his memorandum of law accompanying his motion,
Wayne argued that he could not be liable because the record shows that he was not a party
to the contract. Wayne did not address his failure to properly participate in the civil action.

2 This amount is the total of the $22,000 down payment, $800 for sand that Nguyen had
purchased for the building, and $500 in court costs.

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In June, the district court held a hearing on Frank and Wayne’s motion to vacate
default judgment. Frank and Wayne appeared with their attorney, 3 and Nguyen appeared
pro se. Following arguments from the parties, the district court confirmed with respondents
that they were not making a claim of “excusable neglect,” which is governed by Minnesota
Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(a), but rather were relying only upon an “equitable
argument” under rule 60.02(f)—the residual clause. The district court stated that it was
going to grant Frank and Wayne’s motion under rule 60.02(f). It explained, “[W]ith the
law not favoring default judgments, with the issue about whether Mr. Wayne Knapper’s
actually part of this contract, I’m going to grant the defense motion and vacate the
judgment.” The district court thereafter issued a one-page order, stating that the motion to
vacate default judgment was granted and that the judgment was vacated. The order
contained no findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Nguyen appeals.
DECISION
Nguyen contends that the district court abused its discretion by granting Frank and
Wayne’s motion to vacate under rule 60.02(f).
“The decision to vacate judgment under rule 60.02 rests within the district court’s
discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Meyer v. Best W.
Seville Plaza Hotel, 562 N.W.2d 690, 694 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn. June 26,
1997). The district court abuses its discretion if it “acts under a misapprehension of the law

3 Frank and Wayne are jointly represented in this appeal and were jointly represented in
the district court as well.
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or when its factual findings are clearly erroneous.” Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611,
620 (Minn. 2016) (quotations and citations omitted).
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure grant district courts the authority to vacate
judgments in a variety of circumstances. Rule 60.02 lists six:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(b) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59.03;
(c) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party;
(d) The judgment is void;
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or
(f) Any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.

Frank and Wayne moved to vacate the judgment under only clause (f). Nguyen
argues that vacating the judgment under that clause was an abuse of discretion.
Clause (f) is “a residual clause, designed only to afford relief in those circumstances
exclusive of the specific areas addressed by clauses (a) through (e).” Chapman v. Special
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 454 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn. 1990). Relief is available under clause (f)
only in “exceptional circumstances and then, only if the basis for the motion is other than
that specified under clauses (a) and (e).” Id. When a motion is properly brought under
clause (f), relief “is appropriate when the equities weigh heavily in favor of the party
seeking relief and relief is required to avoid an unconscionable result.” Hovelson v. U.S.
7
Swim & Fitness, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 137, 142- 43 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 16, 1990).
Clause (a) addresses the “specific area” here. See Chapman, 454 N.W.2d at 924.
The district court granted default judgment for Nguyen because Frank and Wayne had not
properly participated in the lawsuit: they failed to pay the filing fee for their answer; they
were informed of the deficiency; and they did not attend the default judgment hearing, even
though they knew the lawsuit was ongoing. And, between the two of them, the only
explanation offered was that Frank “dropp[ed] the ball.” Under these circumstances,
clause (a)— specifically, “excusable neglect” —was the proper analytical framework for
Frank and Wayne’s motion to vacate. See, e.g., Northland Temps., Inc. v. Turpin, 744
N.W.2d 398, 405 (Minn. App. 2008) (applying clause (a) to default judgment granted
following failure to answer).4
But, rather than trying to establish that relief was warranted under clause (a), Frank
and Wayne argued that vacating the judgment would be “equitable” and therefore was
warranted under clause (f). Frank asserted in his motion to vacate that the record did not
support the damages awarded to Nguyen. He claimed that he had completed $22,000 worth
of work and stopped work only because he learned that Nguyen would be unable to pay for
further work under the contract. And Wayne asserted in his motion to vacate that, because

4 A four-part test governs when relief is available for excusable neglect under clause (a).
Finden v. Klass, 128 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1964) (explaining that the defendant must
establish (1) a reasonable defense on the merits, (2) a reasonable excuse for failure to
answer, (3) due diligence, and (4) absence of prejudice to the other party). The four-part
Finden test does not apply to motions to vacate under clause (f). Buck Blacktop, Inc. v.
Gary Contracting & Trucking Co., 929 N.W.2d 12, 19 (Minn. App. 2019).
8
he did not sign the contract, he was not a party to it and therefore could not be found liable.
In other words, both Frank and Wayne both argued that judgment should be vacated
because they have a defense on the merits. But having a possible defense on the merits is
not an “exceptional circumstance” that falls outside the “specific area” of clause (a) when
default judgment is granted based on failure to properly respond to a lawsuit. See Chapman,
454 N.W.2d at 924.
Clause (a) addresses the circumstance leading to the default judgment here;
accordingly, clause (f) does not apply. The district court abused its discretion by granting
Frank and Wayne’s motion to vacate the default judgment.
Reversed.