State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1025

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jordan King LaBelle,
Appellant.

Filed July 8, 2024
Affirmed; motion denied
Slieter, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-21-1997

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Symon Schindler-Sym e, Assistant County
Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;
and Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
This is a direct appeal from the district court’s judgment of conviction for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, malicious punishment of a child, and possession of
child pornography. Appellant Jordan King LaBelle requests that this court reverse and
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remand for a new trial on the criminal-sexual-conduct and malicious-punishment-of -a-
child counts, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting improper
relationship evidence. LaBelle also requests that this court reverse his conviction for
possession of child pornography, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew or should have known the pornographic character
of the photos on his cell phone.1 Because the district court acted within its discretion to
allow the admission of relationship evidence and there exists sufficient evidence to support
his conviction for possession of child pornography, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged LaBelle by complaint with,
as relevant to this appeal, two counts of first- degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(a) (2014); one count of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.343, subdivision 1(a)
(2014); two counts of malicious punishment of a child pursuant to Minnesota Statutes

1 LaBelle submitted a pro se supplemental brief arguing that we should reverse the
convictions because (1) some testimony was untruthful and (2) his prior convictions were
also based on untrue allegations. The state moved to strike LaBelle’s pro se brief.

Upon reviewing LaBelle’s pro se brief, we discern no reviewable claim of error. His
arguments are unsupported by citation to legal authority and would require us to
impermissibly review matters outside the record on appeal and engage in fact-finding and
credibility determinations. See State v. Ivy, 873 N.W.2d 362, 367 (Minn. App. 2015), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2016) (“It is not [this court’s] role as a reviewing court to evaluate
the credibility of the evidence.”); State v. C.J.M., 409 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Minn. App. 1987),
rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987) (“It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the
credibility of witnesses in a criminal trial.” ). Consequently, we decline to address
LaBelle’s claims and deny the state’s motion to strike as moot.
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section 609.377, subdivision 2 (2014); and one count of possession of child pornography
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 617.247, subdivision 4(a) (2014). These charges
stemmed from allegations of years of physical abuse against LaBelle’s son, C.L., and
allegations of physical and sexual abuse against his daughter, S.C.
The case proceeded to a jury trial from which the following facts are derived.
LaBelle began to physically abuse C.L. when C.L. was 10 years old, at which point LaBelle
and the children’s mother, B.L., were still in a romantic relationship and living together
with the children. But B.L. and the children eventually moved out, and the children would
occasionally visit LaBelle at his apartment.
C.L. testified that LaBelle physically abused him by punching him and hitting him
with a belt hard enough to leave bruises. C.L. also testified that LaBelle choked him. The
abuse continued until C.L. was approximately 12 years old. C.L. did not report the abuse
to his mother.
LaBelle began to physically and sexually abuse S.C. when she was eight years old,
when the family still lived together. S.C. testified that LaBelle would hit her in the head
and stomach hard enough to leave a mark. LaBelle also penetrated S.C.’s vagina with his
penis, hands, and a purple vibrator; performed oral sex on her; and forced her to kiss him
and perform oral sex on him. The abuse ended when B.L. stopped letting S.C. visit LaBelle
at his apartment— S.C. was 11 years old at this time.
In 2019, S.C. reported the physical abuse to B.L. and B.L. called the police, but the
police only filed a report because there was no physical evidence. In 2020, when S.C. was
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12 years old, she finally reported the sexual abuse to B.L., and B.L. reported the sexual
abuse to law enforcement.
In 2020, after S.C. reported the sexual abuse, S.C. and C.L were interviewed at the
Family Advocacy Center where they each provided a detailed account of the abuse their
father inflicted on them. During the interview, S.C. acknowledged that LaBelle took
photos of intimate parts of her body. This led investigators to search LaBelle’s cell phone
on which they found seven pictures of female genitalia. An investigator testified that when
he asked LaBelle about the pictures on his cell phone, LaBelle said he was not sure what
pictures the investigator was talking about, but that “they were either from a gal he was
talking with or several gals he was talking with or they’re images of his daughter.” LaBelle
further explained that S.C.’s cell phone had been confiscated at school and after he
retrieved the cell phone, he looked through it and found photos S.C. took of herself.
LaBelle claimed that he sent the photos to himself and then, from his cell phone, sent them
to B.L.
B.L. testified that LaBelle never sent her nude photos of S.C. S.C. testified that
LaBelle took nude photos of her “private parts” with a cell phone, and she identified her
body in five of the seven nude photos recovered from LaBelle’s cell phone.
LaBelle also testified at trial and denied the allegations.
Before instructions were given to the jury, the state dismissed the count of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the
remaining charges. The district court entered judgments of conviction and imposed an
aggravated sentence of 288 months’ imprisonment for one count of first-degree criminal
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sexual conduct and concurrent sentences of one year imprisonment for malicious
punishment of C.L. and 46 months’ imprisonment for possession of child pornography .
Sentences were not pronounced on the other two convicted counts. LaBelle appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court acted within its discretion by admitting relationship
evidence.

LaBelle challenges the admission of the following two categories of relationship
evidence at trial: (1) “general relationship evidence” and (2) testimony about his prior
convictions for domestic abuse and stalking. Because some of the evidence was objected
to and some not, causing different standards of review to apply, we address each in turn.
General Relationship Evidence
LaBelle contends that the district court erred by admitting various items of general
relationship evidence pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 (2022). LaBelle
argues that admission of this evidence was error because the probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of its prejudicial effect on the jury.
At trial, both children testified that they once witnessed LaBelle throw glass bowls
at B.L. and that once, when they got too close while sitting together or playing, LaBelle
became upset and called C.L. a “pervert.” B.L. testified about the abusive nature of her
relationship with LaBelle.
LaBelle did not object to the admission of this evidence during trial. Appellate
courts review unobjected-to errors for plain error. State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804
(Minn. 2016). To establish reversible error under the plain-error test, “a criminal defendant
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must show that (1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the
defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. “If any prong of the test is not met, the claim fails.”
State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681, 690 (Minn. 2006). And, even if a defendant
demonstrates plain error, an appellate court should “correct the error only when it seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Pulczinski v.
State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022). We discern no error in the district court’s
refraining from sua sponte excluding this general relationship evidence.
Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 provides that “[e]vidence of domestic conduct
by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household
members, is admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.” This type of evidence “is relevant because it illuminate[s] the
history of the relationship between the victim and defendant and may also help prove
motive or assist the jury in assessing witness credibility.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d
543, 549 (Minn. 2010).
The defense counsel’s opening statement and cross-examination of the witnesses
challenged S.C. and C.L.’s credibility, including their delay in reporting the abuse. The
state addressed these challenges by asking why S.C. and C.L. did not report the abuse
earlier. Both victims explained that it was because they did not want to endanger their
mother.
B.L.’s testimony about the abusive nature of her relationship with LaBelle and the
children’s testimony that they witnessed LaBelle throw glass bowls at B.L. provided
context for the delayed reporting issue and bolstered their credibility after it had been
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challenged. This testimony’s substantial probative value regarding the issues of credibility
and delayed reporting was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Additionally, the district court provided a cautionary instruction limiting the use of
relationship evidence during trial and during its final instructions to the jury. We discern
no violation of section 634.20 and conclude that the district court did not err by not
excluding this relationship evidence. See State v. Word, 755 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. App.
2008) (concluding no plain error where the relationship evidence provided context to a
challenge to the witness’ credibility); State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App.
2017) (observing that “the district court’s cautionary instructions lessened any probability
that the jury would rely improperly on relationship evidence”).
Regarding the testimony about LaBelle’s “pervert” comment, it is unclear how this
statement is “evidence of domestic conduct,” and LaBelle makes no attempt to explain how
it is properly characterized as relationship evidence. We discern no error in the district
court’s not excluding this testimony pursuant to section 634.20.
Because there was no error in the admission of the general relationship evidence
LaBelle complains of, we need not reach the remaining factors of plain-error analysis. See
Jackson, 714 N.W.2d at 690.
Testimony About Prior Convictions
LaBelle also argues that B.L.’s testimony about his two prior convictions were
(1) inadmissible as relationship evidence and (2) unduly prejudicial. Evidentiary rulings
are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291
(Minn. 2019). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an
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erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation
omitted). The “appellant has the burden of establishing that the district court abused its
discretion that [the] appellant was thereby prejudiced.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201,
203 (Minn. 2003). Because LaBelle objected at trial, the harmless-error standard applies.
State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Minn. 2016). “Under the harmless-error standard,
an appellant who alleges an error in the admission of evidence that does not implicate a
constitutional right must prove that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully
admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted).
At trial, B.L. testified that LaBelle was convicted of domestic assault for an offense
committed in August 2008 and that he was convicted of stalking for an offense committed
in June 2017.
Though LaBelle objected to the admission of this evidence at trial, he did not raise
the particular argument he makes on appeal— that testimony about his convictions is not
“evidence of domestic conduct” within the meaning of section 634.20. On appeal, a party
cannot “obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a
different theory.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988); see Roby v. State,
547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (applying Thiele in a criminal case). Because LaBelle
failed to raise this argument below, and he provides no argument as to why this court should
exercise discretion to review it, we deem this argument forfeited. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d
at 582.
And even if we did not consider LaBelle’s argument forfeited , it would fail on the
merits. LaBelle argues that the “plain language [of section 634.20] does not allow
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admission of a defendant’s prior conviction” and that evidence of a conviction does not
serve the purpose of the statute which is to allow evidence illuminating the history of the
parties’ relationship. We disagree.
In interpreting the meaning of a statute, this court applies a de novo standard of
review. State v. Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Minn. App. 2010). Section 634.20 uses
the phrase “[e]vidence of domestic conduct,” and provides a nonexhaustive list of what
may constitute “domestic conduct.” Further, the statute does not limit how the evidence
must be presented. See Minn. Stat. § 634.20. A conviction is evidence that the domestic
conduct underlying the crime occurred—and though the conviction is evidence that a
defendant was criminally convicted of the conduct, this does not mean that the conviction
is not admissible as evidence of the conduct.
Because section 634.20 does not limit the form or presentation of the evidence of
domestic conduct, we will not read such a limitation into the statute. See State v. Suspitsyn,
941 N.W.2d 423, 429- 30 (Minn. App. 2020) (explaining appellate courts do not add to a
statute “what the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks” (quotation
omitted)). W e are persuaded that the testimony about LaBelle’s prior convictions for
stalking and domestic abuse is evidence of the domestic conduct underlying the convictions
and conclude that admission of testimony about the convictions was within the district
court’s discretion. And, because LaBelle has identified no error, we need not complete a
harmless-error analysis.
Alternatively, LaBelle argues that it was unduly prejudicial to admit testimony
about his prior convictions. LaBelle argues that the evidence was minimally relevant
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because the convictions did not make it more or less likely that he committed sexual or
physical abuse against his children and the danger that the jury would use these convictions
as impermissible character evidence substantially outweighed the minimal relevance. We
are not persuaded.
Section 634.20 excludes evidence of domestic conduct if “the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” (Emphasis added).
“Relationship evidence is relevant because it illuminate[s] the history of the relationship
between the victim and defendant and may also help prove motive or assist the jury in
assessing witness credibility.” Matthews, 779 N.W.2d at 549.
Evidence of LaBelle’s prior convictions for stalking and domestic abuse against
B.L. was relevant to demonstrate the history of LaBelle’s relationship with his family.
Additionally, admission of LaBelle’s prior domestic convictions against B.L. assisted the
jury in assessing S.C.’s and C.L.’s credibility because they testified that they did not
initially report their abuse due to fear for B.L.’s safety. Furthermore, any unfair prejudice
was mitigated by the district court’s cautionary instruction before the evidence was
presented and when it read its final instructions to the jury. See Andersen, 900 N.W.2d at
441. We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion to allow evidence of
LaBelle’s prior convictions.
II. The evidence was sufficient to prove LaBelle knew or should have known that
his cell phone contained pornographic photos of a minor.

LaBelle also argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he knew the
pornographic character of the photographs on his cell phone—an element that the state was
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required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for possession of child
pornography. See Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(a).
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts review the record
to determine “whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach their verdict.” State v. Olhausen, 681
N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 2004). The reviewing court assumes the jury believed evidence that
supported the verdict and disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict. Id.
“[Appellate courts] will not disturb the verdict if the jury, while acting with proper regard
for the presumption of innocence and regard for the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged
offense.” Id. at 25-26.
A finding of guilt can be based on direct or circumstantial evidence, but the test used
by appellate courts to evaluate whether sufficient evidence was produced varies dependent
on the type of evidence used to prove the element at issue. The parties disagree about the
nature of the evidence used to prove LaBelle’s knowledge. B ut we are satisfied that the
state’s burden was met under either test.
Direct Evidence
“[D]irect evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation
and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895
N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation and alteration omitted). When an element of an
offense is supported by direct evidence, this court’s review is limited “to a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
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favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict that they
did.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016). We must assume that “the jury
believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v.
Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989).
S.C. testified that LaBelle took nude photos of her with his cell phone and identified
herself in five of the seven nude photographs recovered from LaBelle’s cell phone. “[A]
conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness.” State v.
Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). We therefore conclude
that, under the direct -evidence test, S.C.’s testimony was sufficient to prove that LaBelle
knew or had reason to know of the pornographic content and character of the photos on his
cell phone.
Circumstantial Evidence
Even if, as LaBelle contends, the evidence used to prove the knowledge element
was circumstantial, we are convinced that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
conviction. Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer
whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist” and always requires an inferential step.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation omitted).
“Under the circumstantial-evidence standard, [appellate courts ] apply a two -step
analysis.” State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). We first identify the
circumstances that were proved at trial. Id. At this step, the reviewing court defers to “the
jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances” and “consider[s] only those
circumstances that are consistent with the verdict.” Id. at 598-99 (quotations omitted).
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Second, the reviewing court determines whether the circumstances, when viewed
“as a whole,” are “consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). At this step, appellate courts do not defer to
the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable inferences. Id. “Circumstantial evidence must
form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt
of the defendant as t o exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other
than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). If
it does not, the conviction must be reversed. Id. at 475.
Circumstances Proved
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the following are
the circumstances proved relevant to the knowledge element:
• LaBelle took nude photographs of S.C.’s “private parts” with a cell phone.

• Seven nude photographs of female genitalia and breasts were found on
LaBelle’s cell phone.

• Five of the seven nude photographs recovered from LaBelle’s cell phone
were of S.C.

• S.C. was under the age of 14 when LaBelle took these photographs.

• LaBelle is S.C.’s father.

• When the photos were being taken, LaBelle accused S.C. of “seeing other
people.”

• LaBelle sexually abused S.C. repeatedly over the course of approximately
three years.

The circumstances proved are consistent with LaBelle’s guilt.
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No Reasonable Alternative Hypothesis
LaBelle argues, however, that the circumstances proved are also consistent with
rational hypotheses other than guilt. Specifically, that (1) he did not view the photos and
(2) he did not have them for a purpose that was pornographic. We are not persuaded. In
determining the circumstances proved, we presumed that the jury rejected these same
claims by LaBelle at trial and we must defer to the jury’s credibility determination. See
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598-99 (explaining that appellate courts “consider only those
circumstances that are consistent with the verdict . . . because the jury is in the best position
to evaluate the credibility of the evidence” (citation omitted)). And because we also
presume that the jury credited S.C. ’s testimony that LaBelle took the photographs, it
necessarily follows that LaBelle was aware of their content.
The jury heard testimony from LaBelle that he took the pictures “to ensure S.C. was
not injured.” But, as we stated, the jury rejected LaBelle’s claim and it is therefore not part
of the circumstances proved. It is not rational to conclude that LaBelle took the photos
merely “to ensure S.C. was not injured” and for no other pornographic purpose. This
hypothesis ignores the greater context of the repeated sexual abuse LaBelle inflicted on
S.C. and no rational jury, having found LaBelle guilty of criminal sexual conduct against
S.C., could have come to the conclusion that LaBelle proposes. LaBelle points to no other
evidence which would support a rational hypothesis other than guilt, and mere speculation
does not support a rational hypothesis other than guilt. See State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d
849, 858 (Minn. 2008) (“[W]e will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” (quotations omitted)).
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We thus conclude that, even under the circumstantial-evidence test, the evidence
was sufficient to prove that LaBelle knew his cell phone contained pornographic photos of
S.C.
Affirmed; motion denied.