State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1030

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jesse Wayne Blaylock,
Appellant.

Filed July 22, 2024
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CR-19-6397

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian A. Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Shane E. Simonds, Assistant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Wheelock , Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for attempted first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his presentence motion to withdraw his Norgaard guilty plea. He also argues that
2
the district court abused its discretion at sentencing by denying his motion for a downward
dispositional sentencing departure. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying either motion, we affirm.
FACTS
In November 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jesse Wayne
Blaylock with second- degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.343, subdivision 1(a) (2014), attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(a) (2014), and attempted
second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.343,
subdivision 1(a) (2014 ). The complaint alleged that, in 2015, Blaylock told his then-
girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter to remove her clothes down to her underwear. The
girl’s mother was not home at the time. Blaylock then touched the child’s inner thigh near
her genital area and underwear, and he partially undressed him self. When the victim’s
mother returned home unexpectedly, Blaylock dragged the victim to the bathroom, told her
to get dressed, and said that he would hurt her mother if she told anyone what happened.
The victim thought that Blaylock was not sober on the day of the alleged offense. The
victim disclosed the incident to a friend almost four years later, saying “I’m done hiding,”
resulting in her father contacting law enforcement.
In December 2022, just before the scheduled trial, Blaylock and the state reached a
plea agreement. The parties agreed that Blaylock would enter a Norgaard guilty plea to
one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and the state would dismiss the other
3
charges.1 The plea agreement called for a “maximum potential [sentence] of 48 months.”
The agreement also permitted Blaylock to argue for a downward dispositional departure.
Blaylock signed a plea petition reflecting the parties’ agreement and a Norgaard
addendum. In the Norgaard addendum, Blaylock acknowledged that he reviewed the
evidence the state would offer against him at trial, he did not recall the circumstances of
the offense, he believed there was a substantial likelihood that he would be found guilty if
the state’s evidence was presented at trial, he did not claim he is innocent, he would be
convicted of the offense if the court accepted the plea, and his lack of memory would not
impact his sentence, probation, or collateral consequences stemming from his conviction.
That same day, Blaylock entered a Norgaard guilty plea in district court. At the
start of the hearing, counsel for the state described the plea agreement. When discussing
the terms of the agreement, the state noted that the plea “implicates registration,” as well
as a ten-year period of conditional release. Blaylock’s attorney agreed.
Blaylock was then examined by his attorney, the state, and the district court
regarding the terms of the plea agreement and the rights he was giving up by pleading
guilty. Most of Blaylock’s testimony was established by leading questions. On
examination by defense counsel and the state, Blaylock acknowledged that he did not
completely remember the conduct underlying the allegations, that he was intoxicated, that

1 A defendant may enter a Norgaard guilty plea if they “claim[] a loss of memory, through
amnesia or intoxication, regarding the circumstances of the offense” and agree that the
record establishes that the state’s evidence is sufficient to persuade the defendant and their
counsel “that the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged.”
State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994); see also State ex rel.
Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1961).
4
he had reviewed the state’s evidence, and that there was a substantial likelihood the state’s
evidence was sufficient to convict him. At the hearing, Blaylock confirmed that he had
signed the plea petition and the Norgaard addendum, which contained similar
acknowledgments. The district court observed that Blaylock appeared “clearheaded” and
seemed to “understand the plea negotiation.” The district court received the signed plea
petition and the Norgaard addendum into the record. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
district court took the matter under advisement so the court could review the evidence
underlying the plea before deciding whether to accept it.
After reviewing the evidence, the district court issued a written order accepting the
Norgaard guilty plea for second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The court determined
that Blaylock entered a valid Norgaard guilty plea, that the state’s evidence provided a
strong factual basis to support the plea, and that there was a substantial likelihood that
Blaylock would be convicted if the case were to go to trial. The court also concluded that
the Norgaard guilty plea “was accurately, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.”
In February 2023, with a new attorney, Blaylock moved to withdraw his plea.
Blaylock argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and, as a result, he did
not knowingly and intelligently enter the plea. Specifically, Blaylock claimed that his
previous attorney did not accurately advise him of the “collateral consequences of entering
into said plea agreement, including the fact and duration of the predatory offender
registration requirement.” Blaylock also argued that his plea was not accurate because the
factual basis was established by leading questions and because the district court did not
expressly find that Blaylock was unable to remember the circumstances of the offense due
5
to intoxication. In support of his motion, Blaylock submitted affidavits from himself, his
fiancé, and his friend, all of whom were present for discussions Blaylock had with his prior
attorney regarding the plea. In his affidavit, Blaylock stated that he would not have pleaded
guilty to the criminal-sexual-conduct offense if he had understood that his plea would result
in mandatory predatory-offender registration for life.
By a written order, the district court denied Blaylock’s motion to withdraw his plea.
The district court first concluded that Blaylock had not demonstrated that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel —specifically relating to the predatory-registration
requirement. The district court noted that “[e] ach witness, including [Blaylock], has a
different recollection of the statements made by counsel about registration” and the
witnesses did not consistently allege that Blaylock was “misadvised about the duration and
mechanics of registration.” Because the witness affidavits did not align, the district court
concluded that Blaylock had not demonstrated that he was misadvised by his attorney about
registration. The district court also rejected Blaylock’s argument that his plea was
inaccurate, concluding that Blaylock’s testimony and acknowledgement of the Norgaard
addendum established a sufficient factual basis to support the plea. The matter then
proceeded to sentencing.
Prior to sentencing, Blaylock moved for a downward dispositional sentencing
departure on the basis that he is particularly amenable to probation. The district court
denied the motion and sentenced Blaylock to 48 months’ imprisonment and ten years of
conditional release. This appeal follows.
6
DECISION
Blaylock argues that the district court abused its discretion b y denying his
presentence plea-withdrawal motion. Alternatively, Blaylock claims that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure. For
the reasons set forth below, we conclude that neither argument warrants reversal.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Blaylock’s motion for
plea withdrawal.

“A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a valid guilty plea.”
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643 , 646 (Minn. 2007). But a district court “[i]n its
discretion . . . may allow the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it
is fair and just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. When considering whether to
grant a presentence plea-withdrawal motion, the district court must “give due
consideration” to “the reasons a defendant advances to support withdrawal” and the
“prejudice granting the motion would cause the [s]tate given reliance on the plea.”
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). The defendant has
the burden to prove withdrawal is fair and just, and the state has the burden to prove
prejudice. Id.
We review a district court’s fair-and-just determination for “abuse of discretion,”
and we will reverse “only in the rare case.” Id. (quotation omitted). In considering whether
the district court abused its discretion, we review a district court’s legal determinations
de novo. Id. at 94; State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 715 (Minn. 2019). We review the
factual findings underlying the district court’s legal determinations for clear error.
7
Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 600 (Minn. 2017); State v. Brown, 896 N.W.2d 557,
560 (Minn. App. 2017) , rev. denied (Minn. July 18, 2017). We give great deference to a
district court’s factual determinations and will not set them aside unless we are “left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” State v. Evans,
756 N.W.2d 854, 870 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). And we defer to the district
court’s credibility determinations. State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App.
2012).
Blaylock contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
presentence plea-withdrawal motion because his plea was invalid. “To be constitutionally
valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Bonnell v. State,
984 N.W.2d 224, 226-27 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). When a guilty plea is invalid,
it is fair and just to withdraw the plea. See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 646, 651 (declining to
analyze plea under fair-and-just standard after determining plea was invalid).
Specifically, Blaylock argues that his plea was unintelligent and involuntary
because the plea was the result of affirmative misadvice by his prior attorney regarding the
predatory-offender-registration requirements arising from pleading guilty. And Blaylock
argues that his plea was not accurate because the district court did not expressly find that
he lacked a memory of the offense due to intoxication and because the plea’s factual basis
was established by leading questions. We address each argument in turn.
8
A. The district court did not err by concluding that Blaylock did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel.

Blaylock argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his
plea, rendering it unintelligent and involuntary. The requirement that a plea i s intelligent
and voluntary ensures the defendant understands “the charges, the rights to be waived, and
the consequences of the plea” and accepts the plea without being subject to improper
pressures. Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016); State v. Trott,
338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983).
Blaylock claims that the affidavits he filed in support of his plea-withdrawal motion
demonstrate that his attorney affirmatively misrepresented the predatory- offender-
registration consequences of pleading guilty and maintains that he would not have pleaded
guilty if he had received accurate advice. On this basis, he claims his plea was unintelligent
and involuntary. The state argues that the district court correctly determined that
Blaylock’s affidavits are inconsistent and do not establish that Blaylock received
affirmative misadvice from his attorney.
A defendant considering a plea agreement has the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Eason v. State, 950 N.W.2d 258, 267 (Minn. 2020). When a defendant asserts
counsel was ineffective, this court evaluates their claims according to the two-prong test
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 687 (1984). Andersen v. State,
830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013). Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show
“(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
9
would have insisted on going to trial.” State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn.
App. 2017) (quotations omitted). Application of the Strickland test involves a mixed
question of law and fact, which we review de novo. State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591
(Minn. 2017). “[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was
reasonable.” Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10.
In determining whether ineffective assistance of counsel renders a plea invalid,
Minnesota courts distinguish between counsel’s advice about “direct” and “collateral”
consequences. Sames v. State, 805 N.W.2d 565, 567- 68 (Minn. App. 2011) , rev denied
(Minn. Dec. 21, 2011). Direct consequences are those which have “a definite, immediate
and automatic effect on the range of a defendant’s punishment” such as the maximum
sentence. Id. at 568 (quoting Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 904 n.6 (Minn. 2002)).
Collateral consequences “are civil and regulatory in nature and are imposed in the interest
of public safety.” Id. (quoting Kaiser, 641 N.W.2d at 905). An attorney must accurately
advise their client about the direct consequences of a guilty plea. See id. at 567-68. But a
failure to advise about a collateral consequence is not necessarily objectively unreasonable
under Strickland. Id. at 568. The requirement to register as a predatory offender is a
collateral consequence of a guilty plea. Taylor, 887 N.W.2d at 823-24. And the supreme
court has held that “a defense attorney’s failure to advise a defendant about predatory-
offender-registration requirements before the defendant enters a guilty plea does not violate
a defendant’s rights to the effective assistance of counsel under the United States and
Minnesota Constitutions.” Id. at 826 (emphasis added).
10
Nevertheless, when an attorney affirmatively misadvises a client about collateral
consequences which are “succinct, clear, and explicit,” courts have concluded such advice
is objectively unreasonable. See Ellis-Strong , 899 N.W.2d at 539- 40. F or example, in
Ellis-Strong, we considered whether affirmative misadvice about the predatory- offender-
registration period resulting from a guilty plea was objectively unreasonable under
Strickland. Id. at 535. In that case, the “attorney gave Ellis-Strong incorrect advice that
he faced ten years of registering as a predatory offender, when he actually faced lifelong
registration.” Id. at 539. We held that the advice was objectively unreasonable under
Strickland because the predatory-registration statute at issue was “succinct, clear, and
explicit” regarding the mandatory lifetime registration requirement. Id. at 540. Therefore,
Ellis-Strong instructs that affirmative misadvice about the applicability of predatory-
offender-registration requirements following a guilty plea can constitute objectively
unreasonable advice. Id.
Here, the district court concluded that Blaylock had not met his burden to show that
his attorney gave affirmative misadvice regarding predatory-offender registration. The
district court found that the three affidavits relied upon by Blaylock to support his motion
“do not align” and that each contained a “different recollection of the statements made by
counsel about registration.” In support of these findings, the district court identified
specific statements in the affidavits that suggest Blaylock was told that registration with
local authorities was mandatory, and other specific statements which suggest that he was
not told he would need to register as a predatory offender as a result of the plea. In
concluding that Blaylock had not demonstrated that he received affirmative misadvice
11
regarding registration, the district court further noted that “registration” was mentioned at
the plea hearing and Blaylock “agreed that he understood the various terms of the plea
agreement.”
To support his argument that the district court erred by concluding that he did not
receive affirmative misadvice, Blaylock points to several statements in his own affidavit.
First, Blaylock claims that his attorney’s statement that he “would only be required to check
in with local authorities” was misadvice because registration is administered by the
statewide Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA). Second, Blaylock claims that his
attorney told him that “we would argue about registration,” even though predatory-offender
registration is a mandatory consequence of the plea. Third, Blaylock claims that he
received misadvice because “the fact that registration was mandatory for LIFE was never
mentioned at all.” We address each specific argument in turn and conclude that the district
court did not err by determining that Blaylock failed to prove that he received affirmative
misadvice of counsel regarding registration.
Registration with Local Authorities
Blaylock argues that it was misadvice for his attorney to instruct him that “he would
only have to check in with local authorities” because registration is administered by the
statewide BCA and persons who register are included in a state wide database. This
argument is unavailing. Under state law, persons required to register as predatory offenders
must “register with the corrections agent” assigned to them or “ with the law enforcement
authority that has jurisdiction in the area of the person’s primary address” if they do not
have, or cannot locate, a corrections agent assigned to them. Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
12
subd. 3(a) (2022). Once a predatory offender registers with local law enforcement or a
corrections agent, the registration information is forwarded to the BCA. Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subds. 3(a), 4(c) (2022). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Blaylock’s
attorney provided affirmative misadvice regarding the registration process.
Argument Regarding Registration
Second, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting
Blaylock’s claim that his attorney misadvised him about registration by telling him that
they would “argue about registration” at the plea hearing. The district court declined to
credit Blaylock’s statement in this regard and therefore rejected the argument, noting that
the affidavits provided by Blaylock “do not align.” As highlighted by the district court,
the affidavit from Blaylock’s friend recalls that “[t]he attorney told us [Blaylock] wouldn’t
be registered as a sex offender,” and Blaylock “would only have to register with local
authorities for a limited amount of time.” But Blaylock’s affidavit states that Blaylock
“would argue about registration and . . . would only be required to check in with local
authorities.” These recollections are inconsistent and contradictory. Blaylock’s friend
represents that the attorney rejected the possibility of predatory- offender registration,
whereas Blaylock represents that his attorney suggested he could be required to register.
The third affidavit—from Blaylock’s fiancé —did not mention either statement. We are
not “left with the definite and firm conviction” that the district court made a mistake when
it declined to credit either of the contradictory statements. See Evans , 756 N.W.2d at 870
(quotation omitted). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court
in this regard.
13
Lifetime Registration
Finally, Blaylock argues that his attorney provided misadvice by failing to explain
that Blaylock would need to register as a predatory offender for life if he pleaded guilty.
This argument is unavailing. As noted above, “defense attorney’s failure to advise a
defendant about predatory-offender -registration requirements before the defendant enters
a guilty plea does not violate a defendant’s rights to the effective assistance of counsel
under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.” Taylor, 887 N.W.2d at 826. In
other words, a lack of advice regarding the duration of registration does not equate to
affirmative misadvice.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Blaylock’s reliance on this court’s decision in
Ellis-Strong. In Ellis- Strong, we held that defense counsel affirmatively misadvised a
defendant about the length of registration by advising the defendant that the registration
period was only ten years even though the statute clearly required registration for life.
899 N.W.2d at 540. But here, Blaylock’s affidavits do not claim that Blaylock was
misinformed about the length of the registration period. Instead, the affidavits aver that
lifetime registration was “never mentioned.” Accordingly, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by concluding that counsel’s lack of advice about the duration of
predatory-offender registration is not affirmative misadvice.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that Blaylock failed to prove that his counsel’s representation relating to
registration requirements fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, as required to
satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test. We therefore decline to reach the second prong
14
of the Strickland test. See Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10 (“We need not address both the
performance and prejudice prongs if one is dispositive.”).
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Blaylock’s
plea was accurate.

Blaylock next argues that his guilty plea is inaccurate because the district court did
not make a factual finding that Blaylock’s memory of the offense was impaired due to
intoxication and because the factual basis for the plea was established by leading questions.
An accurate plea protects the defendant from pleadin g guilty to a charge more
serious than the defendant could be convicted of if they were to go to trial. State v. Epps,
977 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Minn. 2022). “To be accurate, a plea must be established on a
proper factual basis.” Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted). A proper factual basis exists when “the record contains sufficient evidence to
support a conclusion that the defendant is guilty of at least as great a crime as that to which
he pled guilty.” State v. Jones, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 2837364, at *3 (Minn.
June 5, 2024).
Ordinarily, the factual basis is established “by asking the defendant to express in his
own words what happened.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. But, when a defendant enters a
Norgaard guilty plea, the defendant “claims a loss of memory, through amnesia or
intoxication, regarding the circumstances of the offense.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716-17.
Consequently, to establish a proper factual basis for a Norgaard guilty plea, the defendant
instead must acknowledge “that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade
the defendant and [defense] counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of
15
the crime charged.” See id. at 716. And the district court “must affirmatively ensure an
adequate factual basis has been established in the record.” Id. at 717; see also
Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that the supreme court
suggested in Ecker “that a factual basis for a Norgaard plea is sufficiently established
when the record clearly shows that in all likelihood the defendant committed the offense
and that the defendant pleaded guilty based on the likelihood that a jury would convict”) ,
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009).
Findings Regarding Lack of Memory
In considering Blaylock’s motion to withdraw his plea, the district court addressed
Blaylock’s argument that it was inaccurate because the district court did not make a specific
finding about Blaylock’s lack of memory when it accepted the plea. The district court
rejected this argument, noting “there is no requirement that a court must make explicit
written findings to accept a Norgaard plea.” In addition, the district court emphasized that,
at the plea hearing, the court received testimony that Blaylock’s memory of the offense
was impacted by intoxication or drug use and noted that the addendum signed by Blaylock
“acknowledged the same.” Based on Blaylock’s testimony and the addendum, the district
court concluded that there was “sufficient information presented at the hearing to continue
with the Norgaard plea based on [Blaylock’s] lack of memory.”
On appeal, Blaylock again argues that his plea is inaccurate because the district
court did not make a specific factual finding that Blaylock was unable to recall the
circumstances surrounding the offense due to intoxication. Blaylock’s argument is
unpersuasive. Blaylock cites no authority for the proposition that a district court must
16
make an on-the-record finding of intoxication and lack of memory before it can accept a
Norgaard guilty plea, and we are aware of none.
In addition, it is unclear that the absence of such a finding would render Blaylock’s
Norgaard guilty plea inaccurate for two reasons. First, Blaylock acknowledged in
testimony at the plea hearing that he lacked a memory of the conduct in question due to
being intoxicated at the time. There is no dispute as to that point. Second, lack of memory
due to intoxication is not an element of the offense in question. See Minn. Stat. § 609.343,
subd. 1(a) (listing elements for offense of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, none of
which include intoxication). Consequently, we are not convinced that the facts surrounding
Blaylock’s admitted lack of memory are necessary to establish the factual basis for the
plea. Instead, intoxication and lack of memory relate to the reason for proceeding by a
Norgaard guilty plea rather than to any element of the offense. See Rosendahl v. State,
955 N.W.2d 294, 301 (Minn. App. 2021) (distinguishing typical pleas, whose factual basis
must be established by the defendant’s testimony, from Norgaard guilty pleas, whose
factual basis must be supplemented by the record).
Regardless, even assuming that Blaylock’s intoxication and resulting lack of
memory are part of the factual basis of the Norgaard guilty plea, this court has previously
observed that “there is no suggestion in the rules of criminal procedure that a district court
must make an express finding on the record concerning the adequacy of the factual basis”
of a Norgaard guilty plea. State v. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d 210, 216 (Minn. App. 2015), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015). Instead, the applicable rule provides that “[t]he defendant
must state the factual basis for the plea.” Id. (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(8)).
17
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the absence of factual findings about
Blaylock’s intoxication and lack of memory does not render Blaylock’s plea inaccurate.
Leading Questions
Next, Blaylock argues that the plea was inaccurate because the factual basis was
established through leading questions. Blaylock is correct that the use of leading questions
to establish the factual basis for a plea is strongly disfavored. Jones, 2024 WL 2837364,
at *3. Ideally, defendants should establish a factual basis by describing what happened in
their own words. Lussier, 821 N.W.2d at 589. And the supreme court has “repeatedly
discouraged the use of leading questions.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn.
2016) (listing cases). But leading questions do not automatically render a guilty plea
invalid. Id. The ultimate inquiry is whether “the record contains sufficient evidence to
support the conviction.” Id. at 859 (quotation omitted). Our review of the record includes
the contents of written plea petitions and the Norgaard addendum. See Williams,
760 N.W.2d at 15 (considering plea petition when determining whether Norgaard guilty
plea was intelligent).
We conclude the record “contains sufficient evidence to support the conviction,”
despite the disfavored use of leading questions. Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 859. Blaylock was
extensively questioned by his attorney, the state, and the court at the plea hearing. Blaylock
acknowledged his lack of memory at the time of the circumstances of the offense. He also
acknowledged the evidence the state would present if the case went to trial and his belief
that there was a substantial likelihood that he would be convicted based on that evidence.
At the hearing, the district court also received the plea petition and the signed Norgaard
18
addendum, wherein Blaylock again acknowledged his lack of memory and the strength of
the state’s evidence. The record is sufficient to support the district court’s determination
that there was a factual basis to support the plea. For these reasons, Blaylock’s argument
that his plea is inaccurate is unavailing.2
In sum, the district court did not err by determining that Blaylock’s plea was
voluntary, intelligent, accurate, and not induced by ineffective assistance of counsel. We
therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Blaylock’s motion to withdraw his Norgaard guilty plea.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Blaylock’s motion for
a downward dispositional departure.

Blaylock next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for a downward dispositional departure and instead imposed an executed prison
sentence. We disagree.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for felony
convictions. Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2014). A sentencing court may depart from
the presumptive sentence only when “there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support” a departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2014). One
circumstance which may permit a downward dispositional departure from a guidelines’
executed prison sentence is an offender’s particular amenability to probation. State v. Trog,
323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). District courts consider “numerous factors” in

2 Because Blaylock did not demonstrate fair-and-just reasons for withdrawal, we do not
need to determine whether the state showed that plea withdrawal would cause prejudice.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 98.
19
determining whether an offender is particularly amenable to probation. Id. Relevant
factors include age, criminal history, remorse, cooperation, attitude in court, and support
of friends and/or family. Id. But a district court need not depart from the presumptive
sentence based on “the mere fact that a mitigating factor is present in a particular case.”
State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011). Nor must a district court explain
its decision to impose a presumptive sentence instead of granting a departure request so
long as the record reflects that it “considers reasons for departure.” State v. Van Ruler ,
378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. App. 1985).
We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion for a dispositional departure
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014). We rarely
reverse the district court’s decision because district courts have significant discretion in the
imposition of sentences. Id. at 305, 307.
Here, the district court denied Blaylock’s motion for a downward dispositional
departure because it found that Blaylock was not particularly amenable to probation.
Focusing on Blaylock’s criminal history, the district court noted that he has been on felony
probation “on at least four occasions in the past” and violated conditions of probations
“numerous” times, including in a case where he received a downward dispositional
departure. The district court imposed a 48-month executed prison sentence.
Blaylock argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion
because he demonstrated many factors that show “substantial and compelling
circumstances” to support the departure. Blaylock specifically asserts that he has
“demonstrated an ability to change and engage in prosocial lifestyle” by getting treatment
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for alcohol use and achieving sobriety, “building a sober support network,” finding
employment, and avoiding further criminal charges other than traffic violations and a
misdemeanor voting violation. Regarding his age, Blaylock says that he was 30 years old
at the time of the offense, 35 years old at the time of sentencing, and imprisonment at this
stage of his life would create challenging gaps in his work and credit histories. Blaylock
highlights the 11 letters from friends and family submitted with his sentencing
memorandum that he claims “paint an undeniable picture” of his “devotion to his family
and friends, and their support of him.” Finally, Blaylock argues, and the state concedes,
that he behaved appropriately in the courtroom.
While Blaylock presented evidence about his personal improvements since the
offense, he has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion by finding that
he is not particularly amenable to probation or by denying his motion for a downward
dispositional departure . See Pegel , 795 N.W.2d at 253 (noting that the presence of
mitigating factors does not require a downward dispositional departure). The district court
considered Blaylock’s sobriety and alcohol-abuse treatment and congratulated him for his
efforts. But the district court concluded that Blaylock is not particularly amenable to
probation due to his “numerous” past probation violations, including one in a case where
he received a downward dispositional departure. A district court may consider prior
probation violations as “evidence potentially indicating unnameability to probation.” See
State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763 , 770 (Minn. 2003). In sum, the record reflects that the
district court carefully considered the arguments for and against a downward dispositional
departure but declined to grant a departure after determining Blaylock had not
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demonstrated that he is particularly amenable to probation. The district court acted well
within its discretion when it denied Blaylock’s motion for a downward dispositional
departure. This is not the “rare case” requiring reversal. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 305.
Affirmed.