Tyler Edward Connell, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1034

Tyler Edward Connell,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed February 5, 2024
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Watonwan County District Court
File No. 83-CV-23-84

Thomas K. Hagen, Christopher D. Cain, Kohlmeyer Hagen Law Office, Chtd., Mankato,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Rebecca K. Webster, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order sustaining the revocation of his
driving privileges, which stemmed from his arrest for driving while impaired (DWI). We
affirm.

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FACTS
Respondent Commissioner of Public Safety revoked appellant Tyler Edward
Connell’s driver’s license after he was arrested for DWI and chemical testing indicated
that he had driven a snowmobile with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.
Connell petitioned for judicial review of the license revocation. At the hearing on
his petition, Connell limited the issues for the district court’s review to whether there was
reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying his initial seizure and whether there was
reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying the expansion of the initial seizure to include
a DWI investigation. All other issues were waived.
The district court received exhibits, heard testimony from the arresting officer, and
found the facts to be as follows.
On February 12, 2023, at 12:51 a.m., [ an officer] was
on routine patrol when two snowmobiles came to his
attention. He initially observed the two snowmobiles
traveling south in the ditch on the designated snow trail. As
the snowmobiles approached a culvert, there was a sign
directing the snowm obiles to drive to the left to avoid the
culvert. [The officer] observed the snowmobiles [drive] up
onto the shoulder before dipping back onto the snowmobile
trail. The snowmobiles came close to the highway as they
drove onto the shoulder. There was spa ce to the right of the
hazard sign for the snowmobiles to drive on. Based on his
observations, [the officer] initiated a traffic stop.
One of the two snowmobiles came to a stop. [The
officer] approached the snowmobile. The driver (later
identified as [ Connell]) was very argumentative and refused
to take his helmet off. When [the officer] asked [Connell]
where he was coming from, his responses were delayed.
[Connell] also slurred his speech. Based on his training and
experience, [Connell’s] slurred sp eech indicated impairment.
[The officer] asked [Connell] to repeatedly take off his
helmet. When [Connell] finally removed his go ggles, [the
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officer] saw that [Connell] had bloodshot, watery eyes. In [the
officer’s] experience, bloodshot, water y eyes are typically a
sign of impairment. Because of the signs of impairment he
observed, [the officer] asked [Connell] to perform the
horizontal gaze nystagmus test (“HGN”). Ultimately, [the
officer] arrested [Connell] for suspicion of driving while
impaired. [Connell’s] breath test results were 0.15.

(Citations omitted.)

The district court concluded that both the initial seizure and the expansion were
supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion and therefore sustained the revocation of
Connell’s driving privileges.
Connell appeals.
DECISION
Under Minnesota’s implied-consent law:
Upon certification by the peace officer that there existed
probable cause to believe the person had been driving,
operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation
of section 169A.20 (driving while impaired) and that the
person submitted to a test and the te st results indicate an
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more . . . then the
commissioner shall revoke the person’s license . . . to
drive . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4 (2022); see Minn. Stat. § 169A.50 (2022) ( “Sections
169A.50 to 169A.53 may be cited as the Implied Consent Law.”).
A driver whose license has been revoked under the implied -consent law may
petition for judicial review of the revocation under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53 (2022). The
scope of a judicial review hearing is limited to 12 issues. Minn. Stat. § 169A.53,
subd. 3(b)(1)-(12). An unconstitutional traffic stop is not listed among them. However,
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this court has ordered rescission of a license revocation based on an unconstitutional
seizure. Ascher v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety , 505 N.W.2d 362 , 370 (Minn. App. 1993)
(ordering rescission of a license revocation where the revocation stemmed from an
unconstitutional sobriety checkpoint), aff’d, 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994).
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution protect “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall under an
established exception. State v. Othoudt , 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 -22 (Minn. 199 2).
However, a police officer may temporarily detain an individual based on reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Diede,
795 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (Minn. 2011). “Ordinarily, if an officer observes a violation of
a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the
vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted “the principles and framework of Terry
[v. Ohio ] for evaluating the reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops .” State v.
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004). When assessing the validity of an
investigative seizure, a court considers two issues: whether the seizure was justified at its
inception, and whether the actions of the police during the seizure were “reasonably
related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the firs t place.”
Id. at 364.
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“We review a district court ’s determination regarding the legality of an
investigatory traffic stop and questions of reasonable suspicion de novo.” Wilkes v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 777 N.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Minn. App. 2010).
I.
Connell contends that his traffic stop was unconstitutional because it was based on
a mistake of law. An officer’s mistaken belief that conduct violates the law is not a valid
basis for a stop. See State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 824 (Minn. 2004) (holding that
“an officer ’s mistaken interpretation of a statute may not form the particularized and
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity necessary to justify a traffic stop”).
Connell argues that “[w]hen the conduct in question is legal, the mistaken belief
cannot alone justify an investigative stop.” Connell cites several decisions in which traffic
stops were invalid because they were based on mistakes of law . In each of those cases,
the stop was based on conduct that was not illegal under the court’s interpretation of the
relevant statute. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 576 (“A law enforcement officer’s belief a
motorcycle headlight configuration to be illegal is not an objective legal basis for a traffic
stop where the headlight configuration clearly conformed to Minnesota law.”); Anderson,
683 N.W.2d at 820 (“Minnesota Statutes § 169.18, subd. 11 (2002), which requires a
motorist to move ‘a lane away’ from an emergency vehicle on the side of the road does
not require a motorist to provide a la ne between the passing vehicle and the emergency
vehicle.”); State v. Kilmer, 741 N.W.2d 607, 608 (Minn. App. 2007) (“It is not a violation
of state traffic laws for a motorist to enter a controlled intersection on a yellow light, and
that conduct alone cannot be the basis for an investigative stop by a law -enforcement
6
officer.”); see also Birkland v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 940 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Minn. App.
2020) (“Minnesota Statutes section 169.19, subdivision 1(b) (2018) does not mandate that
a driver turning left from a single left -turn lane must turn into the innermost lane of the
roadway being entered.”).
The officer in this case stopped Connell because he believed that it was illegal for
Connell to drive on the shoulder of the road. The relevant statute generally provides that
“[n]o person shall operate a snowmobile upon the . . . shoulder . . . of any trunk, county
state-aid, or county highway in this state,” except as otherwise allowed under one of
several exceptions set forth in the statute. Minn. Stat. § 84.87 (2022). Connell argues that
he was authorized to operate his snowmobile on the shoulder under an exception that
allows a snowmobile to “be operated upon a bridge . . . when required for the purpose of
avoiding obstructions to travel when no other method of avoidance is possible.” Minn.
Stat. § 84.87, subd. 1(c)(6) (emphasis added) . Connell asserts that this exception
authorized him “to cross the bridge to avoid obstructions. ” Connell’s argument that his
use of the shoulder was authorized under the bridge exception fails for the simple fact that
there is no evidence that the officer stopped him for driving on a bridge.
In addition to relying on the bridge exception, Connell generally cites to all of the
other exceptions in section 84.87, subdivision 1(b) and 1(c) , w ithout addressing the
specific application of any of them . Connell asserts that th e other exceptions allow
“snowmobiles to drive on the shoulder to avoid obstacles.” For the reasons that follow,
we disagree.
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The exceptions set forth in subdivision 1(b) (1)-(4) allow “two-way operation” of
snowmobiles on one side of the road. Minn. Stat. § 84.87, subd. 1(b). The exceptions in
subdivision 1(c)(1)-(5) allow a snowmobile to “make a direct crossing of a street or
highway.” Minn. Stat. § 84.87, subd. 1(c). Because this case does not involve the two -
way operation of a snowmobile on one side of the road or the direct crossing of a street or
highway—or a bridge—none of the exceptions in section 84.87 excuse Connell’s use of
the shoulder.
In sum, Connell’s reliance on the exceptions in section 84.87 to establish that his
conduct was legal is unavailing. And because no exception applies, his use of the shoulder
was illegal. Thus, the officer’s stop was not based on a mistake of law , and the officer’s
observation of a violation of section 84.87 provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for
the traffic stop. We therefore do not address the state’s argument that the officer also had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that Connell engaged in careless driving.
II.
Connell contends that the officer unlawfully expanded the traffic stop to include a
DWI investigation. “An intrusion not closely related to the initial justification for the
search or seizure is invalid under article I, section 10 unless there is independent probable
cause or reasonableness to justify that particular intrusion.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at
364.
Caselaw recognizes several indicia of intoxication that may give rise to reasonable,
articulable suspicion of DWI. For example, failing to observe traffic laws may indicate
intoxication. State v. Driscoll, 427 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Minn. App. 1988). Time of day is
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a relevant consideration. See Otto v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 924 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn.
App. 2019) (considering 1:20 a.m. on a Saturday morning to be a “time of day when
drinking is often found to be involved”). Bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and
an uncooperative attitude also indicate intoxication. Holtz v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety ,
340 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. App. 1983).
The district court’s findings include several indicia of intoxication support ing
reasonable, articulable suspicion of DWI. Connell operated his snowmobile on the
shoulder in violation of the law. That violation occurred at around 12:52 in the morning.
Connell was argumentative with the officer, provided delayed responses to the off icer’s
questions, and slurred his speech. Finally, Connell had bloodshot, watery eyes.
Under the totality of the circumstances, there was reasonable, articulable suspicion
to believe that Connell had driven while impaired and, therefore, to expand the traffic stop
to include a DWI investigation.
III.
Finally, Connell contends that his arrest was not supported by probable cause. At
the judicial review hearing in district court, Connell expressly waived all issues other than
whether his traffic stop and DWI investigation were supported by reasonable, articulable
suspicion.
An appellate court generally will not decide issues that were not raised in district
court, including constitutional questions of criminal procedure. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d
354, 357 (Minn. 1996). Moreover, although Connell lists the probable-cause issue in his
brief along with the applicable standard of review, he provides no argument on this issue.
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An appellate court may decline to address an issue i n the absence of adequate briefing.
State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn.
1997).
Because Connell waived the probable -cause issue in district court and the issue is
not adequately briefed on appeal, we do not address whether Connell’s arrest was
supported by probable cause.
Affirmed.