State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1046

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Andre Benjamin Stigger,
Appellant.

Filed July 15, 2024
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-22-4519

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Max B. Kittel, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judg e; and Reyes ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Andre Benjamin Stigger pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
The district court imposed a middle-of-the-box sentence of 140 months of imprisonment .
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We conclude that the district court did not err by denying Stigger’ s request for a bottom-
of-the-box sentence of 119 months of imprisonment. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In August 2022, the state charged Stigger with first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1a(e) (2022). The state later amended the
complaint to add a charge of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1a(e) (2022). The state alleged in both the original complaint and
the amended complaint that Stigger removed a five-year-old boy’s pants and touched the
boy’s penis with his hands and his mouth.
In October 2022, the parties entered into a plea agreement. Stigger agreed to enter
a Norgaard plea
1 to the charge of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, and the state
agreed to dismiss the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
At sentencing, the state asked the district court to impose a 140-month prison
sentence, which is the middle of the presumptive sentencing range. See Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 4.B (2022). Stigger argued for a 119-month prison sentence, which is the
shortest sentence in the presumptive sentencing range. See id. Stigger’s attorney relied on
the probation officer’s recommendation of 119 months and argued that a shorter sentence
is justified by Stigger’s remorse and age, which was 57 at the time of sentencing.

1A defendant may be allowed to enter a Norgaard plea if he or she “claims a loss of
memory, through amnesia or intoxication, regarding the circumstances of the offense” and
“the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade the defendant and his or her
counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” State
v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994); see also State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash,
110 N.W.2d 867, 871-72 (Minn. 1961).
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The district court imposed a sentence of 140 months of imprisonment, to be
followed by a lifetime term of conditional release.
Stigger appeals. His appellate public defender raises one issue, and he raises two
additional issues in a pro se supplemental brief.
DECISION
I. Duration of Sentence
With the assistance of appellate counsel, Stigger argues that the district court erred
by denying his request for a 119-month sentence and imposing a 140-month sentence.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C (2022). The applicable cell in the applicable grid
of the sentencing guidelines typically states a “presumptive range,” which spans durations
that are “15 percent lower and 20 percent higher than the fixed duration displayed in each
cell.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13.c (2022). For any particular offense, a sentence
within the presumptive range is “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing
criminal history and offense severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent’ g Guidelines 1.B.13.
Accordingly, a district court “must pronounce a sentence . . . within the applicable
[presumptive] ran ge . . . unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2022). A bottom-
of-the-box sentence is “not a downward departure.” S tate v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353,
359 n.2 (Minn. 2008).
An appellate court “generally will not interfere with a sentencing court’s decision
to impose a term within the presumptive sentence range.” State v. Kangbateh, 868 N.W.2d
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10, 14 (Minn. 2015). Furthermore, “any sentence within the presumptive range . . .
constitutes a presumptive sentence.” State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App.
2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). “This court will not generally review a district
court’s exercise of its discretion to sentence a defendant when the sentence imposed is
within the presumptive guidelines range.” Id. We may modify a presumptive sentence but
only in “rare” cases and only if modification is supported by “compelling circumstances.”
Id. (quotations omitted).
In this case, the district court stated reasons for its sentencing decision after listening
to the parties’ arguments and the child’s mother’s victim-impact statement. The district
court stated that a middle-of-the-box sentence is more appropriate than a bottom-of-the-
box sentence in light of Stigger’s criminal history, his “failure to take responsibility until
this moment today,” the child’s vulnerability, the unlikelihood that Stigger would engage
in sex-offender treatment, and the likelihood that Stigger would re- offend. The district
court acknowledged the probation officer’s recommendation of a bottom-of-the-box
sentence but stated that there was “no reason” to impose such a sentence.
Stigger contends that, for three reasons, there are compelling circumstances that
should cause this court to modify the presumptive sentence.
Stigger first contends that the probation officer’s recommendation of a 119-month
sentence is a compelling circumstance. He acknowledges that the probation officer “did
not specifically state why” a shorter sentence was more appropriate. That fact undercuts
his contention that the district court should have relied on the recommendation. The district
court provided its own reasons for a middle- of-the-box sentence and expressly stated that
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it was not persuaded by the probation officer ’s recommendation. The district court was
not bound by the probation officer’s recommendation; rather, the district court was
obligated to make an independent sentencing decision. See State v. Park, 305 N.W.2d 775,
776 (Minn. 1981); State v. Halverson, 373 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Minn. App. 1985).
Stigger next contends that his “speedy acceptance of responsibility and
demonstration of remorse” justify a modification of his sentence. Stigger pleaded guilty
on the morning of the day on which the case was scheduled for trial. At the sentencing
hearing, the district court commented that Stigger “fail[ed] to take responsibility until this
moment today,” which indicates that the district court did not consider his acceptance of
responsibility to be “speedy.”
Remorse generally is relevant to a downward dispositional departure but not a
downward durational departure. State v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 527, 534-35 (Minn. 2017);
State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618 , 625-26 (Minn. 2016). Remorse may be relevant to a
downward durational departure only if “a defendant can show that his demonstrated
remorse is directly related to the criminal conduct at issue and made that conduct
significantly less serious than the typical conduct underlying the offense of conviction.”
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 626. For purposes of this non-precedential opinion, we assume
without deciding that these principles also apply to a request for a shorter sentence within
the presumptive range.
Stigger asserts that he was remorseful “immediately following the incident” when
he walked the child home, faced the victim’s family, and waited for police to arrive. He
further asserts that his offense “would have been worse if [he] had simply walked away
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after the incident and not walked the child home or waited for police to arrive.” The district
court did not comment on that factual issue, perhaps because it was not specifically argued
by Stigger’s attorney. We note that the complaint alleges a different motive for calling the
police: that Stigger did so “because he feared that adults at the residence were going to
assault him after the child’s disclosure.” In any event, the record does not conclusively
show that whatever remorse Stigger might have had immediately following the incident is
directly related to his criminal conduct s o as to make the crime significantly less serious
and a compelling circumstance that warrants modification of his sentence. See Rund, 896
N.W.2d at 534-35; Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 626; Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428. We note that,
at the sentencing hearing, Stigger did express remorse and regret and apologized to the
victim’s family. But expression of remorse at that stage of a criminal proceeding has no
bearing on the duration of a prison sentence. See Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 626.
Stigger last contends that a shorter sentence is justified by his age and the likelihood
that he will spend the remainder of his life in prison or on conditional release. Typically,
a defendant’s young age—not old age—is the basis of an argument for a more lenient
sentence. See State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. 2014); State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d
28, 31 (Minn. 1982). Stigger does not cite any caselaw for the proposition that his
advanced age should reduce the duration of his imprisonment. Stigger asserts that,
whenever he is released from prison, he “will be at a reduced risk to reoffend.” But the
district court said otherwise, which is supported by the fact that Stigger committed the
present offense at a similarly advanced age.
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Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence in the
middle of the presumptive range.
II. Pro Se Arguments
Stigger filed a pro so supplemental brief approximately two months after the state
filed a brief in response to Stigger’s appellate counsel’s brief. The state did not file a
second responsive brief to respond to Stigger’s pro se supplemental brief. We nonetheless
consider Stigger’s pro se arguments on the merits. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
Stigger first contends that his guilty plea is constitutionally invalid. Specifically, he
contends that he did not understand that there was a flaw in the district court’s jurisdiction
over him. But his jurisdictional theory has been rejected as a matter of law. See State v.
Winbush, 912 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Minn. App. 2018) (stating that “sovereign -citizen
jurisdictional defense has no conceivable validity in American law” (quotation omitted)),
rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2018). He also contends he was “under heavy pain medication”
at the time of the plea. But that statement is contradicted by the plea petition, which he
signed on the same day as the plea hearing, which states that he was “thinking clearly
today.”
Stigger also challenges the lifetime term of conditional release. Specifically, he
contends that the facts do not satisfy the requirements of the applicable statute, which
applies if a defendant “has a previous or prior sex offense conviction.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3455, subd. 7(b) (2022). He asserts that he should be subject to a ten-year term of
conditional release, which is appropriate for a defendant who does not have a previous or
prior sex-offense conviction. See id., subd. 6. The record reflects that Stigger was
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convicted in 1994 of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342 (1992). Given that prior conviction, the district court did not err by ordering
lifetime conditional release.
Thus, Stigger’s pro se arguments do not warrant appellate relief.
Affirmed.