State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1062

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lisa Dawn Oliver,
Appellant.

Filed May 11, 2026
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-22-2736

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Caitlyn M. Prokopowicz, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction for first-degree assault-harm and second-
degree assault with a dangerous weapon for insufficient evidence. Appellant also argues
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that the district court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for a downward
dispositional departure. Because the direct evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant
intended to cause great bodily harm, and because the district court acted within its
discretion in denying appellant a dispositional departure, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Lisa Dawn Oliver and P.L. were previously in a romantic relationship and
share a twelve-year-old child, B.L. While dating, they lived together in Colorado and
frequently argued, used mood-altering substances, and got into aggressive verbal and
physical altercations including pushing, shoving, name-calling, and making other
“derogatory” comments. They eventually moved to Minnesota and briefly lived together
before moving into separate housing. Their relationship was cordial for some time, but
they soon “back pedaled” into their old ways. P.L. eventually moved out of Oliver’s home,
and things settled down.
During a parenting-time exchange late one Sunday night in October 2022, Oliver
and P.L. got into a physical altercation at P.L.’s apartment, located on the first floor of the
building. P.L. had “probably eight or ten beers” over the course of “six or eight hours” that
day and was “fairly intoxicated.” Oliver had dropped off B.L. at P.L.’s apartment around
7:00 p.m. that evening, but B.L. later told P.L. that he wanted to go back to Oliver’s home.
P.L. relented and, around 9:30 p.m., Oliver returned to P.L.’s apartment to pick up B.L.
Oliver was with her roommate at the time, and they both arrived in a Lyft and waited
on the patio outside of P.L’s apartment. For unknown reasons, the first Lyft did not wait
for Oliver and her roommate and left the apartment parking lot. Oliver’s roommate called
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another Lyft and walked with Oliver and B.L. to the apartment’s parking lot as they waited.
The roommate noticed that Oliver “was getting a little upset that the Lyft wasn’t working
and everything.” Several minutes later, P.L. noticed that Oliver, her roommate, and B.L.
were still waiting, and he stepped outside to check on them. Oliver walked back to P.L.’s
patio in a belligerent manner, calling him names and pushing him; P.L. yelled back .
Oliver’s roommate and B.L. remained in the parking lot. B.L. assumed they were arguing
because P.L. did not want him to go back with Oliver. Sometime during Oliver and P.L.’s
physical altercation, P.L.’s other child, C.L., came outside and stood next to P.L. on the
patio.
At some point, Oliver cut P.L.’s neck with a sharp object, and P.L. “felt [his] neck
open up.” P.L. received stitches for the cut and, at the time of trial, had a scar from the cut.
The police never found the object Oliver used to cut P.L.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Oliver with attempted second-degree
intentional murder under Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1) (2022). By
amended complaint, the state also charged Oliver with attempted first-degree assault and
second-degree assault under Minnesota Stat utes sections 609.17, subdivision 1, .221,
subdivision 1, .222, subdivision 2 (2022).
At a jury trial in January 2023, Oliver and P.L. testified as to their differing versions
of the altercation. Oliver claimed self-defense, testifying that P.L. had chest-bumped her
while they were arguing; that she saw a knife fly out of his hand; and that she picked up
the knife and asked him, “What were you going to do, stab me? What were you going to
do, kill me?” She testified that P.L. grabbed her by the throat and shoved her against the
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sliding glass door of the patio where they were standing. Oliver was holding the knife in
her hand when she attempted to break P.L.’s chokehold and inadvertently cut his throat.
Oliver testified that she did not mean to harm or kill P.L.
In contrast, P.L. testified that the altercation started with Oliver calling him names
and shoving him. P.L. testified that, after shoving him several times, Oliver told him, “I’m
going to kill you.” He explained that after Oliver cut his neck, he asked her, “did you really
just cut my neck wide open,” and Oliver replied, “yes, I sure did.”
The state presented testimony from four other witnesses: P.L.’s oldest child, B.L.;
his youngest child, C.L.; and two of P.L.’s upstairs neighbors. During the altercation, B.L.
was with Oliver’s roommate in the parking lot near P.L.’s apartment. B.L. testified about
hearing the yelling but could not make out what was being said. C.L. testified that he was
playing video games when he heard banging on the sliding glass door. When he went out
to the patio, he saw Oliver yelling at P.L. and pushing him up against the sliding door. C.L.
stated that he was standing right next to P.L. when Oliver “came at daddy and cut him in
the jugular” and that he saw Oliver “put force in it and cut his neck.” P.L.’s upstairs
neighbor was at home when she heard a female voice saying, “I’m going to f---ing kill
you” and “I’m going to f---ing stab you.” The other neighbor testified that he heard a
female voice saying, “I’m going to f---ing kill you.”
The state also submitted photographic evidence of P.L.’s neck on the day of the
incident, which showed a cut that appears to have been at least an inch deep and around
three inches long.
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The jury acquitted Oliver of attempted second-degree murder, but found her guilty
of attempted first- degree assault and second- degree assault with a dangerous weapon.
Before sentencing, Oliver moved for a downward dispositional departure based on her
seeking treatment while in jail, an opportunity to participate in an inpatient treatment
program while on probation, and her strong family support.
The district court sentenced Oliver to a guidelines sentence of 45 months in prison
for attempted first-degree assault. In denying Oliver’s motion for a departure, the district
court emphasized Oliver’s lack of remorse for her conduct and conflicting information in
the record. The district court stated that there was nothing “to hang my hat on” that would
justify a dispositional departure.
In July 2023, Oliver appealed her conviction to this court. See State v. Oliver, 11
N.W.3d 817, 820 (Minn. App. 2024), rev’d , 28 N.W.3d 445 (Minn. 2024). We reversed
her conviction, concluding that: (1) attempted first-degree assault-harm is not a cognizable
crime under the statutory scheme of the assault statute, and (2) the general intent required
for assault-harm and the specific intent required for attempt were irreconcilable. Id.
Accordingly, we did not address the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and sentencing
arguments. The state appealed, arguing that the attempt statute and the first-degree assault-
harm statute were not legally inconsistent. See State v. Oliver, 28 N.W.3d 445, 450 (Minn.
2025). The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed in a divided opinion, and reversed and
remanded the matter back to us to resolve the outstanding arguments. Id. at 456-57.

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DECISION
I. The state presented sufficient direct evidence to sustain Oliver’s conviction.

Oliver argues that there is insufficient evidence to show that she intended to inflict
great bodily harm on P.L. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
“determine whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be
drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of
the offense charged.” State v. Smith, 9 N.W.3d 543, 564-65 (Minn. 2024). In doing so,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. at 565.
We first determine whether the direct evidence sufficiently supports the verdict. See
State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (stating that “when a disputed element is
sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone,” the court applies the direct-evidence standard
rather than the heightened circumstantial-evidence standard). If the direct evidence is
sufficient, the verdict will be sustained if, giving due regard to the presumption of
innocence and the state’s burden to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury
could have “reasonably found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Griffin,
887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016).
Oliver was found guilty of attempted first-degree assault- harm and second-degree
assault with a dangerous weapon. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17, subd. 1, .221, subd. 1, .222,
subd. 2. Section 609.17, subdivision 1 (the attempt statute) states that “[w]hoever, with
intent to commit a crime, does an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than
preparation for, the commission of the crime is guilty of an attempt to commit that crime.”
First-degree assault-harm—the underlying crime for which Oliver was convicted—
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requires the state to prove that Oliver “assault[ed] and inflict[ed] great bodily harm.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1.
Oliver argues that there is insufficient direct evidence to show that she intended to
inflict great bodily harm. Oliver concedes that her statements establish her specific intent
to cause death but argues they do not establish her intent to inflict great bodily harm. We
disagree.
Oliver’s own statements provide direct evidence of such intent. See State v. Jones,
4 N.W.3d 495, 501 (Minn. 2024) (concluding that defendant’s statement about how he
planned to use a weapon and subsequently did use a weapon consistent with that statement
was direct evidence of defendant’s intent); Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 40 (concluding that
defendant’s statement “I want him dead” was direct evidence of intent to murder because
“the jury did not need to draw any inferences about the purposes of her actions”). Evidence
establishing an intent to kill—the highest level of harm to someone’s body—necessarily
establishes the intent to cause great bodily harm, which includes harm that “creates a high
probability of death.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (2022).
Here, Oliver’s statements established an intent to cause great bodily harm. Oliver’s
statement, “I’m going to stab you,” indicates that she intended to inflict great bodily harm.
Oliver argues otherwise, asserting that the statement “does not imply any specific amount
of harm.”1 But this argument overlooks the surrounding context. Witnesses testified that

1 Additionally, Oliver asserts that P.L.’s injuries did not constitute great bodily harm
because the state would have otherwise charged her with first-degree assault rather than
attempted first-degree assault. But the state’s charging decision here has no impact on the
evidence that the jury evaluated.
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they heard Oliver say, “I’m going to f---ing stab you” immediately after saying “I’m going
to f---ing kill you.” T aken together, the statements demonstrate Oliver’s intent to inflict
great bodily harm. Oliver first threatened to kill the victim and then threatened to use the
knife to stab him, all of which occurred in the same encounter in which Oliver stabbed P.L.
in the neck. After the stabbing, P.L. asked whether Oliver had “just cut [his] neck wide
open,” and Oliver responded, “I sure did.” This exchange supports the conclusion that
Oliver intended to inflict great bodily harm, particularly because she targeted P.L.’s neck
knowing that it was a vulnerable part of the body.
Thus, there is sufficient direct evidence that Oliver intended to cause great bodily
harm.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Oliver’s motion for a
dispositional departure.

Oliver argues that even if her conviction of attempted first-degree assault is
affirmed, this court should reverse the district court’s denial of her motion for dispositional
departure at sentencing. She asserts that the district court abused its discretion by solely
relying on just her lack of remorse in denying a dispositional departure.
A district court has broad discretion in sentencing decisions and only an abuse of
that discretion justifies a reversal by this court. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307- 08
(Minn. 2014). A guidelines sentence is presumed appropriate. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
2.D.1 (2022 ). This court affirms the imposition of a presumptive guidelines sentence
“when the record shows that the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and
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information presented before making a determination.” State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917,
925 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
A district court may depart from the guidelines sentence if “identifiable, substantial,
and compelling circumstances” support the departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.
However, the district court has broad discretion not to depart from the guidelines sentence,
even if the record reflects factors that could support a sentencing departure. See State v.
Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468-69 (Minn. App. 2018) (concluding that district court did not
abuse its discretion despite evidence that could have supported a dispositional departure).
In evaluating a motion for downward dispositional departure from the presumptive
sentence, a district court considers whether the specific defendant is “particularly amenable
to individualized treatment in a probationary setting.” State v. Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461,
462 (Minn. 1981). A district court may consider the Trog factors in making this
determination, which include the defendant’s age, prior record, remorse, cooperation,
attitude while in court, and support of friends and family. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28,
31 (Minn. 1982). “Particular” means that a defendant requesting the departure would need
to be “exceptional” or “distinctive among others of the same group.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at
309. Only a “rare case” justifies reversing a district court’s decision not to depart from the
guidelines sentence. See State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981); see also Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 1.A & cmt. 2.D.301 (2022) (noting that factors justifying departures will
only occur in a “small number of cases”).
Oliver argues that the district court impermissibly based its decision only on her
lack of remorse. However, a review of the sentencing transcript shows that the district
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court’s concerns were broader than just a lack of remorse. The district court’s comments
describing its sentencing decision span several pages of the transcript. Taken as a whole,
the district court’s comments also bear upon Oliver’s candor and, notably, whether she
would be successful in rehabilitating herself on probation. The district court pointed out
that there were “so many conflicting things between the PSI [presentence investigation]
and the Psych[ological] Evaluation and things that have been said in the past,” which the
district court found “troubling.” The district court’s later comments touched on some of
these contradictory elements in the PSI and psychological evaluation, including Oliver’s
denial of alcohol or drug use and her invalid responses during the psychological evaluation.
The district court concluded by stating “that is why I say that you need to have some
serious introspection about yourself, so that when you get out you are able to put this behind
you.” Taken as whole, the district court’s comments appear to reflect an overall concern
about Oliver’s denial and dishonesty, not just her lack of remorse. Those patterns,
exhibited clearly in the information before the district court at sentencing, appear to have
undermined the district court’s trust that Oliver would be able to move forward with
treatment and take accountability for her role in this incident.
In denying a dispositional departure, the district court need not discuss every Trog
factor. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Minn. App. 2011). Nor are specific findings
required. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 926 (noting the district court is “not required to state its
reasons for not departing on the record”). Here, although the district court did not explicitly
address all Trog factors in its sentencing decision, the district court expressed concerns that
went beyond just the lack of remorse and weighed directly on the district court’s analysis
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of Oliver’s amenability to probation. Further, the district court’s explanation to Oliver
shows that it carefully considered its sentencing decision. For the above stated reasons,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Oliver’s motion for a dispositional
departure.
Because sufficient direct evidence supports the jury’s finding that Oliver intended
to inflict great bodily harm, and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a dispositional departure, we affirm Oliver’s conviction and sentence.
Affirmed.