State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1087

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jennifer Lynn Matter,
Appellant.

Filed July 22, 2024
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Goodhue County District Court
File No. 25-CR-22-869

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Stephen F. O’Keefe, Goodhue County Attorney, Erin L. Kuester, Assistant County
Attorney, Red Wing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Wheelock , Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this direct appeal from her sentence for second-degree intentional murder,
appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) denying her motion for
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a downward dispositional departure and (2) sentencing her to the midpoint of the
guidelines’ presumptive sentencing range instead of the bottom. We affirm.
FACTS
In the evening hours of December 6, 2003, appellant Jennifer Lynn Matter gave
birth to a live male infant on an isolated, deserted beach on a river in Goodhue County.
She was 31 years old and the mother of two children, ages six and nine, at the time. She
placed the infant on the sand near the water’s edge without clothing or a blanket and left
the beach with no intention of returning. Matter had not told anyone that she was pregnant
and did not notify anyone about the existence or location of the infant. The following day,
four teenagers found the infant dead on the beach.
Four years prior, in 1999, Matter had given birth to a female infant who may have
been stillborn and placed the infant in a river in Goodhue County. The infant was found
in the river a few days later. Matter did not tell anyone about this pregnancy or that she
had given birth. Law enforcement investigated the incident, but they were unable to
identify a suspect or any relatives of the female infant.
In 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation compared DNA samples from the two
infants and determined that they were related. In 2007, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA) compared DNA samples and confirmed the same. At that time, law
enforcement was still unable to identify any relatives of the two infants, and the case went
cold.
In 2020, the Goodhue County Sheriff’s Department began reinvestigating the case,
and further genetic testing and investigative leads led law enforcement to identify Matter
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as the potential mother of both infants. In April 2022, BCA investigators went to Matter’s
home and conducted a recorded interview with her. Matter denied being the mother of the
1999 infant, denied being pregnant in 2003, and refused the investigators’ request for a
voluntary DNA sample. Investigators then obtained a warrant for a DNA sample and
collected a sample of Matter’s DNA, which enabled them to confirm that Matter was the
mother of both infants.
On May 5, 2022, investigators conducted a second interview. Matter explained that
she was in a “bad mental state” in 1999. She had been in and out of jail, was drinking too
much, and had experienced chaotic life circumstances for a long time. Matter then admitted
that she was the mother of the 1999 infant and said that she had been unaware she was
pregnant until she gave birth and that the infant was born blue, was not breathing, and was
not crying. She told the investigators that she now knows she should have gotten help but
that she was scared and her “mind was not there” at the time. Because Matter was drinking
heavily then, she did not remember how much time passed between giving birth and
placing the infant in the river, but she estimated that it was approximately one day.
Matter also initially denied being the mother of the 2003 infant, claiming that she
did not remember a second infant, but later in the interview, she admitted she was the
mother of that child, too. She explained that, although she had known she was pregnant,
she did not receive prenatal care, did not intend to keep the child, a nd did not know what
she was going to do with the child once it was born. She had considered adoption but did
not have a plan in place before the child arrived.
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When describing the incident, Matter said that she did not know she was about to
give birth when she went to the beach that night; rather, she had gone to the isolated beach
because she had a warrant out for her arrest and was trying to evade law enforcement. She
admitted that the infant was breathing when born but asserted that she did not remember if
the baby was crying. She also admitted that she did not call 911 or tell anyone about the
infant but said she hoped that someone in the nearby houses would find the baby.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Matter with second-degree intentional
murder of the infant born in 2003 in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2002).
Matter pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. In the factual-basis portion of the plea
petition, Matter admitted that the outdoor temperatures on the date of the offense would
typically be at or below freezing, that she knew the infant would not survive in those
conditions, and that her actions caused the death of the infant.
In exchange for Matter’s guilty plea, the state agreed that (1) it would withdraw its
motion to seek an aggravated sentence; (2) Matter could seek a downward sentencing
departure; and (3) Matter’s sentence would be capped at 326 months—the midpoint of the
2003 Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines’ presumptive range of 319 to 333 months. See
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines IV (Supp. 2003).
Matter moved for both a dispositional and a durational departure. In reaching its
sentencing decision, the district court considered the following: Matter’s testimony; 12
letters of support from Matter’s family, friends, and employer; a letter written by
law-enforcement investigators; the presentence-investigation report; arguments of counsel;
and two written and oral victim-impact statements. The first victim-impact statement was
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written by the father of one of Matter’s children, born in 2008, and included a statement
from that child as well. The father described an incident that occurred when Matter was
approximately six months pregnant with the child in which she refused to call 911 or
receive medical care after she sustained injuries in a serious car accident. He believed that
Matter intentionally got into the accident in an attempt to end her pregnancy. The child’s
portion of the statement described the pain and negative impact of learning that her mother
had abandoned the two infants and her traumatic childhood experiences of witnessing
Matter’s alcohol use, arrest by law enforcement, and dishonest and erratic behavior.
The second victim-impact statement was written by a couple who had volunteered
to bury both infants with the couple’s deceased daughter. The statement described their
reaction to hearing about both incidents, how they worked with law enforcement to arrange
the burials and funerals, support they received from the community, and their interviews
with the media. The victim-impact statements and the state’s argument opposing Matter’s
departure motions asserted that the victims of Matter’s offense included the deceased
infant, the teenagers who found the infant, the officers who handled the infant, and the
officers and community members who expended effort and resources to solve the case.
The letters of support from Matter’s family and friends show that Matter was treated
poorly as a child, struggled with alcohol addiction, and lacked coping skills, but that she
became a good mother to the two children she raised and was a loving grandmother. Her
supporters noted that after Matter was charged and her actions came to light, she quit
drinking alcohol, began working full time, and demonstrated motivation to make positive
changes in her life. The letter from law enforcement advocated for a shorter prison
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sentence based on Matter’s difficult life circumstances at the time of the offense, positive
life circumstances at the time of sentencing, and her cooperation at the end of the
investigation.
The presentence-investigation report recommended the presumptive sentence while
acknowledging the numerous mitigating circumstances that are described in the letters of
support. After considering all of the information presented, the probation agent who wrote
the report concluded that “there does not appear to be any one right answer” and stated that
“[t]here is no punishment that ‘fits’ this crime; it will always be too much and too little.”
The district court denied Matter’s departure motions and imposed a 326-month
prison sentence—the midpoint of the presumptive sentencing range. With regard to the
dispositional-departure request, the district court acknowledged that some mitigating
factors were present, including Matter’s remorse, cooperation during the proceedings,
support from friends and family, alcohol addiction and mental-health problems at the time
of the offense, and current positive life circumstances. The district court noted, however,
that at the time of the offense, Matter was in her thirties and already a mother—she was
not a young girl who did not know what was happening with her body —and that she
already had an extensive criminal record. Ultimately, the district court determined that
staying Matter’s sentence and placing her on probation was not warranted because the
severity of the offense outweighed the mitigating factors.
With regard to the durational-departure request, the district court stated that Matter
did not play a minor or passive role in the offense, the victim was clearly not the aggressor,
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and Matter’s conduct was not less serious than other second-degree intentional murders
because of the vulnerability of the infant victim.
Matter appeals.
DECISION
Matter argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) denying her motion
for a downward dispositional departure and (2) sentencing her to the midpoint of the
presumptive sentencing range instead of the bottom.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5(2) (2002); Minn. Sent’g Guidelines I (Supp. 2003).
To determine an offender’s presumptive sentence, the district court locates the cell on the
applicable sentencing grid that appears at “the intersection of the column defined by the
criminal history score and the row defined by the offense severity level.” Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines II.C (Supp. 2003); see also Minn. Sent’g Guidelines IV (providing sentencing
grids). When the applicable cell contains three numbers, these numbers represent the
offender’s minimum presumptive sentence, maximum presumptive sentence, and
presumptive “fixed” sentence. State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 359 n.2 (Minn. 2008);
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines IV. A district court must impose a sentence in the presumptive
range “unless the individual case involves substantial and compelling circumstances.”
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines II.D (Supp. 2003). “Because the guidelines’ goal is to create
uniformity in sentencing, departures are justified only in exceptional cases.” State v.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Minn. 2016).
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We may review any sentence “to determine whether the sentence is inconsistent
with statutory requirements, unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably
disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact issued by the district court.” Minn. Stat.
§ 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2022). “Whether to depart from sentencing guidelines rests within
the district court’s discretion, and the district court will not be reversed absent an abuse of
that discretion.” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011). “Only in a ‘rare
case’ will a reviewing court reverse imposition of a presumptive sentence.” State v. Delk,
781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7
(Minn. 1981)), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). An appellate court may not intrude on
the district court’s broad discretion in cases in which there are “arguments for departing
downward” but “also reasons for not doing so.” Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 8. And we will
not “interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion, as long as the record shows
the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before
making a determination.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. App. 1985).
I. The district court acted within its discretion in denying Matter’s motion for a
downward dispositional departure.
Matter contends that that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
motion for a downward dispositional departure, arguing that there were substantial a nd
compelling reasons to depart from the sentencing guidelines’ presumptive imprisonment
sentence because she is particularly amenable to probation.
When deciding whether to grant a downward dispositional departure, “a district
court may consider both offender- and offense-related factors.” State v. Walker,
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913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018). Offender-related factors focus on whether the
defendant is particularly amenable to probation and may include “the defendant’s age,
[their] prior record, [their] remorse, [their] cooperation, [their] attitude while in court, and
the support of friends and/or family.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982)
(discussing what are known as the Trog factors). A district court may also consider whether
placing the defendant on probation would pose a threat to public safety. State v. Soto,
855 N.W.2d 303, 313 (Minn. 2014).
Offense-related factors focus on the proportionality of the sentence to the severity
of the offense, meaning “whether the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less
serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.” State v.
Martinson, 671 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Minn. App. 2003) (quotation omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Jan. 20, 2004). These factors include whether the defendant played a “minor or
passive role” in the commission of the offense, State v. Stempfley, 900 N.W.2d 412, 418
(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted), “the means by which the defendant committed the
offense,” and “the resulting damage or loss,” State v. Myers, 416 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn.
1987) (quotation omitted), which may include the impact on any direct or indirect victims,
State v. Chaklos, 528 N.W.2d 225, 229 n.2 (Minn. 1995). The sentencing guidelines state
that mitigating factors that may support a downward dispositional departure include
whether the victim was an aggressor, whether the defendant committed the offense “under
circumstances of coercion or duress,” and whether the defendant “lacked substantial
capacity for judgment ” because of physical or mental impairment not including the
voluntary use of intoxicants. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines II.D.2.a (Supp. 2003).
10
Matter’s argument focuses exclusively on the offender-related factors that make her
amenable to probation: her remorse, cooperation and attitude, and support from friends and
family. The district court acknowledged that these factors supported amenability to
probation, and the record supports those findings. But the district court went on to state
that it was denying the motion for a downward dispositional departure because “[t]he
severity of the case far outweighs any amenability of Ms. Matter to probation or treatment.”
This statement demonstrates that the district court’s decision was based on offense-related
factors rather than offender-related factors. Matter does not argue that the district court
erred by relying on offense-related factors or that the district court’s findings on that subject
are not supported by the record.
The state argues that the district court properly concluded that the offense was not
less serious than a typical second -degree intentional murder because the victim was a
newborn infant. The state points to two Minnesota appellate decisions affirming the denial
of downward departures in cases in which mothers caused the death of their newborn
infants. State v. Kinsky, 348 N.W.2d 319 (Minn. 1984); State v. Heiges, 779 N.W.2d 904
(Minn. App. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 806 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2011).
The supreme court in Kinsky cited the following findings by the district court
supporting its decision not to depart:
[The] defendant’s conduct manifested “a shocking disregard
for the value of human life in infancy.” In a sentencing
statement, the trial judge noted that some of the factors present
would have supported an upward departure in defendant’s
sentence, particularly the “vulnerability of the victim, her
frailty, her absolute and total dependence upon her mother, the
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sudden manner in which her life was ended, and the indignity
suffered upon her remains.”
348 N.W.2d at 326. The district court here made strikingly similar findings, stating that
the facts of this case would support an upward departure: the victim, a newborn infant,
could not have been the aggressor; the court could not “conceive of a more vulnerable
victim than a newborn infant”; and Matter did not play a passive role, but “rather, the
opposite.” The district court also considered that there was a long list of secondary victims,
including Matter’s family, law enforcement who investigated the case for decades, and
members of the community who “were devastated by this case.”
These findings demonstrate that the district court carefully considered the
information before it and based its decision on appropriate factors pursuant to the
sentencing guidelines and caselaw. We therefore conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Matter’s motion for a downward dispositional departure.
II. The district court acted within its discretion when it sentenced Matter to the
midpoint of the presumptive sentencing range rather than the bottom.
Matter argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence at
the midpoint of the presumptive range instead of the bottom of the presumptive range and
that we should exercise our authority to modify her sentence because compelling
circumstances exist that warrant a shorter sentence. She does not argue that the district
court should have granted her motion for a downward durational departure; rather, she
argues that she deserves the shortest sentence that would not be deemed a departure.
“This court will not generally review a district court’s exercise of its discretion to
sentence a defendant when the sentence imposed is within the presumptive guidelines
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range.” Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428. When the sentence is within that range, we will not
exercise our authority to modify it “absent compelling circumstances.” State v. Freyer,
328 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Minn. 1982).
Matter argues that we should reduce her sentence based on the offender-related Trog
factors and because three law-enforcement investigators supported a lower sentence. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that any sentence within the presumptive
guidelines range “constitute[s] an acceptable sentence based solely on the offense at issue
and the offender’s criminal history score—the lowest is not a downward departure, nor is
the highest an upward departure.” Jackson, 749 N.W.2d at 359 n.2. In other words, “any
sentence within the presumptive range . . . constitutes a presumptive sentence.” Delk,
781 N.W.2d at 428. The district court had the discretion to sentence Matter within the
presumptive guidelines range, and the 326-month midrange term imposed by the district
court was a presumptive sentence. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines IV; see also Delk,
781 N.W.2d at 428. And although it did, “the district court [was] not required to explain
its reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence.” State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925
(Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). Based on the record, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a presumptive guidelines
sentence of 326 months, and we will not exercise our authority to modify it because we
discern no “compelling circumstances” to do so. Freyer, 328 N.W.2d at 142.
1

1 Matter also urges this court to reduce her sentence because “a justice system must have
room for mercy and compassion,” citing Justice Paul H. Anderson’s concurring opinion in
State v. Streiff, 673 N.W.2d 831, 841 (Minn. 2004) (Anderson, J., concurring). In Streiff,
Justice Anderson’s concurring opinion advised that the state, in exercising its prosecutorial
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In sum, because the district court carefully considered the information before it, the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Matter’s motion for a downward
dispositional sentencing departure. And because we discern no compelling circumstances
to warrant exercising our authority to modify her sentence, we affirm the district court’s
decision to impose the sentence duration of 326 months.
Affirmed.

discretion, should consider not only what is “just” but also what is “right.” 673 N.W.2d at
839. Matter does not provide any analysis on how that discussion of prosecutorial
discretion justifies the relief she seeks on appeal, and thus, we decline to address this issue.
See State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Minn. App. 2017) (stating that an argument is
inadequately briefed, and therefore forfeited, if it is “presented in a summary and
conclusory form” and “fail[s] to analyze the law”).