In the Matter of the Welfare of: M. D. T., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1098

In the Matter of the Welfare of: M. D. T., Child.

Filed July 1, 2024
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-22-3232

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant M.D.T.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant M.D.T. challenges his juvenile delinquency adjudication for the offense
of aiding and abetting third-degree riot following a stipulated-facts and stipulated-evidence
trial. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt,
we affirm.
2
FACTS
After a shooting at the Mall of America that resulted in the death of J.H. (the
victim),1 respondent State of Minnesota filed a petition alleging that appellant, a juvenile,
had committed the offenses of aiding and abetting second -degree riot and aiding and
abetting third-degree riot. The district court denied the state’s motion to designate
appellant as an extended jurisdiction juvenile. 2 Appellant then waived his right to a full
court trial and agreed to proceed with a stipulated-facts and stipulated-evidence trial before
the district court.3 The parties submitted 34 fact stipulations and stipulated to 47 exhibits,
which included surveillance video from the mall, video from body -worn police cameras,
video from social media, and photographs. Our summary of the parties’ stipulated facts
and stipulated evidence is as follows.
On December 23, 2022, appellant and his group, D.D.-B., T.A.-W., L.L., and J.H.,
arrived at the mall in the early evening . The group arrived in one car and parked in the
ramp near the Nordstrom department store. For approximately an hour and a half, the
group walked around the mall together, visiting stores and dining areas.

1 Because a witness in the case also has the initials J.H., we use the term “the victim” to
refer to the individual who was killed. Further references to J.H. are to the witness.

2 “‘Extended jurisdiction juvenile’ is a child who has been given a stayed adult criminal
sentence, a disposition under Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.198, and for whom
jurisdiction of the juvenile court may continue until the child’s twenty-first (21st)
birthday.” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 19.01, subd. 2(A); see also Minn. Stat. § 260B.130
(2022) (providing the process by which a defendant may be placed under extended juvenile
jurisdiction).

3 This type of proceeding is authorized by Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency
Procedure 13.03, subdivision 3.
3
K.B.-B. and his mother arrived at the mall about an hour and a half after appellant
and his group . Approximately 20 minutes after K.B.-B. arrived at the mall, appellant
posted a video on social media showing his group and him following K.B.-B. and K.B.-
B.’s mother around the second floor of the mall. In the video, appellant yells at K.B.-B. a
few times, stating, “man, stop you clutching and shit while there’s hella police in this
bitch,” “come here,” and “all we want to do is talk with you. ” Another member of
appellant’s group yells, “[S]top walking away.” Appellant’s group continued following
K.B.-B. until he left the mall with his mother.
After following K.B.-B. and K.B.-B.’s mother, appellant’s group briefly split up.
T.A.-W., L.L., and D.D.-B. return ed to the parked car while appellant and J.H. remained
inside the mall. During this time, appellant and J.H. were stopped by a Bloomington police
officer who was investigating a report made by a mall patron about a person with a gun.
According to the patron’s report, a male was “walking with a lot of young people around
him on the second level of the [mall]” and “a gun [was] protruding from [one of the male’s]
front waistband.” The officer who stopped appellant and J.H. conducted a brief visual and
pat search of the pair but did not find any weapons. Later, the patron who made the report
identified K.B.-B. as the individual with a gun.
Meanwhile, K.B.-B.’s mother left the mall, and K.B.-B. met up with the victim and
another person, N.A., in the parking ramp near Nordstrom. The trio walked into Nordstrom
“through the Level 2 parking ramp” and made their way down the escalator to the first
floor of the department store. Around the same time, T.A.-W. reconnected with appellant
and J.H. in the first-floor men’s shoe department of Nordstrom. Minutes later, appellant,
4
J.H., and T.A.-W. began following the victim, N.A., and K.B.-B as they walked toward the
“up” escalator that would bring them back to the second floor. Appellant’s group let N.A.
and K.B.-B. pass to enter the escalator. But the group blocked the victim’s path so he was
unable to enter the escalator with the two other members of his group. The victim backed
away from the escalator and appellant’s group, but then J.H. chased the victim.
J.H. pursued the victim around the men’s coat section and then physically attacked
him. Other store patrons moved away from the physical altercation. At approximately
7:49 p.m., a Nordstrom employee called mall security and reported that kids were fighting
in the store. During the call, t he employee advised that shots had been fired. Within
seconds of the first shot, surveillance video shows T.A.- W. holding a gun and running
toward the victim. L.L. is visible in the video behind T.A.-W. As L.L. neared the victim,
he took a shooter stance. By 7:49:36 p.m., the video shows J.H., T.A.-W., and L.L. running
away from the victim, who was left lying on the floor. During this incident, the victim was
shot in the back and back side at least eight times. He was declared dead at the scene.
While J.H. chased the victim, appellant remained near the escalator entrance. The
surveillance video shows appellant looking back and forth between the escalator and the
altercation. B efore the first shot was fired, K.B.-B. walked down the “up” escalator.
Appellant can be seen in the video gestur ing at K.B.-B., seemingly pointing toward the
second floor. K.B.-B. turned around and went back up the escalator. During the shooting,
appellant stood about 80 to 90 feet away from the victim.
5
Immediately after the shooting, appellant and the four members of his group left the
mall together. A video posted on social media approximately one hour later showed
appellant and the four other group members together.
Police located a loaded .40 caliber pistol “approximately 40 feet away from where
[the victim] died.” The pistol belonged to the victim’s mother. Subsequent DNA testing
revealed that the pistol contained a mixture of DNA from the victim and J.H. The pistol
had fired at least one expended bullet casing recovered from the scene. But investigators
did not believe that any of the bullets recovered from the victim’s body came from that
pistol.4
Based on this evidence, the district court found appellant not guilty of aiding and
abetting second-degree riot and guilty of aiding and abetting third-degree riot. The district
court placed appellant on supervised probation.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the evidence 5 was insufficient to support the district court’s
finding of guilt for the offense of third- degree riot. That offense occurs “[w]hen three or
more persons assembled disturb the public peace by an intentional act or threat of unlawful
force or violence to person or property.” Minn. Stat. § 609.71, subd. 3 (2022). Here, the

4 Police recovered a second gun on “the floor of the rear driver’s-side passenger seat in the
vehicle [the victim] drove to the [mall].” The DNA on that gun did not match any of the
individuals involved in the incident.

5 We refer to the stipulated facts and the stipulated evidence collectively as the evidence.
6
state alleged—and the district court found—that appellant aided and abetted a third-degree
riot. “A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person
intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the
other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2022). And a defendant
“intentionally aids” an accomplice in the commission of a crime if the defendant knows an
accomplice is going to commit a crime and intends the defendant’s “presence or actions to
further the commission of that crime.” State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 156 (Minn. 2024)
(quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that the stipulated facts and evidence were insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he “intentionally aided” J.H., T.A.-W., and L.L. in
committing the offense of third-degree riot. He contends that the evidence does not support
a finding that he knew members of his group would commit such an offense or that he
intended his “presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.71, subd. 3; Segura, 2 N.W.3d at 156.
In a criminal case, due process requires the state to present sufficient evidence to
prove every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Culver, 941
N.W.2d 134, 142 (Minn. 2020). “When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence,
appellate courts carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the
legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that
the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was
convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
7
Evidence is viewed “in the light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that
the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” Id.
“The ‘intentionally aids’ element of accomplice liability is a state-of-mind
requirement,
” State v. Davenport, 947 N.W.2d 251, 265 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted),
that is rarely proven with direct evidence, State v. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn.
2015). This element can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, however, “including
the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, a close association with the principal
before and after the crime, a lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and
defendant’s flight from the scene of the crime with the principal.” Segura, 2 N.W.3d at
156 (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder
can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d
592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Evidence is circumstantial when it “requires an inferential step to prove a fact that
is not required with direct evidence.” Id. When reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence, appellate courts use a two-step process. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598
(Minn. 2013) (stating that the level of scrutiny a reviewing court applies depends on
whether the elements of an offense are supported by direct or circumstantial evidence).
First, an appellate court identifies the circumstances proved. Id. “In identifying the
circumstances proved, we defer to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances
and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by
the State.” Id. at 598-99 (quotations omitted). Second, an appellate court “determine[s]
whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
8
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599. During this step, a reviewing court
does not defer to the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable inferences. State v. Andersen,
784 N.W.2d 320, 329-30 (Minn. 2010).
Appellant argues, and the state concedes, that the more stringent circumstantial
evidence standard of review applies because the evidence of appellant’s intent to aid others
in the commission of third-degree riot was purely circumstantial. We agree. Applying that
standard of review here, we first identify the circumstances proved. They are as follows.
Appellant, J.H., D.B.-B., T.A.-W., and L.L. arrived at the mall together. About an
hour and a half after they arrived, appellant and his group began following K.B.-B. and his
mother around the mall , yelling that they wanted to “talk” to him, that he should “come
here,” and that he should “stop walking away.” K.B.-B. had a gun at the time he was being
pursued by appellant’s group. A pat search by a police officer revealed that appellant and
J.H. were not carrying any weapons. After K.B.-B.’s mother left the mall, K.B.-B. returned
to the mall with the victim and N.A. The victim, K.B.-B., and N.A. entered Nordstrom on
the second floor and went down to the first floor where they encountered appellant, J.H.,
and T.A.-W. Appellant, J.H., and T.A.-W. followed the victim, K.B.-B., and N.A. as they
walked toward the “up” escalator on Nordstrom’s first floor. After letting K.B. -B., and
N.A. get on the escalator, appellant and his group blocked the victim’s path, preventing the
victim from entering the escalator and separating him from his group. The victim backed
away from the escalator, and J.H. chased after him. J.H. and the victim had a physical
altercation. T.A.-W. ran toward the fight while holding a gun, and L.L. followed, taking a
shooter stance near the victim. Appellant remained near the entrance to the escalator,
9
watching both the escalator and the fight. Before the first shot was fired, K.B.- B. walked
down the “up” escalator toward appellant. Appellant gestured at K.B.-B., and K.B.-B. then
turned around and returned to the second floor. A store employee called mall security to
report “kids fighting.” During the employee’s call, there was a gunshot. Appellant’s
position near the escalator was 80 to 90 feet away from where the victim was shot. The
victim was shot at least eight times in the back and back side, and ultimately died.
Immediately after the shooting, appellant and the four members of his group left the mall
together and remained together for at least another hour. A pistol registered to the victim’s
mother but containing the DNA of both J.H. and the victim, was recovered 40 feet from
where the victim died. That pistol was not the weapon that killed the victim.
We conclude—and appellant acknowledges—that these circumstances support the
reasonable inference that appellant’s group “assembled [to] disturb the public peace by an
intentional act or threat of unlawful force or violence to person” and that appellant both
knew about and intended to support the commission of such a crime. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.71, subd. 3. But appellant contends that these circumstances also support reasonable
inferences that are inconsistent with guilt.
Appellant offers two alternative theories of innocence. First, he argues first that the
circumstances proved support a reasonable hypothesis that the victim drew his gun first
and that J.H. acted only in self-defense. According to appellant, if J.H. acted in self-
defense, there was no “plan” in place and therefore there was nothing for him to “know.”
But this inference is not reasonable based on the evidence. Surveillance video shows J.H.
confronting and pursuing the victim, not the other way around. Moreover, the victim was
10
shot in the back at least eight times by weapons that were not recovered. These facts do
not reasonably support appellant’s alternative theory that J.H. acted in self-defense.
As a second alternative theory, appellant contends that the evidence shows the group
“had not planned to attack [the victim].” He argues that, because there was no such plan,
he could not have known that “his cohorts would disturb the public peace in the way they
did.”
However, the circumstances proved do not reasonably support this second
alternative theory, either. We initially note that the state was not required to prove that
appellant knew the members of his group planned to physically attack the victim. Rather,
the state could establish appellant’s guilt of aiding and abetting third-degree riot by proving
that he knew his accomplices intended to threaten the victim with unlawful force or
violence. See Minn. Stat. § 609.71, subd. 3 (providing that a person is guilty of third -
degree riot if the person, along with at least two other people, “disturb the public peace by
an intentional act or threat of unlawful force or violence to person or property” (emphasis
added)).
The circumstances proved strongly support the inference that, at minimum,
appellant’s accomplices intended to threaten the victim with force or violence. Those
circumstances show a coordinated effort to target the victim and to isolate him from his
friends immediately before the shooting. Appellant, J.H., and L.L. followed the victim
through Nordstrom. Appellant blocked the victim from entering the escalator with his
group. When K.B.-B. attempted to return to the first floor on the escalator moments before
11
the shooting, appellant gestured at K.B.-B., causing K.B.-B. to return upstairs. And when
the victim attempted to run away, J.H. and L.L. chased him.
The circumstances proved also establish that appellant was with J.H., T.A.-W., and
L.L. for almost two hours before the altercation and that he left the mall with this group
after the shooting. An accomplice’s intent to aid the principal’s plan, including knowledge
of the plan, can be inferred from “a close association with the principal[s] before and after
the crime.” Segura, 2 N.W.3d at 156.
Finally, we observe that the circumstances proved are inconsistent with appellant’s
second alternative theory. It is not reasonable to infer from the circumstances proved that
appellant was unaware that his accomplices intended to threaten or harm the victim in
disturbance of the public peace. The only reasonable inference from the evidence is that
appellant intentionally aided his group in targeting the victim in a busy public place.
Even if appellant did not know in advance that his group planned to threaten or
attack the victim, he undoubtedly gained that knowledge as the crime unfolded. To convict
a defendant as an accomplice to an offense, the state is not required to prove that the
defendant knew of the accomplice’s “criminal intent before the crime commence[d.]” State
v. Smith, 901 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2017).
Rather, a defendant is liable for the actions of an accomplice when he learns of the
accomplice’s criminal intent while “the accomplice is in the process of committing the
offense, and makes the choice to aid in its commission either through [his] presence or [his]
actions.” Id.; see also McAllister, 862 N.W.2d at 55 (discussing the knowledge
requirement of accomplice liability and stating that, “even if [the defendant] did not know
12
that his [accomplices] were going to beat and rob [the victim] when the men entered the
alley, we can infer that he acquired such knowledge as the altercation progressed”).
The evidence established that appellant watched as J.H. chased the victim and as
J.H., T.A.-W., and L.L. physically attacked the victim. During this time, appellant was 80
to 90 feet away from the altercation that was so disruptive that an employee called mall
security. Given these circumstances, it is unreasonable to infer that appellant was unaware
that the members of his group were threatening and assaulting the victim. And appellant’s
actions during the attack demonstrate appellant’s decision to aid the members of his group
in committing those offenses. See Segura, 2 N.W.3d at 156; Smith, 901 N.W.2d at 663.
Appellant asserts that, even if he knew his group was planning to threaten or attack
the victim, the evidence does not support a reasonable inference that he intended his
presence to further the attack. But appellant’s actions during the incident belie this
argument. As noted, the evidence shows that appellant isolated the victim, worked to
separate the victim from his group, and then fled with the individuals who shot and killed
the victim. The circumstances rule out any reasonable hypothesis that appellant did not
intend his presence to further the crimes of his accomplices. See McAllister, 862 N.W.2d
at 53 (“A [fact-finder] may infer the requisite state of mind for accomplice liability through
circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, a
close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, a lack of objection
or surprise under the circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime with the
principal offender.”).
13
Finally, appellant offers an alternative interpretation of his gesture to the victim’s
associate K.B.-B., who momentarily attempted to walk down the “up” escalator.6 But as
an appellate court, we must consider the reasonable inferences from the circumstances
viewed “as a whole.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 598. Considering the circumstances proved
in their entirety, the only reasonable inference is that appellant’s gesture was an order to
K.B.-B. to return upstairs. And that inference is only consistent with appellant’s guilt.
The circumstances proved are only consistent with appellant’s guilt of aiding and
abetting third-degree riot and are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than
guilt.7 Thus, the evidence supports appellant’s adjudication of aiding and abetting third-
degree riot.
Affirmed.

6 In conjunction with the argument, a ppellant cites State v. Witherspoon, No. A12-1247,
2013 WL 3284272, at *1 (Minn. App. July 1, 2013). Witherspoon is a nonprecedential and
therefore nonbinding case. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Moreover, we
do not consider the case to be persuasive.

7 The district court stated in its factual findings that appellant knew K.B.-B. had a gun.
Based on our review of the record, this finding was clearly erroneous. See State v. Lopez,
988 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Minn. 2023) (“A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it lacks
evidentiary support in the record.”). But “[a] clearly erroneous finding . . . does not require
a new trial when independent findings of fact, decisive of the case, are supported by the
record.” Id. And we conclude that even without a finding that appellant knew K.B.-B. had
a gun, there was sufficient evide nce presented to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant intentionally aided members of his group.