State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1136

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tatianna Charlene Schmid,
Appellant.

Filed July 1, 2024
Reversed and remanded
Jesson, Judge*

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-21-3814

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mitchell S. Sell, Anneliese McCahery, Mankato City Attorneys, Eckberg Lammers,
Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Tatianna Charlene Schmid appeals her conviction of misdemeanor fifth-
degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2) (2020). At trial, Schmid
testified that she only participated in the underlying altercation after an unprovoked attack.
She requested a self-defense instruction. While the state did not object to the instruction,
the district court denied the request. On appeal, Schmid argues that she is entitled to a new
trial because the district court abused its discretion by denying her request for a self-defense
jury instruction. We conclude that Schmid met her burden of production and therefore was
entitled to such an instruction. Because this error was not harmless, we reverse and remand
for a new trial.
FACTS
On October 13, 2021, Schmid and E.B. got into a physical altercation in a parking
lot outside an apartment complex. E.B. called the police and reported that Schmid had
started the fight. Schmid was subsequently charged with one count of misdemeanor fifth-
degree assault. See Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2) (providing that a person is guilty of
misdemeanor assault if they “intentionally inflict[] or attempt[] to inflict bodily harm upon
another”). Prior to trial, Schmid filed a notice of her intention to assert self-defense. A one-
day jury trial was then held at which respondent State of Minnesota and Schmid presented
two different accounts of what occurred.
The state, through the testimony of E.B., E.B.’s mother, and the police officer who
responded to the scene, presented the following version of events.
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On the day of the incident, E.B. drove to her mother’s apartment to drop off various
items she bought at the store. As she was making her way into the building, she saw Schmid
walking with a friend. Schmid asked E.B., “ What’s up?” in a tone of voice that “wasn’t
. . . very nice. ” E.B. interpreted Schmid’s comment to mean “I want to fight you.”
Although E.B. had not met Schmid prior to that day, she recognized Schmid from social
media. The pair had previously been friends on snapchat, but their virtual friendship ended
after Schmid sent E.B. “nasty” messages when she saw a picture of E.B. with the father of
her child.
E.B. continued to her mother’s apartment where she spent about 20 minutes before
returning to her car. While sitting in the car, E.B. saw Schmid and her friend exit the
apartment building and walk towards her. As the pair walked by, Schmid threw something
at E.B.’s car. E.B. called her mother and got out to check her car for damage. After she
checked her car, E.B. approached Schmid and asked, “why she would . . . throw an object
at [her] car.” Instead of responding, Schmid “swung at” her . E.B. tried to step away, but
Schmid’s friend punched her. As E.B. “fought back,” Schmid pulled E.B.’s hair and kicked
her until she fell to the ground. Schmid and her friend continued to attack E.B. as she lay
on the ground and only stopped when E.B.’s mother appeared.
E.B.’s mother had remained on the phone with E.B. and heard the entire altercation.
After hearing E.B. scream and say, “Mamma and Mom,” she ran out to the parking lot. It
was there that she saw E.B. “on the floor, [being] beaten up by two girls.” While E.B.’s
mother did not see who started the fight, she did see one of the women “holding [E.B.’s]
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hair and kicking and punching” her. E.B.’s mother later identified one of the women as
Schmid.
Once E.B.’s mother appeared, Schmid and her friend left the scene, walked to their
car, which was parked on the other side of the lot, and drove away. At her mother’s
insistence, E.B. called 911 and reported the incident. E.B. told the 911 dispatcher that she
had been “assaulted” by her mother’s neighbors and had so much “hair pulled out” that it
created a bald spot the size of a quarter on her head. A police officer was dispatched to the
scene. As he pulled up to the apartment, he saw a car containing two women drive past him
in the opposite direction. The officer later identified one of the women as Schmid.
When the officer arrived on scene, “[E.B.] was crying . . . [and] she had lots of hair
in her hand.” She told the officer that “she had come to see her mother, had . . . ran into
[Schmid]” and got into “a dispute over some communication [about] boyfriends.” E.B. said
that “[Schmid] and another female assaulted her.” The officer noted that E.B. was
“distraught,” and along with the hair that had been pulled out of her head, also had
“superficial scratches on her face.”
Schmid then testified in her own defense. Her version of events follows.
On the day of the incident, Schmid went to the apartment complex that both the
father of her child and her friend lived in because the father of her child agreed to babysit
while Schmid and her friend went out for the night. After dropping off her child, Schmid
and her friend left the building and walked past E.B., who was sitting in her car. As they
walked by, E.B. said, “what’s up” to them in a “hostile” manner. Schmid—who claims she
had never met E.B. prior to that day and did not recall being friends with her on social
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media—did not “understand what [E.B.’s] issue was.” The trio “exchanged a few words”
before Schmid and her friend turned around to walk away. It was at this point that E.B.
“got out of her car and punched [Schmid] in the back of [her] head.” Schmid, who was
dizzy from the punch, turned around to face E.B. a couple seconds later. E.B. attacked her
again, so Schmid pulled E.B.’s hair to “protect [her]self and get [E.B.] off of [her].” Schmid
only let go of E.B.’s hair when E.B. stopped hitting her.
After E.B.’s mother came out, Schmid tried to explain that she did not start the fight.
The mother did not believe her. Schmid and her friend then walked to their car and drove
off. She chose not to call the police because it “was [her] only night out,” and she “just
wanted to proceed with [her] evening.”
Once both Schmid and the state were done presenting evidence, Schmid moved for
a self-defense jury instruction to be given. T he state did not object to Schmid’s motion,
stating that when “the defendant testifies [that they acted in self-defense] it is a relative[ly]
low burden to get the [jury] instruction.” The district court, however, denied the request ,
and the jury subsequently found Schmid guilty of misdemeanor fifth-degree assault.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Under Minnesota law, a person who “reasonably believes that force is necessary ”
may act in self-defense if they only use a level of force that is reasonably necessary to
prevent bodily harm. State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014) (citing Minn.
Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2020)). But when a defendant wants to argue self-defense, they
have the burden of producing evidence in support of that claim. State v. Basting, 572
6
N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn.1997). If a defendant meets this burden of production and presents
enough evidence to “make the defense one of the issues of the case,” they are entitled to a
self-defense jury instruction. State v. Charlton, 338 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1983).
Once a defendant meets their burden of production, the state then has the burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of at least one of the elements of self-defense.
Basting, 572 N.W.2d at 285. Those elements are:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant;
(2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he or she was
in imminent danger of . . . bodily harm;
(3) the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and
(4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid
the danger.

Id.; see also Devens, 852 N.W.2d at 258 (quoting this aspect of Basting). Any doubts that
arise regarding the validity of a self-defense claim should be resolved in favor of the
defendant and in favor of providing a self- defense jury instruction. State v. Johnson, 719
N.W.2d 619, 631 (Minn. 2006).
Schmid argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by denying her
the opportunity to instruct the jury on self-defense. We give district courts considerable
latitude in crafting jury instructions and in determining the appropriateness of giving a
specific instruction. Morlock v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 650 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Minn.
2002). Given this broad discretion, appellate courts will not reverse a defendant’s
conviction due to an improper jury instruction unless the district court abused its discretion.
Hilligoss v. Cargill, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Minn. 2002). A district court abuses its
discretion if it denies a defendant’s request for a jury instruction on their theory of the case
7
if they have presented sufficient evidence to support it. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 631.
However, an erroneous jury instruction does not automatically require a new trial. State v.
Hall, 722 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Minn. 2006). If we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that an error in the jury instructions “had no significant impact on the verdict rendered,”
we will consider the error harmless and will affirm. Id.
I. The district court abused its discretion by denying Schmid’s motion to give
a self-defense jury instruction.

Here, the district court determined that Schmid had not met her burden of
production. It acknowledged that a fact issue existed as to who the initial aggressor was
given the conflicting testimony from E.B. and Schmid. But the court determined that
Schmid did not present evidence of “having an actual and honest belief that she had
imminent death or great bodily harm from her interaction with [E.B.],”
1 and did not testify
that she “had any fear.” Additionally, the court noted that there was no evidence presented

1 We note that the district court improperly relied on the standard for lethal self-defense,
which was not at issue here. The use of deadly force in self-defense is justified when:

(1) The killing must have been done in the belief that it was
necessary to avert death or grievous bodily harm. (2) The
judgment of the defendant as to the gravity of the peril to which
he was exposed must have been reasonable under the
circumstances. (3) The defendant’s election to kill must have
been such as a reasonable man would have made in light of the
danger to be apprehended.

State v. Pollard, 900 N.W.2d 175, 178-79 (Minn. App. 2017) (emphasis added). But the
supreme court has explained that “a person may use nonlethal self-defense when he or she
is under the ‘actual and honest belief that he or she was in imminent danger of . . . bodily
harm.’” State v. Lampkin, 994 N.W.2d 280, 288 (Minn. 2023) (quoting Devens , 852
N.W.2d at 258 (emphasis added).
8
about Schmid’s efforts to retreat or disengage from the altercation before using force
against E.B.
We disagree with the district court’s analysis. To meet her burden of production,
Schmid needed only to submit “reasonable evidence that [E.B.] was committing an
independent assault on [her] at the time” she grabbed E.B.’s hair. State v. Graham, 371
N.W.2d 204, 209 (Minn. 1985) (quotation omitted). In other words, Schmid had to “present
a sufficient threshold of evidence to make the defense one of the issues of the case.”
Charlton, 338 N.W.2d at 29. Schmid met this burden.
E.B. and Schmid each testified that the other was the initial aggressor. And Schmid
told the jury that she was punched in the back of her head by a person, E.B., who she
claimed she had never met before. It is reasonable to infer that someone in this situa tion
would have an actual and honest belief that they were in imminent danger of bodily harm.
See Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 630-31 (stating that a defendant’s “actual and honest belief
that [she] was in imminent danger of . . . bodily harm,” is subjective and “depends upon
the defendant’s state of mind,” so they do not need to “testify and provide direct evidence
of [her] state of mind”). F inally, according to Schmid, she only engaged with E.B. to
“protect [her]self.” Schmid’s testimony sufficiently made self-defense an issue that should
have been presented to the jury. See Charlton, 338 N.W.2d at 29.
The state argues that we should affirm Schmid’s conviction because “the record is
devoid of any evidence suggesting she lacked an ability to retreat.” Yet caselaw does not
require a defendant asserting self-defense to prove every element to meet their burden of
production. Graham, 371 N.W.2d at 209. It merely requires that a defendant “submit[]
9
reasonable evidence that the victim was committing an independent assault on [the]
defendant at the time [the] defendant” acted in self-defense. Id (quotation omitted). Once
a defendant puts the defense at issue, they are entitled to a jury instruction, and the state
then “bears the burden to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of the four
elements” of self-defense. Devens, 852 N.W.2d at 258. 2 And we reiterate that if the
question as to whether a defendant has met their burden of production, these doubts should
be resolved in favor of the defendant and in favor of providing a self-defense jury
instruction. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 631.
Thus, because Schmid produced enough evidence to meet her burden of production,
she was entitled to a self-defense jury instruction. The district court abused its discretion
by refusing to provide one.
II. The district court’s failure to instruct the jury on self-defense was not
harmless.

Because we have determined that Schmid was entitled to a self -defense jury
instruction, we must now evaluate whether the lack of such an instruction entitles her to a
new trial.3

2 We could not find any Minnesota caselaw in which an appellate court affirmed the denial
of a self-defense jury instruction solely on the basis that a defendant had not shown that
they had no reasonable possibility of retreat. While a factual situation may arise that
warrants such a finding, we reiterate that “the law requires . . . a person retreat if reasonably
possible before acting in self-defense,” id, and usually “a reasonableness determination is
properly made by the finder of fact—in this case, the jury.” State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d
392, 403 (Minn. 2001).

3 We note that, on appeal, the state argued only that Schmid did not meet her burden of
production and therefore was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction. The state did
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Arguing self-defense was central to Schmid’s trial strategy. Her decision to testify
was likely based on the consideration that , to assert such a defense, she needed to tell the
jury her version of events and this included an admission that she grabbed E.B.’s hair. Once
the district court denied Schmid’s request for a self-defense instruction, in its closing
argument the state correctly informed the jury that Schmid’s own testimony produced
evidence that established the elements of assault. As the prosecutor stated, “Schmid
admitted to being at the apartment on October 13th and she admitted to pulling [E.B.’s]
hair. Those elements have been met.”
Without the option to consider self-defense, the jury was forced to either find
Schmid guilty or find her not guilty even though she admitted to assaulting E.B. And the
supreme court has previously determined that if the district court’s jury instructions create
a situation in which the jury is given only the options of finding a defendant guilty or of
finding them not guilty despite the fact that they admitted to conduct that satisfied certain
elements of the charged crime, an error in said jury instructions is not harmless. Cf. State
v. Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d 588, 601 (Minn. 2005) (reversing and remanding for a new trial
when a jury was essentially forced “to choose between convicting [the defendant] of
premeditated murder and acquitting him of a crime for which the evidence clearly
suggested he was responsible-at least to some degree” (emphasis added)); Johnson, 719
N.W.2d at 632 (“The refusal to provide the heat-of-passion and self -defense instructions
provided the jury with no option other than guilt. Without the requested instructions, a jury

not, however, address the issue of whether the failure to give such an instruction was
harmless error, which would entitle Schmid to a new trial on remand.
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following the law would have been required to return a guilty verdict even if it believed
that [the defendant] was acting in the heat of passion or in self-defense. Therefore, we
consider that the errors were prejudicial and [the defendant] is entitled to a new trial.”).
Accordingly, because we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the lack
of a self-defense instruction here “had no significant impact on the verdict rendered,” Hall,
722 N.W.2d at 477, we reverse Schmid’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.