State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1145

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

David Lee Hosea,
Appellant.

Filed July 29, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-2585

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal -Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm because the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
appellant’s proffered evidence on fabrication and appellant was not deprived of a fair trial.
FACTS
On November 10, 2018, A.H. disclosed to his mother, K.J., that his father, appellant
David Lee Hosea, had sexually assaulted him. K.J. reported the sexual assault to child
protection services (CPS) and the police, and Hosea was subsequently arrested and charged
with one count of first -degree criminal sexual conduct (penetration of a victim 13 to 15
years old by a person in a position of authority) in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd.
1(b) (2018). In preparation for his jury trial, Hosea moved to admit various documents and
reports into evidence, which he claimed would show that K.J. had a history of involvement
with CPS. According to Hosea, K.J. manipulated A.H. into falsely accusing him of sexual
abuse so that she could gain custody of him, and Hosea claimed that the proffered evidence
would aid him in asserting a fabrication defense. He asserted that the evidence established
that K.J. was familiar with CPS’s policies and procedures and that she had previously
coached her younger children, whom she did not share with Hosea , to lie to CPS
investigators.
The district court denied in part and granted in part Hosea’s pretrial motion. The
court denied Hosea’s request to admit the records and document s detailing K.J.’s past
experiences with CPS. However, the court determined that “[t]here is relevance in the fact
that the children had been placed with [Hosea] prior to these allegations and that based on
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these allegations custody of the children was transferred to K.J. So, limited testimony
regarding those facts is admissible to allow [Hosea] to show a motive for fabrication.”
Subsequently, a jury trial was held, and the following evidence was presented .
A.H. first testified about his relationship with his parents, Hosea and K.J . A.H. had
lived with his father and stepmother for most of his life, and Hosea had primary custody of
A.H. prior to Hosea’s arrest. Despite having limited contact with her for most of his
childhood, A.H.’s mother was the most important person in his life. For most of his life,
his communications with K.J. had been limited. However, her presence in A.H.’s life had
increased during the few years prior to the incident at issue here as she attempted to gain
custody of him and his older brother, D.H.
A.H. then described the events that led to Hosea’s arrest. On November 9, 2018,
A.H. fell asleep on the living room couch. In the early morning hours of November 10, he
woke up to the feeling of Hosea pulling A.H.’s pants off. Hosea then put his mouth on
A.H.’s genitals and proceeded to sexual ly assault him. A.H. knew it was his father
assaulting him that night because “it [had] happened before.” According to A.H., the sexual
abuse had been happening for about two years, the first time being when he was 12 years
old. While most of those assaults occurred in A.H.’s bedroom, “on the off occasions, it
would happen . . . in the bathroom of the downstairs area .” During those two years, A.H.
tried to stop the abuse from happening by locking his bedroom door at night and by writing
Hosea letters that asked him to stop.
At around 6:30 p.m. on November 10, A.H. texted K.J the following: “ Last night I
was tired then I fell asleep down in the living room around 12 then when I woke up around
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12:45 and [I] felt dad taking of f my pants and underwear and he u know sucked away not
the first time either . . . .” K.J. called A.H. in response to his message but he did not answer.
The next day, A.H. texted K.J. and asked if she thought he “should tell the police.” K.J.
said yes and then told A.H. that she had already called CPS. A.H. questioned why K.J. had
called CPS . She explained that she was initially hesitant to call the police because she
“didn’t want [the report to] come back on [A.H.]” and cause problems with Hosea, but that
she felt she had to “get [him] outta there” somehow and believed calling CPS could make
that happen. A little while later, A.H. asked K.J. to call the police on his behalf and she
did. When asked at trial if he disclosed the abuse so that he could go live with K.J., A.H.
said “no,” and he explained that he wanted the abuse to stop and he did not want one of his
younger siblings, who were also living in Hosea’s house at that time, to have to go through
the same thing he did.
CPS and the police showed up at Hosea’s house on November 11. After a brief
investigation, CPS determined the best course of action at that time was to temporarily
place A.H. in the custody of his stepmother’s cousin. A.H. was taken to the Midwest
Children’s Resource Center (MCRC) on November 12. At MCRC, he was interviewed by
a provider trained in speaking with children who had been victims of sexual abuse. At trial,
A.H. was questioned about inconsistencies that existed between the answers he gave to the
police and his responses to some of the MCRC interview questions. In both situations, A.H.
stated that the abuse started when he was 12 years old. But A.H. had told the police that
Hosea had abused him “four t imes.” And in his MCRC interview, he disclosed that the
abuse occurred “several times ,” which he interpre ted to mean “10ish” times. A.H.
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explained to the jury that when he was speaking to the police, he had wanted to “minimize”
the abuse and “make it seem like it wasn’t that big of a deal,” which accounted for the
discrepancies.
Finally, A.H. testified that Hosea was not just sexually abusive, but that he was also
physically abusive. According to A.H., he had been “choked,” “hit with some objects,”
“punched[,] [and] slapped” by Hosea, which was one of the reasons he did not disclose the
sexual abuse earlier. A.H. was not Hosea’s only target. Hosea had also been physically
abusive to D.H., A.H.’s older brother. In fact, a few days before November 10, D.H.—who
had been living part time with his maternal grandmother —went to Hosea’s house to grab
some of his belongings. While D.H. was at the house, he and Hosea got into a physical
fight. This incident led to a CPS report and investigation. A.H. was interviewed as a part
of that investigation and denied that he had been physically or sexually abused by Hosea.
A.H. explained at trial that he chose not to disclose the abuse at that time because he felt
like CPS was “there for [his] brother,” not him. 1
K.J. testified next. K.J. stated she was first made aware of the abuse A.H. suffered
when he texted her on November 10. She called CPS instead of the police because she
wanted to get A.H. “out of the house” and she believed CPS “would be quicker to remove
the children from the home with those types of allegations as opposed to the police having
to do an investigation first .” The following day, K.J. reported the abuse to the police at the

1 The CPS investigator who interviewed A.H. also testified. He confirmed that A.H. did
not disclose any sexual abuse when he was interviewed as part of the investigation into
Hosea and D.H.’s fight.
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behest of A.H . After making the report, s he went to Hosea’s house because she wanted
A.H. to be released into her custody pending the outcome of the police and CPS
investigations. When A.H. was placed in the custody of his stepmother’s cousin, K.J.
messaged him and said that he was “supposed 2 be comin wit [her] .” She told him to tell
CPS and the police that he “don’t feel safe with nobody on [Hosea’s or his stepmother’s]
side” of the family. K.J. explained at trial that she said this because she did not want A.H.
to be “influenced[] to recant his story [by] someone associated with [Hosea].” K.J. testified
that she was eventually given custody of A.H.
A.H.’s maternal grandmother testified and told the jury that she had been present
the day D.H. and Hosea got into a physical altercation. She stated that she saw Hosea
repeatedly push D.H. “until he fell and tripped backwards down the stairs of the porch,”
and then saw Hosea hit D.H. before he could stand up.
A police officer and an MCRC nurse also appeared at trial and testified on behalf of
respondent State of Minnesota . The officer stated that when he responded to K.J.’s call to
police, CPS was already present and interviewing A.H . According to the office r, CPS
arriving at a scene before the police was a “very rare” occurrence. The officer’s b ody-
camera footage was then played for the jury. The footage shows A.H. reporting to the
officer and CPS that Hosea had sexually abused him “ four times .” It also showed K.J.
asking the officer why A.H. was not immediately placed in her custody. The MCRC nurse
then told the jury about her interview with A.H. She testified that d uring the interview,
A.H. disclosed that “[the abuse] had happened a couple times before .” He then explained
to the nurse that the reason he finally told his mother about the abuse was because “he was
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just sick of it.” The nurse stated that when she asked A.H. whose idea it was to report the
abuse, A.H. told her it was his.
A mental-health coordinator for A.H.’s school district and a police deputy testified
for the defense. The coordinator explained that she met with A.H. in May 2017 as a part of
a routine mental-health screening. A.H. told her that he was doing well, that his biological
mother was the person in his life he was closest to, and that he felt supported by Hosea and
his stepmother. He did not disclose any ongoing sexual abuse. The deputy testified that she
had observed and documented an interview between A.H. and prosecutors assigned to this
case. During the interview, A.H. said Hosea sexually abused him almost every other night.
Hosea testified on his own behalf . He denied abusing A.H., sexually or otherwise.
He told the jury that he had been out “at a bar with [his] friends” on the night of November 9
and the early morning of November 10. And w hen asked about the physical altercation he
had with D.H. in early November, Hosea explained that D.H. arrived at the house agitated
and then pulled a knife . Hosea stated that he grabbed D.H. and kicked him out.
The jury found Hosea guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and the
district court sentenced him to 144 months in prison.
DECISION
Hosea argues that his right to present a complete defense was violated when the
district court denied in part his motion to admit evidence of K.J.’s past experiences with
CPS. “Under our system of jurisprudence, every criminal defendant has the right to be
treated with fundamental fairness and afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense.” State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn. 1992) (quotation
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omitted). This right is articulated in both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7; State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865
(Minn. App. 1995) , rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996) . It “includes the opportunity to
develop the defendant ’s version of the facts, so the jury may decide where the truth lies.”
Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 865. But while courts are required to “allow defendants to present
evidence that is material and favorable to their theory of the case[,]” a defendant does not
have a right “to introduce evidence that either is irrelevant, or whose prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value.” Id. at 866; see also State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 798-
99 (Minn. 2014) (“A criminal defendant has the constitutional due process right to call and
examine witnesses, including expert witnesses, subject to the limitations imposed by the
rules of evidence.”). Evidence is “relevant” if it has “any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. And even if evidence
is relevant, it still may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pr esentation of cumulative
evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.
District courts are afforded “broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters.”
Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015). Appellate courts will not reverse
a district court’s evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Hanks, 817
N.W.2d 663, 667 (Minn. 2012). Overturning a district court’s evidentiary ruling is not
something a reviewing court does lightly. Id. However, if an appellate court “determines
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that the district court ’s evidentiary ruling denied the defendant the right to present a
complete defense, reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Grigsby, 806 N.W.2d 101, 112 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d, 818 N.W.2d 511
(Minn. 2012).
Here, the district court denied Hosea’s motion with respect to evidence about K.J.’s
prior CPS experiences because it determined that such evidence was “ not relevant.” The
court also reasoned that the evidence’s “probative value [was] substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues” because the behaviors and
events articulated in “the CPS records [were] disputed by the parties[,]” which could “lead
to a ‘trial within a trial,’ distracting the jury from the charged offe nse at the center of the
case.” We agree with the district court’s reasoning.
Most of the CPS reports and documents that Hosea moved to admit are related to
allegations from May 2018 that K.J. had been providing marijuana to, and smoking
marijuana with, D.H. in front of her other children. Contained within those reports was the
fact that K.J. wanted to gain custody of A.H. and D.H. Other proffered CPS reports address
allegations that D.H. was violent towards his younger siblings and Hosea. Yet these reports
either do not involve A.H. or involve A.H. as a witness to events that are not related to this
case. Moreover, none of the proffered CPS reports involve allegations of sexual abuse. So,
while Hosea is correct that K.J. has a history of involvement with CPS, the specifics of
K.J’s experiences are not relevant to a criminal-sexual-abuse charge .
Hosea contends that these CPS records are relevant because they establish that K.J.
has a “history of convincing her children to lie to CPS to keep her from losing custody,”
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which makes his defense —that K.J. manipulated A.H. into falsely reporting—more
probable. This argument does not find much support i n the record. There is only one
mention of K.J.’s alleged coaching contained with in the proffered evidence. K.J.’s three-
year-old daughter was interviewed in May 2018 as part of the CPS investigation into K.J.’s
marijuana usage. The investigator asked the child if K.J. had “told her what to say if asked
about smoking.” The child responded , “yes.” In her report, the investigator wrote: “It
appears [the child] was schooled by [K.J.] on what to say and what not to say.” We do not
believe one incident of coaching establishes a pattern of behavior from K.J. Furthermore,
the May 2018 incident and th e allegations against Hosea are distinct. In May 2018, K.J.
allegedly coached her three-year-old daughter to say no one in the house smoked so that
she would not lose parenting time or custody. Whereas in this current case, Hosea is
alleging that K.J. manipulated her teenage son into reporting a crime that could put his
biological father in prison. Thus, we conclude that the proffered CPS records do not make
Hosea’s fabrication defense more probable and are therefore irrelevant.
Even if the evidence of K.J.’s past with CPS was relevant, we agree with the district
court that the probative value does not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect. First,
the probative value of the evidence is low. None of the CPS reports involve allegations of
sexual abuse and, as discussed above, the reports do not establish that K.J. repeatedly and
routinely coached her children to lie to CPS. Additionally, Hosea was permitted to question
witnesses at trial about the fact that K.J. wanted custod y of A.H . and in fact, he did just
that. Thus, any evidence in the proffered CPS records regarding K.J.’s desire for custody
would have been cumulative.
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On the other hand, we agree with the district court that the evidence at issue would
have confused the jury and likely distracted it from the issue in this case . The proffered
CPS records contain disputed and unresolved allegations of child neglect and physical
abuse on both K.J.’s and Hosea’s parts. Introducing such evidence at trial would likely
have turned a criminal trial into a custody battle, and the Minnesota Supreme Court
previously affirmed a district court’s decision to exclude certain disputed evidence because
admitting the evidence would “misdirect the jury away from the key inquiry.”
State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 310, 332 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted) . The supreme court
determined the probative value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice because it would create “a trial-within-a-trial.” Id.; see also
State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 224 (Minn. 2010) (holding that a defendant’s
constitutional right to present a complete defense “is not absolute; courts may limit the
defendant ’s evidence to ensure that the defendant does not confuse or mislead the jur y”);
State v. Garland, 942 N.W.2d 732, 748 (Minn. 2020) (affirming the exclusion of evidence
that “was speculative and confusing”).
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
evidence about K.J.’s past experiences with CPS because the proffered evidence is not
relevant, and its probative value was outweighed by its danger for unfair prejudice. Given
this, we need not conduct a harmless error analysis, and w e affirm Hosea’s conviction.
Affirmed.