State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1206

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Edgar Daniello Martinez-Montez,
Appellant.

Filed November 12, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-2947

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Anders J. Erickson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
A jury found appellant guilty of aiding and abetting second -degree intentional
murder, aiding and abetting second -degree felony murder, and aiding an offender by
destroying or concealing evidence of a crime. The district court entered judgment of
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conviction on all three guilty verdicts and sentenced appellant to serve 306 months in
prison. Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress a
custodial statement he made to the police when he was interviewed as a suspect in the
murder, arguing tha t the state did not establish a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.
Appellant also challenges the district court’s entry of judgment of conviction on both
second-degree-murder verdicts. Because the district court did not er r in determining that
appellant’s Miranda waiver was valid, we affirm in part. But because the district court
erred by entering judgment s of conviction on both second -degree-murder verdicts, we
reverse in part and remand for the district court to vacate the judgment of conviction for
the lesser-included felony-murder offense.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Edgar Daniello Martinez-Montez
with aiding and abetting second -degree intentional murder, aiding and abetting second -
degree felony murder, and aiding an offender by destroying or concealing evidence of a
crime. The complaint alleged that the victim, MM, died after appellant and others tortured
and beat him at a home in Hennepin County. The complaint further alleged that appellant
and others disposed of MM’s body in a culvert in Dakota County.
Prior to charging, appellant was arrested on an outstanding warrant and taken into
police custody. While appellant was in custody, a police officer interviewed him regarding
his role in MM’s death and the disposal of MM’s body. The officer initiated the interview
by explaining that he had investigated MM’s murder, and he showed appellant evidence
that he had gathered, including video evidence implicating appellant in the murder. The
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officer told appellant that he was a suspect , that he had not yet been charged, and that the
officer wanted to hear appellant’s “side of the story.”
Before asking appellant any questions regarding his role in the murder, the officer
read appellant his Miranda rights as follows:
OFFICER: Ok. Well, that - I’m, I’m gonna give you an
opportunity to give me your side of the story, so I’m gonna
read you your rights right now, ok [appellant]? [Appellant],
the Constitution requires I inform you that you have the right
to remain silent. Do you understand that?
APPELLANT: Hmm, little bit.

OFFICER: Do you understand when I say you have the right
to remain silent? Do you understand what that means?
APPELLANT: A, a little bit, yeah.

OFFICER: A little bit?
APPELLANT: Mm-hmm.

OFFICER: What do you think it means?
APPELLANT: Uh, you say they’re supposed to (Inaudible)
like that.

OFFICER: So, what that means is you don’t have to talk to me
if you don’t want to. You, you can be quiet if I ask you
questions. That’s what that means. Does that make sense
now?
APPELLANT: Yeah, because I don’t know, I don’t know why
(Inaudible) this.

OFFICER: Ok. Do you understand what it means now when
I say you have the right to remain silent, that you don’t have to
talk to me? Do you understand that now?
APPELLANT: What happen?

OFFICER: Yes, or no?
APPELLANT: No, don’t understand.

OFFICER: Ok.
APPELLANT: (Inaudible) I don’t know.
4

OFFICER: [Appellant]. [Appellant].
APPELLANT: Yep.

OFFICER: Listen to me bud. This is very serious.
APPELLANT: Yeah, I don’t know why my, my (Inaudible).

OFFICER: Ok. I’m, I’m asking you, I’m asking you a
question right now. When I say you have the right to remain
silent, do you understand me?
APPELLANT: Mm-hmm. That, that, what I say (Inaudible).

OFFICER: [Appellant]. Listen to my question.
APPELLANT: Uh-huh.

OFFICER: You have the right to remain silent. Yes, or no?
Do you understand what I just said?
APPELLANT: I don’t do nothing.

OFFICER: No! Answer my question!
APPELLANT: Uh-huh.

OFFICER: I [am] asking you a question. You have the right
to remain silent. Do you understand?
APPELLANT: Ok.

OFFICER: Yes, or no?
APPELLANT: Yeah, I understand.

OFFICER: You understand? Ok. Anything you say can and
will be used against you in court. Do you understand?
APPELLANT: Yes, I understand.

OFFICER: You understand? Ok. You have the right to talk
to a lawyer now and have the lawyer present now or at any time
during questioning. Do you understand?
APPELLANT: Yeah, I understand.

OFFICER: Ok. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be
appointed for you without cost. Do you understand?
APPELLANT: So . . .

5
OFFICER: If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be
appointed for you without cost. That means if you can’t afford
a lawyer, the county will, uh, give you a public defender, and
you don’t have to pay for it. Do you understand that? You
shake - you say yes, or no.
APPELLANT: Yeah.

At that point, the officer began questioning appellant about his role in MM’s murder
and the disposal of MM’s body. Appellant initially claimed that he was not present when
MM was beaten. Then, he acknowledged that he had been present. He largely denied any
culpability but admitted that he held MM’s hands behind his back while another man tied
them together with a cord. Appellant also admitted that he pushed MM’s body out of a car
and watched as two other men pulled MM’s body down towards the culvert.
Appellant moved to suppress his statement to law enforcement, arguing that the
officer did not give a proper Miranda waiver given appellant’s difficulties with the English
language. Specifically, appellant argued that Spanish is his primary language, that his
English comprehension is lacking, and that he did not understand the Miranda advisory.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress. At
the hearing, the officer who interviewed appellant testified and acknowledged that at times
appellant was not responsive to his questions. However, the officer opined that appellant
understood the questions and was simply trying to avoid answering them. The officer
recognized that English was not appellant’s primary language, but based on his
observations and communications with appellant, the officer believed that appellant could
understand English well enough to understand the advisory. Based on this assessment, the
officer did not utilize an interpreter and continued to question appellant for over an hour in
6
English. At no point did the officer offer appellant an interpreter, and at no point did
appellant request one. The district court denied appellant’s suppression motion, concluding
that during the custodial interrogation appellant “validly waived his Miranda rights and
made all statements voluntarily.”
The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the district court provided a Spanish-speaking
interpreter for appellant at trial. Evidence showed that IC -S was the ringleader in MM’s
murder. IC-S brought MM to the house of BF and questioned him about whether certain
people had talked to the police about IC-S’s drug-dealing activities. IC-S, CM-A,
“Maestro,” AM-C, and appellant were present . T hey and others beat and tortured MM.
IC-S used a power drill to drill into MM’s knee. Another individual pounded a nail into
MM’s heel. MM was moved from BF’s house, and MM ultimately died from his injuries
while riding in the rear of IC-S’s hatchback car. IC-S, appellant, VG, and Maestro drove
MM to a rural area in Dakota County and disposed of his body in a culvert. MM’s body
was discovered approximately one month later, with a nail embedded in his heel.
IC-S recorded the individuals that were present during MM’s beating and tor ture,
so they would not go to the police. Three cell-phone videos admitted into evidence at trial
showed appellant’s presence in BF’s home and a battered MM.
AM-C, an accomplice, gave testimony implicating appellant in the murder of MM.
AM-C testified that appellant hit and kicked MM in BF’s basement, held MM down while
a drill was used on his knee, and tied him up. VG, an accomplice, testified that appellant
assisted in the disposal and concealment of MM’s body.
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Appellant was captured on video at a gas station about an hour before MM’s body
was disposed of in the culvert; the video showed him buying a “Brisk” bottled beverage,
and a similar “Brisk” bottle was recovered near MM’s body.
The officer who interviewed appellant testified that appellant gave multiple versions
of the events; he initially denied being present in the home during MM’s beating, but he
later acknowledged being present when others beat and tortured MM.
Appellant testified that he was under duress during the murder of MM and disposal
of his body. He testified that on the day in question, he was at BF’s house, he heard some
noise downstairs, he went into the living room, and he saw IC -S, AM-C, CM-A, TM, and
a man in a mask, likely Maestro, with MM, who “appeared to be beaten.” Appellant
claimed that IC-S carried a gun, appellant had once seen IC-S shoot a man in the foot, and
on the day in question , IC-S shot near appellant to scare him. Appellant claimed that he
was taken to another room and did not witness the beating of MM, though he could hear it
happening. Appellant also claimed that Maestro held him at gunpoint.
Appellant testified that he was then forced into a car and told that MM had died.
Appellant acknowledged that they stopped at a gas station, and stated that he was told to
go in, but he was under the impression that if he tried to escape, he would be shot.
Appellant acknowledged that he helped push MM’s body out of the car , but he claimed
that he was told to do so at gunpoint. He also claimed that the place where he helped to
move MM’s body from the car was not the place where MM’s body was ultimately found.
Instead, they put MM’s body back in the car and took it to another location.
8
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. The district court entered a
judgment of conviction on each count and sentenced appellant to serve 306 months in
prison on the conviction of aiding and abetting second -degree intentional murder. The
district court did not impose sentences on the other two convictions.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I.
Appellant argues that the district court committed reversible error by failing to
suppress his custodial statement to law enforcement.
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “We may independently review facts that are not in
dispute, and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
“The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the
Minnesota Constitution protect persons from compelled self -incrimination,” and
“[b]ecause of the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation,”1 a criminal suspect must be
warned, before questioning, ‘“that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law,’” that he has the right to have an attorney present,

1 The district court found that appellant was in custody when he was interviewed by the
officer. There is no dispute that the officer’s interview constituted a custodial interrogation.
9
and that ‘“if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning.’” State v. Farrah, 735 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)).
“The defendant may waive his Miranda rights provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Id. at 341 (quotation omitted). “The prosecution
has the burden of proving a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “Only
if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced
choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the
Miranda rights have been waived.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Factors common ly
considered include age, intelligence and education, familiarity with the criminal justice
system, physical and mental condition, and language barriers.” Id. “Findings of fact
surrounding a claimed Miranda waiver are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions
based on those facts are reviewed de novo.” Id.
In denying appellant’s motion to suppress, the district court found, in relevant part,
as follows:
First, this is not [appellant’s] first interaction with the
criminal justice system. In 2017, he pleaded guilty in a gross
misdemeanor case. [He] also has pending misdemeanor
charges in Hennepin and Ramsey counties for allegedly giving
a false name to a peace officer on two separate occasions, once
in 2019 and again in 2021. . . .
Second, the audio recording of the interrogation
supports [a] finding [ that appellant] was able to understand
English to the degree needed for a proper waiver, though it is
apparent English is not [his] primary language. The main
cause for concern is [appellant’s] response to being asked
whether he understood his right to remain silent. Initially, he
twice said he understood it a “little bit.” After [the officer]
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explained the right in simple terms and again asked if
[appellant] understood it, he says, “What happen?” then, “No,
don’t understand.” It is unclear whether his statement, “No,
don’t understand,” refers to whether he understands his right to
remain silent or why he is being charged. [The officer] asked
again whether [appellant] understood, but did not receive a
clear answer. Finally, when [the officer] demanded a direct
answer, [appellant] said he understood. When then asked
whether he understood that his statements may be used against
him, that he has the right to counsel, and that counsel may be
provided for him, he quickly answered that he understood each
of those rights.

(Footnotes omitted.)

The district court credited the officer’s testimony that “he believed [appellant]
understood the question and was simply avoiding answering, a behavior he said is common
amongst suspects being interrogated.” The district court carefully explained that “[w]hile
the opinion of the interrogating officer is by no means dispositive, it is still relevant under
the totality of the circumstances” and that
independent of [the officer’s] analysis, the [c]ourt finds it more
likely that [appellant] was avoiding the question than failing to
understand his right. In the hour of interrogation following the
Miranda waiver, [appellant] generally has no issues
communicating with [the officer]. The two carry on a
conversation with very few interruptions due to
misunderstandings. [Appellant] also did not hesitate to say he
understood his other rights. Based on this l engthy
conversation, the [c]ourt believes [appella nt’s] English skills
were proficient enough to understand the rights being read to
him.
Finally, the [c]ourt recognizes that an understanding of
basic situational questions does not equate to an understanding
of questions about more complex legal principles. However,
the right to remain silent is not an especially abstract idea and
was effectively communicated by [the officer] in simple terms
when he told [appellant], “you don ’t have to talk to me if you
don’t want to. You, you can be quiet if I ask you questions.”
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[Appellant] also immediately acknowledged understanding the
more complex concept that his statements could be used
against him in court.
Because there is only one significant instance where
[appellant] appears to not understand his rights, and because
that lack of understanding is plausibly attributed to avoidance
or denial of wrongdoing and because [appellant] has notable
prior experience with the criminal justice system, the [c]ourt
finds the state has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that [appellant] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights by stating he understood them and
continuing to talk with [the officer].

(Citation omitted.)

Appellant argues that his Miranda waiver was not valid because the officer did not
provide him with an interpreter during his custodial interview and he therefore did not
understand the Miranda advisory.
Appellant’s English Language Proficiency
Minn. Stat. § 611.30 (2022) provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this state that the
constitutional rights of persons disabled in communication
cannot be fully protected unless qualified interpreters are
available to assist them in legal proceedings. It is the intent of
sections 611.30 to 611.34 to provide a procedure for the
appointment of interpreters to avoid injustice and to assist
persons disabled in communication in their own defense.

A person who is “disable d in communication” includes a person who, “because of
difficulty in speaking or comprehending the English language, cannot fully understand the
proceedings or any charges made against the person.” Minn. Stat. § 611.31 (2022). “Under
this policy, followin g the apprehension or arrest of a person disabled in communication,
law enforcement has the obligation to obtain a language interpreter to assist the person
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throughout custodial interrogation.” Farrah, 735 N.W.2d at 341. However, it is well -
settled that the interpreter statute s do not create any new constitutional rights , and a
violation of the statute s does not require the suppression of a defendant’s statement. See
State v. Sanchez-Diaz, 683 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 2004); State v. Dominguez-Ramirez,
563 N.W.2d 245, 253 (Minn. 1997).
The district court found that appellant “was able to understand English to the degree
needed for a proper waiver.” Caselaw treats determinations regarding the degree to which
a criminal defendant understood English as findings of fact. See Arredondo v. State, 754
N.W.2d 566, 577 (Minn. 2008) ( concluding that the record supported the postconviction
court’s findings concerning the petitioner’s ability to understand English ); State v. Perez,
404 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Minn. App. 1987) (“We have reviewed the transc ript, and agree
with the [district] court’s finding that [defendant] possessed sufficient command of English
to assist in the presentation of his defense.”) , rev. denied (Minn. May 20, 1987); State v.
Gany, No. A17-0809, 2019 WL 272853, at *4 -5 (Minn. App. Jan. 22, 2019 ) (stating that
“whether a person is disabled in communication is a fact -specific inquiry” and applying
the clear-error standard to a district court’s determination that defendant was not disabled
in communication) , rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2019) ; see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
136.01, subd. 1(c) (stating that , although nonprecedential opinions are not binding
authority, they may be cited as persuasive authority).
We review a finding of fact for clear error. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502. A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no reasonable evidence to support it or if this court is
13
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. State v. Gomez , 721
N.W.2d 871, 883 (Minn. 2006).
Admittedly, the evidence showing appellant’s English proficiency is conflicting.
On the one hand, the interview makes clear that English is not appellant’s primary
language. And during the interview, appellant said that he did not understand a portion of
the Miranda rights advisory. On the other hand, during the interview, appellant
demonstrated a reasonable understanding of the English language and was generally able
to respond to the officer’s inquiries without difficulty. And appellant was able to
communicate a duress defense during the interview—in English—asserting that IC-S held
him at gunpoint. Finally, although appellant’s English was limited, he was able to
communicate with the officer, answered all but one of the officer’s questions in English,
and responded in English when the officer showed him the evidence that had been gathered.
For example, prior to reading appellant his Miranda rights, the officer showed appellant a
picture of MM’s body after it was removed from the culvert, and appellant exclaimed, “Oh
my God.” Given the record evidence that appellant was able to communicate with the
officer in English during the custodial interrogation and asked for clarification when
needed, the district court’s finding that appellant’s English was sufficient to provide a valid
Miranda waiver is not clearly erroneous.
Appellant argues that the district court’s determination regarding his ability to
comprehend English is a conclusion of law that should be reviewed de novo, and not a
finding of fact reviewed for clear error. Based on the caselaw cited above, we disagree.
We also note that , in a case such as this, in which the district court was able to observe
14
appellant’s communication abilities at the contested evidentiary hearing on his motion to
suppress, the district court was in a far better position to assess appellant’s English
proficiency than we are. 2 See Albertson v. Albertson, 67 N.W.2d 463, 466 ( Minn. 1954)
(“Obviously the [district] court is in a far better position than we are to evaluate the various
factors bearing on the credibility of the witnesses, such as their demeanor, disposition, and
character.”); State v. Nolan, No. A18-0663, 2019 WL 2167467, at *2 (Minn. App. May 20,
2019) ( applying Albertson in an appeal challenging a criminal conviction ), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 6, 2019); see also Perez, 404 N.W.2d at 838 (“Based on testimony given at
the omnibus hearing, the court determined appellant had a sufficient command of the
English language to assist in his defense.”).
Without conceding that the district court’s determination that appellant’s “English
skills were proficient enough to understand the rights being read to him” is a finding of
fact, appellant argues that, to the extent it was a finding, it was clearly erroneous because
the district court weighed the evidence incorrectly. That argument is unavailing because
we do not reweigh evidence on appeal. See State v. Lloyd , 345 N.W.2d 240, 245 (Minn.
1984) (“The resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive function of the [fact-finder]
because it has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and weigh their
credibility.”); State v. Washington , 521 N.W.2d 35, 42 (Minn. 1994) (“The weight and

2 We note that appellant’s behavior at the suppression hearing demonstrated his ability to
comprehend and communicate in English. At the beginning of the hearing, the prosecutor
described the state’s plea offer on the record. The district court asked appellant if he
wanted to accept or reject that offer. Even though an interpreter was present for appellant’s
benefit, appellant answered the judge directly in English, saying “No, I don’t accept. I’m
not guilty.”
15
credibility to be given disputed evidence are determinations to be made by the [fact -
finder].”).
In sum, the district court’s finding that appellant’s “English skills were proficient
enough to understand the rights being read to him” is not clearly erroneous.
Validity of Miranda Waiver
Given the district court’s finding regarding the proficiency of appellant’s English
skills, we are not persuaded by appellant’s arguments that his Miranda waiver was invalid.
Appellant argues that the circumstances here are comparable to those in Farrah, in which
the supreme court held that “[t]he state did not meet its burden to prove that defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.” 735 N.W.2d at 338. The supreme
court explained:
Here, the record clearly indicates that Farrah ’s primary
language is Somali and that, as the prosecutor noted, he
“speaks with a heavy accent.” At the beginning of the recorded
police interrogation, Farrah told the officer that he did not
speak English very well. Although the services of an
interpreter were available, none were provided because the
officer felt that Farrah had an adequate comprehension of the
officer’s questions. The officer acknowledged, however, that
at times he had difficulty understa nding Farrah because of
Farrah’s accent. Farrah’s cousin also testified that “[o]ne fact
that we see as a family is that people are speculating Burhan
knows English very well, and that is not true.”

Id. at 341.
Farrah is distinguishable in several significant ways. First, unlike in this case, the
district court in Farrah did not make a specific finding regarding Farrah’s language skills,
instead stating, “I don’t know right now Mr. Farrah’s proficiency in language.” Id. at 342.
16
Second, “Farrah told the officer that he did not speak English very well.” Id. at 341.
Appellant did not express a similar concern to the officer during his interview. Third,
unlike the circumstances in Farrah, appellant did not present testimony similar to that of
Farrah’s cousin, which indicated that other people had previously overestimated Farrah’s
ability to understand English. Id. And fourth, the district court in Farrah determined that
Farrah made an equivocal request for counsel during his interrogation, “based on its finding
that there was a legitimate lack of clarity on the officer ’s part as to what Farrah had said.”
Id. at 342. “In other words, the officer did not understand Farrah ’s request because of
Farrah’s poor language skills.” Id. The record in this case does not include any finding
that the officer misunderstood any of appellant’s responses to the officer’s Miranda
advisory.
The Farrah court concluded that “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation do not make known whether Farrah ’s Miranda waiver was made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.” Id. When examining the totality of the circumstances, each case
is unique. See id. at 341 (citing caselaw for the proposition that the question of waiver
requires consideration of the facts as found ). Although there is some fact ual overlap
between this case and Farrah, the circumstances described above support a different
outcome in this case.
However, we remind the state of the supreme court’s advisory in Farrah that
“prudent investigators would be wise to implement a system for the provision of language-
interpreter services for persons disabled in communication.” Id. at 343; see Sanchez-Diaz,
17
683 N.W.2d at 835 (stating that prudent police investigators should comply with the
statutory requirements for language services); State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 831
(Minn. 1987) (stating that “[i]n the future, prudent police investigators . . . are advised to
comply with the statutory requirements” for language services); State v. Vu, 339 N.W.2d
892, 898 (Minn. 1983) (stating that “the police and the [district] court would be wise to
engage an interpreter before interrogation so that this issue need nev er arise again in
Minnesota”).
As the supreme court indicated in Farrah, simply providing an interpreter can
prevent issues like the one presented here. Cf. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.
1994) (“[I]n the exercise of our supervisory power to [e]nsure the fair administration of
justice, we hold that all custodial interrogation including any information about rights, any
waiver of those rights, and all questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible
and must be recorded when questioning occurs at a place of detention.” (footnote omitted)).
Appellant also argues that the fact that the officer raised his voice when instructing
appellant on his Miranda rights is significant. When the officer asked appellant if he
understood his right to remain silent, appellant responded, “I don’t do nothing,” and the
officer then stated, “No! Answer my question!” However, the officer’s forceful demand
was limited, and it appears that the officer was merely trying to get appellant to focus on
and answer the question that had been asked. Additionally, as the district court found, it
appears that appellant was trying to avoid answering questions regarding his Miranda
rights. The district court found the officer’s testimony on this point credible, and we defer
to that credibility determination. See State v. Miller , 659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App.
18
2003) (“Because the weight and believability of witness testimony is an issue for the
district court, we defer to that court’s credibility determinations.”), rev. denied (Minn. July
15, 2003). Thus, we are not persuaded that the officer’s raised voice in response to
appellant’s failure to answer one question invalidates appellant’s Miranda waiver.
Finally, appellant argues that he never expressly waived his Miranda rights. But an
express waiver is not required; instead, “[a] waiver may be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances.” State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 213 (Minn. 2015). The state has the burden
of proving a valid waiver, and ordinarily, the state satisfies this burden by showing that
“(1) Miranda warnings were given, (2) the defendant stated that he or she understood those
warnings, and (3) then the defendant gave a statement.” Id. Given the totality of the
circumstances, appellant implicitly waived his Miranda rights. See id. at 214.
In sum, we conclude that the state met its burden to establish that appellant validly
waived his Miranda rights and that t he district court did not err by denying appellant’s
motion to suppress. We emphasize that our decision is heavily influenced by the district
court’s finding that appellant’s “English skills were proficient enough to understand the
rights being read to him.” A finding is not clearly erroneous simply because an appellate
court might have resolved the question differently. See Stiff v. Associated Sewing Supply
Co., 436 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Minn. 1989) (“An appellate court exceeds it s proper scope of
review when it bases its conclusions on its own interpretation of the evidence and, in effect
tries the issues anew and substitutes its own findings for those of the trial judge.”). Instead,
the clear-error standard means that the finding below will stand unless it “is not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole.” EOP-Nicollet Mall, L.L.C. v. County of Hennepin,
19
723 N.W.2d 270, 284 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted); see Miles v. City of Oakdale, 323
N.W.2d 51, 54 (Minn. 1982) (“We have defined a clearly erroneous finding variously to
mean palpably and manifestly against the weight of the evidence or not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole.”). Again, the district court’s finding is reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole, and we do not disturb it.
II.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by entering judgments of conviction on
both of the second -degree-murder offenses because both convictions were the result of a
single act. The state agrees with appellant on this point and asks this court to “remand to
the district court with instructions to vacate Count II, the felony-murder conviction, and to
amend the warrant of commitment.”
Under Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2022), a defendant “may be convicted of either
the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Whether one offense is a lesser -
included offense of another is a legal question, which we review de novo. State v. Cox ,
820 N.W.2d 540, 552 (Minn. 2012). In State v. Lory, this court held that “[s]econd-degree
felony murder is a lesser -included offense of second -degree intentional murder.” 559
N.W.2d 425, 426 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1997). Thus, the district
court erred in entering both convictions.
When a district court erroneously enters a conviction for an included offense, the
appellate court remands to the district court to vacate the conviction for the included
offense, “but otherwise leave the guilty verdicts for those counts in place.” State v.
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Balandin, 944 N.W.2d 204, 222 (Minn. 2020). We therefore remand for the district court
to vacate the felony-murder conviction and to amend the warrant of commitment
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.