State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1225

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shawn Christopher Brown,
Appellant.

Filed July 8, 2024
Reversed and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-22-5142

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge;
and Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from a final judgment of conviction, appellant challenges the validity
of his guilty plea to first-degree criminal damage to property, arguing that his plea is
2
inaccurate because the factual basis does not establish that he intended to cause damage to
the property at issue. We agree, and we reverse and remand.
FACTS
On June 24, 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Shawn
Christopher Brown with one count of first-degree criminal damage to property pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 609.595, subdivision 1(4) (2020). In January 2023, the parties
appeared before the district court for a plea hearing.
During the hearing, Brown agreed that, on June 23, 2022, he was outside a Pearle
Vision store in Stearns County. The prosecutor then questioned Brown about his conduct
on that date as follows:
Q: [T]here were some vehicles parked at that Pearl[e] Vision
and you went up to these vehicles and hit them, correct?
A: One, yes. I fell into the one and I hit my head on the other.
Q: Okay. So you ended up punching one of the vehicles,
correct?
A: No. I hit my head on one. I didn’t punch any.
Q: Okay. So your body intentionally made contact with one of
these vehicles, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you did not know the owner of that vehicle.
A: No.
Q: Nor did you have consent to either cause damage or make
contact with that vehicle, correct?
A: No, I did not.
Q: And you caused that vehicle that made contact with your
body, you caused a dent in that vehicle, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you would agree that that damage or that dent, that
would cost over $1,000 to repair or replace that part of the
vehicle, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And, again, you did that intentionally to cause damage to
the vehicle?
3
A: I didn’t mean to cause damage but I did it intentionally.
Q: So you meant to make your body contact that vehicle?
A: Yes.

The district court noted that the factual basis was adequate to supp ort the plea. In
June 2023, the parties appeared before the district court for sentencing. Pursuant to the plea
agreement, the district court granted a stay of imposition, placed Brown on probation for a
period of up to five years, and ordered him to pay $500 in restitution. Additionally, in
accordance with the agreement, the state dismissed charges that were pending against
Brown in two other district court files.
Brown appeals.
DECISION
Brown contends that he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that
his plea is invalid because he did not admit that he intended to cause damage and his
responses negated that element of the offense. The state concedes that Brown’s guilty plea
is invalid because the factual basis is insufficient to establish the element of intent.
Although the state concedes that Brown should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, we
must independently determine whether his plea is invalid. See State v. Hannuksela, 452
N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (explaining that appellate courts have an obligation to
decide cases according to law).
“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State
v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). A defendant may challenge the constitutional
validity of a guilty plea for the first time on direct appeal. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180,
182 (Minn. 1989). “To be constitutionally valid, a plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
4
intelligent. A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid. Assessing the
validity of a plea presents a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.”
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (citations omitted).
To be accurate, a guilty plea must have a “proper factual basis.” State v. Ecker, 524
N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). A proper factual basis is established when there is a
showing that the defendant’s conduct satisfied all the elements of the offense. State v.
Jones, 921 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019). The
accuracy requirement ensures that a defendant does not plead guilty to a more serious
offense than the defendant could be convicted of at trial. State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248,
251 (Minn. 1983).
In a guilty plea, “[e]ven if an element to an offense is not verbalized by the
defendant, a district court may nevertheless draw inferences from the facts admitted to by
the defendant.” Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. App. 2021) (emphasis
omitted). And, in the plea context, “[i]ntent can be inferred from the idea that a person
intends the natural consequences of his or her actions.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852,
860 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “[A] factual basis is inadequate when the defendant
makes stateme nts that negate an essential element of the charged crime because such
statements are inconsistent with a plea of guilty.” State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603
(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Criminal damage to property requires proof that the defendant “intentionally
cause[d] damage to physical property of another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1 (2020).
“Intentionally” means “the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result
5
specified or believes that the act performed by the actor, if successful, will cause that
result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (2020). For two reasons, the element of intent lacks
a proper factual basis here.
First, the factual basis is inadequate because Brown’s testimony at the plea hearing
negated the elem ent of intent. This case is similar to State v. Mikulak, in which the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea
due to inaccuracy. 903 N.W.2d at 605. In that case, knowledge of a 24-hour predatory-
offender-registration requirement was an element of the offense of failing to register. Id. at
602, 604. During the plea, the defendant stated that, at the time he needed to register, he
did not remember the 24-hour requirement and believed that he had a week to complete it.
Id. at 605. He also agreed that he had been informed of the registration requirement in the
past. Id. Despite his admission to prior knowledge of the requirement, the supreme court
held that the “factual basis fail[ed] to satisfy the accuracy requirement for a valid plea
because [the defendant] made statements that were not withdrawn or corrected and that
negated the mens rea element of the charged offense.” Id. Here, Brown specific ally said
that he did not intend to cause damage —which directly negates the element of intent to
cause damage.
Second, Brown’s plea is inaccurate because there were not sufficient facts from
which the district court could infer that Brown intended to cause damage. Brown admitted
that he fell into one car and hit his head against another. He also admitted that he
intentionally made bodily contact with the vehicle that he damaged. But it was not
6
established which action was intentional or which action caused the damage complained
of.
Because Brown’s statements negated the element of intent to cause damage and
because there were insufficient facts from which the district court could infer intent to
cause damage, Brown’s guilty plea was inaccurate and, therefore, invalid. Brown should
therefore be permitted to withdraw his plea. We reverse and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.