In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Peter Allan.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1260

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Peter Allan.

Filed February 12, 2024
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Commitment Appeal Panel
File No. AP22-9004

Jill Avery, Cheri Templeman, Templeman Law, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant Peter Allan)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Brandon Boese, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent commissioner of human services)

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Benjamin G. A. Olson, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Otter Tail County)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petitions for full discharge or provisional
discharge from his indeterminate civil commitment to the Minnesota Sex Offender
Program as a sexually dangerous person and sexual psychopathic personality. Because
appellant failed to establish prima facie cases to support his petitions, we affirm.
2
FACTS
Appellant Peter Allan is indeterminately civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) and sexual psychopathic
personality (SPP). His commitment is based on a series of sexual assaults he committed
between 1994 and 1998, in which he drugged victims with alcohol and Ambien and had
nonconsensual sexual intercourse with them while they were incapacitated. The
circumstances of the assaults and his initial commitment are described in our opinion
affirming his commitment, In re Civil Commitment of Allan, No. A09-1607, 2010 WL
608028, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Feb. 23, 2010).
In February 2000, a federal district court sentenced Allan to 108 months in federal
prison for convictions related to the assaults . He was placed on supervised release in
September 2007 and was detained for civil commitment at MSOP in December 2007.
Shortly after his indeterminate commitment in July 2009, he was resentenced to 24 months’
imprisonment in his federal case. If and when Allan is discharged from MSOP, he must
serve his pending federal prison sentence.
On September 22, 2020, Allan petitioned the Special Review Board (SRB) pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subd. 2 (2022),1 for three forms of relief: discharge, provisional
discharge, or transfer from MSOP’s secure facility to Community Preparation Services

1 Allan brought his petitions under the 2020 version of the statute. We cite the most recent
version of Minn. Stat. § 253D.27 because it has not been amended. See Interstate Power
Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, in
general, “appellate courts apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on a case”). For
the same reason, we also cite the current versions of other statutes in this opinion.
3
(CPS).2 In support of his request for provisional discharge, Allan proposed a
provisional-discharge plan that required that he (1) serve the balance of his federal prison
sentence; (2) attend sex-offender treatment during his federal incarceration; and
(3) comply with MSOP’s standard provisional-discharge terms upon his release from
federal prison. The provisional -discharge plan also provided that if Allan failed to
satisfactorily complete sex-offender treatment in federal prison, MSOP could revoke his
provisional discharge and return him to a secure MSOP facility, and he would waive his
right to appeal the revocation.3
After holding a hearing, the SRB issued findings of fact and recommended denial
of Allan’s petitions. Allan then timely filed a petition for rehearing and reconsideration
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 1(a), (b) (2022). In November 2022 and March
2023, the commitment appeal panel (CAP)4 held a two-day first-phase hearing on Allan’s

2 “Community preparation services” means specialized
residential services or programs operated or administered by
the Minnesota Sex Offender Program outside of a secure
treatment facility. Community preparation services are
designed to assist civilly committed sex offenders in
developing the appropriate skills and resources necessary for
an eventual successful reintegration into a community.

Minn. Stat. § 246B.01, subd. 2a (2022).

3 We express no opinion as to whether a committed person may waive their right to appeal
a revocation of a provisional discharge under Minn. Stat. § 253D.30, subd. 6 (2022).

4 We refer to the entity formerly known as the supreme court appeal panel, or statutorily as
the judicial appeal panel, as the commitment appeal panel (CAP ). See Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.28, subd. 1(a) (providing for review by “the judicial appeal panel established under
section 253B.19, subdivision 1”).
4
petitions. Among other exhibits, Allan submitted copies of an initial
psychological-evaluation report dated November 2021 and an updated report dated
October 2022, both of which were prepared by Dr. Jessica Mugge, a forensic psychologist
Allan had retained.
To prepare her initial report, Dr. Mugge interviewed Allan, administered various
assessments,5 and reviewed numerous records and documents, including past treatment and
psychological reports. The assessments indicated a moderate level of psychopathy, a
“below average” risk of sexual recidivism, “some need” for treatment, and that Allan’s
treatment needs were greater in the self-management and relational-style domains and
lower in the sexual-interest domain. Based on Allan’s risk level, Dr. Mugge determined
that his optimal “dosage of treatment” was 100-149 hours of sex-offender treatment, but
she did not specify what type of therapy constitutes sex-offender treatment.
Dr. Mugge noted that Allan’s sexual-interest-domain score may have been
“artificially reduced” because it was based solely on Allan’s self-reports, and the
documents she reviewed revealed that Allan had been reluctant to disclose information and
had refused to engage in treatment for the first 14 years of his commitment. In his
self-reports, Allan denied the following behaviors: that he has sexual fantasies, that he
“currently masturbates,” and that he had ever engaged in sexual activity with someone who
was sleeping or unconscious. Dr. Mugge’s report indicates that she did not analyze the

5 Dr. Mugge administered the following assessments: the Hare Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised 2nd edition (PCL-R), the Static-99R, and the Structured Risk
Assessment-Forensic Version (SRA-FV).
5
results of any physiological examinations that test sexual responses to certain stimuli. At
the time of her report, Allan had not submitted to a polygraph since approximately 2003 ,
and there is no evidence in the record that Allan has ever submitted to a penile
plethysmograph.
Dr. Mugge also completed a diagnostic assessment to evaluate whether Allan met
the criteria for paraphilic or other psychological disorders. She opined that based on the
available documents and Allan’s self-reports, there was “insufficient evidence” to diagnose
Allan with a paraphilic or personality disorder . She concluded that his history of alcohol
use met the criteria for Alcohol Use Disorder but opined that his ability to sustain sobriety
prior to his incarceration suggested that this disorder was in remission.
Regarding full discharge, Dr. Mugge opined:
To be sure, Mr. Allan presents with a low level of static
risk. Although the SRA-FV revealed a low level of
criminogenic needs, this assessment may be an underestimate
of his dynamic risk factors given his reluctance to disclose
information and refusal to engage in treatment. As such, we
cannot determine that these aforementioned protective
factors[
6] have effectively reduced the impact of his risk for
reoffending such that he is no longer dangerous to the public
and is no longer in need of treatment and supervision. Indeed,
the multifaceted and complex decisions associated with civil
commitment require the use of comprehensive, evidence-based
practices.

6 “Protective factors” are traits that indicate a reduced risk of recidivism and treatment
needs. Dr. Mugge identified the following protective factors in Allan’s case:
problem-solving and interpersonal skills, advocating for his peers, using his culture to
positively influence others, positive and supportive relationships with his family, and
prosocial interests and pursuits.
6
Given this ambiguity, one cannot conclude with a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that Mr. Allan meets
the statutory criteria for full discharge from civil commitment.
Regarding provisional discharge, Dr. Mugge opined:
Mr. Allan’s present course of treatment and mental
status indicate there is no longer a need for treatment and
supervision in his current treatment setting: My understanding
is that Mr. Allan would be transferred to a federal facility upon
a release from MSOP to serve a 2-year sentence (and would
not be directly discharged to the community).
. . . .
Although Mr. Allan also meets the statutory
requirements for transfer to [CPS] . . . , provisional discharge
to the federal prison and its [sex -offender treatment program]
provides a better option.
In her updated report, Dr. Mugge noted that Allan had made “honorable (and
commendable) efforts and significant gains in exploring factors underlying sexual
offending behaviors” in treatment since her November 2021 report. Allan had begun
attending group therapy in May 2022 for the first time since his initial commitment 14
years earlier, and since then, he had exhibited improvements in prosocial behaviors an d
relationships with peers and staff at MSOP . He had also formed a more “positive
therapeutic alliance” with his primary therapist and had begun to show signs of willingness
to acknowledge his sexually offending behavior and discuss his sexual desires.
Notwithstanding that progress, Dr. Mugge opined that these changes were “relatively
recent” and therefore “ha[d] not been adequately demonstrated or challenged across
relevant high-risk situations.” Thus, she did not change her opinion that provisional
discharge for further treatment in federal prison was the best option.
7
At the hearing, Dr. Mugge opined that CPS was a more appropriate treatment setting
for Allan than MSOP, but that, because of the practical considerations surrounding Allan’s
federal prison sentence, the best options were either transfer to or provisional discharge to
federal prison in accordance with Allan’s provisional-discharge plan. Specifically, she
testified that it would be counterintuitive to prepare Allan for provisional discharge to a
less restrictive setting only for him to end up in the more restrictive setting of federal prison.
Allan’s former primary therapist, who treated him from sometime in 2019 until
February 2021, testified about Allan’s progress in treatment. She testified that Allan had
demonstrated improvements in his antisocial behaviors as a result of individual therapy
sessions with her. She also testified that attending more group therapy sessions would be
an important part of progressing in treatment and that Allan had not yet progressed to the
stage of treatment that addresses the “more difficult topics of actually beginning to address
the offending behaviors.” MSOP’s Reintegration Director testified about MSOP’s
treatment program and Allan’s provisional-discharge plan. Finally, Allan testified about
the same topics as the other witnesses as well as his progress in another treatment program,
his spirituality, and his community service and other pursuits. As of the March 2023
hearing, Allan was still in phase one of MSOP’s three-phase treatment program, and he
testified that he had not progressed to phase two because the clinical supervisor wanted
him to “dig a little deeper into [his] thoughts and offending behaviors.”
At the conclusion of the first-phase hearing, respondent Otter Tail County and
respondent Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services both moved to dismiss Allan’s
8
petitions under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b) .7 The CAP granted respondents’ motions to
dismiss, determining that Allan had failed to present sufficient competent evidence for a
prima facie demonstration that he was entitled to full or provisional discharge under Minn.
Stat. §§ 253D.30-.31 (2022) and had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was entitled to transfer under Minn. Stat. § 253D.29 (2022).
Allan appeals.
DECISION
Allan challenges the CAP’s first-phase dismissal of his petitions for discharge and
provisional discharge, arguing that he met his burden to produce evidence that he is entitled
to a reduction in custody from MSOP’s secure facility. 8 The CAP dismissed Allan’s
petitions under rule 41.02(b) because it determined that he had failed to establish a prima
facie case for either full or provisional discharge.
We first set forth the framework for how petitions for full discharge and for
provisional discharge proceed. A person who is civilly committed as an SDP or SPP may
seek a reduction in custody by petitioning for transfer, provisional discharge, or full
discharge. Minn. Stat. §§ 253D.29 -.31. The committed person files a petition with the
SRB, which conducts a hearing and issues a recommendation to the CAP. Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.27, subds. 2, 4 (2022). If the SRB recommends denial of the petition, the person

7 The commissioner later withdrew its motion to dismiss Allan’s petition for full discharge,
but the county did not withdraw its motion on that point.

8 Allan does not challenge the CAP’s denial of his petition for transfer to CPS.
9
may seek rehearing and reconsideration of the SRB’s recommendation by petitioning the
CAP. Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 1(a). CAP hearings then proceed in two phases.
At a first-phase hearing on a petition for discharge or for provisional discharge, the
petitioner bears the burden of production to “present[] a prima facie case with competent
evidence to show that the person is entitled to the requested relief.” Larson v. Jesson,
847 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted). To make a prima facie case,
the petitioner must produce “sufficient, competent evidence that, if proven, would entitle
the petitioner to relief.” Coker v. Jesson, 831 N.W.2d 483, 485-86 (Minn. 2013) (quotation
omitted). If the petitioner satisfies their burden of production during the first- phase
hearing, the CAP holds a second-phase hearing at which the party opposing the petition
bears the burden of proving “by clear and convincing evidence t hat the discharge or
provisional discharge should be denied.” Id. (quotation omitted). However, the party
opposing the petition may move to dismiss it under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b) after the
first-phase hearing on the basis that the petitioner did not meet their burden at that phase.
When considering a motion to dismiss under rule 41.02(b), the CAP may not weigh
evidence or make credibility assessments and must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the petitioner. Id. at 490-91. If the CAP determines that the petitioner failed
to present a prima facie case, it will dismiss the petition and forgo the second-phase
hearing. See Larson, 847 N.W.2d at 535.
This court reviews the CAP ’s rule 41.02(b) dismissal of a discharge or
provisional-discharge petition de novo. Id. at 534. In doing so, we view the evidence and
apply the law in the same manner as the CAP, viewing the evidence in the light most
10
favorable to the petitioner without weighing evidence or assessing credibility. See Foster
v. Jesson, 857 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. App. 2014). We first consider the CAP’s denial
of Allan’s petition for provisional discharge because “the criteria for a provisional
discharge are more lenient than the criteria for a [full] discharge.” Larson, 847 N.W.2d at
535.
I. The CAP did not err by dismissing Allan’s petition for provisional discharge.
Allan argues that he satisfied his burden of production because he produced
sufficient competent evidence that, if true, met the statutory criteria for provisional
discharge. He also asserts that the CAP erred in its assessment of the evidence and legal
conclusions. We are not persuaded.
To avoid dismissal of their petition for provisional discharge, a committed person
must make a prima facie case by producing “sufficient, competent evidence that, if proven,
would entitle [them] to relief.” Coker, 831 N.W.2d at 486; accord Minn. Stat. § 253D.28,
subd. 2(d) (2022). A petitioner who is civilly committed as an SDP or SPP “shall not be
provisionally discharged unless the committed person is capable of making an acceptable
adjustment to open society.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.30, subd. 1(a). The CAP determines
whether a petitioner has made that showing by considering two criteria:
(1) whether the committed person’s course of treatment
and present mental status indicate there is no longer a need for
treatment and supervision in the committed person’s current
treatment setting; and
(2) whether the conditions of the provisional discharge
plan will provide a reasonable degree of protection to the
11
public and will enable the committed person to adjust
successfully to the community.
Id., subd. 1(b). A petitioner’s self-serving testimony, without more, is insufficient to
satisfy their threshold burden of production. See In re Civ. Commitment of Poole,
921 N.W.2d 62, 68-69 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 2019).
As to the first criterion, Allan asserts that he met his burden of production because
he introduced evidence that he (1) exceeded the optimal number of treatment hours
recommended by Dr. Mugge, (2) does not have a sexual disorder, and (3) no longer needs
treatment at MSOP because, in the absence of a sexual disorder, he does not need
sex-offender treatment.
Allan misconstrues the testimony of his independent examiner, Dr. Mugge, as
supporting his request for provisional discharge. But section 253D.30, subdivision 1, does
not contain any language that allows the CAP to determine that a petitioner has met their
burden by relying on conditional terms. Evidence of an examiner’s conditional opinion is
not sufficient to make a prima facie case that the petitioner no longer needs treatment and
supervision in their current treatment setting. In Foster, we stated that a petitioner’s
evidence was insufficient to meet a prima facie burden of production when the examiner
opined that “‘if appellant has not yet done [a polygraph] . . . that has to happen first’ before
he could recommend . . . transfer.” 857 N.W.2d at 547, 549. Here, Dr. Mugge did not
opine that Allan’s course of treatment and then-present mental status indicated that there
was no longer a need for treatment and supervision in his current treatment setting. Rather,
as occurred in Foster, Dr. Mugge opined that Allan would no longer need treatment and
12
supervision in his current setting at a secure MSOP facility on two conditions: (1) that Allan
be transferred to a secure federal prison upon release and (2) that Allan be required to
participate in sex-offense-specific treatment while in federal prison. Dr. Mugge’s opinion
that Allan no longer needs treatment or supervision at his current MSOP facility is
dependent on her recommendation that he participate in sex-offender treatment in a secure
federal prison.
Moreover, in Dr. Mugge’s October 2022 report, she opined that
while his ability to engage in treatment is certainly impressive,
this remarkable progress is ultimately insufficient to conclude
that Mr. Allan is no longer dangerous to the public and is no
longer in need of treatment and supervision. As such we
cannot determine, with a reasonable degree of scientific
certain[t]y, that Mr. Allan meets the statutory criteria for full
discharge from civil commitment.

Although Dr. Mugge was referring to the criteria for full discharge — no longer dangerous
to the public and no longer in need of treatment and supervision—she stated in unequivocal
terms that Allan has not progressed sufficiently in treatment for her to conclude that he was
no longer in need of treatment and supervision. This further supports our conclusion that
Allan did not meet his burden during the first-phase hearing to produce evidence that he is
no longer in need of treatment and supervision in his current treatment setting.
In its order denying Allan’s petitions, the CAP also pointed to (1) Dr. Mugge’s
disclosure that she based Allan’s SRA-FV score, which demonstrates his risk level and, by
extension, his optimal treatment dosage, solely on his limited self-reports because of his
historical reluctance to discuss sexual topics; (2) her conclusion that Allan’s risk level may
have been “artificially reduced” and “ma y be an underestimate”; and (3) her conclusion
13
that Allan’s recent progress in treatment was “ultimately insufficient” to conclude that he
was no longer dangerous. Dr. Mugge’s description of her interview with Allan, as well as
Allan’s self-reports in the documents she reviewed, reveals that Allan’s self-reports were
limited to conclusory, uncorroborated denials of having any sexual interests at all, which
self-reports are insufficient to avoid dismissal at the first phase. See Poole, 921 N.W.2d at
69. Presenting a committed person’s conclusory assertions in an expert’s report rather than
through the committed person’s testimony or argument does not transform the assertions
into competent evidence. Dr. Mugge acknowledged that the data was unreliable, and a
petitioner is not entitled to move forward to a second-phase hearing based on concededly
unreliable information.
Thus, the information in the sole expert witness’s assessments, if proved, could
show at most that there is a possibility that Allan meets the first criterion for provisional
discharge and that such a possibility exists only if the conditions mentioned by the expert
are met. This is not enough to establish a prima facie case. Appellant’s own testimony
that he does not have a sexual disorder, does not need treatment, and is no longer in need
of treatment and supervision in his current setting is insufficient to make a prima facie case.
Ultimately, Dr. Mugge was unable to unconditionally say that Allan’s course of treatment
and present mental status indicate that there is no longer a need for his treatment and
supervision at MSOP.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Allan, we conclude that he failed
to present sufficient competent evidence that, if true, would show that his “course of
treatment and present mental status indicate there is no longer a need for treatment and
14
supervision in [his] current treatment setting,” as required by Minn. Stat. § 253D.30,
subd. 1(b)(1). Because the first criterion is not satisfied, we need not consider Allan’s
argument on the second criterion or decide whether a committed person can premise a
provisional-discharge plan on a requirement that he be transferred to federal prison or
whether such a provisional-discharge plan could provide a reasonable degree of protection
to the public and enable him to adjust successfully to the community.
We discern no error in the CAP’s determination that Allan did not make a prima
facie case for provisional discharge, and therefore, the CAP did not err in its subsequent
denial of his petition.
II. The CAP did not err when it dismissed Allan’s petition for full discharge.
Allan next argues that he satisfied his burden of production because he produced
sufficient competent evidence that, if true, met the statutory criteria for full discharge .
Allan asserts that he presented sufficient competent evidence (1) t hat he is no longer
dangerous and no longer needs inpatient treatment and (2) that he is not currently
diagnosed with a sexual disorder and, therefore, continued commitment would violate his
right to constitutional due process. We are not persuaded.
A petitioner who is civilly committed as an SDP or SPP “shall not be discharged
unless it appears to the satisfaction of the [CAP] . . . that the committed person is capable
of making an acceptable adjustment to open society, is no longer dangerous to the public,
and is no longer in need of treatment and supervision.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.31. The CAP
determines whether a petitioner has made that showing by considering “whether specific
conditions exist to provide a reasonable degree of protection to the public and to assist the
15
committed person in adjusting to the community.” Id. If the petitioner does not establish
that these conditions exist, the CAP “shall not” grant the petition for full discharge. Id.
Here, Allan could not make a prima facie case for discharge because his independent
examiner opined that his
progress is ultimately insufficient to conclude that Mr. Allan is
no longer dangerous to the public and is no longer in need of
treatment and supervision. As such, we cannot determine,
with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that Mr. Allan
meets the statutory criteria for full discharge from civil
commitment.
(First emphasis added.) Given the examiner’s conclusion, Allan was unable to m eet his
burden on two of three statutory requirements.
We next consider Allan’s argument that the CAP violated his constitutional rights
by dismissing his petition because he produced sufficient competent evidence that he is no
longer in need of treatment for a sexual disorder because he has no sexual disorder. Courts
have limited the application of the statutory criteria for civil commitment to comport with
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, requiring discharge “if no
reasonable relation exists between the original reason for commitment and the continued
confinement.” Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995). This means that a
committed person may be “confined for only so long as he or she continues both to need
further inpatient treatment and supervision for his [or her] sexual disorder and to pose a
danger to the public.” Id. (emphasis added).
However, due process does “not require[] any particular mental condition as a
prerequisite for a person’s ongoing civil commitment.” In re Civ. Commitment of Opiacha,
16
943 N.W.2d 220, 228 (Minn. App. 2020). And legal definitions of mental-health
conditions in the civil -commitment context “need not mirror” those employed by the
medical community. Id. at 228- 29 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359
(1997)).9 Under Opiacha, the question is whether the committed person has presented
evidence that they do not have “serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” Id. at 229
(quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002)). Thus, an expert’s scientific opinion
regarding specific diagnoses, while helpful, is not dispositive.
Allan contends that the CAP erred by rejecting his argument that he does not have
a sexual disorder because, in doing so, it impermissibly weighed evidence and evaluated
credibility. Specifically, Allan argues that the CAP weighed Dr. Mugge’s opinion by
evaluating the quality of her assessment when it stated that her conclusions were “based on
[Allan’s] self-reports and the limited records in light of his limited participation in
treatment.” But the CAP did not need to weigh evidence or evaluate credibility to
determine that Allan did not satisfy his burden—Dr. Mugge’s report states in no uncertain
terms that the information available to her did not alter her ultimate conclusions.
Moreover, the record contains no evidence to the contrary. See Poole, 921 N.W.2d at 69
(“Poole’s own submissions include multiple statements that he remains a danger to the
public and these submissions lack evidence, other than Poole’ s own statements, to the
contrary.”).

9 Allan asserts that “not otherwise specified” disorders cannot justify continued
commitment. We rejected this argument in In re Civil Commitment of Navratil,
799 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011).
17
By itself, a recent willingness to explore sexual topics does not entitle a committed
person to full discharge. See Call, 535 N.W.2d at 319 (Minn. 1995) (stating that “a slight
change or improvement in the person’s condition is not sufficient to justify discharge”) .
Without evidence that provides further insight into Allan’s sexual interests and responses
to challenges , the CAP is unable to evaluate Allan’s difficulty in controlling sexual
behavior at a second-phase hearing. Allan has not produced sufficient competent evidence
that there is no reasonable relation between the original reason for his commitment— his
behaviors of sexually assaulting individuals of varying ages, including a minor, after
incapacitating them with alcohol and Ambien—and his continued confinement.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Allan, we conclude that he failed
to present sufficient c ompetent evidence that he is capable of making an acceptable
adjustment to open society, is no longer dangerous to the public, and is no longer in need
of treatment and supervision. The CAP’s determinations do not violate Allan’s
constitutional rights, and we discern no error in the CAP’s determination that Allan did not
produce a prima facie case for full discharge. The CAP thus did not err in its subsequent
denial of his petition.
In sum, we conclude that the CAP did not weigh evidence or make credibility
determinations when it considered Allan’s petitions for full or provisional discharge and
that Allan did not satisfy his burden to present prima facie cases in support of his petitions.
Therefore, Allan is not entitled to a second- phase hearing, and the CAP did not err by
dismissing his petitions.
Affirmed.